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The State Of Mysore v. Govinda Rao .
Judicial Opinion Summary — Appeal by State against Acquittal (Section 304-A IPC)
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (accused) was a driver employed by the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation. On December 27, 1962, while driving a Corporation-owned bus (registration MYG 904) along Jayachamarajendra Road (north to south) near the Town Hall in Bangalore, the bus collided with and ran over a 17-year-old boy, Kuppaswamy, who was riding a bicycle. Kuppaswamy died from his injuries.
The accused was charged with causing death by rash and negligent driving under Section 304-A of the Penal Code. At first instance the Additional First Class Magistrate, Bangalore, acquitted the accused. The State government (through its Government Pleader) preferred an appeal contesting that acquittal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the magistrate was wrong to acquit the accused of the offence of rash and negligent driving punishable under Section 304-A of the Penal Code.
- Whether the evidence on record established that the accused drove the bus in a rash or negligent manner causing the death of Kuppaswamy.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State) — Mr. Ashrit, Government Pleader
- The magistrate's assessment of the prosecution evidence (particularly that of P.W.3 and P.W.4) was manifestly unreasonable.
- The material on record completely establishes that the motor vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner, thereby making the acquittal erroneous.
Respondent / Defence — Mr. Appaji and Accused's Statement
- Mr. Appaji argued that omissions in the prosecution case (for example, failure to examine bus passengers) were relevant to assessing witness reliability and supported the acquittal.
- Defence theory suggested (as argued before the court) that the cyclist might have been riding carelessly in the middle of the road or possibly suddenly turned into the bus's path, which if accepted, would absolve the accused of rashness or negligence.
- In his examination under Section 342 CrPC the accused stated that he heard a sound from behind, sounded the horn and stopped the vehicle; he denied that he drove rashly.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate bench (Somnath Iyer, J.) reviewed the evidence and the magistrate's findings and proceeded through the following principal steps of analysis, strictly as set out in the opinion:
- Core facts accepted: The court accepted as indisputable that (a) Kuppaswamy was riding a bicycle on Jayachamarajendra Road and was killed by being run over by the bus MYG 904; (b) the accused was driving that bus; and (c) the post-mortem corroborates fatal head and skull injuries consistent with being run over by a moving motor vehicle (P.W.2).
- Assessment of witness evidence:
- The prosecution examined witnesses who said they saw the collision: notably P.W.3 (Central Intelligence Officer) and P.W.4 (plantain vendor). The magistrate disbelieved both and acquitted. The appellate court carefully examined those credibility findings.
- The appellate court found errors in the magistrate's reasoning: the magistrate misinterpreted P.W.4's described location (erroneously thinking the witness would have been too far to observe) and misread the orientation of nearby roads; the court concluded P.W.4's being a "coolie" was not a legitimate basis to discard his testimony and that the magistrate's specific geographic reasoning was flawed.
- The magistrate also misread P.W.3's evidence regarding distances: P.W.3 testified he was about 20 feet behind the bus (not 45 feet as the magistrate recorded). The mistaken reading of distances led the magistrate to doubt P.W.3's ability to observe the incident. The appellate court corrected that misconception and found no reason to disbelieve P.W.3.
- Corroborating evidence: The court relied on corroborative evidence that: police witnesses (P.W.6, P.W.7) found the bus, the damaged bicycle and the dead body near the scene; the motor vehicle inspector (P.W.1) found the bus mechanically sound; and forensic evidence (P.W.2) supported that injuries were consistent with being run over.
- Facts pointing to rash/negligent driving:
- P.W.3 and P.W.4 gave evidence that the bus was travelling at a high speed (estimates of 30–40 miles per hour) on a busy stretch with a downward gradient.
- Both witnesses testified the accused did not sound the horn prior to the striking; the bus continued for 30–35 feet after the collision before being stopped by bystanders.
- P.W.3 testified that the accused drove without sounding the horn despite vehicular traffic around, and that the cyclist was in front of the bus at a relatively short distance (about 20 feet) when the incident occurred.
- The right wheels passed over the cyclist, indicating the bus passed to the right of the cyclist in a manner inconsistent with a proper overtaking procedure.
- On defence contentions: The appellate court considered the suggestion that the cyclist might have darted into the bus's path but found no material or satisfactory basis in the record to support that theory; it also considered the accused's Section 342 statement but found it did not demonstrate the accused had sounded the horn or taken any effective precaution before collision.
- Legal standard applied: The court applied the ordinary rule that a motorist must exercise the care and caution expected on a highway, particularly on busy or downward-gradient roads, to avoid endangering others. A driver who sees (or should have seen) a person ahead and does nothing to reduce speed, brake, or warn (by sounding horn) and thereby causes death may be held guilty of a rash and negligent act under Section 304-A.
- Conclusion of analysis: After correcting factual misunderstandings in the magistrate's assessment and accepting the testimony of P.W.3 and P.W.4 (together with corroborative police and forensic evidence), the court concluded that the accused drove at an excessive and unsafe speed, failed to sound the horn or take adequate steps to avoid collision, and therefore committed a rash and negligent act causing Kuppaswamy's death.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appellate court allowed the appeal, reversed the magistrate's acquittal and convicted the accused under Section 304-A of the Penal Code for causing death by rash and negligent driving.
Sentence imposed: The court imposed a fine of Rupees three hundred (Rs. 300), and in default of payment, simple imprisonment for two months. The court explained that, given the lapse of time and the circumstances (including the victim's own careless riding in the middle of the road), immediate imprisonment was unnecessary.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The accused's earlier acquittal was set aside; he was convicted under Section 304-A and sentenced to the fine (with default imprisonment). The court explicitly recorded the facts supporting conviction (speed, failure to warn/sound horn, failure to take precautionary steps) as establishing rash and negligent driving.
- The opinion did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle or cite precedent to create new law; it applied established duties of motorists to take reasonable care on highways. No broader precedent or additional consequences beyond the conviction and sentence were articulated in the opinion.
Source of summary: This HTML summary is based exclusively on the text of the opinion provided and contains no information beyond that opinion.
Somnath Iyer, J.:— In this appeal preferred by the State Government from an order of acquittal made by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Bangalore, the question is whether the respondent who was charged with an offence of rash and negligent driving punishable under Section 304-A of the Penal Code was wrongly acquitted.
The accused was a driver employed by the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation and was driving a bus owned by that Corporation on December 27, 1962, along the road between the Municipal Corporation Offices and the Puttannachetty Town Hall, known as the Jayachamarajendra Road. The bus was proceeding from the north to the south. It was said that a certain Kuppaswamy, an young boy of seventeen years of age was also riding a bicycle on that road and that, at a point very near the Town Hall, the bus collided against the cyclist and killed him. The prosecution case was that the accused drove the motor vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and had therefore committed a offence punishable under Section 304-A of the Penal Code.
In support of the charge, the prosecution examined among others two witnesses who professed to have seen the collision and they are P.Ws 3 and 4. The Magistrate believed neither of these two witnesses and thought that the charge against the I accused had to fail, there being, in his opinion, no reliable evidence that there was any rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused.
Mr. Ashrit, the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State, urges that the Magistrate's assessment of the evidence produced by the prosecution is manifestly unreasonable and that the material on record completely establishes the charge that the motor vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner.
There is indisputable evidence that Kuppaswamy was riding a bicycle along the Jayachamarajendra Road over a stretch between the Corporation Offices and the Town Hall building, in the afternoon of December 27, 1962, and that he was killed in consequence of the motor vehicle driven by the accused having run over him. P.W 6 a Sub-Inspector of Police gave evidence that on December 27, 1962, at about 3 p.m he got information at his residence about the accident and that he immediately went to the scene of the collision where he saw a bus bearing the number MYG 904 standing parked, with its face towards the south and the dead body of Kuppaswamy behind the bus. He added that he found a cycle M.O 1 lying damaged at a little distance away and that P.W 3 a Central Intelligence Officer had detained the accused there. He stated that he sent a message over the telephone to the Circle Inspector P.W 7 and remained at the spot till he arrived.
P.W 7 the Circle Inspector gave evidence that on receiving the telephonic message from P.W 6, he rushed to the spot which he reached at 4 p.m and received from P.W 3 his report Exhibit P-2 on the basis of which he registered a case under Section 304-A of the Penal Code. He stated that he saw P.W 3 and others had detained the accused while the bus bearing the number MYG 904 had been parked in front of the Town Hall. The dead body of Kuppaswamy was lying on the main Narasimharaja Road towards the north of the Town Hall. He stated that he observed near the dead body two patches of blood on the road and a damaged bicycle on the road. According to him, there were seven injuries on the body of Kuppaswamy which was at a distance of 25 feet from the hind wheel of the bus.
P.W 2 a lecturer in forensic medicine in the Bangalore Medical College was the person who conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Kuppaswamy which was brought to him in the morning of December 28, 1962. He observed that the face of Kuppaswamy was disfigured and that his left eye and forehead were compresed while the brain substance was exuding from the nostrils. He found lacerated wounds on the front of the left arm and on the right ankle. He found abrasions and contusions and discovered that the frontal bone had been broken into four pieces and that the brain had been crushed into pieces. He added that the first seven ribs on the right side had also been fractured along with the right finger and that there was a laceration of the right lung. In his opinion, death was instantaneous and was attributable to shock and haemorrhage in consequence of the injuries to the brain and the skull, and those injuries might have been sustained by reason of Kuppaswamy having been run over by a moving motor transport. In his cross-examination it was elicited that the injuries observed by him could also have been caused if Kuppasway had fallen in front of the bus and had been run over.
However that may be, it is clear from the evidence of P.Ws 2, 6 and 7 that sometime before 3 p.m on December 27, 1962, Kuppaswamy was run over by the bus bearing the number MYG 904 and got killed. It is beyond doubt that bus was the one which was driven by the accused.
P.W 1 a motor-vehicle Inspector was examined to demonstrate that the motor vehicle driven by the accused was not mechanically defective. His evidence was that on the date of the accident, he inspected the vehicle which had been parked in front of the Town Hall and that he did so at 6-15 p.m According to him, the horn, the tyre threads and their pressure, the wiper and the lights were in order; there was no damage of any kind to the vehicle and the brakes were in working condition. Although, very strangely, no sketch of the scene of Govinda Rao occurrence was produced on behalf of the prosecution and a Somnath sketch prepared during the investigation Exhibit D-1 was got exhibit only on behalf of the defence—what emerges from the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses is that Kuppaswamy was run over at a point very proximate to a traffic island where there was a confluence of more than one road. The Jayachamarajendra Road is a road which commences from the Corporation Offices and proceeds after reaching the traffic island near the Town Hall, towards the south. Near the traffic island there is a road which is from the east to the west known as the Narasimharaja Road. The place where Kuppaswamy was run over is to the north of the traffic island and to the north of the place where there is a confluence of the Narasimharaja Road and the Jayachamanijendra Road. Although P.W 7 gave evidence that the width of the road where Kuppaswamy was killed was 76 feet, it appears from the evidence of P.W 3 that the actual width is only 35 feet. It is probable that P.W 7 was giving the width of the road at a point to the south of the scene of occurrance where the traffic island is situate. That part of the Jayachamarajendra Road which lies between the Corporation Offices and the Town Hall and over a part of which Kuppaswamy was killed, slopes from the north towards the south, the gradient being a downward gradient along that stretch.
It was said that Kuppasway was riding his bicycle along the Jayachamarajendra Road while the accused was driving his bus behind him and that the accused was driving his vehicle with great speed. P.W 3 estimated it at 35 to 40 miles on hour while P.W 4 stated that it was about 30 miles an hour. The evidence given was that the accused drove his bus on that stretch of the road without sounding his horn and dashed against Kuppaswamy who was riding his byclcle in front of him and that the right wheels of the bus ran over the bicycle and the cyclist, instantaneously killing Kuppaswamy. This is the substance of the evidence given by P.Ws 3 and 4.
P.W 3 who was an officer in the Central Intelligence Department stated that at about 2-15 p.m he was proceeding from his office to his house on his bicycle along the road leading from the Corporation Offices towards the Town Hall and that he noticed that a Grovernment Road Transport bus went ahead of him at great speed which he estimated to be about 35 to 40 miles an hour. He stated that the bus did not sound its horn but dashed against a cyclist who was also proceeding in the same direction in front of the bus and that the boy fell down. According to him, this happened just opposite to the Town Hall. He added that the bus proceeded a distance of 30 feet when the public raised a cry and the bus was stopped, when it was observed that the accused was the person who was driving bus. That the cycle was completely damaged and that the boy died with injuries on his head was what he also stated. According to him, the front right wheel of the bus had passed over the boy's face, and, the witness was himself 20 feet behind the bus when the boy was knocked down. He stated that he then sent a telephone message to the several Police Stations and made a report Exhibit P-2 when the Police arrived. The name of the boy who was so killed was ascertained by him to be Kuppaswamy. He also acquired information that Kuppaswamy was a coolie boy in the City Market.
In his cross-examination, it was elicited that Kuppaswamy was proceeding in the middle of the road and that he was about 40 feet ahead of the witness and that there were vehicles both behind him and in front of his travelling on the road. It was also elicited that the right wheels of the bus went over the wheels of the bicycle and over Kuppaswamy.
P.W 4 a plantain vendor corroborated the testimony of P.W 3. His evidence was that at about 2-15 p.m when he was proceeding towards the City Market by the side of the Town Hall, a Government bus came at great speed from the cantonment side towards the Town Hall and that Kuppaswamy who was working in the market as a coolie and who was riding a bicycle in front of the bus was knocked down by the bus and that he fell down in front of the bus and was run over. That in consequence, Kuppaswamy's head was crushed and that the bus was still proceeding when P.W 3 went ahead of the bus and stopped it at a distance of 30 or 35 feet from the scene of occurrence, was the further evidence given by the witness. The accused was identified by him to be the person who was driving the bus and M.O 1 as the bicycle ridden by Kuppaswamy.
In his cross-examination, P.W 4 stated that he was carrying plantains on his head and was at a distance of ten feet from the bus where Kuppaswamy was killed. He stated that the wheels of the bus on the right side ran over Kuppaswamy first over the head and then on his left side and the right thigh.
The Magistrate was inclined to take the view that P.W 4 was not a witness of truth and that P.W 3 was not in a position to observe how Kuppaswamy was killed.
One of the reasons assigned by the Magistrate for distrusting the testimony of P.W 4 was that he was “only a coolie”, and, it is obvious that this is an extremely insufficient ground for viewing his evidence with suspicion. But the Magistrate proceeded to point out that in his opinion it was improbable that P.W 4 was, when he was proceeding towards the City Market, in a position to witness the occurrence. He pointed out that according to the evidence of the witness, he was proceeding from the Shivaji Talkies which lies to the south of the scene of occurrence to the City Market and that if that was how he was performing his journey to the market, he would have been so far away from the scene of occurrence that he could not have been in a position to give any evidence as to how Kuppaswamy was killed. P.W 4 stated that although he came from the direction of the Shivaji Talkies which is about two furlongs away from the Town Hall, he was at a distance of ten feet from the place where Kuppaswamy was knocked down when he was proceeding towards the market and that he was towards the west of Kuppaswamy on a footpath 35 feet away from the Town Hall and just opposite to it. This evidence of P.W 4 according to the Magistrate meant that when he saw the occurrence, P.W 4 was on the western footpath of the Jayachamarajendra Road to the north of the confluence of the Jayachamarajendra Road and the Narasimharaja Road. The Magistrate thought that since a person who wishes to proceed to the market from the Shivaji Talkies has to turn to his left immediately he reaches the Narasimharaja Road without there being any reason for him to proceed further north along the western footpath of the Jayachamarajendra Road, the evidence of P.W 4 was liable to be discarded as untrustworthy evidence.
It appears to us that the Magistrate did not accurately understand the evidence of P.W 4. In regard to his evidence, this is what he observed:
“According to P.W 4, he was proceeding from the Shivaji Talkies side which lies to the south of the scene of offence to the City Market along the Narasimharaja Road which lies to the east of the scene of offence. With reference to the sketch Exhibit P-1 prepared by P.W 7, P.W 4 should be on the western foot-path of Jayachamarajendra Road or on the southern foot-path of Narasimharaja Road. But in order to show that he was not so far away from the scene of offence, P.W 4 has gone to the extent of saying that he was on the foot-path which lies to the west of the scene of occurrence, which places him on the northern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road or the Western foot-path of Jayachamarajendra Road. A person going to City Market from the Shivaji Talkies side has no necessity to cross the Narasimharaja Road and walk along the northern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road or the western foot-path of Jayachamarajendra Road”.
The first mistake committed by the Magistrate was in thinking that the Narasimharaja Road was to the east of the scene of occurrence, and, Mr. Appaji, the learned Advocate for the accused had to admit that road was to the west of the scene of occurrence. Next, it does not appear to us that there is any material on the basis of which the Magistrate could have thought that P.W 4 after crossing the Narasimharaja Road, walked along the western foot-path of the Jayachamarajendra Road towards the north. All that the witness stated was that he was at a distance of ten feet from where Kuppaswamy was knocked down and that he was to the west of Kuppaswamy on a foot-path. It may be that P.W 4 wanted to proceed to the Market along the northern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road instead of proceeding along the southern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road and that, for that reason, he was nearer the scene of occurrence than he would have been if he had been on the southern foot-path. There is nothing intrinsically improbable in P.W 4 selected the northern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road in preference to that in the south. The selection of foot-paths in the City of Bangalore is made by pedestrains for various reasons, one of them being that a footpath on the side is better than the foot-path on the other if there are really any foot-paths at all over which a pedestrian can make his journey without the risk of breaking his bones. P.W 4 was not asked in the course of his examination whether he was walking on the northern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road or whether he had crossed the Narasimharaja Road and was quite inexplicable walking on the western foot-path of the Jayachamarajendra Road towards the Corporation Offices on the north. That was not what he stated.
So, the Magistrate was not right in thinking that there was anything unusual or odd about P.W 4 having selected the northern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road or that he had crossed the Narasimharaja Road and was proceeding in a direction in which the City Market was not situate. Such is not the effect of the evidence of P.W 4.
The evidence of P.W 7 was that Kuppaswamy's dead body was lying on the ‘main Narasimharaja Road’, and, although he stated that it was lying towards the north of the Town Hall, it is clear from the evidence of this witness and also from the evidence of the other witnesses that although Kuppaswamy was run over by the bus on the Jayachamarajendra Road, he was run over at a point which was very near the place where the Jayachamarajendra Road and the Narasimharaja Road meet. If that is the meaning of the evidence, it becomes clear that P.W 4 was speaking the truth when he stated that he was standing on a foot-path to the west of Kuppaswamy when he was killed. He must have been standing on the northern foot-path of the Narasimharaja Road.
So, the main reason assigned by the Magistrate for distrusting the testimony of P.W 4 has been demonstrated to be groundless. There is nothing surprising in P.W 4 walking on the foot-path to the north of the Narasimharaja Road. His evidence does not mean that he crossed the Narasimharaja Road and walked towards the Corporation Offices.
In that view of the matter, the Magistrate could not have depended upon P.W 4 being merely a coolie as a ground for not attaching to his evidence the importance which it otherwise merits.
Turning to the critcism made by the Magistrate of the evidence of P.W 3, it transpires that P.W 2's evidence was discarded for a reason which is not easy to accept. After dismissing the evidence of P.W 4, the Magistrate proceeded to observe that he was not prepared to base a conviction on the sole testimony of P.W 3 which was all that remained according to him. It is obvious that even if the Magistrate was right in not believing P.W 4—and we have no doubt that he was not right in disbelieving him—it was not right for him to think that the evidence of P.W 3 could be discarded on the sole ground that he was the only witness who spoke about the incident.
The Magistrate further observed that P.W 3 could not have been in a position to observe how exactly Kuppaswamy was killed. He pointed out that since P.W 3 was at a distance of 45 feet behind the bus, there was inability on his part to observe the incident. Here again, the Magistrate misread the evidence of P.W 3 whose evidence was that he was at a distance of 20 feet behind the bus and not 45 feet as stated by the Magistrate. Since the main reason which influenced the view of the Magistrate that P.W 3 was at a distance of 45 feet behind the bus has been demonstrated to be faulty and since his evidence was that he was 20 feet behind the bus when Kuppaswamy was killed, it is difficult to predicate whether the Magistrate would not have believed P.W 3 if he had not misunderstood his evidence in that way.
The evidence of P.W 3 which was to the effect that the cyclist was at a distance of 45 feet away from him was mistaken by the Magistrate as indicating the distance between P.W 3 and the bus, and, it is this error which was responsible for the doubt generated in the mind of the Magistrate about the ability on the part of P.W 3 to observe how exactly Kuppaswamy was killed.
We have taken through the evidence of P.W 3 and we see no reason to think that he is not a witness of truth. He is a person employed in the Department of Central Intelligence and there is no reason for him to falsely implicate the accused or to give evidence about anything which he did not see. According to his evidence, he was also riding his bicycle in the same direction in which the bus was proceeding and Kuppaswamy was run over by the bus when he was at a distance of 20 feet behind the bus and when Kuppaswamy was 40 feet away. His evidence was that the bus was travelling at “great speed” and that the accused did not even sound the horn. Although it may be that we should regard the estimate made by P.Ws 3 and 4 in regard to the speed at which the bus was travelling as estimates of lay men which can only be approximate estimates, there is no reason why we should not believe their evidence as indicating that the bus was travelling faster than it should have been driven along a road like the one where Kuppaswamy was killed which, according to P.W 7 was a “busy traffic ridden road.”
There is also no reason why we should not depend upon the evidence of P.W 3 who gave evidence that the accused drove the bus without sounding the horn. The evidence of P.W 3 was that there was vehicular traffic both behind him and ahead of him. The bus which was driven by the accused collided against the bicycle ridden by Kuppaswamy in consequence of which Kuppaswamy fell down and the wheels of the bus ran over him. We should, in our opinion believe the evidence of P.W 3 that the bus was stopped by the accused only after it proceeded a distance of about 30 feet after it knocked down Kuppaswamy. The evidence of P.W 4 was that it proceeded about 30 or 35 feet. The effect of the evidence of both P.Ws 3 and 4 was that the accused stopped his bus only after attempts were made to stop it. Indeed, P.W 3 stated that he was one of those persons who stopped the bus.
In the course of his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused stated nothing which was of any use to him. He stated that the evidence of P.Ws 3 and 4 that he drove his bus at great speed in a rash or negligent manner and dashed against Kuppaswamy and killed him was false, and added:—
“There was a sound from behind. I stopped the vehicle sounding the horn, I gave side and turned to the left. There was ‘Dubb’ sound from behind. I stopped the vehicle.”
It seems to us that we should take the view that the evidence given by P.Ws 3 and 4 establishes these facts. What it establishes is that the bus was driven by the accused on a stretch of the road which had a downward gradient. It also establishes that Kuppaswamy was riding a bicycle along that road in front of the bus driven by the accused and that he was at a distance of about 20 feet in front of bus when P.W 4 saw him. What it further establishes is that the accused was driving his bus at a speed which was not safe for others who had a right to use the high way, particularly since the high way was one which was a “busy and traffic ridden road.”
What is next proved is that the accused did not sound the horn at any time before P.W 3 saw him driving the bus and before Kuppaswamy was knocked down and killed.
Mr. Appaji submitted to us that the omission on the part of the prosecution to examine the passengers who were in the bus when the unfortunate incident happened was rightly considered by the Magistrate as a relevant factor in assessing the evidence of P.Ws 3 and 4. But on behalf of the prosecution it was explained before the Magistrate that by the time P.Ws 6 and 7 arrived at the scene of occurrence the passengers, with their characteristic indifference, had disappeared and that was the reason why none of those passengers could be examined. It does not appear to us that this explanation was unacceptable.
The question is whether it can be said that the accused caused the death of Kuppaswamy by doing a rash or negligent act within the meaning of Section 304-A of the Penal Code. It appears to us that he did.
It was both rash and negligent on the part of the accused to have driven his bus at excessive speed along the busy road on which there was heavy traffic. It was equally rash and negligent on his part to have not sounded the horn when Kuppuswamy was riding his bicycle right in front of him at a distance of 20 feet along that road. It does not appear that the accused made any attempt to stop his vehicle before it collided against Kuppuswamy. The accused stopped his bus only after Kuppuswamy had been killed and after he was compelled to stop his bus by persons who did so. We do not find it possible to accede to the argument advanced before us by Mr. Appaji that the accused did sound his horn, or made an attempt to stop the bus or to reduce its speed before the bus ran over Kuppaswamy. The statement made by the accused in the course of his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on which Mr. Appaji depended in this context, does not demonstrate that any such thing was done by the accused. What he stated was that he stopped the vehicle after he heard a sound from behind and that before he stopped the vehicle he sounded the horn. Although what exactly the accused meant when he made this statement is not very cleat there is no reason to discard the evidence given by P.W 3 that the accused did not sound the horn before he knocked down Kuppaswamy.
It is the plain duty of a person driving a motor vehicle along a busy road, particularly when the road has a down-ward gradient, to project his observation to the extent it is possible and necessary, in more directions than one and his primary duty is to focus attention on the stretch of road in front of him even if he is not able to do so in other directions. It is his duty to do nothing which imperils the safety of the others who have as much rights as himself to use the high way, particularly of those who are found using the high way on those stretches of the road which are before him. The fact that Kuppuswamy was riding his bicycle in the middle of the road as stated by P.W 3 can make no difference, since the moment the accused saw Kuppuswamy riding his bicycle that way in the middle of the road in front of him, it was his clear duty to do everything that he could to reduce the speed of his vehicle by the application of brakes and otherwise and to simultaneously blow its horn to warn Kuppuswamy that another vehicle was moving behind him.
The question whether a motorist has driven his vehicle in a rash or negligent manner is one which has to be answered on the facts and circumstances of each case. But it is a sound and well known rule that a motorist or a person who drives a mechanically propelled transport has to exercise all that care and caution which is expected of him when he drives the transport on a high way, so as to eliminate to the extent it is possible danger and peril to others who have an equal right to use the high way.
Mr. Appaji suggested to us that besides the fact that Kuppuswamy was riding on his bicyble quite carelessly, right in the middle of the road, instead of keeping to the left of the road as he should have done, it is also probable that Kuppuswamy who was just at the confluence of the Jayachamarajendra Road and the Narasimharaja Road, suddenly turned towards the right with a view to proceed towards the market and that at that point of time collided against the bus and come to grief. If it had been possible for us to say that was how Kuppuswamy was killed, there would of course have been no difficulty in pronouncing in favour of the accused and in finding that there was neither rashness nor negligence on his part. But Mr. Appaji was unable to point out to us any satisfactory material on the basis of which we could reach the conclusion that Kuppuswamy darted in front of the bus in that way. No such theory was even propounded by the accused in the course of his statement made during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
We must therefore say that what is proved in this case is that, when Kuppuswamy was using the high way, the accused who was coming behind him and who must have seen him if only he had observed the ordinary rules of prudence which every motorist should observe, without doing anything to avoid a collision between his bus and the bicycle ridden by Kuppuswamy and without taking any precaution to avert any such collision, knocked down Kuppuswamy and killed him. The evidence of P.Ws 3 and 4 is that the wheels which ran over him were the right wheels of the bus which means that the accused drove his bus to the right of Kuppuswamy which is not how Kuppuswamy should have been overtaken by the accused if he wanted to overtake him.
If a motorist sees a person using a high way in front of him and without doing anything to arrest the motion of his own vehicle, drives his vehicle with uttar indifference and apathy and knocks down the other person who is in front of him, that, in our opinion, is sufficient proof of a rash and negligent act. In this case there is evidence in addition that the accused not only did so but drove his motor vehicle with greater speed than was safe for any one and without even taking any precaution such as the sounding of the horn and the like to warn the person on the portion of the road which he had to traverse. In our opinion the Magistrate should have found little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that what was done by the accused was a rash and negligent act which caused the death of Kuppuswamy.
This appeal must therefore succeed. Dissenting from the Magistrate we should say that the evidence on record establishes beyond doubt that the accused committed an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the Penal Code. We do so and convict him of that offence.
In regard to the sentence it seems to us that it is not necessary at this distance of time, and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to impose a sentence of imprisonment. In taking this view which we have reached after bestowing over the matter our most careful thought and attention, we are also influenced by the fact that Kuppuswamy himself quite carelessly was proceeding in the middle of the road on a bicycle, knowing as he should have done, that it was extremely dangerous to do so and that he should have kept to the left side of the road instead of venturing into the middle of it which was full of dangers and perils such as those which he ultimately encountered. In that view of the matter we think that the ends of justice will be met if we sentenced him to pay a fine Rupees three hundred (Rs. 300), and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months. We order accordingly.
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