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Subhas Chandra And Others v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Opposite Parties.
Gulati, J.:— The petitioners' father Sheo Narain was a tenant of the disputed accommodation where he was running a motor repairing workshop. The accommodation belongs to Chandrika Prasad (hereinafter referred to as the landlord). The landlord moved an application under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘old Act’) for permission to file a suit against Sheo Narain (hereinafter referred to as the ‘tenant’). The application was moved on the ground that the landlord wanted the premises for the use of his younger son, who wanted to open a utensil factory there. The application was contested by the tenant on the ground that he was a motor mechanic carrying on business since a long and that business was the only source of his livelihood. It was also stated that the landlord had a flourshing business and his fourth son, for whom the accommodation as needed, was already carrying on business in a separate accommodation. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, however, allowed the application vide his order dated 9th January, 1967. The tenant preferred a revision before the Commissioner, but the same was dismissed. Against that order the tenant preferred a revision petition under Sec. 7-F of the Act before the State Government. The State Government granted a stay order but before the stay order could be communicated the landlord had already instituted a suit. The suit was dismissed on 29th September, 1970. The landlord filed an appeal which was allowed by the District Judge, Allahabad and the suit for ejectment was decreed. The tenant came up to this Court in second appeal. The said appeal was allowed on 18th April, 1972, and the suit for ejectment was dismissed.
2. It appaars that the State Government was informed that the landlord had already instituted a suit and the revision petition of the petitioner was consigned to the record-room with the observation that after the decision of the suit either party could approach the State Government. When the suit of the landlord was finally dismissed by the High Court he applied to the State Government to revive the revision petition of the tenant and to dispose of it on merits. This request was accepted and the revision petition was revived and finally dismissed on 22nd of February, 1947. This order has been challenged.
3. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that the impugned order is manifestly erroneous and wholly without jurisdiction. In the first place the revision petition had been filed by the tenant and it could be revived only at his instance. As the suit of the landlord had been dismissed by the High Court he was obviously not interested in having the revision petition revived. The revision petition could not be revived at the instance of the landlord. He could institute fresh proceedings under the U.P Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972, which had, in the meantime come into force. Secondly, the revision petition had become in fructuous. The only prayer in that application was that the permission granted to the landlord to file a suit by the Commissioner be revoked. The suit having already been instituted on the basis of the permission granted by the Commissioner, the question of revoking the permission did not survive. Thirdly, the State Government had become functus officio after the institution of the suit and had no power to deal with any application under Sec. 7-F against the permission granted by the Commissioneer. This proposition has been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Doshilal v. Mantri Ram A.I.R 1965 Alld. 498. which has since been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Mohammad Ismail v. Manna Lal 1969 1 SCC 727. There it has been held that the State Government can exercise jurisdiction under Sec. 7-F of the Act to revive the order of the Commissioner before the institution of the suit. Once, the suit is instituted, the State Government becomes functus officio.
4. In the instant case the suit had not only been filed, but had finally been decided by the High Court. Obviously the State Government could not by any means set aside or bye-pass the decree of the High Court.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also attacked the impugned order on merits. He says that according to the established view of this Court, it was necessary for the State Government to have compared the needs of the petitioner and of the landlord. The petitioner had also raised a plea that he had acquired a good will which would be destroyed, if he was forced to move to same other place. It is, however, not necessary to go into this question, because the petition succeeds on the ground already indicated.
6. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the State Government dated 22nd February, 1974 is quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the costs.
7. Petition allowed.
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