Balkrushna Misra v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Orissa And Another

Das, J.:— This is a petition for quashing the decision of the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal upholding the action of the management in dismissing the service of the petitioner.

2. Petitioner was posted at the Manganese Mines of Pellotising Plant of M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., at Joda in Keonjhar district on August 4, 1954. He was promoted as a Telephone Operator ‘B’ from August 31, 1962 and thertafter as a Telephone Operator ‘A’ from October 1, 1965. He worked in that capacity till January 15, 1971. He was further promoted as Fitter-cum-Operator and was transferred to Pelletising Plant at Nuamundi, Singhbhum with effect from January 16, 1971. He has been dismissed from service on the allegation that on February 1, 1971 at Joda Time Office he had tampered with the pay-sheet inserting the figure T before Rs. 88.05 against the amount payable to him for the month of January, 1971. He pleaded not guilty to the charges and denied to have any knowledge thereof. He urged that the entire proceeding against him was misconceived and the order of dismissal was based on no evidence. He admits that he had gone to the office of the Head Timekeeper on February 1, 1971 for securing a bus pass to go to Nuamundi from Joda. It is alleged that the enquiring officer has wrongly held that he inserted the figure T before the amount payable to him. He claims that the enquiry for the order of dismissal was in violation of principles of natural justice and there was no evidence to establish the offence against him, The case of employer is that after the transfer of the petitioner from Joda to Nuamundi, the pay of the petitioner from January 1 to 15, 1971 was drawn at Joda and that from January 16 to 31, 1971 at Nuamundi. The pay rolls had been duly drawn up by January 31, 1971 and were to be signed by the Assistant Town Manager on February 1, 1971 at Joda. The net amount receivable by the petitioner was Rs. 88.05 After the signature of the Assistant Town Manager on February 1, 1971, the originals of the pay rolls were sent to the Accounts Office at Jamshedpur in the afternoon of February 1, 1971. The petitioner had gone to the Time Office at Joda during early hours of February 1, 1971 before the Assistant Town Manager had signed the pay rolls. The petitioner surreptitiously inserted the figure ‘1’ before Rs. 88.05 in the pay roll in the net amount receivable by him and thereby converted the actual amount payable to him from Rs. 88.05 to Rs. 188.05 with dishonest intention in order to make a wrongful gain of Rs. 100/-. This was detected after the pay rolls were despatched to Jamshedpur by an officer of the Audit Section on February 4, 1971 while checking the pay rolls. Preliminary investigation into the above matter revealed a prima facie case against the petitioner and he was charge-sheeted on March 3, 1971. The petitioner submitted his explanation, but the same was not found to be satisfactory and a domestic enquiry was conducted on March 16, 1971. The petitioner participated in the enquiry. The enquiring officer found the petitioner guilty of the charge and finally dismissed him from service on May 7, 1971.

3. An industrial dispute was started and the Central Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad on the following question:—

“Whether the action of the Management of Pelletising Plant of M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., P.O Nuamundi. Distt. Singhbhum was justified in dismissing from service Sri B.K Misra, Filter-cum-Operator, from May 7, 1971? If not, to what relief is the workman concerned entitled?”

4. The Central Government withdrew the proceeding in relation to the above dispute from the Tribunal and transferred the same to the Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar for disposal according to law with a direction that the Tribunal would proceed with the proceeding from the stage it was transferred. The Tribunal, after considering the materials on record, came to the conclusion that the action of the management was justified in dismissing the petitioner from service and the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. As against the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal, the present writ petition has been filed.

5. It is admitted by the petitioner that he had gone inside the Time Office in the morning of February 1, 1971. It is also not disputed that the petitioner authorised M.W 1 in the official form to receive the pay amount on his behalf. M.W 1 received Rs. 88.05 from the pay Master and handed over the same to the wife of the petitioner. The petitioner's wife enquired from him as to why he was paying Rs. 88.05 instead of Rs. 188.05 that she had informed by the petitioner. The petitioner also admits that he had no enmity with M.W 1. This M.W 1 has stated that he did not know what amount the petitioner was to receive.

6. The Tribunal found that there was no eye-witness to inserting the figure ‘1’ by the petitioner before Rs. 88.05 The petitioner admitted that he was present in the Time Office in the early hours of February 1, 1971. The Tribunal also accepted the statement of M.W 1 regarding the query made by the wife of the petitioner as to why he was paying her only Rs. 88.05, when petitioner had informed here that the amount would be Rs. 188.05 Though this witness was cross-examined by the petitioner, this fact was not challenged by him. The learned Tribunal has further held that before the enquiring officer there was evidence to the effect that the petitioner was present in the Time Office in the early hours of February 1, 1971 and the most incriminating circumstances comes from M.W 1. The chance of clerical error in noting the figure was also considered by the enquiring officer and the learned Tribunal held that the enquiring officer rightly brushed aside the same on cogent ground. The interpolation would not benefit anybody else other than the petitioner. Ultimately, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the evidence and the materials placed before the enquiring officer clearly justified in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner had tampered with the pay-sheet by inserting the figure 1 before Rs. 88.05

7. It is well settled that a finding recorded in a domestic enquiry cannot be characterised as perverse by the Labour Court unless it can be shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence, or is entirely opposed to the whole body of the evidence adduced. In a domestic enquiry once a conclusion is deduced from the evidence, it is not permissible to assail that conclusion even though it is possible for some other authority to arrive at a different conclusion on the same evidence—vide The Benaras Electrict Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. The Labour Court II, Lucknow(1)

8. If the decision of the learned Tribunal is judged keeping in view the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, it would appear that the decision is not perverse and it is not that the finding is not supported by any evidence, or is entirely opposed to the whole body of evidence adduced. In fact there is evidence on record and the learned Tribunal has accepted the same. Even though there can be any possibility to arrive at a different conclusion on the same evidence, this Court cannot substitute its conclusion on facts. In an application under Articles 226 and 227, the High Court cannot sit in appeal ever the findings recorded by the competent Tribunal. It cannot reappreciate the evidence. It would however, be justified in setting aside the finding if it is based on no evidence.

9. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the evidence of M.W 1 to the extent that the petitioner had told his wife about the amount, is not admissible in evidence as the same is hearsay. In our opinion, such a statement cannot be said to be hearsay. M.W 1 states about the enquiry made by the wife of the petitioner while he handed over the money to her. The petitioner himself cross-examined, but did not challenge the aforesaid statement. Even assuming that it is hearsay evidence, there is no bar on the part of the competent authority to rely on the same in a disciplinary proceeding. Law is well settled that the Evidence Act has no application to such a proceeding. If the Evidence Act has no application then the principles of that Act have equally no strict application. It is the principle of natural justice which should be followed (See Harihar Das v. I.G of Police, Orissa(2). In that case, a question arose whether hearsay evidence was admissible in a disciplinary proceeding. Following two English decisions, this Court came to the conclusion that hearsay evidence was admissible before a domestic tribunal provided the essential condition that an opportunity was afforded to the parties to comment and contradict such evidence was fulfilled. This view has also been reaffirmed in another decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Behera v. State of Orissa(3). This Court has consistently held that hearsay evidence is admissible in a departmental proceeding. As such, the contention of the petitioner has no force.

10. On the aforesaid analysis, we hold that there is no justifiable ground to interfere with the decision of the learned Tribunal and this writ petition is without any merit. In the result, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

R.N Misra, J.:— I agree