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Dr. Jai Gopal Gupta And Others v. Bodh Mal .
Case Summary — Dwivedi, J. (Second Appeal on Material Alterations)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants are landlords of a house which includes a courtyard; the respondent is the tenant. The respondent erected a kitchen and a bathroom on a portion of the courtyard without obtaining the landlords' permission. The appellants sued, seeking ejectment inter alia on the ground that the tenant had made material alterations to the premises without permission. The trial court granted the suit, finding that the constructions amounted to material alterations. On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed that finding and dismissed the appellants' suit, holding that the constructions did not amount to material alterations. The appellants brought a second appeal. A learned single judge referred the appeal to a larger Bench because of conflicting single-judge authorities on whether the question of material alterations is one of fact, law, or mixed. The present opinion is by Dwivedi, J., delivered by the larger Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the constructions carried out by the tenant (a kitchen and a bathroom in the courtyard) constitute "material alterations" of the accommodation within the meaning of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, so as to permit ejectment of the tenant.
- Whether the question whether a construction "has materially altered the accommodation" is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore whether a second appeal may entertain the matter.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The constructions made by the respondent in the courtyard (kitchen and bathroom) amounted to material alterations to the rented accommodation, and therefore warranted the suit for ejectment.
Respondent's Arguments
- The constructions do not amount to material alterations.
- The finding of the lower appellate court that the constructions were not material alterations is a finding of fact and, accordingly, not examinable in a second appeal; the respondent relied on a dictum in Jai Bhawan v. Padam Sen (1964 A.L.J 991) in support of this contention.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jai Bhawan v. Padam Sen, 1964 A.L.J. 991 (single Judge) | Dictum that whether a construction "has materially altered the accommodation" appears to be a question of fact (supported by a passage in Halsbury's). | The respondent relied on this dictum to argue the matter was a finding of fact not examinable in a second appeal; the Court noted it is a single Judge decision and observed that the Halsbury/Hyman authorities relied on relate to covenants, not a statutory standard. |
| Sardar Bahadur Mathur v. Kali Prasad Gupta, 1961 A.L.J. 137 (single Judge) | Held that the finding about material alterations is a question of law. | Presented as the conflicting authority to Jai Bhawan; the existence of this conflict prompted reference to a larger Bench. The Court adopts the view that the question of materiality is ordinarily one of law. |
| Hyman v. Rose, 1912 A.C. 623 (House of Lords) | Decision cited (via Halsbury) concerning tenant covenants and whether alterations change the nature of premises. | The Court observed that Hyman (and the Halsbury passage based on it) concerns covenants and is not concerned with a statutory standard; therefore, it is not directly applicable to determining a statutory standard of "materially altered". |
| Atul Chandra Lahiry v. Sonatan Daw, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 78 (Division Bench) | Held that a finding about constructions being of a permanent nature under clause (e) of Section 108, Transfer of Property Act, is a mixed question of fact and law. | The Court cited this case to illustrate that some issues may be mixed questions; it supports the proposition that legal conclusions drawn from facts are open to second appeal where the legal conclusion is mistaken. |
| Lachmeshwar v. Manowar, 1892 19 Cal. 253 | Example that findings on adverse possession are often mixed questions of fact and law. | Used as an example to explain the concept of mixed questions where facts are ascertained and legal principles applied to those facts. |
| Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 1956 S.C.R. 691 | Explanation of the concept of mixed questions of law and fact: ascertain facts, then apply principles of law to reach legal conclusion. | Quoted at length to support distinguishing questions of fact, law, and mixed questions, and to explain when a second appeal is competent. |
| Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishan Das, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 643 | Authority that alterations which have the effect of altering the form and structure of the premises are material alterations; material alterations mean important or substantial changes to front or structure. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court statement to explain the ordinary meaning of "material alterations" and applied it in assessing whether the tenant's additions altered the form or structure of the house. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps, closely following the statutory language and authorities cited in the opinion:
- Statutory Framework: The court identified sub-sec. (1) of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, which permits suit for ejectment (without District Magistrate permission) on specified grounds, including where a tenant "has materially altered the accommodation" without written permission of the landlord. This statutory phrase sets a legal standard to be applied.
- Three-Part Inquiry Defined: The court distilled the matters the court must form an opinion upon into three components:
- (a) The actual constructions made by the tenant — a factual finding;
- (b) Whether the construction has altered the accommodation — a matter to be determined after ascertaining the facts;
- (c) Whether any alteration is "material" — ordinarily a question of law because it invokes a statutory standard.
- Nature of the Questions — Fact, Law, or Mixed: The court examined authorities: Jai Bhawan suggested materiality is a question of fact (relying on Halsbury/Hyman, concerning covenants). Other authorities (Mathur's case) said it is a question of law. The court explained that passages from Halsbury/Hyman concern tenant covenants and are not directed at a statutory standard. The court also cited Atul Chandra Lahiry and Sri Meenakshi Mills to explain the doctrine of mixed questions, where facts are ascertained and legal principles applied to reach an ultimate legal conclusion — in such cases a second appeal may lie on the ground that the legal conclusion is mistaken.
- Application to the Present Facts — Findings on Fact: The lower appellate court's factual findings (accepted by this court) were that the respondent built a new bathroom and kitchen separate from the house, occupying about one-third of the courtyard; the structures had no foundation, were built of pucca bricks and plastered; the tenant used the side of a bed as roof support for one room; the house as let had no separate bathroom and had a separate but inconvenient kitchen.
- Application to the Present Facts — Legal Conclusion on Materiality: The court considered dictionary meanings of "alter" and "materially" and prior authority (including Manmohan Das Shah) that material alterations are those that alter form or structure of the premises and substantially change front or structure. The court concluded that:
- The tenant did not touch the house structure as let; the additions were built in the courtyard and separate from the house;
- The additions appeared necessary for proper and convenient use of the house;
- The additions lacked foundations, were essentially temporary and could be demolished without damage to the accommodation; the use of a bed side as structural support indicated temporariness;
- The additions occupied only a small portion of the courtyard and did not change the front or the structure of the house.
- Conclusion: Having applied the statutory standard and relevant authorities to the facts, the court agreed with the lower appellate court's conclusion and dismissed the appeal.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED (with costs).
Holding (core ruling): The court affirmed the lower appellate court's determination that the kitchen and bathroom constructed by the tenant in the courtyard did not materially alter the accommodation within the meaning of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The appellants' appeal is dismissed and the lower appellate court's dismissal of the ejectment suit is upheld; costs were awarded against the appellants.
- On legal characterization: The court explained that the issue of whether constructions "materially alter" accommodation ordinarily involves application of a statutory standard (a question of law) to established facts; factual findings as to what constructions were made remain findings of fact, but whether those facts meet the statutory standard of "material alteration" is ordinarily a legal conclusion (and can be scrutinised in a second appeal to the extent a legal conclusion is drawn from the facts).
- The court's reasoning distinguishes authorities based on covenants (Halsbury/Hyman) from the statutory inquiry, and emphasizes the mixed-fact-and-law character of such disputes where applicable.
Appeal dismissed. (Final paragraph of the opinion: "Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.")
Dwivedi, J.:— In this appeal the appellants are the landlords of a house; and respondent the tenant of it. The house has a courtyard. On a portion of the courtyard the respondent erected a kitchen and a bath-room. He made these constructions without obtaining permission from the appellants. They instituted a suit for his ejectment, inter alia, on the ground that he has made material alterations in the house without their permission. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The trial court took the view that the constructions made by the respondent amounted to material alterations. In appeal, the lower appellate court has taken the contrary view. It has held that the constructions do not amount to material alterations. Accordingly it has dismissed the appellants suit.
2. When the second appeal was heard by a learned single judge, the appellants recanvassed the argument that the constructions amount to material alterations. But according to the respondent they do not. The respondent also said that the finding of the lower appellate court on the question of material alterations is a finding of fact and cannot be examined by this Court in second appeal. He sought support from a dictum in Jai Bhawan v. Padam Sen 1964 A.L.J 991.. It is single Judge decision. In Sardar Bahadur Mathur v. Kali Prasad Gupta 1961 A.L.J 137., another single Judge has held that the finding about material alterations is one of law. As there is a conflict between the decisions, the learned single Judge referred this appeal to a larger Bench. The case is now before us.
3. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act permits the institution of a suit for ejectment of a tenant without permission of the District Magistrate on one or more of the seven grounds specified therein. Thus a suit may be instituted for ejectment if the tenant has without the written permission of the landlord made or permitted to be made “any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the accommodation”. The Court is required to form opinion on three matters: (1) The actual constructions made by the tenant; (2) the construction has altered the accommodation; and (3) the alteration is material. The finding of the lower appellate court regarding the actual constructions made by the tenant is a finding of fact. But its opinion regarding the constructions being material alterations is one of law. The statute prescribes a standard. That standard is that the construction should materially alter the accommodation. Whether the actual constructions made in a particular case reach up to the statutory standard is we think, a question of law. Counsel for the respondent relies on a dictum of Mr. Justice Dhavan in Jai Bhawan's case. He said there:
“I think that the question whether in any particular case the construction made by the tenant ‘has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value’ appears to be one of fact. I am fortified in this opinion by the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, third Edition, Volume 23 (landlord and tenant) p. 595: In each case it is a question of fact whether the alteration changes the nature of premises or property and if it is so, the tenant will be guilty of waste.”
4. Apart from seeking support for his view from the foregoing passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, the learned Judge does not appear to have given any reason of his own in support of his view. The passage in Halsbury's Laws of England is based on a similar remark in Hyman v. Rose 1912 A.C 623 at p. 632.. Neither the said passage nor the decision of the House of Lords is concerned with a statutory standard. They have reference to a covenant by a tenant against making alterations in the premises let to him. On the other hand, in Atul Chandra Lahiry v. Sonatan Daw A.I.R 1962 Cal. 78., a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that a finding about the constructions made by a tenant being of a permanent nature within the meaning of clause (e) of Sec. 108. Transfer of Property Act, is a mixed finding of fact and law. Again, although a second appeal will lie from finding of fact, yet where a legal conclusion is drawn from the finding, a second appeal will lie on the ground that the legal conclusion is mistaken. Thus a finding on adverse possession is often a mixed finding of fact and law. See Lachmeshwar v. Manowar 1892 19 Cal. 253.. In Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 S.C.R 691., the Supreme Court observed:—
“In between the domains occupied respectively by questions of fact and of law, there is a large area in which both these questions run into each other, forming so to say, enclaves within each other. The questions that arise for determination in that area are known as mixed questions of law and fact. These questions involve first the ascertainment of facts on the evidence adduced and then a determination of the rights of the parties on an application of the appropriate principles of law to the facts ascertained. To take an example, the question is whether the defendant has acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession. It is found on the facts that the land is a vacant site, that the defendant is the owner of the adjacent residential house and that he has been drying grains and cloth and throwing rubbish on the plot. The further questions that has to be determined is whether the above facts are sufficient to constitute adverse possession in law. Is the user continuous or fugitive? Is it as of right or permissive in character? Thus, for deciding whether the defendant has acquired title by adverse possession, the Court has firstly to find on an appreciation of the evidence what the facts are. So far it is a question of fact. It has then to apply the principles of law regarding acquisition of title by adverse possession, and decide whether on the facts established by the evidence, the requirements of law are satisfied. That is a question of law. The ultimate finding on the issue must, therefore, be an inference to be drawn from the facts found, on the application of the proper principles of law, and it will be correct to say in such cases that an inference from facts is a question of law.”
5. In a suit based on material alterations, the lower appellate court has first to record a finding about the actual constructions made by the tenant; and that finding will be a finding of fact. After the lower appellate court has ascertained the actual constructions made by the tenant, it has to form an opinion as to whether these constructions have materially altered the accommodation. The expression ‘materially altered’ finds place in a statute. Its meaning has to be ascertainted first. And then the lower appellate court has to see whether the constructions made amount to material alterations within the meaning of the Act. This will, as already stated, be ordinarily a finding of law.
6. The next question is whether the constructions made in this case have materially altered the accommodation. Admittedly, the respondent has constructed a new bath-room and a new kitchen. They are, however, separate from the structure of the house. They cover about one-third portion of the courtyard. They have no foundation. They are built of pucca bricks and are plastered with cement. The tenant has used the side of a bed for giving support to the roof of one of the rooms. The accommodation as let has no separate bath-room. It has a separate kitchen but it appears that it could not be conveniently used. These are the findings of the lower appellate court in regard to the construction made by the tenant. The question is whether on these facts it can be held that the respondent has materially altered the accommodation. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the word ‘alter’ means ‘change in character, position etc. The word ‘materially’ means ‘important, essentially, concerned with matter, not with form’. In Mathur's case Mr. Justice Srivastava took the view that the expression ‘materially altered’ should be held to mean ‘a change in the character or position of the accommodation which is essential or important.’ According to the Supreme Court if the constructions have the effect of altering the form and structure of the premises, they will be material alterations. In Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishan Das A.I.R 1967 S.C 643., the Supreme Court said:
“Without attempting to lay down any general definition as to what material alterations mean, as such a question would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, the alterations in the present case must mean material alterations as the construction carried out by the respondent had the effect of altering the form and structure of the accommodation. The expression ‘material alterations’ in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises.”
7. In this case the tenant had made alterations in the building which was let to him. And they were to be material alterations. In the case before us the tenant has not touched the house which was let to him. It remains as it was when it was let out to him. He has, however, added two rooms on a portion of the courtyard. These additions are a kitchen and a bath-room. They appear to be necessary for the proper and convenient use of the house let out to him. They have no foundations, although they are built of pucca bricks and have been plastered with cement. Essentially they are of a temporary character. They can be demolished at any time without causing any damage to the accommodation. Their temporary character is also evinced by the tenant's use of a side of a bed as a support for the roof of one of them. They also occupy only a small portion of the courtyard. It cannot be said that they have changed the front or the structure of the house let to the tenant. It is difficult to say on the facts of this case that the constructions made by the tenant have materially altered the accommodation.
8. In sum, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we agree with the lower appellate court that the constructions made by the respondent have not materially altered the accommodation.
9. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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