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Mohd. Yaseen v. Forest Range Officer, Flying Squad, Rayachoti, Cuddapah Dist.
Judgment Summary — Kondaiah, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
On 28 July 1976 forest authorities seized an Ambassador car (No. A.A.T. 2236) together with 117 billets of sandalwood at Rajampet for alleged contravention of Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Sandal-wood and Red-Sandal Wood Transit Rules for transporting sandalwood without marks and without a transport permit. The seized items were produced before the District Forest Officer (DFO), Cuddapah, who recorded statements of four persons (including the second appellant). The DFO, invoking Sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967, ordered confiscation of the forest produce and the vehicle on 28-7-1976.
The first appellant (who claimed to be the hire-purchaser) appealed against the DFO's confiscation order by Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1976 under Sub-section (2-E) of Section 44 to the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, and that appeal was dismissed. A Criminal Revision (No. 189 of 1977) to this Court was also dismissed on 7-2-1978 (dates in the opinion vary but the order of this Court confirming confiscation is recorded). Thus the confiscation order was confirmed by the Sessions Judge and by this Court.
Separately, criminal proceedings against the accused for transporting sandalwood ended in acquittal by the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rajampet on 17-6-1978; the State's criminal appeal was later rejected by this Court on 4-12-1978. After these outcomes the appellants filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking mandamus directing respondents not to give effect to the DFO proceedings of 28-7-1976 (as confirmed later) and to direct release of the Ambassador car. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition, prompting this writ appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts of this case, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal prosecution for a forest offence entitles the appellants to claim return of the motor vehicle (and the seized forest produce) used in committing that offence.
- Whether provisions of Section 44(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act are analogous to Section 6-C(2) of the Essential Commodities Act (formerly cited as rule 6-C(2) / section 6-C(2)), such that an acquittal in the criminal proceeding would require return of seized goods/vehicle.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (as summarized by the Court)
- The appellants (through Mr. Innayya Reddy) contended that the appellants are entitled to the return of the Ambassador car because the second appellant was acquitted in the criminal proceedings.
- They further argued that Section 44(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act is analogous to Section 6-C(2) of the Essential Commodities Act, which (they submitted) provides for return of seized goods upon acquittal; accordingly, the confiscation procedure under Section 44(2-A) is summary in nature and should yield to the acquittal.
- The appellant relied on a Division Bench decision in Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of A.P. to support their position (as authority for return upon acquittal).
Respondent / Government Arguments (as summarized by the Court)
- The Government Pleader for Industries argued that Chapter VII of the Forest Act provides two independent procedures: (a) confiscation of forest produce and instruments (including vehicles) used in committing the offence, and (b) criminal prosecution of persons who committed the offence; the two are separate.
- He contended the confiscation procedure under Section 44(2-A) is not summary in the sense urged by the appellants, and it affords remedies including a regular appeal (Section 44(2-E)) and revision — a full and efficacious remedy.
- He further submitted that the result of criminal proceedings (including acquittal) would not affect the separate confiscation proceedings; therefore acquittal does not entitle appellants to return of the vehicle or produce.
- He pointed out that the Division Bench decision relied upon by appellants (Smt. Hazi Begum) had been set aside by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 1216 of 1979 (23-4-1979).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1978 (2) ALT 44 (NRC) = 1978 (2) APLJ 191 (Division Bench of this Court) | Observed that on acquittal in prosecution before the Magistrate, custody of goods is with the forest officer and delivery to persons mentioned in clause (3) is only subject to the order of the Magistrate (an interpretation suggesting the criminal court's acquittal affects custody). | The Court disagreed with that view, expressed inability to subscribe to it, and noted that the decision has been set aside by the Supreme Court; thus it declined to follow Hazi Begum. |
| Supreme Court — Civil Appeal No. 1216 of 1979, dated 23-4-1979 (setting aside the High Court's decision in Hazi Begum) | The Supreme Court observed that confiscation proceedings must go on before the Divisional Forest Officer and be decided there "unfettered and unprejudiced" by any High Court judgment; parties may thereafter appeal to the District Court if necessary. | The present Court relied on the Supreme Court's setting aside of Hazi Begum to support its view that confiscation proceedings are independent and must be decided by the forest authorities (with available appeals), and therefore acquittal in criminal proceedings does not automatically entitle return of the seized property. |
| Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977 (this Court) — dismissal/confirmation of confiscation order dated 7-2-1978 (referred to in the opinion) | This Court's dismissal confirmed the confiscation order passed by the District Forest Officer under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 44, making that confiscation order final in the proceedings described. | The Court held that the order of confiscation passed under Section 44(2-A) in this case has become final by reason of the Criminal Revision dismissal and is binding on the first appellant; that finality precludes issuance of the writ sought to prevent giving effect to that order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds by close statutory interpretation of Chapter VII of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, particularly Sections 44 to 46, and by assessing the relationship (or lack of it) between confiscation proceedings and criminal prosecutions.
Key statutory points the Court relied on include:
- Section 44(1) authorises seizure by forest or police officers of forest produce and tools/vehicles used in committing an offence.
- Section 44(2) requires marking the seized property and producing it before an authorised officer or reporting to a Magistrate without unreasonable delay; it is procedural and concerns immediate steps after seizure.
- Section 44(2-A) empowers a forest officer (or an authorised officer before whom the property is produced) to order confiscation of forest produce and tools/vehicles used in committing the offence if satisfied an offence was committed; but such confiscation requires adherence to procedural safeguards in Sub-section (2-B) (notice and opportunity to make representation and to be heard).
- Section 44(2-C) allows owners to claim back tools/vehicles if they can satisfy the Forest Officer that the property was used without their knowledge or connivance and that reasonable precautions were taken.
- Section 44(2-D) permits review/suo motu examination of confiscation orders by forest officers below Conservator rank, but no prejudicial order can be made without hearing the affected person.
- Section 44(2-E) provides a regular appeal to the District Court against orders under 44(2-A) and 44(2-D); this is a comprehensive remedy in which parties may fully establish their claims and obtain a final decision on confiscation.
- Section 45 imposes a duty on the convicting Court to confiscate timber/produce and instruments used in committing the offence when a person is convicted, but it expressly excepts cases where an order of confiscation has already been passed under Section 44 of the Act; this reflects legislative intent that the confiscation regime under Section 44 is independent and complete.
- Section 46 prescribes disposal of timber/forest produce after conclusion of trial and does not expressly deal with disposal of tools, vehicles or conveyances in the same manner — reinforcing that confiscation under Section 44 is a separately governed process.
From this statutory framework the Court drew the following conclusions:
- Section 44(2-A) and the appeal and revision remedies provided (notably Section 44(2-E)) constitute an independent, efficacious regime for confiscation that does not depend upon the outcome of criminal prosecution against accused persons.
- Therefore, an acquittal in the criminal proceedings does not automatically entitle the accused (or persons connected to the vehicle) to the return of seized property when a confiscation order under Section 44(2-A) has been validly made and finally confirmed on appeal/revision.
- The appellants had, in fact, participated in the confiscation proceedings and in subsequent appeals and revisions (the first appellant was a party throughout), and the confiscation order had become final on dismissal of Criminal Revision No. 189 of 1977 by this Court — making any collateral attack by way of writ inappropriate.
- The comparison relied upon by the appellants between Section 44(2) of the Forest Act and Section 6-C(2) of the Essential Commodities Act is unsustainable because the Essential Commodities Act contains a specific provision entitling return upon acquittal which has no counterpart in the Forest Act; Section 44(2) in the Forest Act only prescribes immediate procedural steps after seizure and is not analogous to the Essential Commodities provision.
- The Division Bench decision in Smt. Hazi Begum was not persuasive because the Court disagreed with its rationale and, crucially, the Supreme Court has set that decision aside in C.A. 1216 of 1979 — reinforcing the view that confiscation proceedings must be determined by the designated forest authorities and not be overridden by the criminal court's acquittal.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Writ appeal dismissed.
The Court concluded that (1) the confiscation order passed under Section 44(2-A) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act has become final (as confirmed by this Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977) and is binding on the appellants; and (2) the acquittal in the criminal prosecution of the second appellant does not entitle the appellants to claim return of the vehicle or sandalwood seized and confiscated under Section 44(2-A).
Implications / Consequences:
- Direct effect: The appellants are not entitled to the relief of a writ directing respondents not to give effect to the confiscation order; the confiscation remains final and effective and the writ appeal is dismissed. Costs were awarded against the appellants (the judgment records "W.A dismissed" and "but in circumstances, the costs").
- Broader legal implication: The Court affirmed that the statutory confiscation regime under Sections 44–46 of the Forest Act is independent of criminal proceedings and that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not automatically negate a valid confiscation order made under Section 44(2-A). The Court also treated the Division Bench decision in Hazi Begum as not persuasive and noted it has been set aside by the Supreme Court (C.A. 1216 of 1979), reinforcing the independence of the confiscation procedure. The opinion states that no authority was shown to justify issuance of a writ to prevent giving effect to a valid and final confiscation order.
- No new precedent: The Court applied existing statutory interpretation and prior decisions (including the Supreme Court setting aside Hazi Begum) to resolve the matter; the decision enforces finality of a confiscation order rather than creating a new rule contrary to the statutory scheme.
G.V.K.R
W.A dismissed.
Kondaiah, C.J:— This writ appeal is directed against judgment of our learned brother Chowdary, J., dismssing the appellants writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the proceedings of the District forest officer, Cuddapah dated 28-7-1976 as confirmed by the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah in Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1976 and by the High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977 dated 7-2-1978 and consequently to direct the respondent to release the Ambassador Car bear-ring No. A.A.T 2236.
2. The Ambassador car along with 117 billets of Sandal-wood was seized by the Forest Authorities on 28th July 1976 at Rajampet for contravention of Rule 3 of Andhra Pradesh Sandal-wood and Red-Sandal Wood transit Rules by transporting the Sandal-wood billets without the requisite mark and without a transport permit by the requisite authority. The forest produce and the vehicle were seized immediately and they were produced before the District Forest Officer, Cuddapah, who recorded statements of four persons, including the second appellant herein. The commission of offence was admitted before the District Forest Officer. The accused were also produced on the same day before the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rajampet. The first appellant is said to be the member of E.P.D.C Motor Taxi Drivers Cooperative Society and he claims to be the hire purchaser of that vehicle from that Society.
3. The District Forest Officer, Cuddapah in exercise of his powers under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44 of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ordered confiscation of the forest produce so seized, together with the vehicle used in committing the offence on 28-7-76 as he was satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect of forest produce produced before him.
4. Against the confiscation order of the District Forest Officer, the first appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1976, under Sub-section (2-E) of section 44 of the Act as he was aggrieved by the order of the District Forest Officer, Cuddapah confiscating the forest produce and the vehicle under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44 of the Act. The appeal to the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah was dismissed. Thereupon Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977 was filed before this court and the same was dismissed on 7-12-1978. The result of the aforesaid proceedings is that the order of confiscation passed by the District Forest Officer, Cuddapah on 28-7-76 under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44 was confirmed and upheld by this court in Criminal Revision case No. 189 of 1977 on 7-2-1978.
5. However, the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused, who were charged with the commission of offence of transporting sandalwood billets unauthorisedly ended in acquittal of the accused by an order of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rajampet on 17-6-1978. The Criminal appeal preferred by the State against the order of acquittal was also rejected by this Court on 4-12-1978.
6. The present writ petition has been filed by the appellants on the premise that the first appellant is the hire-purchaser of the vehicle and the Second appellant has an agreement to use the vehicle and they are therefore interested in the vehicle and the forest produce so seized.
7. The claim of the appellants was rejected by the learned single Judge holding that the first appellant, who was a party to the proceedings before the District Forest Officer, who confiscated the forest produce and the vehicle, and to the appeal before the District Judge and also to the revision in this Court, cannot be heard to say that the order of this court as embodied in the Criminal Revision Case shall not be given effect to. Consequently the order of confiscation has been allowed to become final and there is no error or want of jurisdiction in the earlier proceedings. Hence this writ appeal proceedings. The plea of the appellants-petitioners before the learned single Judge that Section 44 (2) of the Act is analogous to rule 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act has not been acceded to. Hence this writ appeal.
8. The sum and substance of the contentions of Mr. Innayya Reddy learned counsel for the appellants is that the appellants are entitled to have the Ambassador car returned in view of the acquittal of the 2nd appellant in the criminal proceedings and also in view of the fact that the provisions of section 44 (2) of the Act are analogous to rule 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act. According to the learned Counsel, the proceedings relating to confiscation of the forest produce and the vehicle under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44 are of summary in nature, although an appeal to the District Court under Sub-section (2-E) is provided and revision under the Page: 11Criminal Procedure Code against the order of the Sessions Judge is permissible. A decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of A.P ??? is relied upon by the appellant's counsel in support of his stand.
9. This claim of the appellants is resisted by the Government Pleader for industries contending inter alia that the Act has provided under Chapter VII, two independent procedures, one relating to confiscation of the forest produce along with the vehicle used in committing such as offence and the other relating to the prosecuting of the persons, who committed the forest offence, that the procedure prescribed for the confiscation of the forest produce along with the vehicle is not summary in nature, that in any event the procedure, which provides for an appeal and a revision is a proper one, that the result of the criminal proceedings against the accused persons would not have any impact on the decision taken by the concerned authorities for the confiscation of the forest produce and the vehicle used in committing such an offence, that the decision of the division Bench of this Court in Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of A.P 1978 (2) ALT 44 (NRC) = 1978 (2) APLJ 191 relied upon by the appellant's learned counsel, has been set aside by the Supreme Court in C.A No. 1216 of 1979, dt. 23-4-1979 and that therefore there is no valid or justifiable ground for interference by this Court with the order of the learned single Judge.
10. The Short question that falls for consideration is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for the commission of a forest offence would come to the help of the appellants to claim return of the motor vehicles used in committing that particular forest offence?
11. The answer to the question depends upon the provisions of chapter VII and in particular sections 44 to 50. Section 44 (1) provides for the seizure of forest produce along with all tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles and cattle used for committing such an offence, by any forest officer or police officer. Sub-section (2) enjoins the officer seizing any properly under Sub-section (1) to place a mark indicating the same as having been so seized, and either produced before an officer, not below the rank of a Asst. Conservator of forests authorised by the Government in this behalf by a notification or make a report of such a seizure to a Magistrate. It means immediate action should be taken by the officer, who seized the property and the vehicles, without any unreasonable delay. Secondly he should resort to this procedure only where the offender does not agree in writing forthwith to get the offence compounded. Where the property seized belongs to the Central or State Government and the offender is not known, a report narrating the circumstances under which the offence was believed Page: 12to have been committed may be made to the Divisional Forest Officer. Where the produce seized along with the vehicle has been produced by the officer, who seized the same in the commission of forest offence before a forest officer, the previsions of sub-sectipn (2-A) of section 44 would come into play. Where the forest officer himself has seized the forest produce along with the vehicle, he may order confiscation of the forest produce or other produce so seized with all tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles and cattle used to commit such forest offence, if he is satisfied that a forest offence is committed in respect thereof. He can also exercise this power of confiscation under this provision where any timber or forest produce along with tools, vehicles etc., has been produced by the officer, who seized them under sub-section (2) of section 44. Sub section (2-B) requires a notice in writing informing the person from where the property is seized, of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such property and also an opportunity to such a person of making a representation in writing as well as a reasonable opportrnity of being heard against the grounds for confiscation. Unless this notice and a reasonable opportunity, as provided under sub-section (2-B) is afforded no order of confiscation of any property shall be made under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44.
12. Sub-section (2-C) of section 44 does not empower confiscation of any tool, rope, chain, beat or vehicle, if the owner thereof proves to the satisfaction of the Forest Officer that it was used in carrying the property without his knowledge or connivance, or knowledge or connivance of his agent, if any, or the person in charge of it, in committing an offence and that each of them has taken all necessary and reasonable precautions against such use. In other words if a tool, rope, chain, beat or Vehicle is confiscated along with the forest produce under sub-section (2-A) by a Forest Officer, its owner can successfully claim back his property, if he can establish to the satisfaction of the Forest Officer that it was used in carrying the property without his knowledge or connivance, or the knowledge or connivance of his agent or a person in charge of it, provided that each one of them has taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use.
13. Sub-section (2-D) empowers any forest officer, below the rank of a conservater of Forests to call for, either suomotu or on application, and examine the record of the order of confiscation passed by the Forest officer under sub-section (2-A) and to make such inquiry and pass such order as he may think fit. However, no order prejudicial to any person can be made without giving an opportunity of being heard, to that person.
14. Sub-section (2-E) provides for a regular appeal by any person aggrieved by an order passed under Sub-section (2-A) or sub - section (2-D) to the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the property has been sized. The District Court, shall after giving an oppr-Page: 13tunity to the parties to be heard, pass such order as it may think fit and the order so passed shall become final, Therefore, not only the first appellant, who claims to have hire-purchase interest, as the society owned the vehicle, but also the second appellant, who claims to have some interest in the vehicle could have preferred an appeal, The appeal provided under Sub-section (2-E) to the District Court against an order of confiscation under sub-section (2-A) by a forest officer, is a regular appeal, wherein the parties would be given full opportunity to establish their claims.
15. Sub-section (3) of section 44 applies to a case where a forest officer, not below the rank of a Forester, or whose subordinate, has seized any tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles or cattle under sub-section (1) and where he makes report of such seizure to a Magistrate under sub-section (2). Sub-section (3) therefore empowers the forest officer to return the tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles, or cattle seized under sub-section (1) on condition that he (the owner) produces the same as and when required before the Magistrate, to whom a report is made under sub-section (2).
16. Sub-section (4) prescribes the procedure for the Magistrate to proceed upon the receipt of any report under sub-section (2) by a Forest Officer or police officer, who seized the forest produce along with a vehicle. The Magistrate, under this sub-section (4) shall take such measures as may be necessary for the trial of the case, unless the offence is compounded and thereafter take steps to the disposal of the property according to law.
17. Sub-section (5) requires the property seized under sub-section (1) to be kept in the custody of the forest officer until the compensation for compounding the offence is paid or until an order of the Magistrate directing its disposal, is received.
18. Section 45 enjoins the Court to confiscate to the Government the timber or forest produce in respect of which such an offence was committed or of any tool, beat, vehicle or other conveyance so used in committing such an offence, wherever a person is convicted of a forest offence. The only exception to it is in respect of a case where an order of confiscation has already been passed in respect thereof under section 44 of the Act. In other words the Legislature has clearly made a provision for confiscation of the forest produce and the tools, ropes, chains, vehicles, cattle etc., used in committing the offence under sub-sections (2-A) by a forest officer, against whose order an opportunity of appeal under Sub-section (2-E) to the District Court is provided and a revision under the Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court. Though the Court, which convicted any person for a forest offence, has a statutory duty to confiscate the forest produce along with the vessel or other conveyance used under section 45, exception is made with regard to confiscation in case where an order of confiscation has already been passed under section 44 of the Act. This clearly indicates that Page: 14the Act contemplates two procedures, one being independent of the other. Though prosecution of the person is provided for only in a criminal Court i.e, before a Magistrate under sub-section (4), section 44 (4) read with section 45 contemplates two separate procedures so far as the confiscation of the property, vehicle or vesseal so used was concerned. Section 46 provides for the disposal of any timber or forest produce in respect of which any forest offence was committed after conclusion of the trial. Where property is found to belong to the Central or State Government or if it is confiscated, it shall be taken possesion of by and under the authority of the Divisional Forest Officer. In any other case such timber or forest produce shall be disposed of in such manner as the Court having jurisdiction may by order direct. Section 46 would apply only to the case of disposal of any timber or forest produce after the conclusion of the trial of any forest offence. It is significant to note that section 46 does not tally with a case pertaining to the disposal of any tool, beat, vessel, vehicle or other conveyance or any other article used in comitting a forest offence.
19. A close, careful and combined reading of sections 44, 45 and 46 Of the Act would leave no doubt in our minds that sub-section (2-A) provides specifically for the confiscation of any timber or forest produce along with tools, ropes, chains, beats and vehicles used in committing the forest offence. A specific provision, which shall be given effect to in so far as this aspect is concerned, for a regular appeal, a revision and a suo motu revision is provided. This is a very effective and efficatious remedy. The orders of confiscation passed under section 44 would not in any way depend upon the result of the criminal prosecution against accused persons in respect of the forest affence, as seen from section 45 or section 46 of the Act.
20. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the order of confiscation passed by the forest officer under sub-section (2-A) in the present case has become final in view of the decision of this court in Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977 dated 7th February 1978 to which the first appellant is a party and it is binding on him. The second appellant also, if really so aggrieved by the order of the forest officer under sub-section (2-A), could have preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah under sub-section (2-A) as any person aggrieved by the order of confiscation passed under sub-section (2-A) can prefer an appeal to the District Court.
21. That apart the criminal court's judgment, which ended in acquittal of the second appellant and others would not entitle him to claim return of the vehicle or the sandal-wood. The previsions of section 44 or any other section of the Forest Act would not come to the aid of the appellants herein in this regard. Mr. Innayya Reddy tries to rely upon the provisions of subsection (2) of section 44, which, according to him, are analogous to section 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act. As pointed out earlier section 44 (2) would only require the officer, be it Forest officer or police Page: 15officer, who seized the forest produce along with the vehicle, to place a mark and also to produce the property seized before an officer not below the rank of an Asst. Conservater of Forests without any unreasonable delay, Unless the offenders agree in writing forthwith to get the offence compounded or make a report of such seizure to the Magistrate. Option is given to the concerned officer to have resort to either of the courses indicated therein.
22. section 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 would apply to a case where a person, who was prosecuted for the contravention of the licensing order in respect of which an order of confiscation has been made under section 6-C was acquitted. It provides for the return of the essential commodities so seized to such person or pay the price there of if confiscation was already ordered. No such corresponding provision has been made in the Forest Act. As pointed out earlier section 44 (2) is in no way analogous to section 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act.
23. That apart no writ can be issued not to give effect to an order of this court passed in a Criminal Revision Case preferred by the first appellant against the order of Sessions Judge, Cuddapah under Sub-section (2-E) of section 44 of the Act, which confirmed the order of confiscation passed by the Forest officer under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44. No authority has been placed before us in support of the appellants plea that a writ must be issued in a case where the order of confiscation has been passed by an authority, which is competent to make the same under a statute and which has been allowed to become final.
24. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1978 (2) ALT 44 (NRC) = 1978 (2) APLJ 191 on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Innayya Reddy, need not detain us long. True, as submitted by the learned counsel, it was observed therein, that in the event of an acquittal in a prosecution before the Magistrate on the confiscation by the Forest officer, the custody of the goods is with the forest officer and delivery to persons mentioned in clause (3) is only subject to the order of the Magistrate in view of the provisions of sections 44 and 45 of the Act. With great respect we are unable to subscribe to this view as pointed out earlier.
25. That apart the decision relied upon by the learned counsel has been set aside by the Supreme Court in C.A 1216 of 1979 dated 23-4-1979, wherein the learned Judge, Untwalia J. speaking for the court, observed:--
“In our opinion on the facts and circumstances of this case the order of the High Court is not fit to be sustained. The High Court has taken an erroneous view of the report by the forest ranger to the Magistrate while for-Page: 16warding the accused to him. The proceedings as to the confiscation of the property seized as also the car has got to go on before the Divisional Forest officer. He will decide the matter unfettered and unprejudiced by anything that has been said in the judgment of the High Court. Thereafter if necessary, it will be open to the respondents to file on appeal before the District Court.”
26. For all the reasons stated, we see no merit in this writ appeal. It is therefore dismissed, but in circumstances, the costs.
G.V.K.R
W.A dismissed.
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