- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ida v. Board Of Revenue, U.P.
Judgment Summary — N.D. Ojha, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Hari Shanker filed a suit on 1-2-1961 under Sec. 171 of the U.P. Tenancy Act against Habib Ahmad and Ida alleging that Habib Ahmad was his tenant and had sublet the land to Ida in 1351 F (corresponding to 1943 A.D.) and that the sub-lease was for more than five years in contravention of Sec. 40 of the Act.
The suit was contested. The trial court's decree included an option to Habib Ahmad to apply for ejectment of Ida within one month and resume occupation in terms of the proviso to Sec. 171. On appeal by Ida the decree was set aside by the Additional Commissioner on 18-4-1962 and the suit dismissed. Hari Shanker filed a second appeal and the Board of Revenue allowed it on 13-3-1963/17-4-1964, restoring the trial court decree.
Ida challenged the Board of Revenue's order by Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 2386/64, which was dismissed on 26-3-1970. Special appeals Nos. 394 and 418 of 1970 were filed by Ida and Habib Ahmad respectively against that judgment.
After the Board of Revenue decree, Hari Shanker filed for execution; Ida's objection in execution was dismissed by revenue authorities. Habib Ahmad filed an application on 16-6-1964 as contemplated by the proviso to Sec. 171 which the opinion states "has so far not been decided on merits." Writ petition Nos. 613 of 1970 and 910 of 1971 were filed by Habib Ahmad and Ida respectively against orders passed by the Revenue authorities on the execution side.
The special appeals and the writ petitions were heard together and decided by this common judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and applicable law (including statutory amendments and notifications), the sub-lease in favour of Ida ever became in contravention of Sec. 40 of the U.P. Tenancy Act prior to Hari Shanker's suit.
- Whether the Board of Revenue erred in decreeing the suit for ejectment under Sec. 171 of the Act.
- Whether the execution proceedings based on the Board of Revenue's decree should be quashed as a consequence of any error in the decree.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel for Hari Shanker (summary of arguments recorded in the opinion)
- A preliminary objection that the special appeals filed by Habib Ahmad and Ida were not maintainable because they had not filed writ petitions against the Board of Revenue order decreeing the suit; also that Habib Ahmad's writ petition was not maintainable because he had not filed any objection in execution proceedings nor had he challenged the trial court's order in appeal or revision before the Board of Revenue.
- Substance of a substantive argument: the Government notification (dated 23-1-1958) placed no bar on institution of a suit; it only stayed suits that may have been filed — therefore Habib Ahmad's failure to file a suit for ejectment on 1-7-1953 meant the sub-lease became for a period of more than five years and was in contravention of Sec. 40.
Arguments or contentions recorded for Habib Ahmad and Ida (as reflected in the opinion)
- Ida challenged the Board of Revenue's order by writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ No. 2386/64) and also filed a special appeal; the controversy was therefore presented for decision on the merits.
- Habib Ahmad filed an application on 16-6-1964 under the proviso to Sec. 171 (the opinion records this filing and that it had not been decided on merits at the relevant time).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Virendra Pratap v. Gulwant Singh | The holding that if a sub-lease commenced from 1st July and was year-to-year it would expire on 30th June; if the subtenant was allowed to continue on the following 1st July by the land-holder, the sub-lease would continue for another year and so on (year-to-year computation dependent on the tenant's volition in allowing continuation). | The court used this principle to illustrate how the annual year-to-year calculation operates: if the sub-lease began on 1-7-1943, five years would elapse on 30-6-1948 and the 6th year commence on 1-7-1948, at which point contravention of Sec. 40 would occur if the tenant had allowed continuation. The case informed the temporal calculation but was read together with the statutory amendment affecting permitted relief. |
| Ram Sunder v. Triloki Nath | The principle that a court may not pass a decree in anticipation of a cause of action which will arise in the future because a statutory provision prevents present relief; specifically, plaintiffs cannot claim a subsisting cause of action where statute (Sec. 295-A) made the defendant not liable to ejectment for a five-year period from the date the Amendment Act came into force. | The court relied on this authority to hold that Habib Ahmad had no cause of action to sue Ida for ejectment from 14-6-1947 to a later date (the opinion states "from 14-6-1947 to 14-6-1962" in recounting the Ram Sunder decision) and therefore a decree could not be sustained in anticipation of a cause of action which the statute suspended. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a chronological and legal analysis focused on three overlapping sources that affected whether the sub-lease ever became contrary to Sec. 40 before Hari Shanker's suit:
- Date and nature of the sub-lease: The sub-letting was said to have occurred in 1943 and was year-to-year (no registered deed). The court applied the principle from Virendra Pratap v. Gulwant Singh to explain how a year-to-year sub-lease would be computed (annual expiry on 30th June if commencing 1st July), and that the tenant's volition in "allowing to continue" is material to the extension of each year.
- Effect of the statutory amendment (Sec. 295-A): The United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. X of 1947) introduced Sec. 295-A, effective 14-6-1947. The court quoted the section which, subject to a proviso, entitled every person who on commencement was a sub-tenant to retain possession for five years from that date and specified that during that period Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 44 or Sec. 171 would not render the landlord liable to ejectment under Sec. 171. The court concluded that as a consequence Habib Ahmad was not entitled to sue Ida for ejectment from 14-6-1947 to 14-6-1952 (the opinion states this date range).
- Reliance on Ram Sunder v. Triloki Nath: The court cited this decision where a similar situation arose — proceedings for ejectment had been commenced before Sec. 295-A and a party sought a decree in anticipation of the cause of action that would arise after the five-year prohibition. The authority held a decree could not be passed in anticipation of a cause of action. The court applied that reasoning to the present facts to conclude that Habib had no subsisting cause of action during the period the statute protected the sub-tenant.
- Character of the tenant's omission to sue: The court distinguished between a tenant's conscious volition to allow a sub-tenant to continue and an omission caused by a statutory prohibition which made suit impossible or futile. Relying on the authorities and the nature of Sec. 295-A, the court concluded that where statute prevented initiating effective proceedings, the omission cannot be treated as an act of volition amounting to "allowing to continue" the sub-lease for year-to-year extension purposes.
- Additional statutory bar — Government notification of 23-1-1958: The court noted a Government notification issued under Sec. 10 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants Acquisition of Privileges (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1950 (No. 9734.I-A-1278-1252, dated 23-1-1958) which provided that suits under Sec. 175 of the Act shall remain stayed under Sec. 10 in respect of lands included on 7-7-1949 in certain civic areas. The land in dispute fell within that notification. The court rejected Hari Shanker's argument that the notification only stayed suits and did not bar institution; the court reasoned that requiring a person to file a suit that could only be stayed and not decided on merits would obligate litigants to perform a vain and infeasible act (invoking the maxim lex neminem cogit ad vana seu impossibilia and lex semper intendit quod convenit ratione).
- Net result of the statutory and regulatory framework: The court found that at no point before Hari Shanker filed his suit on 1-2-1961 had the sub-lease in favour of Ida become in contravention of Sec. 40, because the statutory protection and the notification excluded periods during which ejectment actions could be effectively prosecuted. Consequently, Hari Shanker's suit under Sec. 171 was not maintainable.
- Procedural consequence and disposition: Because the court quashed the decree passed by the Board of Revenue in the suit under Sec. 171, the court held the execution proceedings taken pursuant to that decree would automatically fall. The court therefore found it unnecessary to adjudicate the preliminary objection to maintainability of the special appeals.
Holding and Implications
The Court held that the order of the Board of Revenue dated 13-3-1963/17-4-1964 decreeing Hari Shanker's suit under Sec. 171 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was vitiated by error of law and is quashed; the suit is dismissed; the writ petitions are allowed; and the execution proceedings founded on that decree are quashed.
Direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):
- The special appeals and the writ petitions were allowed.
- The judgment of the learned Single Judge (in the writ) was set aside.
- The Board of Revenue's decree (13-3-1963/17-4-1964) decreeing the suit of Hari Shanker for ejectment under Sec. 171 is quashed and the suit is dismissed.
- The writ petitions are allowed and the proceedings in execution of the aforesaid decree of the Board of Revenue are quashed.
- The court made no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond applying Sec. 295-A and the cited precedents to the facts before it; it specifically resolves the parties' rights by reference to the statutory bar and the 1958 notification. The opinion does not state any further prospective rule-making beyond the decision in the present case.
Appeals allowed.
N.D Ojha, J.:— Hari Shanker, a respondent in the special appeals as also in the writ petitions, filed a suit under Sec. 171 of the U.P Tenancy Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, on 1-2-1961 against Habib Ahmad and Ida on the allegation that Habib Ahmad was his tenant of the land in dispute, had sublet the same to Ida in the year 1351 F (corresponding to 1943 A.D) and that since the sub-lease was for more than five years, it was illegal being in contravention of Sec. 40 of the Act. The suit was contested, but Ahmad was given the option to apply for ejectment of Ida within one month and resume occupation of the land in dispute in terms of the proviso to Sec. 171 of the Act. On an appeal filed by Ida the aforesaid decree was set aside by the Additional Commissioner on 18-4-1962 and the suit was dismissed. Hari Shanker filed a second appeal which was allowed by the Board of Revenue on 13-3-1963/17-4-1964, whereby the decree of the Additional Commissioner was set aside and that of the trial court was restored. Ida challenged the aforesaid order of the Board of Revenue by way of Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 2386/64. That petition was dismissed on 26-3-1970. Special appeals Nos. 394 and 418 of 1970 have been filed against this judgment by Ida and Habib Ahmad respectively.
2. After His suit had been decreed by the Board of Revenue Hari Shanker filed an application for execution of the decree in which an objection was filed by Ida which was dismissed by the Revenue authorities. Habib Ahmad also on 16-6-1964 filed an application as contemplated by the proviso to Sec. 171 of the Act. According to him that application has so far not been decided on merits. Writ petition Nos. 613 of 1970 and 910 of 1971 have been filed by Habib Ahmad and Ida respectively against the orders passed by the Revenue authorities on the execution side.
3. The Special appeals and the writ petitions have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. Learned counsel for Hari Shanker raised a preliminary objection that the special appeal filed by Habib Ahmad and Ida respectively able, in as much as he had not filed a writ petition against the order of the Board of Revenue decreeing the suit, and further that even his writ petition was not maintainable, because he had not filed any objection in execution proceedings too; nor, had he challenged the order of the trial court in appeal or a revision before the Board of Revenue.
4. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the Board of Revenue in passing the decree in the suit under Sec. 171 committed a manifest error of law and its order deserves to be quashed. Since the said order was challenged at any rate by Ida by filing a writ petition, and he has also filed a special appeal, the controversy has to be decided on merits. After the decree itself passed in the suit under Sec. 171 of the Act is quashed by this Court, the proceedings taken in execution of that decree will automatically fall, and in this view of the matter we have found it unnecessary to record any finding on the merits of the preliminary objection.
5. The sub-letting is said to have taken place in 1943. No registered deed of sub-lease was executed and the sub-lease even according to the case set up by Hari Shanker would be from year. In Virendra Pratap v. Gulwant Singh1 it was held that if a sub-lease commenced from 1st of July and was one from year to year, it would expire on the 30th of June, and if the subtenant was allowed to continue by his land holder on the 1st of July following he would become entitled to hold the land for another year expiring on 30th June next. During that year the sub-lease would be held to be for two years and so on.
6. In the instant case, if we proceed on the assumption that the sublease for the first year commenced on 1-7-43, and had Habib Ahmad allowed the sub-lease to continue, the period of five years would have elapsed on 30th of June, 1948, and the sub-lease would have entered its 6th year on 1-7-1948. It is then that it would have become in contravention of Sec. 40 of the Act. Before, however, the said contingency could happen, the Act was amended and Sec. 295-A was added to it which reads:—
“Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, or anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, every person who on the date of the commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 is a sub-tenant, shall, subject to the provisions of the proviso to Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, be entitled to retain possession of this holding for a period of five years from that date, and for this period nothing in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 44 or Sec. 171 shall render the land-holder of such sub-tenant liable to ejectment under the provisions of Sec. 171:
Provided that nothing in this section shall authorise a sub-tenant of a person who belongs to one of the classes mentioned in Sec. 41, to retain possession of his holding after the disability of such person has ceased.”
7. The aforesaid section was introduced by U.P Act No. X of 1947 and came in force on June 14, 1947.
8. As a consequence of Sec. 295-A Habib Ahmad was not entitled to sue Ida for his ejectment from 14-6-1947 to 14-6-1952. On 14-6-1947 even four years had not expired from the date of sub-lease.
9. In Ram Sunder v. Triloki Nath2, proceedings for the ejectment of a sub-tenant under Sec. 175 of the Act were commenced in 1944. The suit was decreed on 1-9-1945 by the trial court which decree was affirmed on 20-3-1946 by the lower appellate court. A second appeal was pending in this Court when Sec. 295-A was introduced. Finding that the suit could no longer be decreed till 14-6-1962, when the second appeal came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court on or about 15-11-1951, on a reference by a Single Judge, it was urged by the plaintiff's counsel that a decree may be passed in anticipation of the cause of action that would arise after 14-6-1962. The argument was repelled and it was held:—
“As regards the second contention, the Act makes it amply clear that the defendant being a sub-tenant is not liable to ejectment for a period of five years from the date the Act came into force. The plaintiffs cannot, therefore, claim that they have now any subsisting cause of action which would entitle them to a decree for ejectment. Their cause of action for ejectment would arise on the expiry of a period of five years and we cannot pass a decree in anticipation of the cause of action arising in 1952.”
10. In the case of Virendra Pratap, the emphasis was laid on the act of the tenant in allowing the sub-tenant to continue on 1st of July each year. Allowing to continue implies volition on the part of the tenant. It has to be a conscious and deliberate Act. It may also be the result of an omission to file a suit for ejectment if a suit could legally be filed. If, however, there is a statutory prohibition as a result of which the tenant cannot file a suit and is helpless, the cause of action for filing a suit for ejectment itself does not subsist. In view of the authority of Rain Sunder's case Habib Ahmad did not have any cause of action to file a suit for ejectment of Ida from 14-6-1947 to 14-6-1962. Since he could not file suit even if he very much liked to do so, being helpless in the matter, his omission to file suit cannot, in law be treated to mean that he allowed the sub-tenant to continue on 1st of July, 1947, and on the successive first days of July. When Sec. 295-A was introduced, even four years had not elapsed from the commencement of the sub-lease as it was to elapse on 30-6-47. The cause of ??? 14-6-47 to 14-6-52, the aforesaid period has to be excluded from consideration. In this view of the matter, the 5th year of the sub-lease would commence on July 1, 1952, and the sub-lease would have become in contravention of Sec. 40 if Habib Ahmad had not filed a suit for the ejectment of Ida on 1st July, 1953. Much before 1st of July, 1953, however, a new bar was introduced by a Government notification No. 9734.I-A-1278-1252, dated January 23, 1958, issued under Sec. 10 of the U.P Agricultural Tenants Acquisition of Privileges (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1950, whereby it was provided that suits under Sec. 175 of the Act shall remain stayed under Sec. 10 of the aforesaid Act in respect of lands which were included on the 7th of July, 1949 in a municipality or a notified area, or a cantonment or a town area. It is not disputed that the land in dispute falls within the ambit of the aforesaid notification.
11. Learned counsel for Hari Shanker, however, urged that the said notification placed no bar on the institution of a suit. It only provided for staying such suits as may have been filed and since Habib Ahmad did not file a suit for ejectment of Ida on 1-7-1953, the sub-lease became for a period of more than five years on the dale. We are, however, not impressed by this argument. A suit is filed for a particular relief. If the suit that may be filed is only to be stayed and not to be decided on merits with the result that the relief prayed for cannot be granted the filing of a such a suit would be in vain and infeasible. No person can be penalised for not filing a suit in such a situation. Lex neminem cogitad vana seu impossibilia—the law obliges no man to do vain or infeasible things. It cannot be said that in issuing the notification aforesaid the intention was that the tenants should continue to file suits under Sec. 175 for the ejectment of their sub-tenants lief, and the suit is to be stayed on its institution. The law always intends what is agreeable to reason Lex semper intendit quod convenit ratione.
12. It is again not disputed that the bar created by the aforesaid notification was in force even on 1-2-1961 when Hari Shanker filed the suit for ejectment of Habib Ahmad and Ida under Sec. 171 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that at no point of time before Hari Shanker filed the aforesaid suit, the sub-lease in favour of Ida became in contravention of Sec. 40 of the Act and, consequently, the suit was not maintainable. The writ petition filed by Ida challenging the order of the Board of Revenue in the suit under Sec. 171, therefore, deserves to be allowed. As already pointed out, on the said order being quashed the proceedings in execution of the said decree passed by the Board of Revenue would automatically fall, and the writ petitions too, therefore, deserve to be allowed on this short ground even without going into the merits of the various contentions raised therein.
13. In the result the special appeals as well as the writ petitions are allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the order of the Board of Revenue dated 13-3-1963/17-4-1964 decreeing the suit of Hari Shanker for ejectment of Habib Ahmad and Ida under Sec. 171 of the U.P Tenancy Act is quashed. Suit is dismissed. The writ petitions are also allowed and the proceedings in execution of the aforesaid decree of the Board of Revenue are quashed. Under the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
Appeals allowed.
Alert