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State v. Mohd. Yasin .
Legal Opinion Summary — Uniyal, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
These are two connected appeals (one by the State Government and one by the Municipal Board of Saharanpur) from an order of the Sessions Judge dated 10-9-1964 acquitting the respondent Mohd. Yasin of an offence under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
On 13 June 1963 Head Constable Baboo Khan observed heaps of shakkar at the chakki of Abdul Razzaq and saw labourers mixing shelkhari into it. After notifying the Chief Sanitary Inspector and the Food Inspector, the latter purchased 1½ seers of shakkar from the respondent as a sample, paying its price and dividing it into three parts (one given to the respondent, two retained). One sample was sent to the Public Analyst, whose report (11-7-1963) indicated deficiencies and excessive extraneous matter relative to prescribed standards. The Magistrate convicted the respondent under Sec. 7/16, sentencing him to one year's RI and a fine of Rs. 2,000 (in default six months' RI). On appeal the Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent, finding inter alia that the prosecution had not proved the shakkar was stored for sale, that no standard was prescribed for shakkar, and that the sale to the Food Inspector was not voluntary.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the article described as "shakkar" is legally identical to "jaggery" (gur) and therefore subject to the standards prescribed for jaggery under the Rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
- Whether the transaction in which the Food Inspector purchased a sample of shakkar (for which he paid) amounted to a "sale" within the meaning of Sec. 2(xiii) of the Act, even if the vendor's consent was alleged to be obtained under duress.
- Whether the Food Inspector had jurisdiction under Sec. 10(2) to enter and take samples from the premises where the shakkar was stored or being converted into Raab, particularly if the product or premises were not "for sale".
- Whether on the facts the shakkar found in the godown was being manufactured into Raab (and thus not stored for sale) so as to defeat the prosecution's case that the respondent possessed adulterated food for purposes of sale.
Arguments of the Parties
Municipal Board / Appellants
- Contended that "shakkar" and "jaggery" (gur) are the same; therefore the analytical standards prescribed for gur/jaggery under the Rules apply to the shakkar in question.
- Maintained that the Public Analyst's report established that the shakkar sample was below prescribed standards and therefore adulterated, attracting liability under Sec. 7 read with Sec. 16.
Respondent (Mohd. Yasin)
- Argued that the sale of the sample to the Food Inspector was not voluntary but effected under duress and in the presence of police, and so did not constitute a "sale" because contracts/sales require free consent.
- Contended that the shakkar in the godown was not kept for sale but was being converted into Raab (a different stage of manufacture), and that therefore the Food Inspector lacked jurisdiction to take samples for analysis.
- Implicitly relied on the Sessions Judge's view that no standard had been prescribed for shakkar and that shakkar could not be equated with gur/jaggery.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mangal Das v. Maharashtra State, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 128 | Held that purchase of an article of food by a Food Inspector for purposes of analysis constituted "sale" within Sec. 2(xiii) of the Act, and that the character of a sale does not disappear merely because the transaction was not voluntary. | The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to reject the respondent's argument that a sale under duress could not be a "sale" within the meaning of the Act; it adopted the principle that statutory sample-purchases amount to sale even if not freely consented to. |
| Food Inspector, Calicut v. Parameshwaran Chettiar, 1962 1 Cr. L.J. 152 (Kerala) | Held (by Raman Nayar, J.) that a transaction in which a Food Inspector obtained an article under Sec. 10 might not constitute a "sale" (i.e., a view that purchase under statutory power did not amount to sale). | The opinion noted this earlier authority but rejected its conclusion in light of the Supreme Court's decision (Mangal Das), explaining that Parameshwaran Chettiar's contrary view was not followed and that purchase by a Food Inspector for analysis is a "sale" within Sec. 2(xiii). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual determinations based on the record and statutory provisions:
- Identification of the article: The court consulted an English dictionary definition which equated "jaggery" with "shakkar" (Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary). From this it concluded as a matter of language that jaggery and shakkar are synonymous, and therefore the analytical standards prescribed for "gur or jaggery" in the Rules applied to shakkar.
- Application of Rules/analytical standards: The court quoted Para. A.07.05 of Appendix B of the Rules (standards for gur/jaggery) specifying limits for total sugars, sucrose, extraneous matter insoluble in water, total ash and acid-insoluble ash, and moisture. It then compared those standards with the Public Analyst's findings (total sugar 72.7%, sucrose 64.7%, extraneous matter 17%, etc.) and concluded the sample was below prescribed standards and therefore adulterated within the meaning of Sec. 2(i)(1) of the Act.
- Nature of the "sale": The court examined Sec. 2(xiii)'s wide definition of "sale" (which expressly includes sale "for analysis") and Sec. 10 (which empowers Food Inspectors to take samples and to pay the price). The court reasoned that where Sec. 10 authorizes a Food Inspector to purchase samples on payment of price, read together with Sec. 2(xiii), such purchase is a "sale" in law even if the vendor's consent was obtained under compulsion. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Mangal Das to reject the contention that consent is a prerequisite to characterizing the transaction as a sale under the Act.
- Jurisdiction to enter/inspect: Addressing the contention that the Food Inspector lacked jurisdiction because the shakkar was being manufactured into Raab and not "for sale," the court examined Sec. 10(2), which permits a Food Inspector to enter and inspect places where any article of food is "manufactured, stored or exposed for sale" and to take samples. The court observed that the word "manufactured" is not expressly qualified by "for sale" in the subsection, and even if it were, the facts (a large quantity purchased for a substantial sum) supported an inference that the product or its manufacture was for sale.
- Factual rejection of manufacturing-for-Raab contention: The court reviewed evidence: a witness (Shabbir, D.W.6) said Raab manufacture involves no masala or other substance; the Food Inspector observed shelkhari (a stone powder) being mixed into the shakkar. The court found the respondent's claim that the shakkar was being converted into Raab to be without substance and therefore rejected the Sessions Judge's finding to that effect.
- Conclusion on liability: On the combined findings—that the article was shakkar (jaggery) subject to prescribed standards, that the Public Analyst's report showed adulteration, that the sample-purchase constituted a sale under Sec. 2(xiii), and that the Food Inspector had jurisdiction under Sec. 10(2)—the court concluded the respondent was liable under Sec. 7 read with Sec. 16 of the Act.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEALS ALLOWED. The court set aside the order of acquittal by the Sessions Judge and restored the Magistrate's conviction and sentence of the respondent under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Direct consequences and practical effects:
- The respondent Mohd. Yasin's acquittal was quashed; the earlier conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrate were restored.
- The respondent was ordered to be taken into custody forthwith to serve the sentences awarded to him.
Broader implications:
The decision applies and follows established statutory interpretation and the Supreme Court authority (Mangal Das) that a purchase by a Food Inspector for analysis amounts to a "sale" under the Act even if not voluntary. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the application of statutory definitions, the Rules' standards for gur/jaggery, and the cited precedent.
Appeals allowed.
Uniyal, J.:— These are two connected appeals, one by the State Government and, another by the complainant, the Municipal Board of Saharanpur, from an order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 10-9-1964 acquitting the respondent Mohd. Yasin for offence under Sec. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
2. The facts giving rise to the prosecution of the respondent may be briefly stated. On 13th June, 1963 Head Constable Baboo Khan was on patrol duty. He happened to reach Chakki of one Abdul Razzaq. He found heaps of Shakkar lying there and some labourers mixing Shelkhari in it with spades. He asked the labourers not to leave the place until his return. He went to the police station to inform the Station Officer about it but neither the Station officer nor the Second Officer was found there. He then met Chief Sanitary Inspector whom he informed about what he had seen at the Chakki. The Chief Sanitary Inspector accompanied by the Food Inspector then proceeded to the Chakki of Abdul Razzaq. They found labourers mixing something in the heap of Shakkar. Shortly afterwards the Station Officer and the Dy. S.P Police also arrived there. On enquiry by the Food Inspector he was told that the stock of Shakkar belonged to Mohd. Yasin, the respondent.
3. The Food Inspector purchased 1½ seers of Shakkar from the respondent by way of sample after paying its price. He divided the samples into three parts and gave one sample to the respondent and kept two other samples with him.
4. One of the samples was sent to the Public Analyst for scientific examination and report. The Public Analyst submitted his report on 11-7-1963. The report disclosed that the Shakkar contained 2.4% moisture, 72.7% total sugar, 64.7% sucrose, 17% extraneous matter insoluble in water. The opinion of the Public Analyst was that the Shakkar in question was deficient by 17% in total sugar and by 5.0% in sucrose contents. According to him the extraneous matter insoluble in water, total ash and ash insoluble in Hydrochloric acid exceeded by 15.0%, 10.1% respectively as against the maximum prescribed standards of 2.0%, 6.0% and 0.5% respectively. The Magistrate while holding that the sale of Shakkar to the Food Inspector was not voluntary and was made under duress came to the conclusion that the respondent had stored it for sale and that it was adulterated. He accordingly convicted the accused and sentenced him to one year's R.I and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default six months' R.I under Sec. 7 read with Sec. 16 of the Act.
5. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent on the finding that the prosecution had failed to prove that Shakkar stored by the respondent was for purposes of sale. He held that Shakkar found in the godown of the respondent was being converted into Raab by mixing extraneous matter and as such it could not be said that it had been stored for purposes of sale. He further held that no standard was prescribed for Shakkar, and that as an article of food it could not be equated with Gur or jaggary. He also held that the Shakkar in question had been obtained from the respondent under duress and the transaction could not be regarded as sale in the eye of the law.
6. It was contended for the Municipal Board that Shakkar and jaggery were one and the same thing. The rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act had prescribed a standard for jaggery and, therefore, that standard applied in all respects to Shakkar stored by the respondent and purchased by the Food Inspector.
7. In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (Revised Edition) jaggery is defined thus:
“A coarse dark sugar made from palm sap or otherwise (Hindi-Shakkar; Sanskrit-Sarkara).”
8. The above definition shows that in the English language jaggery and shakkar are synonimous terms and the one is not different from the other.
9. It, therefore, follows that the standard prescribed for jaggery under the rules was applicable to shakkar sold in the instant case.
10. Para. A.07.05 of Appendix B of the Rules reads:—
“Gur or jagger means the product obtained by boiling or processing juice pressed out of sugar cane or extracted from palmyra palm, date palm or coconut palm. It shall be free from substances deleterious to health and shall conform to the following analytical standards on dry weight basis:—
(i) total sugars not less than 90 per cent, and sucrose not less than 70 per cent.,
(ii) extraneous matter insoluble in water not more than 2 per cent.,
(iii) total ash not more than 6 per cent.,
(iv) ash insoluble in hydrochloric acid (Hcl) not more than 0.5 per cent.
Gur or jaggery other than that of the liquid or semi-liquid variety shall not contain more than 10 per cent, moisture.”
11. The report of the Public Analyst clearly goes to prove that the sample of Shakkar that is ‘jaggery’ which was sent for analysis was below the prescribed standard and that the extraneous matter insoluble in water found therein was in excess of the prescribed standard. He was accordingly of the opinion that the sample of Shakkar sent for analysis was adulterated.
12. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore clearly in error in thinking that ‘Shakkar’ and ‘jaggery’ are not one and the same thing, and that no standard has been prescribed for shakkar in the Rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He was also wrong in holding that Shakkar contains more foreign matter than Gur and that presence of extraneous matter in the sample did not indicate that it was adulterated. We are clearly of opinion that the sample of Shakkar sold to the Food Inspector was ‘adulterated’ within the meaning of Sec. 2(i)(1) of the Act.
13. The next question is whether the sample purchased by the Food Inspector for purposes of analysis amounted to sale within the meaning of the Act Sec. 2(xiii) defines ‘sale’ as follows:—
“Sale” with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means the sale of any article of food whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale, and offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article and includes also an attempt to sell any such article.”
14. It is not disputed that the Food Inspector did purchase a sample of Shakkar from the respondent and had paid its price to him. What was contended for the respondent, was that sale of the sample had been effected under threat and in the presence of police officers and it was not a voluntary act of the respondent. According to the learned counsel such a transaction did not amount to sale because the concept of sale involves free consent on the part of the vendor and the vendee. The argument loses sight of the fact that by Sec. 10 the Food Inspector is empowered not only to take sample of any article of food but also to enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured, stored or exposed for sale and take samples of such articles of food for analysis. The food inspector is thus authorised by law to purchase a sample of any article of food under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 10 after paying its price in accordance with sub-sec. (3) of that section. By reading Sec. 2(xiii) and Sec. 10(2) together it becomes clear that the Food Inspector is empowered to purchase any article of food from any person on payment of price and such a transaction amounts to sale in law. In view of the report of the public analyst that the sample in question was adulterated the respondent rendered himself liable under Sec. 7 read with Sec. 16 of the Act.
15. The allegation that the sale of article in question was the result of coercion exercised on the respondent is, to our mind, of no consequence. Where there is a statutory power empowering an authority like the Food Inspector to purchase sample of food for purposes of analysis, the law implies the enforcement of that power even against the will of the person storing or exposing that article for sale. In Mangal Das v. Maharashtra State A.I.R 1966 S.C 128. the point under consideration was whether sale of an adulterated article of food for purposes of sample constituted sale within the meaning of the Act when the transaction in question could not be said to be free or voluntary. Dealing with this aspect of the matter Madholakar, J. delivering the judgment of the Court said as follows:—
“Mr. Anthony contends that a contract must be consensual and that this implies that both the parties to it must act voluntarily. No doubt a contract comes into existence by the acceptance of a proposal made by one person to another by that other person. That other person is not bound to accept the proposal but it may not necessarily follow that where that other person had no choice but to accept the proposal the transaction would never amount to a contract….
“That was evidently because here we have a special definition of ‘sale’ in Sec. 2(xiii) of the Act which specifically includes within its ambit a sale for analysis. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the reasons which led Raman Nayar, J. in Food Inspector Calicut v. Parameshwaran Chattiar 1962 1 Cr. L.J 152 Kerala. to hold that a transaction like the present does not amount to a sale. We are, therefore, unable to accept that view.”
16. I may be pointed out that in the case of Parameshwaran Chettiar referred to above Raman Nayar, J. was of opinion that if a Food Inspector obtain an article of food for price but in exercise of a statutory power under Sec. 10 the transaction did not constitute sale. The above view was repelled by the Supreme Court and it was held that purchase of an article of food by the Food Inspector for purposes of sample was ‘sale’ within the meaning of Sec. 2(xiii) and that irrespective of whether the transaction was voluntary or otherwise it did not lose its character of being a sale as defined in the Act.
17. Lastly it was contended that the Food Inspector had no jurisdiction to enter the premises where shakkar was stored as the same was not for sale and ex hypothesis the purchase of shakkar by the Food Inspector would not be a sale under Sec. 2, clause (xiii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In support of the contention reliance was placed on the finding recorded by the learned lower court that the shakkar which was in the godown was stored for being manufactured into Raab and was not for sale. Assuming for the moment that the aforesaid finding is correct it would not lead to the conclusion that the Food Inspector had no authority to visit the godown or to take a sample of the shakkar. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 reads as below:—
“Any Food Inspector may enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured, stored or exposed for sale and take sample of such articles of food for analysis.”
18. It would thus appear that it is within the power of the Food Inspector to enter and inspect the place where any article of food is manufactured and even according to the finding recorded by the learned lower court shakkar was being converted into Raab. Raab is an article of food and the godown was a place where Raab was being manufactured. The Food Inspector had thus power and authority to enter the aforesaid godown and take a sample of the article of food. It was also contended on behalf of the respondent that since the Raab was not for sale the Food Inspector did not have any power to take a sample of it. It will will be noticed that the word ‘manufacture’ is not modified by the words ‘for sale’. If the intention of the legislature had been that the words ‘manufacture’ and ‘stored’ should also be qualified, by the expression ‘for sale’ sub-sec. (2) would have been worded somewhat as below:—
“any Food Inspector may enter and inspect any place where for the purposes of sale any article of food is manufactured, stored or exposed and take sample of such articles of food for analysis.”
19. Even if it be held that the expression ‘for sale’ governs the word ‘manufacture’ also it would not improve the respondent's case. The respondent had purchased shakkar for Rs. 12,000/- or so and the Raab that was in the process of manufacture must have been for sale. It has not been shown that such a huge quantity of Raab would have been utilised by the respondent for any other purpose.
20. We are not inclined to uphold the finding recorded by the learned lower court that the shakkar found in the godown was to be or being manufactured into Raab. Shabbir (D.W 6) has been doing business in Gur and shakkar for the last 28 years and he has stated that in the manufacture of Raab no masala or any other substance is mixed. At the time when the Food Inspector visited the godown in question he found that Shelkhari which is a kind of stone in a powdered form was being mixed in the shakkar in question. Thus the respondent's case that shakkar found in the godown was to be or being manufactured into Raab has no substance. We, therefore, reject the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent that the Food Inspector had no power or authority to enter and visit the godown in question and take a sample of the shakkar.
21. On the facts of the case we are of opinion that the sample of shakkar purchased by the Food Inspector from the respondent for purpose of analysis amounted to a transaction of sale. The article sold having been found to be adulterated, the respondent could not escape liability for being in possession of an adulterated article of food, the sale of which is prohibited by Sec. 7 of the Act.
22. We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the order of acquittal and restore that of the learned Magistrate convicting and sentencing the respondent under Sec. 7/16 of the Act. He will be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentences awarded to him.
Appeals allowed.
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