Satish Chandra, J.:— This writ petition arises out of proceedings under the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It seeks to quash an order of remand.

2. Petitioner No. 1 is a Public Limited Company. It owns and operates a sugar factory at Behari in the district of Bareilly. It has an extensive farm where it cultivates sugarcane which, it is alleged, is consumed in its own factory. After the abolition of zamindari, the petitioner company became the bhumidhar of the farm at Mudiya and sirdar of the farms at Kachcha and Bhawanipur., The total area of these farms is 2,129 acres. It appears that in response to the general notice issued under Sec. 9(1) of the Act, the petitioner company did not submit the required statement. On 8-12-1961, a notice under Sec. 10(2) of the Act was served on the petitioner. The petitioner applied for extension of time for filing objections and the Prescribed Authority allowed an extension of fifteen days. On 9-1-1962 the company filed its objection. In January, 1962 some evidence was recorded by the Prescribed Authority, but thereafter the proceedings were stayed under an interim order granted by this Court during the pendency of a writ petition filed by the petitioner company, questioning the constitutional vires of the Act. On the dismissal of the writ petition on 9-9-1963, the Prescribed Authority revived the proceedings and fixed 16-3-1964 for farther hearing. On this date the petitioner filed another set of objection. One objection was that an area of 112 bighas and 17 biswas of village Dhaura Khera exclusively belonged to Sri J.C Parik (petitioner No. 2 here) and not to the company. On 31-3-1964 Sri Parik also filed an objection claiming title to the said holding. On 13-4-1964 the petitioner company filed an application indicating its choice in the matter of determining the ceiling area as well as the exempted area. The petitioner company filed applications on 14-4-1964 and 22-4-1964 claiming certain other exemptions. The petitioner claimed that a total area of 1736.53 acres be exempted under various heads.

3. The Prescribed Authority decided the matter by its order dated 4-5-1964. It did not accept the petitioner's claim in its entirety, but exempted an area of 496 acres only. It accepted the claim that the holding in village Dhaura Khera belonged to Sri J.C Parik and not to the petitioner company. The petitioner as well as the State felt aggrieved at the order of the Prescribed Authority. Both went up in appeal. Both the appeals have been decided by a common judgment dated 1-6-1966. The learned Civil Judge has set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority and has remanded the matter back to it with certain directions.

4. The appellate Authority has taken the view that the Prescribed Authority was not competent to entertain an objection filed after the expiry of the period specified in the notice issued under Sec. 10 of the Act. It held that the objections filed on 18th March, 1964 and subsequently were not in the nature of particulars in support of the objections already filed on 9-1-1962, and were barred by time. It held that the time for filing objections has been fixed by the statute itself under Sec 10(2) and hence it could not be extended by the Prescribed Authority because Sec. 148, C.P.C will be in applicable. It also held that the Prescribed Authority had extended the time once, but the petitioner company did not pray for any further extension of time to file subsidiary objections and for this reason also the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the subsequent objection. I am unable to endorse this view of the learned Civil Judge. Sec. 10(2) of the Act does not prescribe any limit of time within which an objection may be filed. It leaves to the Prescribed Authority to fix the time limit in the notice that it will issue. It only provides a safeguard for the benefit of the tenure-holder by providing that the time so fixed shall not be less than ten days from the date of the service of the notice. This provision has left to the will of the Prescribed Authority to fix any period of time in excess of ten days. The time within which an objection may be filed is to be fixed by the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority has under Sec. 37 of the Act all the powers and privileges of a Civil Court while conducting these proceedings. Sec. 148 of the Civil Procedure Code will be applicable, and the Prescribed Authority will have jurisdiction to extend the time for filing objections. The learned Civil Judge has not held that the act of the Prescribed Authority in extending the time once was without jurisdiction. There is no provision in the Act which authorises the Prescribed Authority to extend the time only once. If it could extend the time once, it could extend it again. The subsequent objections were entertained by the Prescribed Authority. There is no suggestion that the State raised any objection. Under the circumstances it can be inferred that the Prescribed Authority extended the time by implication. The Act does not lay down any procedure or form for the extension of time. The learned Civil Judge was, therefore, in error in directing in its order of remand, the Prescribed Authority not to take into consideration the subsequent objections.

5. The second point relates to the objection filed by Sri Parik, petitioner No. 2. This relates to the exclusion of the holding of 112 bigha 17 biswas in village Dhaura Khera. The petitioner company had in its objection filed on 10-3-1964 claimed that this holding did not belong to it but to Sri Parik and hence it be excluded from consideration. Sri Parik on 31-3-1964 filed an objection of his own to the same effect. The Prescribed Authority had, in view of the evidence on the record, held that really this holding did belong to Sri Parik and not the Company. The learned Civil Judge held that Sri Parik had no competence to file any objection in proceedings under Sec. 10 of the Act and hence the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain this objection from a third party. He had consequently directed the Prescribed Authority not to consider the objection of Sri Parik. The learned Civil Judge has rightly held that Sri Parik could not file any objection in this proceeding. Under Sec. 10 a notice is issued to tenure-holders. The tenure-holders have been given a right to file objections. The statute does not provide for an objection by another person. The Prescribed Authority has been conferred jurisdiction only to decide the objection filed by the tenure-holder to the statement prepared by it and served on the tenure-holder along with the notice. These are statutory proceedings and can be conducted only in accordance with the statute. Sri Parik was not the recepient of any notice. He, therefore, had no locus standi to file any objection of his own. Technically, the objection filed by him was not competent; but this is hardly of any consequence. The company had taken the objection that this holding did not belong to it but to Sri Parik. The Prescribed Authority had to adjudicate this objection. The relevant evidence was on the record. The learned Civil Judge has not held that on the materials the finding was incorrect on the merits. The Prescribed Authority, therefore, could entertain this objection and decide it. It is immaterial whether the evidence on this point was actually filed by the Company or through Sri Parik. Sri Parik could well appear as a witness of the company and produce evidence. The evidence that has been adduced on the record in respect of this point was admissible. The Prescribed Authority, therefore, did not commit any error in adjudicating this matter. The learned Civil Judge was in error in directing the Prescribed Authority not to consider this question. Since I have held that Sri Parik had no locus standi to file an objection of his own, it is apparent that Sri Parik has no locus standi to file this petition. The writ petition filed by him is liable to be dismissed.

6. Sri Brijlal Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, next submitted that the Act on its true interpretation does not apply to those portions of Tarai and Bhabar Sub-Division where no intermediaries exist, unless a special notification extending the Act to those Areas has been issued by the State Government and that no such notification has yet been issued. It is submitted that the authorities below had no jurisdiction to deal with the petitioner's land in those areas. The learned Civil Judge has negatived this contention. He has held that the Act applies to this area of its own fores and does not require any special notification by the State Government. I am in agreement with this view point. The same view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of this court in Suraj Narain v. State of U.P C.M.W No. 1268 of 1964 decided on 5th May, 1966. The learned Junior Standing Counsel appearing for the State has stated that a special appeal filed against this decision was dismissed and the opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge was upheld. I, therefore, do not consider it feasible to discuss the point any further.

7. The learned Civil Judge found that the Prescribed Authority was right in exempting a total area of 2 acres of land under Sec. 6(iii) on account of cattle shed, compost pits, threshing-floor etc. The petitioner's contention is that it was entitled to an exemption of two acres in each of the villages in which its land was situate. This submission cannot be accepted. Under Sec. 6 the land falling in any of the mentioned categories is not to be taken into consideration for determining the ceiling area or surplus land of a tenure-holder. Under clause (iii), land not exceeding two acres in area, used for cattle-shed compost pits, threshing-floor or for such other purposes as may be prescribed is mentioned. These exemptions are for purposes of determining the ceiling area of the tenure-holder and not the ceiling area of the tenure-holder in each village. The ceiling area is determined as a whole and not village-wise. The exemptions are also to the extent mentioned in respect of the tenure-holder and not in respect of each of his village. Tenure-holder is entitled to exemption of a total area not exceeding two acres under clause (iii).

8. In respect of the exemptions granted under other clauses of Sec. 6, the learned Civil Judge found that in many cases the Prescribed Authority had based its finding on observations made by him on the spot and on enquiries made otherwise. He found that for several of such findings, there was no evidence on the record. The Prescribed Authority was not in law entitled to use his personal observations on the spot as evidence. It could be used to verify or appreciate the evidence led by the parties. He also observed that the record does not indicate as to how and from whom the local enquiries were made. The Prescribed Authority had not placed on the record the papers of the proceedings relating to the local enquiries. He, therefore, opined that in matters for which there were no recorded entries available, the Prescribed Authority should have allowed the parties to adduce oral evidence or to have appointed some Commissioner and asked him to report the true position. He, therefore, held that the Prescribed Authority has not determined the land exemptable under Sec. 6 on a proper basis. He has directed in its order of remand that the Prescribed Authority shall allow the parties to produce whatever documents or oral evidence they may like to produce and then give its finding in regard to the exemptions under the various heads. The Prescribed Authority has further been directed to keep in mind that the spot inspections and local enquiries should be made after due notice to the parties and reports in regard thereto should be placed on the record and the parties should be allowed opportunities to meet them according to law. I do not find any manifest error of law in these directions. The learned Civil Judge has observed that the entries in the revenue records were relevant evidence. He has, therefore, not in any matter indicated that the Prescribed Authority will not rely upon the revenue records while deciding the matter after remand. The directions made to the Prescribed Authority in respect of the procedure to be followed in determining these matters are, in my opinion, correct.

9. In respect of the exemptions claimed under Sec. 6(xvii) for purposes like poultry farming and dairying etc. the learned Civil Judge has upset the finding mainly on the ground that it is based on local enquiries etc. without the relevant reports being on the file and without really determining whether the area was exclusively devoted by the landholder to these persons. This view does not appear to be erroneous, because the learned Civil Judge seems to be of the opinion that there was no proper material for deciding this matter. But, at the same time the learned Civil Judge observed that the exemption of an area of one acre for every ten poultry birds seems to be much excessive, and the judgment of the prescribed authority shows no treasonable criterion at all for allowing so much area. He further observed:

“I think that it is not a question of exempting the particular area by assuming that so many birds should have been maintained in so much area of land, but it is a question of ascertaining as to how much area of land has been solely devoted to poultry farming or dairying.”

10. On this question the petitioner has urged that the Prescribed Authority had granted exemptions to the extent of one acre of land for every ten poultry birds and two acres of land for every head of cattle on the basis of departmental instructions issued by the Government. If that is so, the Prescribed Authority could legitimately take such instructions into account. The Act has been enacted so as to find surplus land of a tenure-holder, which vests in the State. The State is the beneficiary of the surplus land. In determining the surplus land the lands mentioned in section 6 are disregarded or exempted. The exemptions are, therefore, at the expense of the State. If the State Government makes a concession is respect of the determination of the exemptible area under Sec. 6, the Prescribed Authority could legitimately take into account such concessions. These concessions may be made in the evidence adduced in this respect, or may take the shape of departmental instructions. If there are clear departmental instructions on this point, the Prescribed Authority could legitimately base its finding on them. In any event, when the learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that the materials on the record were not enough to enable the proper finding to be recorded, it was not proper for him to have found that the exemption of one acre for every ten poultry birds was much excessive. The Prescribed Authority will disregard this observation while dealing with the case on remand.

11. In respect of the exemption granted on account of growing fodder for purposes of dairy, the learned Judge has observed that the Prescribed Authority should have found that the land sought to be exempted was exclusively used for growing fodder and that there should have been some evidence on the record to show that Dhencha crop was really used for purposes of fodder. Learned counsel for the petitioner has criticised this finding on the ground that it is well known that Dhencha crop is used only for fodder. It may be that the learned Civil Judge was not aware of this so called well-known fact. The view that there should have been some evidence on the record to sustain this conclusion was not in law, erroneous. In view of the Explanation to clause (xvii) of Sec. 6, only such land as is exclusively used by the tenure-holder for growing of fodder for purposes of his dairy is exemptible. The observations of the learned Civil Judge on this point, therefore, do not suffer from any error of law.

12. Learned counsel also urged that the authorities below should have allowed an area of land equal to the total area exempt-able under the various heads of Sec. 6 as a compact area in a place near the one where the petitioner's ceiling area was determined. Learned counsel has with vehemence argued that the grant of exemptions of land under various heads at their existing places virtually renders them useless and of no value to the enjoyment or the proper use of the ceiling area. The ceiling area left to the petitioner may be in one village whereas the areas exempted are in different villages and at various scattered places. He has urged that the land exempted on account of cattle-shed, compost pits, threshing-floor etc. under clause (iii) or under clause (ii) on account of its use for industrial purposes, or land for cremation ground or as a grave-yard, or land exempted under clause (iv) as an area appurtenant to a residential house, or land exempted under clauses (vi) and (vii) for tea, coffee or rubber plantations, or pharmacological or herbai plantation etc. and least but not last, land exempted under clause (xvii) as included in specialised farms and exclusively devoted to poultry farming or dairying etc. will become totally useless, if it is not nearby the ceiling area which is left with the tenure-holder. It will not be possible for a tenure-holder to use such land beneficially or economically if they are scattered at various places. It is not difficult to agree with the learned counsel that a tenure-holder is undoubtedly put to a good deal of hardship, if the Act is worked in this manner, but the provisions of law cannot be disregarded merely because they cause any inconvenience or hardship. The scheme of the Act is that a tenure-holder is debarred from holding an area in excess of the ceiling area. The land which is in excess of the ceiling area is called “surplus land” and it vests in the State and the right, title and interest of the tenure-holder in such surplus land extinguishes. In determining the ceiling area and the surplus land of a tenure-holder lands falling in certain categories mentioned in Sec. 6 are not taken into account. These mentioned kinds of land continue to belong to the tenure-holder as before. The Prescribed Authority, therefore, cannot do anything except to find the lands of a tenure-holder which are of the kind mentioned in the section and to leave them out of consideration. It cannot touch them or deal with them much less shift them to some other place. The hardship, if any, can be mitigated only by the ceiling area of the tenure-holder being left in such a place and in such a manner that may be given maximum benefit to the tenure-holder. For this purpose the Act provides under Sec. 9 a right in the tenure-holder to give his choice. The choice of the plot or plots of land, which a tenure-holder may like to retain as part of the ceiling area and which he indicates under Sec. 9, is liable to be accepted. I am, therefore, not impressed by the sub-mission that the Prescribed Authority could not ought to have granted a compact area as the land exempted under Sec. 6.

13. Learned counsel urged that the word “used” mentioned in various clauses of Sec. 6 should be interpreted to mean “usable”. The intention behind Sec. 6 is to find land which is being put to the uses mentioned in various clauses at the time of the determination of the ceiling area and to exempt them. This purpose cannot be properly achieved if a land which is capable of being used for this purpose is to be considered. Under clause (2) the land used for industrial purposes is excluded. If the word ‘used’ is interpreted to mean ‘usable’, this clause cannot work properly because every land can be said to be usable for industrial purpose. The tenure-holder may claim that the entire land be longing to him is intended to be used for industrial purposes and should be exempted. The legislature intentionally confined the exclusion of only such land which was being actually used for the mentioned purposes. Similarly, under clause (v) land used for cremation ground or as grave-yard is exempted. If these exemptions are not confined to the land which was being actually put to these uses, it will be not possible to work it out because any and every land will be usable as such. I am, therefore, not prepared to endorse this submission. The authorities below were right in excluding from consideration only such lands which did actually answer the description mentioned in various clauses of Sec. 6.

14. Sri Brijlal Gupta then submitted that the land which was being used for cultivation of sugarcane was used for an industrial purpose within the meaning of Sec. 6(ii), because the entire production of sugarcane was being consumed by the factory for manufacturing sugar. All such land was hence exemptable. Clause (ii) of Sec. 6 refers to land used for industrial purposes within the meaning of Sec. 143 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Sec. 143 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act reads as follows:

“143. Use of Holding for Industrial or Residential purpose (1) Where a bhumidhar uses his holding or part thereof for a purpose not connected with agriculture, horticulture, or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming. The Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division may, suo moto or on an application, after making such enquiry as may, be prescribed, make a declaration to that effect.

(1-A) Where a declaration under sub-sec. (1) has to be made in respect of a part of the holding, the Assistant Collector-in-charge of the Sub-division may in the manner prescribed demarcate such part for the purposes of such declaration.

(2) Upon the grant of the declaration mentioned in sub-sec. (1) the provisions of this chapter (other than this section) shall cease to apply to the bhumidhar with respect to such land and he shall thereupon be governed in the matter of devolution of the land by personal law to which he is subject.”

15. The word ‘industrial’ has not been defined either by the Act or by the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. For land used for industrial purposes within the meaning of clause (ii) at least one thing has to be established that it is used for a purpose not connected with agriculture etc. The question therefore, is what is agriculture and what is a purpose not connected with it. The claimed land is being used for growing sugarcane crops. It is alleged that the entire crop goes to feed the factory which manufactures sugar and is not used for human consumption. This ultimate use indicates that the land is not being used for a purpose connected with agriculture. It is difficult to accept this line of reasoning.

16. The primary sense in which the term “agriculture” is used is ager-field and cultura-cultivation: i.e cultivation of the field for purposes of effectively raising produce from the land. The process of raising the produce from the land by performance of operations is ‘agriculture’. The term ‘agriculture’ denotes the integrated activity of a person beginning with tilling of the land, sowing of the seed, weeding, tending, harvesting and rendering the produce fit for the market. The use of the land for a purpose connected with agriculture would be a use involving such an integrated activity in order to raise produce from the land. If the object of the use of the land is to raise the produce, it will tentamount to a purpose connected with agriculture. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. B.K.S Roy A.I.R 1957 S.C 768 para 97., observed that the term ‘agriculture’ cannot be confined merely to the production of grain and food products meant for human beings and beasts, but must be understood as comprising all the products of the land which have some utility either for consumption or for trade or commerce. “The ultimate use of the produce need not be human consumption. Even if it is used for trade or commerce, the land yielding the produce will be used for agricultural purposes. The petitioner claims that he is exclusively using the sugarcane crop for consumption in his factory i.e using it for purposes of trade and commerce. The use does not change the object of the user of the land, which was used for an agricultural purpose.

17. It is urged that Sec. 143 uses the negative phrase “a purpose not connected with” agriculture etc. This means nothing else but that the land is not being used for raising produce from the land by expenditure of human skill and labour upon the land. The circumstance that the ultimate produce is not being consumed by human beings or beasts but by a factory is, in my opinion, irrelevant for determining the purpose for which the land is being used. The petitioner is not entitled to the exemption of the land used for sugarcane cultivation under Sec. 6(ii). These are all the submissions made by the learned counsel.

18. In the result the petition succeeds in part. The direction given by the learned Additional Civil Judge that the Prescribed Authority shall not take into account the subsequent objections filed by the petitioner is set aside. The objection filed by Sri Parik will be treated as merely a statement in support of the objection of the petitioner company. The direction that the Prescribed Authority acted in gross-violation of the provisions of Sec. 10 by taking into consideration the choice of the plots given by the land-holder in the subsequent objections filed by the petitioner company is also set aside. The Prescribed Authority shall decide whether the petitioner has been able to satisfy it that the choice indicated by the petitioner company was more proper than the statement served upon him under Sec. 10(1). It shall not be influenced by the finding of the learned Additional Civil Judge that the area of one acre for every ten poultry birds was much excessive. The petition of Sri Parik is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Petition partly allowed.