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Bisakha Dassi & Ors. Plffs.- v. Radharani Biswas & Anr. Defts-

Calcutta High Court
Jan 4, 1966
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Case Summary — Excerpted Opinion by P.N. Mookerjee, J. (with D. Basu, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants (plaintiffs) were sub-tenants occupying disputed premises under respondent No. 2 (the tenant). Respondent No. 2 was a tenant of respondent No. 1 (the superior landlord). The plaintiffs sued for a declaration that they were entitled to remain in occupation as direct tenants under respondent No. 1 on the same terms and conditions as between them and respondent No. 2, and for a permanent injunction restraining respondent No. 1 from taking possession or otherwise disturbing their possession by executing an ejectment decree obtained by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2.

The trial court dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed. It was common ground that the plaintiffs had not served the notice of sub-tenancy required by section 16(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The trial judge held that because no notice under section 16(2) was given, respondent No. 1 was not bound to implead the plaintiffs in her ejectment suit against respondent No. 2 and that the decree obtained by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2 was executable against the plaintiffs (the sub-tenants). The present appeal challenges that conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether sub-tenants who have not given notice under section 16(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, are entitled to be impleaded in an ejectment suit by the landlord against the tenant when the ground of ejectment is the landlord's reasonable requirement under clause (f) of section 13(1).
  2. Whether, in that situation, a decree for delivery of possession obtained by the landlord against the tenant is binding and executable against such sub-tenants who did not give the section 16(2) notice, and whether the sub-tenants can obtain a declaration of right to remain or injunctive relief to restrain execution of that decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Das)

  • The appellants contended that where the landlord seeks ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement under clause (f) of section 13(1), sub-tenants should be impleaded irrespective of whether they served the notice required by section 16(2).
  • Relying on subsections (2), (3) and (4) of section 13, Mr. Das argued that subsection (4) stands independently and mandates impleading of all sub-tenants in cases under clause (f), even if they did not give notice under section 16(2); the first part of subsection (2) (which speaks of impleading only those sub-tenants who gave notice) has no reference to subsection (4).
  • He further relied on the language of subsection (3) (which states "save as provided in sub-section (2) and sub-section (4), a decree ... shall be binding on every sub-tenant") to submit that the statute distinguishes between sub-section (2) cases and sub-section (4) cases, so that subsection (2)'s notice requirement should not limit subsection (4).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent(s)' legal arguments as distinct submissions; the trial judge's findings are recorded but the respondents' advocacy is not separately summarized in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and structural construction of section 13 (subsections (2), (3) and (4)) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, to determine whether subsection (4) can be read independently of the first part of subsection (2).

Key points in the court's step-by-step analysis:

  • The court regarded the first part of subsection (2) as the primary and exclusive statutory provision that entitles a sub-tenant to be impleaded in a landlord's ejectment suit against a tenant. Under the "general law," no sub-tenant is ordinarily a necessary party, and subsection (2) creates the exception by providing for impleading only those sub-tenants who have given notice under section 16(2).
  • Subsection (4) was interpreted as referring only to a sub-tenant who has already been impleaded in the suit (i.e., a sub-tenant who it is necessary to implead). The subsection's text, which contemplates agreement by the particular sub-tenant, would be inapplicable unless that sub-tenant is a party to the suit; hence subsection (4) presupposes impleading under subsection (2).
  • The court examined the proviso to subsection (2), noting that it expressly references clause (f) and thereby indicates that the general language of the first part of subsection (2) applies to all clauses of section 13(1), including clause (f). The proviso grants limited protection to sub-tenants but expressly excludes cases covered by clauses (f) and (g); subsection (4) supplements protection in clause (f) situations only for sub-tenants who are parties to the suit.
  • Subsection (3) was read as affirming and emphasizing that the protective provisions apply in respect of sub-tenants eligible under subsection (2) (i.e., those who gave notice under section 16(2)), with the proviso to subsection (2) and subsection (4) supplying the relevant protections in different circumstances (the proviso for clauses other than (f) and (g), subsection (4) for clause (f)).
  • On this construction, subsection (4) cannot be read independently to create an entitlement to implead for sub-tenants who have not complied with section 16(2). Thus, subsection (4) provides protection only to sub-tenants who are properly impleaded under subsection (2) — which, in turn, requires the section 16(2) notice.
  • Applying this statutory construction to the facts (the appellants did not give notice under section 16(2)), the court concluded that the appellants were not necessary parties to the landlord's ejectment suit and therefore could not challenge the resulting decree by seeking a declaration or permanent injunction to prevent execution of that decree against them.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court DISMISSED the appeal and affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the appellants' suit.

Direct consequences and practical implications (as ordered by the court):

  • The appellants are not entitled to a declaration that they may remain in occupation as direct tenants under respondent No. 1, nor to a permanent injunction restraining respondent No. 1 from executing the decree for ejectment obtained against respondent No. 2.
  • Execution of the existing decree for ejectment will not be permissible against the appellants immediately. The court granted a limited grace period: the decree will not be executable against the appellants until the expiry of June next provided that the appellants deposit Rs. 70 per month (current mesne profits) to the credit of respondent No. 1 in the trial court, month by month, regularly, within the 15th day of the next succeeding month (English calendar). If the appellants default in any two such deposits, the decree will become executable at once and the grace period will lapse automatically.
  • There is no order as to costs in this Court or the court below.

The opinion confines itself to statutory construction and the consequences for the parties in the present litigation; it does not purport to set out or discuss any broader precedent beyond the application of the cited statutory provisions to these facts.

Additional Notes

The opinion was delivered by P.N. Mookerjee, J.; D. Basu, J. agreed with the judgment as recorded in the text.

Show all summary ...

P.N Mookerjee, J.:— This appeal is by the plaintiffs and it arises out of a suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs, who were sub-tenants, were entitled to remain in occupation of the disputed premises as direct tenants under respondent No. 1 on the same terms and conditions existing between them and the tenant, respondent no. 2. Respondent no. 1 is the superior landlord. Respondent no. 2 was the tenant under her and the plaintiffs appellants claimed to be sub-tenants under respondent no. 2.

1. In the suit, there was also a prayer for a permanent injunction, restraining respondent no. 1 from taking possession or in any way disturbing the appellants' possession by executing the decree for ejectment, obtained by respondent No. 1 against respondent no. 2. The suit has been dismissed by the learned trial Judge. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs.

2. There is no dispute that the appellants (plaintiffs) were sub-tenants in respect of the disputed premises under respondent no. 2 who was the tenant under respondent no 1 (landlord). There is also no dispute that the appellants did not serve any notice of their sub-tenancy under sec. 16(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 on respondent No. 1 (landlord). Because of the absence of this notice, the learned trial Judge has held that respondent no. 1 was not bound to implead, in her suit for ejectment against respondent no. 2, the present plaintiffs appellants and that the decree, obtained by the landlord (respondent no. 1) against the tenant (respondent no. 2) was executable also against the subtenants (plaintiffs-appellants).

3. Before us, the above view of the learned trial Judge has been assailed by Mr. Das, who appears in support of this appeal. His contention is that, as the instant case was a case of ejectment on the ground of the landlord's reasonable requirement of the disputed premises under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 13 of the above Act, the plaintiffs appellants, who were subtenants, were entitled to be impleaded notwithstanding the fact that they had given no notice to the landlord (respondent no. 1) under sec. 16(2) of the above Act. In other words, Mr. Das's contention is that, once it is held that the plaintiffs appellants were sub-tenants, the landlord (respondent no. 1) was bound to implead them in her suit for ejectment against the tenant (respondent no. 2) on the ground of reasonable requirement of the disputed premises under Sec. 13 (1) (f) notwithstanding non-service of any notice under sec. 16(2) by the plaintiffs appellants. For this proposition, Mr. Das relies on Sec. 13, sub-sections (2), (3) & (4) and, in particular, upon the latter two sub-sections. In substance, Mr. Das's contention is that the first part of sub-section (2), which provides for the impleading of only those sub-tenants, who have given notice under sec. 16 (2), has no reference to and no connection with sub-section (4), which stands independently and, under which, all subtenants whether they have given the above notice or not, will have to be impleaded, if the landlord wants a decree under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 13, as mentioned in the said subsection (4). Mr. Das seeks to reinforce this submission by reference to the language of sub-section (3), which provides that “save as provided in sub-section (2) and sub-section (4), a decree or order for the delivery of possession of any premises shall be binding on every sub-tenant.” On this provision, he contends that, in a case, falling under subsection (4), the decree or order for delivery of possession of any premises would not be binding on any sub-tenant except as provided therein and in cases falling under sub-section (2), the decree or order will not be binding on a subtenant except as under the said subsection. The substance of his submission is that the provision for impleading sub-tenants as provided in the first part of sub-section (2) has reference to cases other than cases coming under sub-section (4) or, in other words, to cases other than cases of ejectment under clause (f) of sub-section (1)

4. We are unable to accept this contention. On a reasonable construction the first part of sub-section (2) should be held to be the only provision which entitles a sub-tenant to be impleaded in a suit for ejectment by the landlord on any of the clauses including clause (f) of sec. 13, sub-section (1). Sub-section (4) obviously refers to the ease of a sub-tenant who has been impleaded in the suit, or, in other words, whom it is necessary to implead in the suit for ejectment, as the sub-section clearly contemplates agreement by the particular sub-tenant, which would be impossible unless the said sub-tenant is a partly to the suit. On a reference to the language of of sub-section (2) first part, it is obvious that the said language is general and applies to all suits for ejectment under any of the clauses of sec. 13 (1). This is confirmed by the proviso to sub-section (2), where there is reference to clause (f) also, which indicates that the earlier part of that sub-section has also reference to that clause. The proviso grants certain protection to the sub-tenant except in cases of clause (f) or (g) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) only supplements it by providing for protection to the sub-tenant in a case under clause (f) also. In other words, the proviso to sub-section (2) and sub-section (4) must be read as complementary or as supplementing each other in the matter of protection to sub-tenants and it is this aspect of the matter, which is referred to sub-section (3), where reference is made therein to sub-section (2) and sub-section (4). Neither the proviso to sub-section (2) nor sub-section (4) has any bearing on the question as to which, if any, of the sub-tenants are to be impleaded.

5. It is to be remembered in this connection that, under the general law, no sub-tenant is to be impleaded in a suit for ejectment by the landlord against the tenant and the only exception to this general law is to be found in the first part of sub-section (2), which provides that sub-tenants, who have given notice under sec. 16(2) of the Act, are to be impleaded in suits for ejectment by the landlord against the tenant. As we have already said, sub-section (4) refers only to cases of a sub-tenant who has to be impleaded in a suit for ejectment and such a subtenant in the view, which we have expressed above, must be a sub-tenant, coming under the first part of sub-section (2), which is the only provision under which sub-tenants are entitled to be impleaded in suits for ejectment by the landlords against the tenants. We, accordingly, hold that sub-section (4) cannot be read independently of the first part of sub-section (2) and, accordingly, no sub-tenant, who has not given notice under sec. 16 (2), will come under it or can claim the protection under the said sub-section (4).

6. In the above view, we hold that the plaintiffs appellants were not necessary parties to the suit for ejectment, in which the impugned decree for ejectment was obtained by respondent no. 1 against respondent no. 2, and, accordingly, they are not entitled to make any grievance against the said decree and cannot get a declaration of their right to remain in the disputed premises in spite of the said decree or a permanent injunction, restraining respondent no. 1 (landlord) from executing the said decree against them to oust them from such possession.

7. We have sufficiently explained why the decision in the instant case should go against the appellants but, by way of further clarification, we may add the following.

8. As we have said above, so far as the present point is concerned, the relevant provisions are sub-secs. (2), (3) and (4) of Sec. 13 of the above Act, and, under them, the relative scheme of the statute starts by providing for impleading of certain sub-tenants, to wit, sub-tenants, who have given notice under sec. 16 (2), in suits for ejectment by landlords against tenants upon all the grounds, permissible under the statute, as indicated by the reference to the same in the proviso to sub-section (2) of sec. 13. That proviso, on its language, is comprehensive in this respect and, obviously, refers to all the clauses of sec. 13(1) and thus applies to all suits for ejectment, coming under the Act. The statute then provides, in the said proviso, a limited protection in favour of sub-tenants, or, more precisely, such sub-tenants as are to be impleaded as aforesaid, this protection, however, not extending to cases, covered by clauses (f) and (g) of sec. 13(1), as expressly mentioned in the proviso in question. From sub-sec. (2), read as a whole including its proviso, it is thus fairly clear that, even in a case under clause (f) of sec. 13 (1), the only sub-tenant who is entitled to be impleaded is one, who has given notice under sec. 16(2), but even such a subtenant would have no protection in such a case under the said sub-sec. (2), or, for the matter of that, under its proviso, to be more precise. Sub-sec. (4) then enacts that, even in a case under sec. 13 (1) (f), a sub-tenant, that is, a sub-tenant, who agrees to an order under the said sub-sec. (4) and is thus a party to the suit, or, in other words, one who has a right to be impleaded, — and that takes us to sub-sec. (2) and points to a sub-tenant, who has given notice under sec. 16(2) — will be entitled to the limited protection, as provided in the said sub-sec. (4), and thus will not be without any protection in spite of the absence of any protective safeguard in his case in the earlier provision, namely, the proviso to sub-sec. (2); and sub-sec. (3) only affirms and emphasises the above protections, that is, in favour of the sub-tenants, eligible for the same under sub-sec. (2), or, in other words, sub-tenants, who have given notice under sec. 16(2), the relative or relevant protective provisions being contained in the proviso to sub-sec. (2) in cases other than under clauses (f) and (g), and in sub-sec. (4) in cases under clause (f), there being no protection in a case under clause (g).

9. In the premises, the appellants' suit was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Judge and his decree of dismissal must be affirmed.

10. We, accordingly, dismiss this appeal but this dismissal will, in the circumstances of this case, be subject to this that the present decree for ejectment will not be executable against the appellants until the expiry of June next, provided, of course, that they go on depositing, in the trial court, to the credit of the decree-holder respondent no. 1, a sum of Rs. 70/- (Rupees seventy) per month, month by month regularly, according to the English calendar, within the 15th of the next succeeding month according to the same calendar, on account of current mesne profits. In default of any two of such deposits, this decree for ejectment will become executable at once and the above provision for time or grace period will automatically lapse.

11. There will, however, be no order for costs, either in this Court or in the court below.

D. Basu, J.:— I agree.

S.K.B