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Sachindra Nath Sarkar & Ors. v. Sm. Binapani Basu & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs and defendants are co-sharers of Plot Number 83 Mouja Andul P.S Sankrail, which includes a common passage used for ingress, egress, repairs, light, air, rainwater drainage, and laying electric wires. An agreement existed to keep this passage open to the sky to maintain privacy and enjoyment for all owners. The defendants constructed a balcony projecting over the common passage, which the plaintiffs claimed was unauthorized and would cause permanent obstruction and irreparable injury. The plaintiffs instituted a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from such construction.
The trial court decreed the suit, holding that the defendants had no right to encroach upon the common passage. However, the appellate court reversed this decree, finding that after enforcement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, the common passage ceased to be common property as the co-sharers became direct tenants of separate portions. The appellate court dismissed the suit, and the plaintiffs appealed against this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the common passage ceased to be common property following the vesting of raiyat's interest under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.
- Whether the defendants had the right to construct a balcony projecting over the common passage without infringing the rights of the plaintiffs as co-sharers.
- Whether a co-sharer is entitled to an injunction restraining another co-sharer from constructing over the jointly owned property without consent, and under what circumstances such injunction is justified.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The common passage was created for joint use and enjoyment, with an agreement to keep it open to the sky, maintaining privacy and access.
- The defendants' balcony construction would cause permanent obstruction, infringing on ingress, egress, light, air, rainwater flow, and privacy.
- Reliance on Israil v. Samser Rahman to argue that possession by one co-sharer does not entitle changing the nature of joint property use without consent.
- Reliance on Shibba Mal v. Naurang Mal to support the proposition that one co-owner cannot alter joint property use to the detriment of other co-owners.
- Claim that a joint owner is entitled to an injunction restraining other co-owners from making the joint property more exclusive to themselves.
Respondents' Arguments
- Denial of any agreement among co-sharers to keep the common passage open to the sky.
- The balcony would cover only an insignificant portion of the passage, supported by the defendants' house roof, causing no obstruction to light or air.
- Reliance on Calcutta High Court decisions holding that a joint owner is not entitled to restrain another without showing special damage.
- Argued that the Allahabad High Court decision relied upon by the appellants was not followed subsequently and is inconsistent with other High Court decisions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Madan Mohan v. Sishu Bala, AIR 1972 Cal. 502 | Effect of vesting of raiyat's interest under West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act on common passages. | Appellate court relied on this to hold that the common passage ceased to be common after vesting. |
| Israil v. Samser Rahman, 18 CWN 176 | Possession of joint property by one co-sharer does not entitle changing the nature of possession without consent. | Appellants relied on this to argue defendants cannot change joint property use. |
| Shibba Mal v. Naurang Mal, AIR 1971 Allahabad 118 | Joint owners cannot make joint property exclusively their own; use as passage does not permit building projecting over it. | Appellants cited this to support injunction against balcony construction. |
| Shamnugger Jute Factory Co. Ltd. v. Ram Narain Chatterjee, (1886) ILR 14 Calcutta 189 | Granting injunctions under Specific Relief Act is discretionary and requires showing of damage. | Court emphasized discretion and need for damage to justify injunction. |
| Joy Chunder Rukhit v. Bippro Chunrn Rakhit, ILR 14 Cal. 236 | Injury materially affecting position or enjoyment is necessary to justify restoration orders by court among co-sharers. | Applied to show substantial injury must be proven for relief. |
| Ram Nandan v. Jai Gobind, AIR 1919 Pat 445 | Similar principle as above; injury materially altering position required for relief. | Followed Calcutta decisions, rejecting Shibba Mal's approach. |
| S.S.V Krishna Pillai v. Kilasathammal, AIR 1928 Madras 810 | Injunction depends on whether encroachment interferes with enjoyment or accustomed use. | Court refused injunction where no interference with accustomed user was shown. |
| Akshay Kumar v. Bhajagobinda Shaha, AIR 1930 Calcutta 341 | One joint owner not entitled to erect building on joint property without consent, but injunction depends on damage. | Clarified that injunction is not absolute without regard to damage. |
| Manilal Ratanchand v. Nanubhai, AIR 1947 Bombay 394 | Injunction granted for balcony projection exceeding permissible limits. | Supported principle that injunction depends on extent of encroachment and damage. |
| Chhedilal v. Chhotoley lal, AIR 1951 Allahabad 199 | Relief for invasion of rights depends on circumstances, balancing injury to parties. | Court emphasized discretion guided by justice, equity, and good conscience. |
| Khimji Mulji v. Popatlal Bhanji, AIR 1951 Saurashtra 85 | Injunction refused when projection over common passage caused no inconvenience or injury. | Defendants relied on this to argue no injunction warranted for minor balcony projection. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the appellate court's finding that the common passage ceased to be common property after vesting of raiyat's interest, affirming that although the co-sharers became direct tenants of separate portions, joint ownership rights and equities among co-sharers continue under general law unless expressly removed by statute.
The Court accepted the trial court's finding that no agreement existed to keep the passage open to the sky, but noted the defendants' balcony would be supported by their first-floor roof without ground support, thus not obstructing free use of the passage.
The Court analyzed legal principles regarding injunctions among co-sharers, emphasizing that a co-owner is not entitled to an injunction solely by virtue of co-ownership; rather, the plaintiff must prove material injury affecting enjoyment or accustomed user of the joint property.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found the plaintiffs failed to establish that the proposed balcony would cause such material injury or interference with accustomed use, including obstruction of light, air, privacy, or passage of electric wires.
The Court also noted that the plaintiffs acted promptly in seeking relief and that the balcony's limited projection would not convert the passage into a tunnel or cause irreparable harm.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal on grounds different from the appellate court but consistent with equitable principles and the balance of convenience.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, upholding the appellate court’s dismissal of the suit for injunction against the balcony construction.
The direct effect is that the defendants are permitted to maintain the balcony projecting over the common passage as proposed, since the plaintiffs failed to prove material injury or interference with their rights as co-sharers. No new legal precedent was established; the decision reinforces existing principles that injunctions among co-owners require proof of substantial injury and are granted at the Court’s discretion considering equity and balance of convenience.
JUDGMENT
1. This is an appeal against judgment and decree of reversal. Plot Number 83 Mouja Andul P.S Sankrail is a common passage in which the plaintiffs and the defendants, as transferees, are co-sharers. The common passage is flanked on one side by the houses of the plaintiffs nos. 1 and 2 and on the other side by the houses of the plaintiff no. 3 and other defendants. According to the plaintiffs' case, the common passage was created for ingress and egress, space for repairs of structures, passage for light and air, and rain water and also for laying electric wires. There was an agreement to keep the common passage open to the sky for beneficent enjoyment of the dwelling houses on either sides of the common passage and their privacy was thereby maintained. The defendants by force completed all arrangements to construct a balcony from their house over the common passage. It was said that the defendants had no right to make such construction, which if made would cause permanent obstruction to the common passage and change its nature and character causing irreparable injury to the other owners, the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in the circumstances instituted the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from making any construction over the common passage.
2. The defendants filled their written statement denying that there was any agreement among co-sharers to keep the common passage free upto the sky. Further, it was said, there would be no obstruction to the common passage as the balcony, sixteen two-third ft. by two and half ft. would be supported by the first floor roof of the defendants' house, covering only an insignificant portion of the common passage while there would be no occasion for affecting the light and air to the plaintiffs' residences as they are far away from the proposed balcony.
3. The learned Munsif, on a trial of evidence, held that every co-sharer has the right to use every part of the joint pathway, which was not a public pathway. The proposed construction would reduce the gap of five and half ft. to three ft. encroaching the pathway. The defendants had no such right to encroach the common pathway and the question of encroachment of light and air or of agreement was immaterial. The suit was accordingly decreed and the defendants were permanently restrained from making any construction over the common passage.
4. The appellate court reversed the decree on the finding that the suit passage after vesting of raiyat's interest on enforcement of Chapter VI of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 was no longer common. The common passage was recorded in four khanda khatians, khatian Nos. 113 and 53 in the name of the plaintiffs in .04 and .01 sataks while khatian nos. 54 and 932 in the name of the defendants in nil and .01 sataks respectively. Relying on the decision in Madan Mohan v. Sishu Bala AIR 1972 Cal. 502, the Court held that as the cosharers of the holding ceased to be cosharers and each raiyat of the holding because a direct tenant under the State in respect of the holding he is entitled to retain, the common passage ceased to be a common passage from the date of vesting. There was no proof that the proposed projection would be beyond the portion of the defendants' khatian and no agreement to keep the suit land free was established. Accordingly the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. The present appeal is against this decision.
5. Before we proceed to consider the points in controversy in appeal, the appellate judgment holding that common passage was no longer common after enforcement of Chapter VI may be examined. There is no dispute that after vesting of raiyat's interest an undivided share in the land can be the subject-matter of a separate tenancy and can constitute a holding of a raiyat or under-raiyat as has been held in the said decision. If a plot of land continues to be jointly owned in undivided share by different persons after vesting even as part of their separate tenancy, they become joint owners of such land and are subject to the legal rights and equities of cosharers amongst themselves under the general law. Such rights have not been taken away by the laws of land reforms and the laws of co-ownership continue to be in full force and effect except in regions specially covered by the relevant statutes.
6. The finding of the Courts below that no agreement amongst cosharers regarding use of the suit land was established except that the land was used as private pathway in unassailable in this appeal as a finding of fact. It is also evident on the defence case that the proposed balcony will have no support from the ground obstructing free and unrestricted use of the land. The question for consideration is the extent of the right of one cosharer to an injunction in respect of any action by the other cosharer in excess of his rights in the land jointly owned by them in undivided shares.
7. Mr. Gopal Coandra Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs-appellants referred to the decision in Israil v. Samser Rahman 18 CWN 176 in which it was held that the possession of a portion of joint property by one cosharer does not necessarily constitute ouster of the other co-owners. But it does not follow that because one co-owner is in the occupation of a portion of the joint property with the tacit or express consent of his cosharers, he is entitled to change the nature of that possession or to use the property in a mode different from that in which it has been previously used.
8. Mr. Mukherjee strongly relied on the decision in Shibba Mal v. Naurang Mal AIR 1971 Allahabad 118 in which the Division Bench in Letters Patent appeal, set aside the judgment of the single Judge with the following observations:—
“…… He (the learned Judge) seems to have thought that just as a private individual cannot maintain a suit in respect of a public highway without showing special damage so also one of two joint owners of a piece of land which has been used as a passage cannot maintain a suit, unless he can show that the right of passage has been substantially interfered with. The reason why a private individual cannot maintain a suit in respect of public property. Is because the property does not belong to the private individual. But one joint owner of private property has no right to do anything which will make the joint property more exclusively his. It cannot for a moment be disputed that if the land, instead of being used as a passage, had been left waste the defendant would not have been entitled to have built a balcony projecting over the land. In our opinion, the fact that the land was used as a passage can make no difference whatsoever.”
It was contended that a joint owner is entitled, as of right, to an injunction restraining other cosharers from using the joint property which would make the property more exclusive to them.
9. Mr. Manindra Nath Ghosh, with Mr. Tapas Chandra Roy and Alak Chakravarty learned Advocates for the defendant submitted on the other hand that the above decision is not a correct enunciation of the principle of law. The decisions of the Calcutta High Court lay down that a joint owner is not entitled as of right as a joint owner to restrain another joint owner in his acts without consent of the other joint owners in respect of any portion of the joint property unless special damage thereby sustained is established by the complaining joint owner. It was further submitted that the Allahabad High Court decision was not even subsequently followed by the said High Court and other High Courts have followed the view laid down by this Court in cases noted below.
10. In the Shamnugger Jute Factory Co. Ltd. v. Ram Narain Chatterjee (1886) ILR 14 Calcutta 189, it was held that granting of injunction under Ss. 54 and 55 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is regulated by the principles of equity acted upon by the courts of Equity in England and long since introduced in this country as the principles of law were in accordance with equity and good conscience. The Court observed that in respect of various kinds of proprietary rights, such as to restrain the infringement of casements and other rights in many cases injunctions have been granted:
“But we are not aware of any decision which establishes the broad proposition contended by the plaintiffs, that one co-owner is entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights, absolutely, and without reference to the amount of damage to be sustained by the one side or the other from the granting or withholding of the injunction.”
The Court held that the granting of an injunction is a matter of the judicial discretion of the Court, and the award of money damages to the plaintiffs by the District Judge was approved.
11. In Joy Chunder Rukhit v. Bippro Chunrn Rakhit ILR 14 Cal. 236, it was observed following the above and earlier decisions that before a Court will, in the case of co-sharers, make an order directing that a portion of the joint property alleged to have been dealt with by one of the co-sharers without the consent of the other should be restored to its former condition (as, for instance, where a tank has been excavated), a plaintiff must show that he has sustained by the act he complains of, some injury which materially affects his position. It was held while dismissing the suit that a portion of the land on which a tank has been excavated by the defendant was fit for cultivation does not constitute an injury of a substantial nature such as would justify an order of that nature.
12. In Ram Nandan v. Jai Gobind AIR 1919 Pat 445, the decision in Shibba Mal's case though considered was not followed and the Court followed the Calcutta High Court decisions. It was laid down that before a Court will, in the case of a co-sharer, make an order directing that a portion of the joint property alleged to have dealt with by one of the co-owners without the consent of the other should be restored to its former condition a plaintiff must show that he has sustained, by the act he complains of, some injury which materially alters his position.
13. In S.S.V Krishna Pillai v. Kilasathammal AIR 1928 Madras 810, the Court was considering the erection of a platform and a shed thereon over a lane of five and half feet wide used both parties as passage with the defendants' buildings on both sides of the passage. While confirming order of removal of the support, the Court on the balance of convenience took into consideration if the encroachment of common rights committed by the defendant resulted in interference of the plaintiff's enjoyment or accustomed user of the lane and refused the injunction prayed for.
14. In Akshay Kumar v. Bhajagobinda Shaha AIR 1930 Calcutta 341, the Court noted the view of the Allahabad High Court that one of the several joint owners of land is not entitled to erect a building upon the joint property without consent of the other joint owners notwithstanding that the erection of such building may cause no direct loss to the other joint owners. The Court also noted that this view was not consistent with the line of decisions of this Court which held that there is no such broad proposition that one co-owner is entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights absolutely and without reference to the amount of damage to be sustained by the one side or the other from the granting or withholding of injunction.
15. The above principle laid down by this Court was followed in Manilal Ratanchand v. Nanubhai AIR 1947 Bombay 394 and an injunction exceeding projection of the balcony beyond two feet of five feet lane was granted against the defendants.
16. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Chhedilal v. Chhotoley lal AIR 1951 Allahabad 199 considered all the relevant decision on the subject and held that question of what relief should be granted to the plaintiff in event of the invasion of his rights will depend on the circumstances of each case and there can be no inflexible rule as to the circumstances in which the relief for demolition and injunction should be granted or refused. The relief may be granted if the evidence establishes that the plaintiff cannot be adequetly compensated at the time of partition and that greater injury will result to him by refusal of the relief than by granting it. On the contrary if material and substantial injury will be caused to the defendant by granting of the relief, the Court will no doubt be exercising proper discretion in withholding the relief.
17. In Khimji Mulji v. Popatlal Bhanji AIR 1951 Saurashtra 85, a case strongly relied by the defendants, following the Calcutta decisions and on a conspectus of the relevant cases the Court refused an injunction when the projection over common passage was three and half feet at a height of over 12 feet and no inconvenience or discomfort was likely to be caused to the plaintiff nor his right of way was likely to be injured by the overhanging balcony.
18. Consistent with the decision of this court, the position in law as follows:
(a) The co-owner is not entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights in the common property, absolutely and simply because he is a co-owner.
(b) Before an injunction can be issued, the plaintiff has to establish that he would sustain, by the act he complains of some injury which materially would affect his position or his enjoyment or accustomed user of the joint property would be inconvenienced or interfered with.
(c) The question as to what relief should be granted is left to the discretion of the Court in the attending circumstances on the balance of convenience and in exercise of its discretion the Court will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good conscience.
19. We shall now consider the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs. According to the plaint, the proposed construction will interfere with agrees and ingress over the passage, space for scaffolds for repairs, light and air, movement of rain water as also with laying of overhead electric wires and privacy of the plaintiffs' families. It has also been stated that opposite to the proposed construction across the common passage there is the boundary wall of the plaintiffs and thereafter, lies their tank. In evidence the case was made the proposed construction will seriously interfere with the passage of light and air. There is also indirect hint about interference with privacy as their bath rooms and latrines are stated to be by the side of the proposed balcony. It was also said that if the proposed construction is permitted, the passage will be converted into a tunnel as the other co-owners would start constructions projecting over the balcony.
20. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiffs came to Court at the earliest opportunity before the defendants could start the construction and the injunction has been continuing. Delay in moving the Court has been held in many cases as fatal to the grant of any relief which is not the case here. The proposed construction cannot be deemed to be ouster of the other co-owners from the common passage and this has not been disputed. The plaintiffs, however, must establish that they would suffer an injury which would materially affect their accustomed user of the common passage. As the proposed construction will have no support from pillars on the lands of the common passage and will be situate on the level of the existing first floor of the building of the defendants there will be no obstruction to the user of the common pass age. There is no evidence that the proposed balcony, which will be projecting not more than two and half ft. by sixteen two-third ft. over the common passage of about 200 feet, will obstruct the taking of overhead electric lines through the common passage. Obstruction of light and air, as contended, does not appear to interfere with the accustomed user or enjoyment of the common passage by the plaintiffs. On the materials on record, the plaintiffs have not been able to establish that they would suffer such injury as would materially affect their position or enjoyment or accustomed user of the common passage. The appeal accordingly must fail and is dismissed though for reasons different from those of the appellate Court as indicated above. There will be no order for costs in the circumstances.
21. Mr. Roy prays for leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and leave is granted.
Appeal dismissed. Leave under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patient given.
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