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T.C Sreedharan Pillai And Others (Petitioners) v. The State Of Kerala And Others (S).

Kerala High Court
Dec 14, 1972
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Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Balakrishna Eradi, J., addresses multiple writ petitions challenging executive orders issued by the State of Kerala under Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 and related statutory provisions in the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968. The petitions contest the validity and scope of orders (referred to as Exhibits P3, P4, P9, P11 and others) that altered seniority, rank and promotional consequences of various government employees by means of relaxation or exemption from qualifying provisions (such as departmental/test qualifications) and by purportedly invoking Rule 39.

The litigation followed these key developments (as described in the opinion):

  • Rule 39 (originally referring to the "Governor") was central to the dispute. During the hearing the State issued a notification (S.R.O No. 379/72 dated 10-7-1972) substituting "Government" for "Governor" in Rule 39 and stating the amendment was deemed effective from 17-12-1958.
  • Petitioners challenged: (a) the authority to exercise powers under Rule 39 (Governor v. State Government), (b) retrospective validity of the amendment substituting "Government" for "Governor", (c) the legality of executive orders (notably Exhibits P3, P4, P9, P4 (different context), P11) that restored seniority or extended exemptions, and (d) alleged contraventions of Articles 14 and 16 and principles of natural justice.
  • The court consolidated considerations by treating O.P No. 5157 of 1969 as the principal case for addressing common legal questions and then decided other writ petitions (including O.P No. 5506 of 1970, O.P No. 1185 of 1970 and a multiple-party petition concerning Rule 13-A / Research Assistant promotions) on the basis of the principles it elaborated.
  • Relief claimed across petitions included quashing the challenged government orders, preventing their implementation, and directing reversion or promotion consistent with the statutory rules.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the proper interpretation, scope and ambit of Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 (and whether it permits blanket or general exemptions from other rules)?
  2. Whether the power conferred by Rule 39 is exercisable only by the Governor or by the State Government (and whether the 1972 amendment substituting "Government" for "Governor" could be given retrospective effect)?
  3. Whether executive orders (Exhibits P3, P4, P9, P4 (Statistics case), P11, etc.) relying on Rule 39 to restore seniority, grant exemptions or extend temporary exemptions were valid exercises of power, or ultra vires and in conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution?
  4. Whether the orders under Rule 39 which directly affect the settled seniority, rank or promotions of other officers require observance of principles of natural justice (including prior notice and opportunity to be heard) to persons likely to be affected?
  5. Whether the State Government could lawfully extend or renew temporary exemptions provided under Rule 13-A (Special/departmental test exemption) beyond the mandatory two-year period, except where permitted by the rule itself (e.g., for Scheduled Castes/Tribes)?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Rule 39 originally empowered only the Governor to exercise the specified power; orders passed by the State Government without placing files before the Governor were therefore illegal and without jurisdiction.
  • The notification amending Rule 39 (substituting "Government" for "Governor") and making it retrospectively effective back to 17-12-1958 was invalid, because the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (the parent enactment relied upon for the rule-making power) came into force only on 17-9-1968.
  • Rule 39 does not authorize blanket exemptions or general orders exempting an undefined class of officers from rules (e.g., Rule 27(a), Rule 30(b), Rule 13-A); it permits only individualised, exceptional relief after application of mind to facts of each case.
  • The impugned government orders violated Articles 14 and 16 by granting special treatment to undefined groups without reasonable classification or rational nexus to the object of the rules.
  • Orders that disrupt settled seniority, rank or promotions were passed without giving affected officers an opportunity to make representations, violating principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem).
  • Rule 39 cannot be used to abrogate substantive provisions of the general or special rules or to validate actions that go to the root of service conditions.

State Government's Arguments (as presented in the counter-affidavits / submissions)

  • The expression "Governor" in the original Rule 39 was intended to denote the State Government (i.e., the Governor acting on advice), so the State Government could lawfully exercise the power without submitting files to the Governor personally.
  • After the 1972 amendment substituting "Government" for "Governor", the State contended that retrospective validation back to 17-12-1958 (via the notification) validated earlier orders passed by the State Government under Rule 39.
  • The State relied on Rule 39 as authority to grant relaxations/exemptions (including in respect of Rules 27(a), 30(b), and Rule 13-A) and argued that the orders were therefore within executive competence.
  • In some pleadings the Government raised the position that certain older special rules (e.g., Madras Ministerial Service Rules) might no longer be in force; the court did not accept that general contention and confined its analysis to the material rules in force.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409 Prohibition on framing rules or measures that regularise or validate appointments which nullify operation/effectiveness of existing service rules; limits of proviso to Article 309. The court relied on the decision to hold that Rule 39 cannot be construed to permit executive orders that totally nullify service rules; a rule or executive action cannot be used to regularise actions that violate substantive service provisions.
S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1427 Principle that administrative discretion must be confined within clearly defined limits; absence of arbitrary power is essential to rule of law. Quoted to support the restrictive construction of Rule 39 and to underline that discretion must be predictable and guided by known principles.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150 Principles of natural justice are flexible; applicability depends on facts and consequences of the decision. Applied to hold that when orders under Rule 39 directly affect settled seniority or rank, affected persons must be given an opportunity to be heard; natural justice obligation arises in such cases.
Income-tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose, (1969) 2 SCC 351 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 385 Executive orders granting retrospective eligibility/benefits will not validly confer retrospective promotion eligibility in contravention of rules. Relied upon to state that executive exemptions cannot have retrospective effect to confer eligibility as of an earlier date when they were not eligible under the rule.
Ex-Major M.C. Singhal v. Director General Armed Forces Medical Services, (1972) 4 SCC 765 : A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 628 Similar authority on limits of retrospective operation of executive actions affecting service conditions. Used to support the proposition that executive orders cannot retrospectively create eligibility contrary to the operative date under the rules.
Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 470 Principle that appointments/promotions effected long ago should not be lightly disturbed after lapse of years; stability in service is important. Applied to underline that it would be inequitable and disruptive to review and unsettle promotions and seniority long after they have been settled.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a structured analysis addressing (i) validity and scope of Rule 39; (ii) retrospective amendment issues; (iii) constitutional constraints under Articles 14 & 16; (iv) principles of natural justice; and (v) application of those principles to the facts of the several writ petitions.

On the validity and construction of Rule 39:

  • The Court rejected a broad attack that Rule 39 amounted to excessive delegation or arbitrary discretion; it found the rule contained sufficient guidance by conferring power only to deal with cases "in such manner as may appear to be just and equitable".
  • Rule 39 was construed narrowly: it authorises special treatment only in cases admitting a reasonable classification based on real and substantial distinctions bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object of the rules. It is primarily to meet "very exceptional" situations where strict application of the rules causes manifest injustice or inequity.
  • The non obstante clause in Rule 39 (and its repetition in other rules) was given a restricted meaning: it does not authorise wiping out or nullifying the entire operation of other rules by executive fiat. It was interpreted as permitting relaxation only insofar as necessary to effect justice in the particular subject-matter of the rule and not as a carte blanche to override all rules.
  • Rule 39 may be used to relax procedural or incidental provisions and, in rare, exceptional cases with valid classification, to relax substantive provisions — but only where application of the rule is preceded by careful application of mind to individual facts and circumstances.

On Articles 14 and 16:

  • The Court reiterated established principles: classification is permissible but must rest on real and substantial distinctions reasonably related to the object of the rule. Arbitrary picking and choosing is forbidden.
  • Accordingly, Rule 39 had to be construed so as to eliminate arbitrariness and ensure compatibility with Articles 14 and 16; any exercise of the power inconsistent with reasonable classification would be ultra vires.

On the amendment substituting "Government" for "Governor" and retrospective operation:

  • The court noted the 1972 amendment merely replaced the word "Governor" with "Government" and added "or persons" (which was held inconsequential). The court observed this substitution did not change the scope or content of the power under Rule 39.
  • The court declined to reach a final conclusion on the validity of the retrospective effect claimed by the notification (deemed effective from 17-12-1958) because it found the impugned orders ultra vires even assuming the amended rule applied. Thus the court resolved the cases on ultra vires grounds without deciding the retrospectivity question.

On natural justice:

  • Relying on Kraipak, the Court held the rules of natural justice are not rigid; applicability depends upon the nature and consequences of the impugned order.
  • Where an order under Rule 39 will directly affect settled seniority, rank, or previously conferred promotions, the authority must afford affected persons an opportunity to make representations. Thus, in such cases audi alteram partem is mandatory.
  • By contrast, not every order under Rule 39 (particularly those relaxing purely procedural requirements with no direct effect on others' settled rights) will require notice to all remotely affected persons.

Application to the facts (selected findings):

  • O.P No. 5157 of 1969 (two petitioners promoted to Assistant Grade I with effect from 1-11-1961): Exhibits P3 and P4 were general orders restoring seniority to a broad undefined class of seniors on specified conditions of passing tests within certain chances; Exhibit P9 extended that restoration indefinitely. The Court held P3, P4 and P9 to be invalid because they were general orders affecting an undefined class without specific application of mind to individual cases and because they effectively nullified Rule 27(a) absent strong and exceptional justification. Accordingly, those orders were ultra vires Rule 39.
  • O.P No. 5506 of 1970 (Legislature Secretariat petitioner promoted to Grade I earlier): The same pattern of orders (Exts. P1–P3 in that petition, corresponding to P3/P4/P9) was impugned. Because the Court had already concluded those government orders were invalid, the petitioner succeeded; the respondents were prohibited from implementing Ext. P3 as against the petitioner.
  • O.P No. 1185 of 1970 (Madras Ministerial Service recruits allotted to Kerala): The government issued general exemption from Rule 30(b) for certain seniors and consequentially revised promotion lists many years after the lists had been settled. The Court held the exemption and consequential amendments (Exhibits P4 and P5) were not validly made under Rule 39 (general exemption, no individualised consideration), were in part unsupported (no shown special circumstances) and were also in breach of natural justice because petitioners who suffered adverse alteration of seniority were not heard. Exts. P4 and P5 (insofar as they included specified respondents in the 1961 list) were quashed.
  • Case concerning Kerala Statistics & Economics Subordinate Service and Rule 13-A (Research Assistant promotions): The Special Rules introduced a selective test; Rule 13-A allowed temporary appointments for up to two years from introduction of test, with automatic reversion thereafter unless the test was passed (with limited extension only for SC/ST). Government orders (Exhibit P4 dated 29-6-1970 and later Ext. P11 dated 29-6-1972) extended temporary exemption generally. The Court held that the government had no power under Rule 39 to grant a general extension for all provisional promotees beyond the mandatory period, and that such general orders (and the later extension) were invalid. The Court quashed Exhibits P4 and P11, directed reversion of unqualified provisional promotees and directed prompt promotion of qualified petitioners within two months.

Holding and Implications

Core holdings:

  • O.P No. 5157 of 1969: The petition is allowed; Exhibits P3, P4 and P9 are quashed as ultra vires Rule 39.
  • O.P No. 5506 of 1970: The petition is allowed; respondents are prohibited from implementing the provisions of the relevant government order (Ext. P3) as against the petitioner.
  • O.P No. 1185 of 1970: Judgement allows the petition in part; Exhibits P4 and P5 (to the extent they place specified respondents above the petitioners in 1961 list) are quashed and the specified respondents are held not entitled to seniority above the petitioners.
  • Kerala Statistics & Economics Subordinate Service matter: Exhibits P4 (29-6-1970) and P11 (29-6-1972) granting general extensions of temporary exemption beyond the two-year period under Rule 13-A are quashed. The State is directed to revert unqualified provisional promotees and promote qualified petitioners within two months.

Implications and practical consequences:

  • The Court affirms that Rule 39 is constitutionally valid but is to be narrowly construed and sparingly exercised. It authorises individualized relief in exceptional cases supported by reasonable classification; it does not permit blanket or general exemptions in favour of an undefined group of officers without specific application of mind to individual circumstances.
  • Any executive order under Rule 39 that effectively nullifies or renders ineffectual an existing rule (especially substantive provisions governing recruitment, promotion or seniority) will be liable to be struck down as ultra vires. The proviso to Rule 39 protects the position of the person whose case is dealt with but does not extend to a blanket protection preventing any adverse effect on others where a valid classification exists; nevertheless, the authority must take into account repercussions on others.
  • Where an order under Rule 39 directly affects settled seniority or rank or upsets already-conferred promotions, the authority must afford affected persons an opportunity to make representations (audi alteram partem).
  • The Court did not authoritatively decide the law on the retrospective validity of the 1972 Rule 39 amendment under Sections 2 and 3 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968, because the impugned orders were invalid on other grounds; consequently, the judgment resolves the petitions without ruling finally on that retrospective-notification issue.
  • Direct consequences for parties: quashing of the specific executive orders named; directives for reversion and promotion where applicable; prohibition on implementing the invalidated orders as against petitioners named in the writs. The decision establishes binding outcomes for the particular petitions decided in this judgment; it does not purport to announce a broader legislative change beyond the interpretive constraints placed on Rule 39.
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The Judgment of the court was delivered by

Balakrishna Eradi, J.:— The main question that falls to be decided in these writ petitions concerns the interpretation and scope of Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 and also Sections 2 and 3 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968. The petitioners have challenged the validity of certain orders passed by the State Government in purported exercise of the power conferred by Rule 39 afore mentioned. One of the important points raised by them is that the only authority empowered by the said Rule to exercise the power conferred by it is the Governor of the State and since the orders impugned in the writ petitions were passed only by the State Government without even submitting the files to Governor those proceedings are illegal and without jurisdiction.

2. After the commencement of the hearing of these cases the Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 read with Section 3 thereof issued an amendment to the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules whereby a new provision was substituted in the place of the original Rule 39. This amendment was made as per notification S.R.O No. 379/72 dated the 10th July, 1972 published in the Kerala Gazette dated the 18th July, 1972. It is stated in the said notification that the amendment shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 17-12-1958 which is the date on which the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules were originally brought into force. The petitioners have challenged the validity of the said notification in so far as it purports to give retrospective operation to the amendment with effect from a date anterior to the date of coming into force of the parent enactment under which the amendment purports to have been issued, namely the Kerala Public Service Act, 1968 which came into force only on the 17th September, 1968. It is also contended by them, in the alternative, that even if the amended provision is to be regarded as having been validly given retrospective effect, it has not brought about any change in the scope, of the power conferred by the rule (Rule 39) and that the orders impugned in these writ petitions are wholly beyond the competence of the State Government even under the rule as now amended. Rule 39 as it originally stood was in the following terms:—

“Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the Special Rules, the Governor shall have power to deal with the case of any person serving in a civil capacity under the Government of Kerala or any candidate for appointment to a service in such manner as may appear to him to be just and equitable:

Provided that, where any such rule is applicable to the case of any person, the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him than that provided by that rule”.

3. After the amendment dated the 10th July, 1972 the rule reads:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the Special Rules or in any other Rules or Government Orders the Government shall have power to deal with the case of any person or persons serving in a Civil capacity under the Government of Kerala or any candidate for appointment to a service in such manner as may appear to the Government to be just and equitable:

Provided that where such rules or orders are applicable to the case of any person or persons, the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him or them than that provided by those rules or orders.”

4. In addition to the contentions referred to above concerning the retrospectivity of the amendment of Rule 39 and the competence of the Start Government to exercise the power conferred by Rule 39 prior to its amendment, various other points have also been raised in common by all the writ petitioners. The petitioners contend that there has been a voilation of their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by reason of the denial to them of the right to have their seniority and rank reckoned under Rule 27 which is applicable to all other Government servants. It is argued on their behalf that what had been done by the State Government under the impugned orders is to grant a special treatment to an undefined group of officers by exempting them from the relevant rules and consequently to deprive the petitioners of the rights which have legitimately accrued to them under the existing rules and that this action is not supported by any valid or reasonable classification which has a rational relationship to the object and purpose of the Rules in question. It is also strongly contended on behalf of the petitioners that Rule 39 does not confer a blanket power to abrogate or nullify by an executive order all or any of the provisions contained in the General or Special Rules in respect of any group of officers governed by those provisions. It is submitted by the petitioners that the object and purpose of the said rule is only to reserve power with the authority named in it to deal individually with the case of any particular officer or officers and to pass any order as may appear to the authority to be just and equitable, notwithstanding any or the provisions contained in the General or Special Rules. The petitioner's argument is that Rule 39 does not confer any power to grant a general exemption or on case relaxation of the provisions of the General or Special Rules in favour of a class or group of persons but warrants only a special treatment being given in any specified case or cases where after due application of the mind of the competent authority a satisfaction is arrived on that it is just and equitable to pass such an order. Another point that is taken on behalf of the petitioners is that Rule 39 does not empower in order being passed in direct contravention of any substantive provision contained either in the General or Special Rules; it merely permits a relaxation of the rigour of such provision so far as they pertain to procedural or incidental matters in respect of which no vested right can be postulated as having accrued to any of the other officers in the service. Counsel for the petitioners very strongly put forward the plea that the power under Rule 39 having been avowedly conferred for the purpose of enabling the authority named in it to deal with the case of any person in a just and equitable manner, it is implicit that the said power cannot be exercised in favour of any particular officer in such a manner as would cause injustice or inequity to other persons in service. Counsel went further and urged that no order under Rule 39 can be validly passed if it would have the result of pre-judicially affecting the rights of any other person in service. Alternatively, it is argued that, in any event, it is incumbent on the authority exercising the power under Rule 39 to take into account the repercussions that the proposed action will have on other personnel belonging to the service before any conclusion is arrived at as to whether such action would be just and equitable. Lastly, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order which have the direct effect of disrupting the settled seniority and rank of the petitioners and thereby visiting them with adverse civil consequences, were issued without givining any opportunity to the petitioners to make their representations against the proposed action. It is said that if only the petitioners had been given an opportunity to represent their case before the Government it would have been possible for them to place all the relevant facts and circumstances and prove to the satisfaction of the Government that the proposed action was neither just not equitable. It is accordingly urged that the impugned orders should be declared to be null and void on the ground of contravention of the principles of natural justice also.

5. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government the petitioner's contention that the power conferred by Rule 39 is to be exercised only by the Governor and not by the State Government has been strongly refuted. The stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that the expression ‘Governor’ used in the rule denotes only the State Government and that it is not intended that the power should be exercised by the Governor himself in the exercise of his individual discretion. Elaborate arguments were, therefore, advanced by the counsel for the petitioners in support of their contention that Rule 39 has conferred a special power on the Governor treating him as distinct from the State Government. The Learned Government Pleader had also addressed his arguments touching this aspect of the case in part and it was at that stage that Rule 39 was amended as per the notification dated the 10th July, 1972. In the light of the said development the hearing of the case was adjourned by us on the request of the petitioner's advocates in order to enable the petitioners to amend the writ petitions by incorporating certain additional contentions which they wished to raise concerning the validity and scope of the amended rule. When the hearing of the cases was resumed on 31-7-1972 the Government Pleader submitted before us that he was no longer pressing the contention originally raised by him that the expression ‘Governor’ occurring in Rule 39 as it stood prior to its amendment should be understood as denoting only the State Government and that the power under the unamended rule could be exercised by the State Government without the files being placed at all before the Governor. The Government Pleader further told us that the impugned orders are now sought to be supported by him only by relying on the amendment made in Rule 39 by substituting the word ‘Government’ in the place of the expression ‘Governor’ with retrospective effect from 17-12-1958. He contends that the said amendment has the effect of validating all the orders previously passed by the State Government in purported exercise of the power conferred by Rule 39 even though at the time when those orders were passed the State Government was not really the authority competent to exercise the power conferred by the said rule as it then stood. In view of the above submissions made by the Government Pleader it has become unnecessary for us to deal with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the Governor alone could have exercised the power conferred by Rule 39 as it stood prior to the amendment. We may, however, observe that after having heard the arguments addressed to us on this aspect by the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners and by the Government Pleader who too had submitted most part of his arguments covering this matter before the hearing of the case was adjourned in view of the introduction of the amendment, we were inclined to take the view that the power under Rule 39 as it stood prior to the amendment could be exercised only by the Governor of the State acting on the advice of the Cabinet and not by the State Government without any reference of the matter to the Governor. The concession made by the Government Pleader has only obviated the necessity for an elaborate discussion by us in this judgment dealing with the arguments advanced by both sides on this aspect and stating our reasons in support of the conclusion indicated above.

6. For the sake of convenience, we propose to treat O.P No. 5157 of 1969 as the main case and to refer to the facts of that case while dealing with the common questions of law arising for decision before us. After recording our conclusions on the said questions we shall be dealing with the facts of each of the remaining cases separately in this judgment.

7. There are two petitioners in O.P No. 5157 of 1969 and both of them are working as Assistant Grade I in the Government Secretariat, Trivandrum. The first petitioner was originally working as a lower division clerk in the Harijan Welfare Department having been recruited thereto by the Public Service Commission in 1959. The second petitioner had been recruited by the Madras Public Service Commission and he was appointed as a lower division clerk in the office of the Director of Medical Services of Madras with effect from 26-3-1954 Consequent on the reorganisation of States, the second petitioner was allotted to Kerala and he worked in the Directorate of Health Services in Trivandrum and subsequently in the Medical College, Calicut as a lower division clerk. Both the petitioners were subsequently recruited by transfer to the Kerala Government Secretariat service as Assistants Grade II in 1960. In order to be eligible for promotion from the category of Assistant Grade II to that of Assistant Grade I the passing of the account test (lower) was a necessary qualification. The first petitioner had acquired the said qualification in 1960. The second petitioner had passed the test in 1957 itself. During the period from 1-11-1961 to 25-12-1961 there arose in the Secretariat 18 vacancies in the posts of Assistants Grade I and they had to be filled up by promoting qualified hands from the category of Assistants Grade II. The first petitioner and four others were provisionally promoted as Assistants Grade I as per the order Ext. P1 dated 12-3-1962. The promotion given to the 1st petitioner under the said order was with effect from 1-11-1961. Even though there were six other officers including the 2nd petitioner, who were also fully qualified for promotion at that time and though sufficient number of vacancies did exist, they were not then promoted. Several representations were made to Government by those officers from 1962 onwards pressing their claims for promotion. Ultimately, on 20-1-1968 the Government passed the order Ext. P2 holding that the denial of promotion to the six officers including the second petitioner constituted a discrimination which required to be set right and hence granting sanction for the notional promotion of the said six persons to Grade I with effect from the respective dates noted in the order against the names of each of the officers. The 2nd petitioner was granted the promotion with effect from 1-11-1961. Ext. P2 proceeds on the basis that the 1st petitioner and four others had been promoted regularly to Grade I with effect from November, 1961. Likewise the promotions granted to the six persons including the 2nd petitioner under Ext. P2 were also regular in character. Thus, the position was that as a result of Exts. P1 and P2 the two writ petitioners had been regularly promoted to the category of Assistants Grade I with effect from 1-11-1961 and they were entitled to ranking and seniority in the said category on that basis.

8. As on 1-11-1961 which is the date with reference to which the petitioners have beeen granted promotions to Grade I, there were several persons in the category of Assistants Grade II who were seniors in the said category in relation to the two writ petitioners but they had not passed the account test (lower) and were not, therefore, eligible for promotion to Grade I. Some of these persons acquired test qualifications subsequently and they appear to have made reprentations to the Government requesting that they should be given a restoration of their seniority over their erstwhile juniors on their promotion to the higher grade. Since all these persons were recruited into the Secretariat service only after the formation of the Kerala State they were not entitled to the benefit of the order R. Dis, 8207/60.CS dated the 7th May, 1951 issued by the Travancore-Cochin Government and consequently the proviso to Rule 27(b) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules was also not attracted. However, on 3-8-1963 the Government issued the order Ezt. P3 directing that, as a special case, in relaxation of Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules such of the seniors amongst Assistant Grade II who had passed the account test within the first two chances after the date of their joining duty in the Secretariat service will regain their seniority in Grade I on their promotion thereto. It is mentioned in Exhibit P. 3 itself that the promotions that were granted to test qualified hands had been made by adhering to the rules which were then applicable. It is also stated in the order that even though the principal originally followed, in the Travancore-Cochin area prior to the date of issuance of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules was that a senior without test qualification who was passed over for promotion could regain his seniority in the higher grade on his subsequent promotion provided the junior who superseded him had not been confirmed in the higher grade in the meantime, the position had become altered with the introduction of the General Rules for the State and Subordinate Services and such restoration of seniority was not thereafter possible. It is then said in Exhibit P. 3 that the application of Rule 27(a) has put senior hands who had no sufficient opportunity to get themselves qualified in account test in a most-disadvantageous position and that the said contingency has arisen as no minimum period of service in Grade II was required for promotion to Grade I prior to 13-11-1963 on which date alone it was laid down as per the G.O Exhibit P. 5 that the minimum service of two years as Assistant Grade II will be insisted on as a qualification for promotion to Grade I. It is on the aforesaid ground that the Government have proceeded to relax Rule 27(a) of the General Rules and to issue the direction contained in Exhibit P3 that such of the seniors who had passed the account test within the first two chances should be allowed to regain their seniority in Grade I on promotion thereto.

9. Further representations seem to have been made to the State Government by some of the Assistants Grade II who apparently had not passed the account test even within the first two chances and were not therefore, eligible for the benefit granted under Exhibit P3. On a consideration of those representations, the State Government issued revised-orders in the matter as per Exhibit P4 dated 30-10-1969 in supersession of Exhibit P3. By this order the benefit of restoration of seniority was extended to all the seniors amongst Assistant Grade II who had passed the account test (lower) within the first four chances and had thereafter got promoted to Grade 1. In addition to setting out the very same grounds which had already been mentioned in Exhibit P3 as the justification for the relaxation of Rule 27(a), a further reason is also given by the State Government in Exhibit P4. Reference is made in Exhibit P4 to the fact that in case of persons appointed by direct recruitment to posts requiring test qualification two year's time is usually granted to them to acquire test qualification. Mention is also made of the circumstance that when new tests are introduced persons in service are given exemption from the tests for two years and that in such cases it has been made clear that four chances should be allowed where the period of exemption to pass the test is fixed as two years. After referring to these two aspects it is stated in Exhibit P4 that the Government considered that such of the Assistants who were superseded for promotion to Grade 1 by their juniors for want of test qualification should be given at least the same treatment admissible to others in service in the matter of acquisition of test qualification. Accordingly, Government have proceeded in Exhibit P4 to expressly invoke the power conferred by Rule 39 of the General Rules of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules to order, as a special case, in relaxation of Rule 27(a) that such of the seniors who have passed the account test within the first four chances available to them after the date of their joining duty in the Secretariat service will regain their seniority in the Grade 1 on their promotion thereto. As a result of this order passed in 1969 the rank and seniority of persons like the petitioners who had been granted promotions with effect from 1961 were very seriously affected. Thereupon the petitioners came up to this court with this writ petition dated the 18th December, 1969, challenging Exhibit P3 and P4.

10. Subsequent to the institution of this writ petition and during its pendency the Government have again passed another order covering the same subject as per G.O.MS 335.PD dated 25-9-1970 in supersession of Exhibit P3 and P4. Exhibit P. 9 is a copy of the said order. Government have stated in Exhibit P9 that on a re-examination of the case it was found that Exhibit P3 and P4 have caused much hardship to a number of Senior Assistants instead of redressing their grievances and that the purpose which the Government had in view when passing the orders Exhibits P3 and P4 had not been achieved by the issuance of those orders. It is further stated in Exhibit P9 that the Government was of the opinion that the only fair and equitable solution to the problem was to cancel Exhibits P3 and P4 and to allow restoration of rank on promotion as Assistant Grade 1 to all those Assistants who had joined the Secretariat during the period from 17-12-1958 to 13-11-1963 and who were superseded by their juniors for promotion to Grade 1 for want of test qualification. A direction to that effect is given under Exhibit P9 in relaxation of Rule 27(a) of the General Rules contained in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The passing of Exhibit P9 has made the position of the petitioners much worse than what it was on the date of institution of the writ petition. In view of this development which took place during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioners were permitted by this court to amend the two writ petitions by incorporating a challenge against Exhibit P9 which is now the only surviving order, on the subject in as much as Government themselves have cancelled Exhibits P3 and P4. Whereas under Exhibits P3 and P4 the benefit of restoration was granted only to those superseded seniors amongst Assistant Grade II who had acquired the test qualification within the first two chances and four chances respectively, under Exhibit P9 a senior in the category of Assistant Grade II can acquire the account test qualification at any time and on getting promoted to Grade 1 can claim restoration of his seniority in the higher grade as of right over all his erstwhile juniors, even though they might have been regularly promoted to the higher category many years earlier. The result is that the rank and seniority of those promoted to Grade 1 will be indefinitely in an uncertain and insecure state because as long as here is any single unqualified senior remaining in service in the category of Assistant Grade II the Democleus sword of exhibit P9 will continue to menacingly dangle over the heads of the Assistant Grade I.

11. Against the back-drop of the above narration of facts relating to O.P No. 5157 of 1969 we shall now proceed to consider the various points urged on behalf of the petitioners. Although a faint suggestion was made by some of the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that Rule 39 itself suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and is, therefore, invalid for arbitrariness, this attack was not seriously pursued. In our opinion, sufficient indication is contained in the rule regarding its underlying object and purpose in as much as it is expressly stated therein that the power conferred by it is only to deal with the case of any officer in a just and equitable manner which is not less favourable to him than what is provided under the rules. This constitutes sufficient guidance to the authority who is to exercise the power and hence it cannot be said that there has been an excessive delegation or that the discretion conferred by the rule is arbitrary or unguided.

12. We now come to the more important question as to the precise nature, scope and amplitude of the power conferred by Rule 39. We may say at the outset itself that the amendment introduced by the notification dated the 10th July, 1972 has made no alteration at all in the scope or content of the power conferred by the rule and the position in that regard remains the same both before and after the said amendment.

13. The import content and scope of Article 14 of the Constitution has been elaborately considered and explained in a number of authoriative pronouncements of the highest court of our country. The first part of the Article is a declaration of equality of civil rights of all citizens within the territories of India and the second part which is a corollary of the first, enjoins that equal protection shall be secured to all such persons in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties without discrimination and favoritism; it is a pledge of the protection of equal laws, that is, laws that operate alike on all persons under like circumstances. The prohibition under the Article is directed against the ‘State’ which expression is defined in Article 12 as including not only the legislatures but also the Governments in the country. Article 13 of the Constitution has defined ‘law’ as including among other things any order, rule or notification having the force of law so that even executive orders or notifications must not infringe Article 14. The principle of equality laid down in Article 14 is reiterated in Article 16 of the Constitution which guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. All statutory rules and notifications pertaining to matters “relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State” (which words are wide enough to include conditions of service and all like matters incidental to the employment) must, therefore, conform to the principles enunicated in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The principle of equality does not, however, mean that every law must have universal application to all persons even if they are not by nature, or circumstance similarly situated. What is insisted by Articles 14 and 16 is that equal laws have to be applied to all in the same situation and that there should be no discrimination between one person and another, if as regards the subject matter of the legislation or rule their position is substantially the same. The legislature or the rule-making authority has the undoubted right of classifying persons and applying different rules or principles to persons differently situated, but such a classification must rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object and purpose sought to be served by the rules. A law will be liable to be struck down as offending Articles 14 and 16 if it empowers any authority to arbitrarily pick and choose according to its sweet will and pleasure certain persons from out of a large group of individuals similarly situated and subject them either to a hostile or a favourable treatment.

14. We have considered it necessary to restate the settled legal position relating to the scope and effect of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because it has material relevance in determining the precise nature and amplitude of the power conferred by Rule 39. The attack made against the validity of the rule on the ground of arbitrariness has been repelled by us by holding that the rule contains sufficient indication of is policy and purpose for the guidance of the authority exercising the power conferred by it. We have, therefore, to so construe the rule as would eliminate arbitrariness and would also render its provisions consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An interpretation which would lead to the result of laying the rule open to attack on the ground that it permits dissimilar treatment of persons situated alike, has manifestly to be avoided.

15. In the light of the principles stated above we feel no doubt that the proper construction to be placed on Rule 39 is to understand it as conferring power on the authority designated therein to meet out special treatment only in cases where the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonable classification is possible. The classification must, no doubt, be based on some real and substantial distinction having a just and reasonable relation to the object and purpose of the rules. It is in this context that the words “just and equitable” occurring in Rule 39 assume great importance as they furnish the guiding principle on the basis of which the classification is to be made. In our opinion, Rule 39, so understood, is perfectly valid and constitutional. Any action taken in purported exercise of the power conferred by the said rule will however be liable to be set aside by the Court if it fails to satisfy the test of reasonable classification. The interference by the Court will then be not so much on the ground that the action is in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution but more for the reason of the impugned action being not sanctioned or authorised by the rule itself and hence ultra vires.

16. The setting in which Rule 39 appears has also a bearing on the construction to be placed upon it. It is the last amongst the general rules contained in Part II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. Detailed provisions have been made in Rules 1 to 38 laying down the conditions of service relating to the methods of recruitment, promotion, special qualifications, departmental tests, the grant of temporary exemption from test qualification for purposes of promotion, reservation of appointments for backward classes and scheduled castes etc., probation, its suspension, termination or extension, seniority-principles for the reckoning of and entitlement for promotion to non selection posts, mode of making appointments to selection category, postings and transfers, of officers temporary promotions etc. etc. It is thereafter that Rule 39 occurs whereby power is reserved with the authority designated therein to deal with the case of any person serving in a civil capacity under the Government or any candidate for appointment to service in such manner as may appear to it to be just and equitable. In our view, it would not be correct to interpret Rule 39 as conferring an unbridled discretion on the competent authority to decide at its sweet will and pleasure either to apply or not to apply the provisions of the remaining rules in the case of any person or groups of persons, much less to ignore or violate all those rules. In fact, the conferment of such an abritrary power would be plainly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and will not be valid.

17. In a case recently decided by the Supreme Court—R.N Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409 their Lordships had occasion to consider the question whether it is competent for the Governor to invoke the power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution for regularising an appointment which had been made in violation of the existing rules governing the subject. One Dr. Thimmiah, who was holding substantively only the post of an Assistant Geologist which is a Class III post in the Technical Education Department of the Mysore Government, was appointed Principal, School of Mines with effect from the 15th February, 1958 as per an order passed by the State Government dated July 3, 1959. The post of Principal was Class I post. Under the relevant provisions of the Mysore State Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957 and the Mysore Education Department Services (Technical Education Department) Recruitment) Rules, 1964 Dr. Thimmiah was not eligible to be appointed as Principal either on deputation or by way of promotion. His appointment was, therefore, one made in contravention of the existing service rules framed under the proviso to Article 309. To get over this difficulty the Governor of Mysore, in purported exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 published the following “Special Recruitment Rules” on February 9, 1967.

“In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor of Mysore hereby makes the following rules, namely—

1. Title.—These rules may be called the Mysore Education Department Services (Technical Education Department (Special, Recruitment) Rules, 1967.

2. Provisions relating to regularisation of appointment of Principal, School of Mines. Ooragaum, Kolar Gold Fields.

Notwithstanding any rule made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, or any other rules or Order in force at any time, Dr. T. Thimmia, B.Sc (Hons.) P.H.D (Lond.) F.G.S shall be deemed to have been regularly appointed as Principal, School of Mines, Ooragaum, Kolar Gold Fields, with effect from February 15, 1958.

(By order and in the name of the Governor of Mysore (Sd.) S.N Sreenath

Under Secretary to Government Education Department.”

18. The challenge before the Supreme Court was against these “Special Rules”. It was contended on behalf of the State Government of Mysore that the State had that the state had the power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to make a rule regularising the appointment of an officer even though the appointment had been made contrary to the existing rules on the subject. This plea was rejected by the Supreme Court and the impugned rules were declared to be void. Their Lordships said;—

“Assume that rules under Article 309 could be made in respect of appointment of one man but there are two limitations. Article 309 speaks of rules for appointment and general conditions of service. Regularisation of appointment by stating that notwithstanding any rules the appointment is regularised strikes at the root of the rules and if the effect of the regularisation is to nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules, the rules itself is open to criticism on the ground that it is in violation of current rules. Therefore, the relevant rules at the material time as to promotion and appointment are infringed and the impeached rule cannot be permitted to stand to operate as a regularisation of appointment of one person in utter defiance of rules requiring consideration of seniority and merit in the case of promotion and consideration of appointment by selection or by competitive examination.

If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an Act which is within the power and province of the authority but these has been some non compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules.” (Underlining is ours).

19. The above observations of the Supreme Court lend full support to our view that a rule cannot be validly framed under the proviso to Article 309 conferring an arbitrary discretion on the State Government or any other authority to totally ignore the existing rules governing any aspect of the service conditions and to meet out special treatment to any particular officer or groups of officers in such a way as to totally nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules. Hence, if Rule 39 is be valid it has to be interpreted in such a manner as would render its provisions consistent with the above legal position. If, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision above cited, an action taken in contravention of the existing rules cannot be validated by making a special rule for that purpose under the proviso to Article 309, it is equally clear that no such action can be authorised to be done by any special provisions made in that behalf udder the proviso to Article 309, such as Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules; much less can it be done by an executive order passed pursuant to the power conferred by such a rule.

20. Rules 1 to 38 contained in Part I of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules are of general application and they are as much binding on the Government as on the officers in its service. While framing those rules it would appear to have been, however, recognised by the rule making authority that instances may sometimes occur where a strict and rigorous application of the aforementioned rules may result in manifest injustice or inequity and it, is only to deal with such an extraordinary situation that the power has been conferred under Rule 39. It goes without saying that the said power is to be sparingly exercised and its use must be restricted to cases of a very exceptional nature. If due regard be had to the real nature and purpose of the power as explained above, there can be no difficulty in seeing that it can be exercised only in those individual cases where the authority finds that on account of special circumstances a separate or differential treatment is justified and that such action is necessary in order to meet out justice and equity. The actual exercise of the power must therefore be preceded by a careful application of the mind of the authority to all the relevant facts and circumstances and a satisfaction being arrived at by it to the effect indicated above. In this context it is necessary to remember that the service rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 must ordinarily be taken to be in perfect conformity with accepted notions of justice and equity. It could not, therefore, have been the intention of the rule-making authority in framing Rule 39 that the power conferred by the said rule is to be utilised whenever it is found that the enforcement of any particular service rule results in some hardship to any officer or groups of officers. The remedy for such a situation, if it is found to exist, will be only to amend the offending rule and the power under Rule 39 cannot be resorted to as an easy substitute.

21. We have already pointed out that it is not the purpose of Rule 39 to empower the authority designated in it to arbitrarily deal out special treatment to any officer or officers to its sweet will and pleasure by passing orders in direct contravention of any of the Rules Nos. 1 to 38. The non obstante clause occurring in Rule 39 cannot be construed as enabling the authority designated in the Rule to nullify by an executive order the provisions contained in the remaining rules. The expression ‘notwithstanding anything contained in these rules’ occurs in various other rules contained in Part II also for example, see Rule 3(c), Rule 9(c). Rule 9(d), Rule 13 AA. Rule 17-A, Rule 30, Rule 35(f) and Rule 37. An examination of the context in which these identical words have been used in the other rules reveals that the object underlying the incorporation of the non obstante clause is only to declare that in regard to the particular topic dealt with in the concerned rule, where the clause occurs, the provisions of the said rule shall prevail, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any of the other rules contained in Part II or in the special rules. In other words, the intention is not that take the particular rule where the clause occurs will override the provisions of all the remaining rules in respect of all matters; it only means that for the limited purpose of effectuating the provision of that particular rule in relation to its subject matter the other rules would not stand in the way. In our view, it is this restricted interpretation that is to be given to the non obstante clause occurring in Role 39 also and it will not be correct to understand the said rule as giving a carteblanch; to the authority named in it to cast to the winds the provisions contained in the general or special rules and in dealing with the cases of any set of officers. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in S.G Jaisinghani v. Union of India, A.I.R 1967 S.C 1427. “the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is.”

22. Ordinarily, therefore it is not expected that the power under Rule 39 should be resorted to merely for the purpose of getting round the provision contained in any of the general rules or special rules. Rule 39 is to be invoked only to meet exceptional situations where gross injustice or inequity is seen to result from the application of the rules in all their rigour. In such cases and such cases alone. Rule 39 empowers the designated authority to meet out equity and justice by passing appropriate orders in relaxation of the provisions of the rules concerned.

23. We may now summarise the conclusions that emerge from the preceding discussion. We hold that Rule 39 is valid and that it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or excessive delegation. We are of the view that the said Rule does not warrant the passing of any general order with respect to any undefined or large group of persons exempting them from the operation of any existing rule or granting a relaxation of the rules in favour of such a group. The rule only authorises the authority designated therein to deal with any specific case or cases of individual officers and to pass orders in a just and equitable manner after a full application of mind of the authority to all the relevant facts and circumstances necessary for a proper determination of the question as to what would constitute justice and equity. In exercising this power it is open to the authority to relax the rigour of the rules to such extent as may be necessary to ensure justice and equity, but it cannot completely nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules in the guise of relaxing their rigour. If, however, special circumstances do exist warranting a valid classification of the particular case or cases it will also be open to the authority exercising the power under Rule 39 to accord a special treatment in respect of such exceptional cases even by exempting the person or persons concerned from the operation of any particular rule. In saying this we consider it necessary to emphasise that such a course will be permissible only in those rare cases where very strong grounds exist justifying a valid classification of the cases of the officers in question for the purpose of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In determining what is ‘just and equitable’ the authority should take into account the over all effect that the proposed order would have in relation not merely to the particular officers whose cases are specifically dealt with by it but also to all others belonging to the same service, category or class. The mere fact that the enforcement of a rule creates hardship to an officer or a group of officers will be no ground for invoking the power under Rule 39, because it must be assumed that the possibility of the causation of any such hardship must have been duly taken into account at the time when the rule in question was made and the rule-making authority has nevertheless thought it fit to enact such a provision.

24. Though it was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioners that the power under Rule 39 can under no circumstances be exorcised in such a way as to affect the rights of any of the other persons in the service, we find it difficult to uphold the said contention when it is stated in such a wide form. While explaining the scope of Rule 39 we have already held that it is permissible under the said rule to grant a relaxation of the rigour of the rules or even an exemption from any provision contained in the rules in favour of any officer or officers, in regard to whom the facts and circumstances are such that a valid classification for according special treatment would be justified under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is quite possible that when such an order is passed it may directly or indirectly have repercussions regarding the seniority, rank or chances of promotion of some of the other officers in service. That however, has to be regarded as an inevitable incident of service flowing from the exercise of the power under Rule 39 which is as much a rule regulating the conditions of service of all the officers in the service of the State as the other provisions contained in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The rights conferred on the members of service by the earlier Rules Nos. 1 to 38 in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules are not absolute in character but are inherently subject to the contingent liability of being affected by any order validly passed under Rule 39.

25. We are not impressed with the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the proviso to Rule 39 has the effect of prohibiting any order being passed under the said rule in favour of any particular person or persons in such a way as to adversely affect other persons in the service. What is laid down by the proviso is only that in dealing with the case of any person under Rule 39 the order passed by the authority should not have the effect of placing him in a more disadvantageous position than what it would be if the rules in force were strictly applied to his case; in other words, the proviso only introduces a safeguard that the special treatment meted out to any person whose case is dealt with under Rule 39, should not have the result of placing him in a position less favourable than under the rules. The expression “any person” occurring in the proviso has reference only to the person whose case is specifically dealt with under Rule 39 and it will not take in other officers belonging to the service, it is therefore not correct or possible to construe the proviso as imposing a restriction that an order passed in the legitimate exercise of the power under Rule 39 should under no circumstances affect adversely other person in the service. Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on an unreported decision of our learned brother Govindan Nair, J. in O.P No. 851 of 1968 wherein the learned Judge has expressed the view that “what can be done under 39 is only to pass an order in favour of the employee provided that order does not adversely affect other employees who are governed by the same service Rules”. We are informed that though a writ appeal. W.A No. 137 of 1970—was filed against the above decision it was dismissed in limine.

26. For the reasons indicated in the preceding two paragraphs we are constrained to disagree with the view expressed by Govindan Nair, J. We do not find any justification for reading into Rule 39 a limitation that no order can be passed in favour of an employee in exercise of the power conferred by it if it will adversely affect any of the other employees who are governed by the same service rules. In our view, the effect of importing such a restriction would be virtually to nullify the utility and the very purpose of the rule and to render its provisions nugatory.

27. The possibility of the proposed order having an adverse effect on the rights of other employees is, however, a matter vitally relevant for determining whether the course of action proposed would be “just and equitable”. It is mandatory on the part of the authority exercising the power under Rule 39 to apply its mind to this important aspect also before taking a final decision to invoke Rule 39 in each specific case, because it will not be “just or equitable” if for the purpose of relieving some genuine hardship that may exist in the case of an individual officer, undue prejudice of hardship is caused to others.

28. We have already made it clear that Rule 39 cannot be regarded as conferring an arbitrary power to ignore the existing service rules and to deal with cases of any officer or officers in violation of the existing rules. Its main purpose, as we see it, is to invest the authority designated in it with the power to relax the rigour of the rule in regard to matters that are merely procedural or incidental in nature and which do not go to the root of any of the substantive service conditions dealt with in the rules. We have also indicated that in rare and exceptional cases where there are valid grounds for a reasonable classification, it is permissible under Rule 39 to accord a special treatment by granting a partial or even total relaxation of a substantive provision contained in the rules.

29. We shall now deal with the further contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that even if Rule 39 is to be regarded as authorising the making of an order which will adversely affect other persons in the service, natural justice requires that any such order should be passed only after affording to all the persons likely to be affected an opportunity to make their representations. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in A.K Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 150, the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be straight-jacketed into a rigid formula. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case. Without intending to be exhaustive, we may state that the obligation to give a hearing to persons likely to be affected will arise in all cases where the order proposed to be passed under Rule 39 will have the direct consequence of affecting the settled seniority or rank of any of the other persons in the service of the upsetting promotions already given to them. It appears to us beyond doubt that any such order can be validly passed only after giving to those person likely to be affected an opportunity of making their representations concerning the matter.

30. We are, however, unable to accept the petitioners' broad contention that in every case where action is taken under Rule 39 all the persons in service who are likely to be even very remotely affected by such an order should be notified and heard. We can well conceive of many orders that may be legitimately passed under Rule 39 giving only a relaxation of some procedural provisions, will not have any direct effect on the rights of others in the service. Even if such orders may have some very remote or indirect repercussion on the prospects of promotion etc. of other officers, we are not prepared to re orgnise any obligation on the part of the authority exercising the power under Rule 39 to give a notice or hearing to all the personnel in service in regard to whom there may be such a remote likelihood of indirect prejudice. As already observed by us, the applicability of the rules of natural justice would depend upon the nature of the order that is passed in each given case and the consequences, if any, that it will bring about in relation to the rights of the other personnel in service. We have already indicated the view that in all cases where in respect of any matter relating to the seniority, rank or promotion of others which was already settled by an earlier order the existing position is sought to be altered or will be directly affected by the order proposed to be passed under Rule 39, the principle of audi alteram partem will get automatically attracted.

31. Having thus explained in detail the nature, intent and a scope of the power conferred by Rule 39 it is next necessary to test the validity of the impugned orders in the light of the principles that we have enunciated. However, before proceeding to do so we may briefly advert to a contention strongly urged by the petitioners' advocate which concerns the validity of the notification Ext. P. 16 dated the 10th July, 1972 in so far as it purports to give retrospective operation to the amendments introduced by it in Rule 39. According to the provisions in para 2 of the said notification the amendments effected in Rule 39 are to be deemed to have come into force with effect from 17-12-1958. By virtue of Section 3 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968, which came into force on the 17th September, 1968, the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, though originally framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, are to be deemed to have been made under the aforesaid Act. It is in the exercise of the power conferred by Section 2(1) read along with Section 3 of the aforesaid Act that the Government of Kerala issued the notification Ext. P16 dated the 10th July, 1972 substituting a new provision in the place of the old Rule 39. Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act empowers the Government to make rules either prospectively or retrospectively to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to Government service. The argument of the petitioners is that inasmuch as the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 itself came into force only on the 17th September, 1968 the rule-making power conferred by Section 2 cannot have the effect of enabling the subordinate rule-making body to bring into force rules framed by it with effect from any date anterior to the date of coming into force of the parent enactment. It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that the Kerala Public Services Act has not been given any retrospective operation and that it was brought into force only with effect from the 17th September, 1968 Counsel for the petitioners contend that just as a child cannot be older than its mother it is not legally possible for a rule framed under the statute to have operation or effectiveness during a period when the parent enactment itself had not come into force. In answer to this contention the Government Pleader relied very strongly on the deeming provision contained in Section 3 of the Act. That Section is in the following terms:

“3. Continuance of existing rules. All rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, regulating the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Kerala and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have made under this Act as if this Act had been in force on the date on which such rules were made and shall continue to be in force unless and until they are superseded by any rules made under this Act.”

32. According to the learned Government Pleader, by virtue of the above deeming provision a legal fiction is created that the provisions of the Act were in force on the date on which the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules were framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The correctness of this submission regarding the effect of the deeming provision contained in Section 3 is strongly refuted by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners. Both sides addressed somewhat detailed arguments concerning the interpretation to be placed on the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the Act. We do not however, consider it necessary for the purposes of these cases to express any final opinion on the said matter because, we have come to the conclusion that even if the provision in the notification Exhibit P16 giving retrospective operation to the amendments made. Rule 39 is to be regarded as valid, still the impugned orders are all liable to be struck down as illegal on the ground that they do not evidence a proper or legitimate exercise of the powers, of the State Government even under the provisions of the amended rule and are, therefore, ultra vires. Hence we do not propose to decide the question whether the amended rule has been validly given retrospective operation but shall proceed to examine the legality of the impugned orders on the basis that the provisions of Rule 39 as amended will govern these cases.

33. The only material change brought about in Rule 39 by reason of the amendment made under Exhibit P16 is that instead of the ‘Governor’ it is the ‘State Government’ that is authorised by the amended rule to exercise the power conferred by it. Another alteration made in the rule is by the addition of the words “or persons” after the words “any person” occurring in the rule. In our opinion, this latter modification is of no consequence at all, since even without tbs addition of the new words it was perfectly open for the authority designated in the rule to deal with the case of more than one Government servant in an order passed under Rule 39. Even after the addition of the words “or persons”, the scope, nature and purpose of the power conferred by Rule 39 remain the same as before; the position continues to be that it is not permissible to make use of the said power for passing blanket orders granting en masse exemptions or relaxations of the rules in favour of a large or undefined number of persons without specific application of the mind of the Government to the relevant facts and circumstances of the individual cases.

34. We shall now revert to the facts in O.P No. 5157 of 1969. The two writ petitioners in this case were promoted to the category of Assistant Grade I with effect from 1-11-1961 as per the orders evidenced by Exhibits P1 and P2 respectively. Mention has already been made of the fact that during the period between 1-11-1961 and 25-12-1961 vacancies had arisen in the category of Assistants Grade I in the Secretariat and they had to be filled up only by promoting qualified hands from amongst the Assistants Grade II. No person was eligible for being promoted to the 1st Grade unless he had passed the Account Test (lower). Both the writ petitioners possessed the said qualification at the time when the aforesaid vacancies arose and it was in view of the said fact that they were granted the promotion to Grade I. Even though Exhibit P1 mentions that the promotion thereby given to the 1st petitioner and four others was provisional in nature, it is seen from Exhibit P2 that the State Government has subsequently treated the 1st petitioner as having been regularly promoted to Grade I with effect from 1-11-1961. By virtue of the aforesaid promotions the two writ petitioners acquired a vested right to have their rank and seniority fixed in the category of Assistants Grade I having their length of service in that category from 1-11-1961 taken into account under Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. But the Government have made a substantial inroad into that right by directing that as per Exhibits P3 and P4 such of their seniors in Grade II who passed the Account Test within the number of chances specified in those orders will regain their seniority in Grade I on their promotion thereto. In other words, the effect of Exhibits P3 and P4 is to disrupt the rights of seniority and rank which had become vested in the writ petitioners by compelling them to surrender the position already acquired by them in favour of their erstwhile seniors in Grade II whom they bad superseded for the valid reason that the seniors did not possess the test qualifications and were not therefore eligible for promotion. If Exhibits P3 and P4 are implemented the result is that the principle laid down in rule 27(a) is substantially rendered Ineffective. There is nothing in Exhibits P3 and P4 to indicate that the Government had specifically considered the individual cases of any of the seniors with reference to the relevant facts relating to their inability to acquire the test qualification and arrived at a conclusion that circumstances justifying a valid classification did exist so as to warrant a differential treatment being meted to them in relaxation of the provisions of rule 27(a). What was apparently done under those two orders was to grant a general exemption in favour of a large undefined group consisting of all the seniors who had acquired the test qualification within the specified number of chances. As already held by us, rule 39 does not warrant any such order being passed in favour of an undefined group without specific application of the mind of the mind of the authority to the facts of the individual cases covered by the order; nor does the rule ordinarily contemplate any action being taken in direct violation of a provision, like rule 27(a) unless strong and exceptional grounds justifying a valid classification are shown to exist. The main reason given in Ext. P4 in support of the action taken under that order directly offends the last principle aforementioned. We may extract para graph 3 of Ext. P4 which reads:

“Till 17-12-1958, i.e the date of issue of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, a senior who was passed could regain his seniority in the Grade I on his subsequent promotion provided the junior was not confirmed earlier in the Grade I. With the introduction of the General Rules for the State and Subordinate Services, such restoration of seniority was not possible except in the case of persons governed by Travancore-C chin Rules, as seniority in a grade had to be determined by Rule 27(a) of the General Rules. The application of the above rule caused hardships to the senior hands who did not have sufficient opportunity to get them selves qualified in Account Test and to become eligible for promotion to the Grade I”

35. The rule-making authority must have been fully aware of the position which obtained in the Travancore-Cochin area at the time of framing the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules in regard to the restoration of seniority of seniors superseded for want of test qualification. Nevertheless, it did not consider it necessary to incorporate a similar provision in the rules. On the other hand, a proviso was introduced in rule 27 which saved only the operation of the order dated 7th May 1951 passed by the Travancore-Cochin Government in relation to any person who was member of any service on the date of coming into force of the rules. Obviously, therefore, the intention of the rule-making authority was that in respect of matters not governed by the aforesaid order of the Travancore-Cochin Government, the seniority of personnel is to be reckoned only by applying the principles laid down in rule 27. It is not open to the executive Government to state that the application of the said rule has caused hardship and that therefore the seniority of certain persons should be reckoned not in the manner laid down in rule 27(a) but by applying a principle completely at variance with what is provided in the rule. A relaxation of the statutory rule on the aforesaid ground is not authorised to be done under Rule 39. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the order Exts. P3 and P4 do not evidence a valid exercise of the Government's power under Rule 39 and are therefore illegal and void. We are fully aware that these orders have been already superseded by the State Government itself as per the order Ext. P9. But since Ext. P9 is also under challenge in this writ petition and since we have come to the conclusion that the said order cannot also be sustained, doubts may arise as to whether Ext. P3 and P4 will revive on Ext. P9 being quashed. It is to remove any such difficulty or doubt that we have thought it necessary to consider the question of validity of Ext. P3 and P4 also.

36. Under Ext. P9 which is the next order under challenge what the Government has done is to allow restoration of rank of all the Assistants who joined the Secretariat during the period from 17-12-1958 to 13-11-1963 and who were superseded by their juniors for promotion to Grade I for want of test qualification on such superseded persons getting promoted as Assistants Grade I after acquiring the necessary test qualification. There is no time limit fixed within which the persons concerned should acquire the test qualification and get promoted as Assistant Grade 1 in order 10 be eligible for the benefit of restoration. While Exts. P1 and P2 limited the scope of the benefit of restoration granted under those orders to persons who had passed the test within the first two chances or the first four chances respectively. Ext. P9 extends the benefit to all the superseded seniors who had joined service between 17-12-1958 and 13-11-1963 irrespective of the number of chances taken by them for acquiring the test qualification. Ext. P9 will take within its ambit persons who have not acquired the test qualification even till the date of its passing and the benefit will continue to be available to them for an indefinite period of them entitling them to restoration of seniority in the category of Assistant Grade I as and when they get a promotion to that category in the future after acquiring the test qualification. Ext. P9 thus is an order in favour of an indefinite group of persons and all that we have said against Exts. P3 and P4 will apply here with much greater force. We rind absolutely no justfiable basis for a classification of this indeterminable body for the purpose of extending to them a special treatment contrary to the rules relating to test qualification and the reckoning of seniority. It is impossible in the nature of things to think that the Government could have applied their mind to the individual cases of all the officers who will be benefited by the relaxation given under Ext. P9. The position resulting from an implementation of Ext. P9 is to disrupt the seniority of all the persons who have been regularly promoted to the category of Assistant Grade I and to introduce an element of utter uncertainty for an indefinite period of time regarding the ranking of the officers in the said higher category, because it has rendered it open to all persons who were seniors in Grade II and who are continuing in that gride for want of test qualification, to pass the Account Test (lower) at any time in the future and thereafter on their getting promoted to Grade I to claim restoration of their seniority in the category of assist int Grade I irrespective of the length of service put in by the other officers who were promoted much earlier to that category. As already observed, we see no valid or relevant reason on which a separate classification of this indefinite body of persons in whose favour a relaxation of Rule 27(a) has been ordered, can be said to be justified.

37. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the action taken by the State Government under Ext. P9 is not warranted by. Rule 39 and cannot therefore be sustained. In this view it is really un-necessary for us to consider the further contention raised by the petitioners that the said order is violative of the principles of natural justice, but we may observe that we find considerable force in that argument also.

38. In the result we allow O.P No. 5157 of 1969 and quash Exts. P3, P4 and P9.

O.P No. 5506 of 1970

39. The petitioner in this case is a Senior Grade Assistant in the Legislature Secretariat at Trivandrum. He was appointed as a lower division clerk in the Legislature Secretariat on 17-10-1960 pursuant to his selection for the said post by the Kerala Public Service Commission. The designation of the post of lower division clerk was later changed as Assistant Grade II. The petitioner had previously worked for some time in the Animal Husbandry Department as a lower division clerk and had during that period acquired the Account Test (lower) qualification. Thus, even on the date of his appointment into the Legislature Secretariat the petitioner was possessed of the said qualification which was an essential prerequisite for promotion to the category of Assistant Grade I. Since the petitioner was the only person amongst the Assistants Grade II in the Legislature Secretariat who possessed the test qualification, he was promoted as Assistant Grade I with effect from 17-10-1960. He was subsequently confirmed in the said post with effect from 4-8-1961. Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 were seniors in relation to the petitioner in the category of Assistants Grade II. But they did not possess the test qualification and hence were not eligible for promotion as Assistants Grade I at the time when the petitioner was promoted to that category. On those respondents subsequently acquiring the test qualification they were also promoted as Assistants Grade I on different dates between 21-6-1961 and 14-3-1966, the latter date being the date of promotion of the 6th respondent.

40. According to the Rule 7 of the Travancore-Cochin Legislature Secretariat (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1953 “unless the Speaker otherwise directs, the conditions of service of the staff of the Legislature Secretariat shall in regard to matters not provided for in these rules be such as are admissible to the staff of the State Administrative Secretariat”. The petitioner has produced as Exts. P1 to P3 the three orders passed by the State Government allowing restoration of seniority to seniors amongst Assistants Grade II in the Secretariat service who had been superseded for want of test qualification in relaxation of Rule 27(a) of the State and Subordinate Services Rules. The petitioner contends that these orders are not warranted by Rule 39 and are ultra vires the powers of the State Government. He has sought to quash the said orders on the further grounds that they are violative of the principles of natural justice and constitute also as infringement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

41. The orders Exts. P1 to P3 impugned in this case are the same as those marked as Exit. P3, P4 and P9 in O.P No. 5157 of 1969. We have already discussed in detail the question of validity of those orders and declared them to be illegal and void. In the light of said conclusion already recorded by us, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this writ petition. This writ petition is accordingly allowed and the respondents are prohibited from implementing the provisions of Ext. P3 as against the petitioner. The parties will bear their respective costs.

O.P No. 1185 of 1970

42. There are three petitioners in this writ petition. These petitioners as well as respondents Nos. 3 to 8 were appointed as lower division clerks in the Revenue Department in the Madras Ministerial Service and consequent on the reorganisation of the States and the formation of the State of Kerala they were all allotted to this State. The petitioners are all seniors in relation to respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the category of lower division clerks. Under Rule 30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules, lower division clerks of Revenue Department had to acquire the following qualifications for being considered for appointment; as upper division clerk:—

(a) Pass in a Revenue Test Parts I, II and III,

(b) Chain Survey Training for a period not less than six weeks and

(c) Service as Revenue Inspector in charge of a Firka for a period not less than one year.

43. As per the scheme of the aforesaid rules the Collector of each district is required to draw up on the 15th March of every year an annual promotion list showing the names of qualified lower division clerks to be promoted to the upper division during that year. The petitioners had all become fully qualified before 15-3-1952 and they were included in the list of upper division clerks drawn up as on 15-3-1962. Ext. P1 is a copy of the proceedings of the District Collector, Kozhikode, dated 11-2-1965 wherein it is stated that the petitioners were included in the list of upper division clerks for the year ending 15-4-1962 and that they will be deemed to have been promoted to the upper division with effect from 29-10-1962. Respondents Nos. 3 to 8 who acquired the Firka Service qualification only subsequently, were included in the list of upper division clerks for 1963 as seen from the Collector's proceedings evidenced by Ext. P2 dated 20-2-1965. On 28-10-1966 the State Government passed the order Ext. P3 granting general exemption from the operation of Rule 30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in favour of all the senior lower division clerks allotted from Madras who had not been able to acquire the Firka training qualification by reason of their not having been posted as Firka Revenue Inspectors due to exigencies of service. It is stated in Ext. P3 that on individual proposals from the Board of Revenue Government had already granted a relaxation of Rule 30(b) in a number of cases and that it was considered necessary to grant the general exemption in order to avoid the issue of orders in individual cases.

44. The District Collector, Kozhikode, however, seems to have felt doubts or misgivings about the implementation of Exhibit P3 and hence for a period of nearly three years the matter was kept in abeyance. Respondents Nos. 5 to 8 had made representations to the District Collector claiming the benefit of the provisions of Exhibit P3. These representations were forwarded by the District Collector to the State Government with a request that the matter may be dealt with by the Government itself. Thereupon, the Government passed the order Exhibit P4 dated 13-10-1969 exempting respondents Nos. 5 to 8 from the operation of Rule 30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in so far as the said rules insisted on one year's service as Firka Revenue Inspector as a necessary qualification for promotion as upper division clerk. In addition to granting the said exemption the Government also directed as per Exhibit P4 that respondents Nos. 5 to 8 should be included in the list of upper division clerks of Kozhikode District for the year 1961. Pursuant to Exhibit P4, the District Collector, Kozhikode passed orders as per his proceedings evidenced by Exhibits P5 dated 22-10-1969 including the names of respondents Nos. 5 to 8 in the list of upper division clerks for the year 1961 and directing consequential amendments to be carried out in the list for 1961 which had been published as per the Collector's proceedings dated 9-2-1965.

45. The 4th respondent Shri V.P Alavikutty was junior in relation to the petitioners in the lower division category. He had also been included along with the petitioners in the list for 1962 evidenced by Exhibit P1. But he had been assigned only the last rank in the said list. The 4th respondent did not actually possess the Firka experience qualification at that time. But he moved the Government seeking the grant of an exemption from the operation of Rule 30(b) and Government appears to have passed an order dated 2-8-1965 granting a relaxation of the said rule in his favour. Similarly the 3rd respondent is also stated to have been granted an exemption by the Government from the operation of Rule 30(b) as per the Government order dated 14-8-1962 and on the basis of the said exemption he was included in the list of upper division clerks for the year 1961 even though the exemption was actually granted only in 1963.

46. The District Collector while passing the order Exhibit P. 5 has also appended thereto a list showing the revised ranks assigned to the upper division clerks by rearranging them in the 1961, 1962 and 1963 lists. Asa result of the said reallocation and revised ranking so made in 1969 respondents Nos. 3 to 8 who were juniors to the petitioners in the lower division and who had acquited the qualifications required for promotion to the Upper Division only subsequent to the acquisition of the said qualifications by the petitioners have all been assigned ranks above those of the petitioners by including respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the 1961 list. The petitioners contend that the action of the State Government and the District Collector in disrupting their seniority and rank which had become settled many years earlier by passing the orders evidenced by Exhibits P3 to P5 constitutes a serious infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed to them under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that the said action has also been taken in gross violation of the principles of natural justice.

47. It admits of no doubt that as a result of the passing of the order Exhibit P5 the petitioners have been visited with adverse consequences in as much as their seniority and rank have been altered by placing several of their erstwhile juniors above them in the category of upper division clerks. Respondents Nos. 3 to 8 were admittedly juniors in service in relation to the petitioners in the lower division. Respondents Nos. 3 and 5 to 8 had been originally included only in the list of upper division clerks of 1963 whereas the petitioners had all been given promotions in the 1962 list itself. The 4th respondent though included in the 1962 list was the junior most in that list. Thus the seniority of the petitioners over respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the upper division category had become settled as early as in 1965 as per the orders evidenced by Exhibits P1 and P2. More than four years thereafter the Government have passed the order Exhibit P4 purporting to exempt respondents Nos. 5 to 8 from the operation of Rule 30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules requiring one year's service as Firka Revenue Inspector for pi emotion as upper division clerk on the ground that a strict application of Rule 30(b) will therefore be prejudicial to their interests.” It is in implementation of Exhibit P4 that the District Collector has issued the proceedings evidenced by Exhibit P5 amending the list of upper division clerks for the year 1961 and revising the ranks assigned to the persons included in the promotion lists for 1961, and 1962.

48. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government it has been submitted that the impugned orders of exemption have been passed in the exercise of the power conferred by Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. We have already held that the said rule does not warrant the passing of such general orders of exemption as has been done under Exhibit P3. We have also expressed our conclusion that it will not be a proper or valid exercise of the power under Rule 39 to exempt any particular person or persons from the operation of a rule merely on the ground that the application of the particular rule will cause some hardship or inconvenience to them. The reason given in Exhibit P4 for invoking the power under Rule 39 is that “a strict application of Rule 30(b) will therefore be prejudicial to their interests.” It is manifest that the grant of the exemption on the aforesaid ground is illegal and unsustainable.

49. It is pointed out by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners that since respondents Nos. 3 to 8 were all juniors in service in relation to the petitioners in the lower division, even if the principle laid down in Exhibit P3 is to be regarded as valid, the same can have no application at all to the present case because it cannot be said that the petitioners were given any undue preference over respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the matter of their being posted as Firka Revenue Inspectors. There is considerable force in this argument. We have not been shown any special circumstances which would justify the differential treatment meted out to respondents Nos. 5 to 8 in exempting them from the operation of Rule 30(b) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules.

50. The orders of exemption passed in favour of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have not been produced in the case and hence we do not want to express any opinion concerning their legality and validity. It is seen from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that the 3rd respondent was granted exemption from the operation of Rule 30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules as per G.O (Rt.) 1833/63.Rev. dated 14-8-1963. It is likewise stated in the counter-affidavit that a relaxation of Rule 30(b) was granted in favour of the 4th respondent as per G.O (Rt.) 1266/65 dated 2-8-1965.

51. The executive orders passed by the State Government granting exemption from the operation of Rule 30(b) in favour of respondents Nos. 3 to 8 even if they are assumed to have been validly passed, cannot have retrospective operation and they will not have the effect of conferring on the aforesaid respondents eligibility for promotion as on 15-3-1961 which is the relevant date for purposes of inclusion in the 1961 list. See The Income-tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C Ponnoose, (1969) 2 SCC 351 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 385, and Ex-Major M.C Singhal v. Director General Armed Forces Medical Services, New Delhi, (1972) 4 SCC 765 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 628.

52. The petitioners were duly qualified for inclusion in the 1962 list and they had been granted promotions to the upper division in the list for 1962. By virtue of that promotion they had acquired a right to have their ranks and seniority in that category reckoned on the basis of the principles laid down in Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The position of the officers in relation to the promotions of 1961 and 1962 had become settled at least by the orders Exts. P1 and P2 passed in February, 1965 No statutory appeals or revision petitions are shown to have been filed against those orders and hence it must be taken that those lists had become final. It is not in the interests of the maintenance of the morale, efficiency and contentment in the service to disrupt after such long lapse of time matters pertaining to vital service conditions like seniority and rank which have already become settled. We may usefully refer in this context to the observations of the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 470 at 478.

“Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after a lapse of a number of years.”

53. It will be neither just or equitable to deprive persons who have been promoted many years ago, of the rights that have accrued to them regarding their rank and seniority by purporting to conduct a review of promotions after the lapse of many years.

54. The learned Government Pleader advanced before us a contention that the Madras Ministerial Service Rules are no longer in force and that therefore it was really unnecessary even to grant any exemption to the respondents from the operation of Rule 30(b) of those rules, in support of this contention he sough to rely on certain observations contained in a recent judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in O.P 4522 of 1969 we have carefully gone, through the judgment in that case which was rendered by one of us (Raghavan C.J) who was a member of that Full Bench also. The passage in that judgment on which reliance was placed by the Government Pleader does not specifically refer to the Madras Ministerial Service Rules and the observations contained therein regarding the operation of the Madras Special Rules must, in our view, be confined to the context of the facts and circumstances of that case. We are unable to treat that decision as an authority laying down that all the Madras Special Rules including the Madras Ministerial Service Rules ceased to be in force so far as the allotted persons from Madras are concerned after the coming into force of the General Rules contained in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The Madras Ministerial Service Rules were framed by the Governor of Madras under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. They constitute a ‘Law’ within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2(h) of the States Reorganisation Act. Under Section 119 of the said Act the said “Law” will continue to be operative even after 1-11-1956 in the territory in which it was originally applicable unless otherwise provided by a competent legislature or other competent authority. Hence until the framing of unified special rules for the concerned service either by the Governor of Kerala in the exercise of his power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or by the State Government in the exercise of the power conferred by Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, the Madras Ministerial Service Rules would continue to govern the ministerial service personnel who were allotted to this State from the erstwhile composite State of Madras. The contention to the contrary put forward by the Government Pleader cannot therefore be sustained.

55. We see also considerable force in the contention taken on behalf of the petitioners that Ext. P5 has been passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice. It is undeniable that as a direct result of the said order the petitioners have been made to suffer a reduction in their seniority and rank in the upper division category. What was done under file order Ext. P5 passed in 1969 was to review the promotion lists for 1961 and 1962 and to revise the seniority list which had been settled by the District Collector in 1965. Before any such action was taken, the petitioners ought to have been afforded a full and fair opportunity of making their representations before the concerned authorities. The said basic requirement not having been complied with, Ext. P5 must be held to be illegal on the ground of contravention of the principles of natural justice also.

56. In the result we quash Exts. P4 and P5 in so far as they have directed the inclusion of respondents Nos. 3 to 8, in the promotion list of upper division clerks for 1961 on the strength of the exemptions granted to them from the operation of Rule 30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules. We hold that the said respondents are not entitled to be assigned seniority and rank above the writ petitioners in the category of upper division clerks. The original petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their respective costs.

57. The writ petition has been filed by eight employees of the State Government belonging to the Kerala Statistics and Economics Subordinate Service. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 are working as Junior Statistical Inspectors and the 4th petitioner is holding the post of upper division investigator in the Bureau of Economics and Statistics. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 are post-graduate degree holders and the remaining petitioners namely, Nos. 5 to 8, are graduates.

58. Respondents Nos. 5 to 52 are other employees belonging to the same department. All of them are seniors in relation to the petitioners in the category of Junior Statistical Inspectors. Respondents Nos. 1 to 24 are graduates and the remaining respondents are non-graduates.

59. Special Rules were framed for the Kerala Stastistics and Economics Subordinate Services as per G.O (P) No. 255, Public (Rules) Department dated 22-6-1966—Exhibit P1. Under rule 2 of those rules the qualifications required for appointment to the various categories in the service have been prescribed. The next higher post to which those in the category of Junior Statistical Inspector/Upper Division Investigator can look for promotion is that of Research Assistant. It is laid down in item 1 of the Schedule annexed to Rule 2 that for promotion from Junior Statistical Inspector/Investigator to the category of Research Assistant a candidate must have passed the selective test in Applied Statistics and allied subjects conducted by the Public Service Commission. The rule also lays down the conditions for eligibility to appear for the said selective test but we are not directly concerned with that matter in this writ petition by an amendment to the Special Rules made on the 12th March 1968 as per the order Exhibit P3, post-graduate decree-holders were exempted from the necessity of passing the aforesaid test. Writ petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 being post-graduate degree-holders were covered by the said exemption.

60. Respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11 had been promoted to the category of Research Assistants even prior to the coming into force of the Special Rules and hence they are not bound to pass the test which was newly introduced by the Special Rules which came into force only subsequent to their promotion. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioners made it clear that the petitioners are not challenging the legality of the promotions granted to the aforesaid respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11.

61. It took some time for the Government to prescribe the syllabus etc. for the newly introduced test and hence the first test was actually conducted only on 1-7-1968. Writ petitioners Nos. 5 to 8 appeared for the first test and came out successful. Respondents Nos. 14 to 16, 18, 22 and 24 also passed the said test at the same time along with petitioners Nos. 5 to 8.

62. The grievance of the petitioners is that even though the maximum time allowed under Rule 13-A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules for the passing of the new test came to a close on 30-5-1970 on the expiry of the period of two years from the date of the actual conduct of the first test, many of the respondents who have not passed the selective test and who were promoted to the category of Research Assistants during the period of exemption allowed under Rule 13-A are being illegally allowed to continue the higher posts while the petitioners who have acquired the test qualification are being denied their legitimate promotion. The petitioners have alleged that for the purpose of conferring an undue advantage to the unqualified hands in the service who are said to have brought pressure to bear on the State Government through the Bureau of Economics N.G.O Association, the Government passed the order Exhabit P4 dated 29-6-1970 granting to the provisional employees in the cadre of Research Assistant/Statistical Inspector etc. an extension of the temporary exemption from passing the test in Applied Statistics and Allied Subjects for a period of two years from 30-6-1970. The petitioners contend that Exhibit P4 is directly contrary to the provision contained in Rule 13-A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules and that it is beyond the competence of the State Government to pass an executive order under Rule 39 granting a general exemption from a mandatory provision contained in the Special Rules.

63. During the pendency of this writ petition the period of two years mentioned in Exhibit P4 also expired and thereupon the Government passed another order—G.O Rt. 205/72.Plg., dated 29-6-1972 Exhibit P11—which is in the following terms:—

“READ:—

1. G.O Rt. 154/70.Plg. dated 29-6-1970.

2. Representation dated 25-5-1972 from the General Secretary, Joint Council of State Service Organisations, Trivandrum.

64. Government are pleased to order that the temporary exemption from passing the departmental tests enjoyed by the provisional promotees to the cadre of Research Assistant/Statistical Inspector/Supervisor, Mechanical Tabulation Unit as per G.O Rt. 154/70.Plg. dated 29-6-1970 will be extended for a period of 2 years with effect from 30-6-1972

(By Order of the Governor)

P. Sukumaran, Under Secretary.

65. The petitioners have thereupon amended the writ petition with the permission of this court by incorporating a prayer for the quashing of Exhibit P11 also on the same grounds.

66. Rule 13-A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules lays down that where a pass in a special or departmental test is newly prescribed by the Special Rules of a service for any category, grade or post therein or in any class thereof, a member of the service who has not passed the said test but is otherwise qualified and suitable for appointment to such class, category, grade or post may within 2 years of the introduction of the test be appointed thereto temporarily. It is further mandatorily enjoined in the rule that if a member so appointed does not pass the test within 2 years from the date of introduction of the said test, he shall be reverted to the class, category or grade or post from which he was appointed and shall not again be eligible for appointment under the said rule. The rule contains two provisos of which the second proviso alone, is material and it reads:—

“Provided further that the period of temporary exemption shall be extended by two years in the case of a person belonging ta any of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes.”

67. It is on the strength of the temporary exemption granted under Rule 13th that those amongst the respondents Nos. 1 to 38 (other than respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11) who did not possess the test qualification were provisionally promoted to the category of Research Assistants/Statistical Inspectors/Supervisors. The Special Rules which introduced the requirement of passing the test came into force on 22-6-1966. The syllabus for the test was however, prescribed only on 3-7-1967 and as already noticed the first test was actually conducted only on 1-7-1968. Even if the date on which the first test was actually conducted is to be regarded as “the date of introduction” of the test for the purposes of Rule 13-A, the period of temporary exemption came to a close on 30-6-1970. Thereupon the latter portion of Rule 13-A which is mandatory in character automatically became operative and it was incumbent on the State Government and the Director of Bureau of Economics and Statistics to take immediate action to revert to the lower category all those amongst the provisional promotees who had not passed the lest within the aforesaid period of two years ending with 30-6-1970 Instead of doing so what the State Government did was to pass the order Exhibit P4 dated 29-6-1970 which is in the following terms;—

“Read;—1. Letter dated 12-5-1970 from the Secretary, Bureau Economics and Statistics N.G.O Association.

2. Letter No. F5-8947/70-FSD dated 23-6-1970 from the Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics”

68. According to the qualifications prescribed under Rule 2 of the Karala Statistics and Economics Subordinate Services Rules, a person must have passed the test in Applied Statistics and Allied Subjects conducted by the Public Service Commission for his eligibility for promption to the post of Research Assistant/Statistical Inspector/Mechanical Tabulation Supervisor. The above test was first conducted by the Public Service Commission on 1-7-1968. Hence, the period of temporary exemption under Rule 13-A of the General Rules expires on 30-6-1970. The General Secretary, Bureau of Economics and Statistics N.G.O Association, in his letter first cited, has requested that the period of temporary exemption from passing the test may be extended for a further period of two yeas from 1-7-1970. The Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics has recommended to sanction the above request as a special case.

69. In the circumstances, Government order that the provisional promotees to the cadre of Research Assistant/Statistical Inspector/Mechanical Tabulation Supervisor will be granted extension of temporary exemption from passing the departmental test mentioned for a period of 2 years from 30-6-1970, or from the date of the modification to the special Rules, takes effect, whichever is earlier.

(By Order of Governor)

M.N Elayadom, Assistant Secretary.

70. The effect of Exhibit P4 is to render ineffective the provision contained in Rule 2 of the Special Rules which lays down that for promotion to the category of Research Assistants, the person concerned must have passed a selective test. But, even more than that, the grant of the temporary extension is directly opposed to the mandatory provision in Rule 13-A which enjoins that on the expiry of the period of two years the provisional promotees who have failed to acquire the test qualification shall be reverted to their original grade or post and that they shall not be eligible for being provisionally appointed on the basis of a temporary exemption. The second proviso to the rules makes it very clear that there is no power vested in the Government to extend the period of temporary exemption except in respect of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in whose cases alone the proviso specifically confers a power for extending the period of temporary exemption by two years. We have already held that it is not ordinarily open to the State Government under Rule 39, even after its amendment, to exercise the power under the rule in direct contravention of a mandatory provision in the existing rules, and that the only exception to the said principle is that in rare and exceptional cases where the circumstances are such that a reasonable classification of the particular case or cases is validity possible for the purpose of Articles 14 and 16 a relaxation of the rigour of any rule or even an exemption from its provisions may be granted. We have also held that a general order granting an exemption in favour of a large or undefined group of persons is not warranted under Rule 39. It is seen from Exhibit P4 and also from the subsequent order of exemption Exhibit P11 the text of which we have already extracted, that they are merely general orders passed by the State Government on certain representations made to it by the General Secretary of a service association. There was no application at all of the Government's mind to individual cases in the light of the principles enunciated by us earlier in this judgment it has to beheld that the Government had no power to grant a general exemption from the provisions of Rule 13-A in favour of all the unqualified provisional promotees by allowing an extension of the period of temporary exemption from passing the departmental test beyond the prescribed period of two years.

71. Exhibits P4 and P11 are, therefore invalid and they are hereby quashed. The State Government and the Director of Bureau of Economics and Statistics should take immediate action to revert from the higher category of Research Assistants/Statistical Inspectors/Supervisors, all these persons amongst respondents Nos. 1 to 52 (other than respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11) who have failed to pass the test on or before 30-6-1970 and to grant to the petitioners promotions to that category in as much as they are duly qualified. Such action should be completed within a period not exceeding two months from to-day. The original petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their respective costs.

Sd./T.C Raghavan, Chief Justice.

Sd./V. Balakrishna Eradi, Judge.

Sd./N.D.P Namboodiripad, Judge.