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Sujit Kumar Gupta v. Kartick Chandra Manna

Calcutta High Court
Aug 29, 1979
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Rule challenges Order No. 54 dated 23 June 1978 made by the learned Munsif, 4th Court at Alipore, in Title Suit No. 334 of 1974. The lower court disposed of an application under section 17(2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and a joint petition of the parties agreeing that arrear rent be paid by monthly instalments of Rs. 45/- along with current rent for each succeeding month. The Munsif allowed payment by instalments but held that the landlord was not entitled to recover that portion of the arrear rent which was barred by the law of limitation as of the date the suit was instituted. The only question before the Court was whether the landlord-petitioner can recover that portion of arrear rent which stood time-barred at the date of institution of the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 a tenant is required to deposit or pay the entire amount of arrear rent as a condition for protection against eviction, including any portion of arrear rent that had become time-barred by the date of institution of the suit.
  2. Whether a time-barred portion of arrear rent (barred by the Law of Limitation) is recoverable by the landlord for the purposes of section 17 (i.e., whether "amount of rent due/entire amount of rent due" includes time-barred arrears).

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite Party's Arguments

  • The opposite party relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Raghunath Singh v. Messrs. Patel & Co. (65 CWN 1093) and a single-Bench decision in Nripendra Mohan Ghose Chowdhury v. Tripti Rani Chakravorty (ILR (1976) 2 Cal. 359) to contend that section 17 does not require a tenant to deposit or pay amounts in respect of time-barred arrear rent; that the court has no jurisdiction to direct deposit of rents which were already barred by limitation at the date of institution of the suit.
  • It was noted in the earlier single-Bench decision that the advocate for the party opposing the rule did not dispute the principle that under sub-sections (1), (2) or (2A) time-barred rent need not be paid or deposited; this was part of the factual posture that influenced that earlier judgment.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (landlord) relied on the Supreme Court decision in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ram Chaudraji Virajman Mandir (AIR 1978 SC 287) and a single-Bench decision of this Court in Sohan Lal Rajgaria v. Calcutta Chromotype Pvt. Ltd. (1979 (1) CLJ 274) to support the proposition that statutory protection (of the tenant from eviction) which uses language such as "entire amount of rent due" should be read to include arrears that have become time-barred, because limitation bars only the remedy and does not extinguish the debt.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ram Chaudraji Virajman Mandir, AIR 1978 SC 287 Interpreted the phrase "entire amount of rent due" (under a U.P. Rent Act provision) to include rent that had become time-barred because the Law of Limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt. The Court treated this Supreme Court decision as authoritative and dispositive: it adopted its principle and held that under S.17(1) and S.17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the tenant must deposit or pay the entire arrear rent, even if part of it is time-barred.
Raghunath Singh v. Messrs. Patel & Co., 65 CWN 1093 Bench decision holding that under S.17 of the 1956 Act a tenant was not required to deposit or pay amounts in respect of time-barred arrear rent. The Court considered this Bench decision but concluded that it is no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court decision and the statutory wording of the 1956 Act. The Court rejected the analogy and reasoning in Raghunath Singh.
Nripendra Mohan Ghose Chowdhury v. Tripti Rani Chakravorty, ILR (1976) 2 Cal. 359 Single-Bench decision taking the view that under S.17(2) and S.17(2A) the Court had no jurisdiction to direct deposit of rents which were barred by limitation at the date of institution of the suit. The present Court observed that no reason had been assigned in that earlier judgment and treated it as not persuasive in light of the Supreme Court authority; implicit rejection in the present opinion.
Sohan Lal Rajgaria v. Calcutta Chromotype Pvt. Ltd., 1979 (1) CLJ 274 Applied the Supreme Court's reasoning (Khadi Gram Udyog Trust) to a similar question under S.17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Referred to by the petitioner and relied upon by the present Court as consonant with the Supreme Court decision; used to support the conclusion that S.17 covers time-barred arrears.
Krishna Chandra Bose v. Radharani Ghose, AIR 1954 Cal. 102 = 57 CWN 801 Under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, K.C. Chunder J. held that a tenant could not be compelled to pay any portion of arrears barred by limitation and the Court could not order deposit of such time-barred arrears (on the basis that the 1950 Act used the phrase "amount of rent legally payable"). The Court distinguished the 1950 Act from the 1956 Act (noting the 1956 Act's omission of the words "legally payable") and indicated that the view in Krishna Chandra Bose is applicable to the 1950 Act but not to the 1956 Act; therefore it did not control the present decision under the 1956 Act.
Daya Devi v. Chapla Devi, 63 CWN 976 Held under sub-s. (1) of S.17 that a tenant was not bound to pay amounts of rent assigned to an assignee of the landlord; arrears may lose their character as arrears of rent upon assignment. The Court considered the Daya Devi rationale (used in Raghunath Singh) but found the analogy inapplicable to the present facts and statutory context; it did not accept that Daya Devi mandated exclusion of time-barred arrears under S.17 of the 1956 Act.
Nasiban Bibi v. Parulbala Dutta, 62 CWN 778 Concerned whether a tenant must deposit under S.17(1) arrears which became due before the coming into force of the 1956 Act; used the phrase "legally recoverable" in context of facts there considered. The Court held that Nasiban Bibi's wording cannot be read to establish the broad principle that only legally recoverable arrears should be deposited; the decision was fact-specific and not a general pronouncement contrary to the Court's present conclusion.
Ganga Kumar v. Chintamoni Roy, 65 CWN 639 Interpreted "due" in Ss.3 and 6 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 as meaning "payable" (i.e., that which ought to be paid) and not necessarily "recoverable." The Court referenced Ganga Kumar for the proposition that "payable" can mean what ought to be paid (not strictly "legally payable"), supporting construction that arrears—barred or not—may be regarded as part of the amount relevant for statutory protection; used in broader statutory interpretation discussion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from statutory text, precedent (including Supreme Court authority), and established principles concerning the effect of the Law of Limitation:

  1. Statutory wording: The Court closely compared the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950 and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The 1950 Act used the phrase "the amount of rent legally payable by the tenant and which was in arrear," whereas the 1956 Act omitted the words "legally payable" and instead prescribed that the tenant "shall deposit in Court or with the Controller or pay to the landlord the amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made."
  2. Legislative intent: The omission of the words "legally payable" in the 1956 Act was treated as deliberate and significant. The Court inferred that the legislature intended to require the tenant to deposit or pay the entire amount of arrear rent for which there had been default as a precondition for the statutory protection against eviction. Thus the protection is available only if the tenant puts in the entire arrear amount as calculated under the statute.
  3. Law of Limitation principle: The Court reiterated the acknowledged legal principle that limitation bars the remedy of enforcement but does not extinguish the underlying debt. Therefore, even though a portion of arrears may be time-barred in terms of procedural enforceability, the debt itself remains.
  4. Precedent synthesis: The Supreme Court decision in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust was considered authoritative and held that words like "entire amount of rent due" include rent which became time-barred. The present Court regarded that principle as applicable and binding.
  5. Rejection of contrary local Bench decisions: Decisions of this Court (Raghunath Singh and the single-Bench Nripendra Mohan Ghose Chowdhury) which held that time-barred arrears need not be deposited under S.17 were examined and found inconsistent with the Supreme Court authority and the statutory language of the 1956 Act. The Court concluded those decisions are no longer good law.
  6. Distinctions and precedents with limited application: Cases like Daya Devi and Nasiban Bibi were distinguished on their facts; the Court found their reasoning fact-specific and not sufficient to displace the combined effect of the 1956 Act's language and the Supreme Court ruling.
  7. Conclusion of legal effect: On the combined basis of statutory text, legislative intent, the Limitation Act principle, and binding Supreme Court authority, the Court concluded that under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 17 of the 1956 Act a tenant is bound to deposit or pay the entire arrear rent, whether any part of it is time-barred or not.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule is made absolute. The impugned order is set aside and the plaintiff-petitioner (landlord) is entitled to recover the entire arrear rent from the defendant-opposite party, including that portion which had become time-barred by the date of institution of the suit. The Court also awarded costs to the petitioner.

Implications:

  • The Court applied and followed the Supreme Court's principle that limitation bars the remedy but not the debt; consequently, "entire amount of rent due" under S.17 of the 1956 Act includes time-barred arrears.
  • Bench decisions of this Court to the contrary (notably Raghunath Singh and Nripendra Mohan Ghose Chowdhury) were held not to be good law insofar as they exclude time-barred arrears from the S.17 deposit/pay obligation.
  • Practically, the landlord-petitioner may recover the whole arrear rent (including the time-barred portion) and the lower court is directed to dispose of the S.17(2A) application and the parties' joint petition in accordance with this legal conclusion.
  • No broader novel legal principle was declared beyond application of existing Supreme Court authority and statutory construction; the decision resolves the specific question of recoverability of time-barred arrears under S.17 of the 1956 Act and requires the lower court to act accordingly. The opinion explicitly sets aside the impugned order and makes the Rule absolute with costs.

Disposition

The Rule is made absolute with costs. The application under section 17(2A) and the joint petition are to be disposed of by the court below according to law.

Show all summary ...

1. This Rule is directed against Order No. 54 dated June 23, 1978 made by the learned Munsif, 4th Court at Alipore, in Title Suit No. 334 of 1974 while disposing of an application under S. 17(2A) and a joint petition made by the parties agreeing that the arrear rent due is to be paid by monthly instalments of Rs. 45/- each along with the current rent payable for each succeeding month.

2. The learned Munsif allowed the joint prayer for payment by instalment of the arrear rent due @ Rs. 45/- per month along with the current rents for the succeeding months but the held that the landlord was not entitled to recover that part of the arrear rent as stood barred by the Law of Limiation on the date of the institution of the suit.

3. The only question raised in the case is whether the landlord-petitioner can recover that part of the arrear rent which stood barred at the date of the institution of the suit.

4. On behalf of the opposite party reliance was placed on a Bench decision of this Court rendered in Raghunath Singh… v. Messrs. Patel & Co.…Opposite Party. 65 CWN 1093 and a single Bench decision of this Court in Nripendra Mohan Ghose Chowdhury v. Tripti Rani Chakravorty ILR (1976) 2 Cal. 359 where it was held that S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 does not require the tenant to deposit or pay any amount in respect of time-barred arrear rent. The petitioner, on the other hand, relied on the Supreme Court decision in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ram Chaudraji Virajman Mandir AIR 1978 SC 287 and a single Bench decision of this Court in Sohan Lal Rajgaria v. Calcutta Chromotype Pvt. Ltd. 1979 (1) CLJ 274.

5. The Supreme Court decision referred to above relates to a case under U.P Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act (13 of 1972). Section 20(4) of that Act conferred on the tenant the benefit of avoiding a decree for eviction in case he complied with the requirements of S. 20(4). If the tenant in such a case does not within one month of the date of service on him of a notice of demand pay the rent for not less than 4 months, the landlard under S. 20(2) of the Act would be entitled to an order of eviction. In that case the question arose whether the expression “entire amount of rent due” in S. 20(4) of the Act would include rent which had become time-barred. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the law was well-settled that under the Law of Limitation it was the remedy which was barred but that did not extinguish the debt. It was further stated by Their Lordship that the Statute conferred a benefit on the tenant to avoid a decree for eviction by complying with the requirements of S. 20(4), that if he failed to avail himself of the opportunity and did not pay the rent for not less than 4 months and within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand, the landlord under S. 20(2) would be entitled to an order of eviction, that still the tenant could avail himself of the protection by complying with the requirements of S. 20(4) but if he does not deposit the entire amount due the protection was no more available and that the words “entire amount of rent due” would include rent which became time-barred. In the case of Sohan Lal Rajgaria (supra) where similar question arose under S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 the said Supreme Court decision was followed. That being the legal position the decisions in the cases of Raghunath Singh & Nripati Mohan Ghose Chowdhury (supra) are no longer good law. In Krishna Chandra Bose v. Radharani Ghose AIR 1954 Cal. 102=57 CWN 801 which was a case governed by the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, K.C Chunder J. took the view that the tenant could not be compelled in law to pay any portion of such rent as is barred by limitation and the Court could not, therefore, make an order for deposit of such time-barred arrear rent. Under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950 that would be the legal position because there S. 14(4) was to be read subject to the provisions of S. 14(1) of that Act and S. 14(1) speaks of amount of rent “legally” payable by a tenant and which was in arrear. It it significant to note that even though in the said Act of 1950 the Statute used the words “the amount of rent legally payable” by the tenant which was in arrear in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the legislature thought it proper not to use the expression “legally payable.” Instead the expression used in S. 17 was “the tenant shall deposit in Court or with the Controller or pay to the landlord the amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made.” Thus, there was a deliberate departure made in this regard by the said Act of 1956 from what was there contained in the said Act of 1950. The omission of the words “legally payable” is significant in this regard. Under the provisions of S. 17 of the Act of 1956 the tenant who made a default would be protected from eviction provided he complies with the provisions of S. 17(1) or S. 17(2), as the case may be. Accordingly, it is the clear intention of the legislature that in a case governed by the said Act of 1956 before the tenant may be entitled to such protection from eviction he is to put in the entire amount of arrear rent no matter whether a part of such rent has already become time-barred. As already pointed out the acknowledged legal position is that by reason of the provisions of the Limitation Act if a debt becomes time-barred, only the remedy is lost and the debt on that account is not extinguished.

6. In the case of Nripendra Mohan Ghose Chowdhury (supra) Chittatosh Mookerjee J. took the view that under sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (2A) of S. 17, the Court had no jurisdiction to direct the defendant to deposit amounts of rent which became barred by limitation at the date of the institution of the suit in question. But no reason whatever was assigned by the learned Judge for so holding. What moved the learned Judge was the fact that the learned Advocate for the party opposing the Rule in that case did not dispute the well established principle that under sub-s. (1), (2) or (2A) time-barred rent need not be paid or deposited.

7. The case of Raghunath Singh (supra) was decided by Bachawat and Chatterjee JJ. Bachawat J. referred to the decision in Daya Devi v. Chapla Devi 63 CWN 976 where it was held that under sub-s. (1) of S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the tenant was not bound to pay to the plaintiff the amount of rent which was assigned to him by the landlord as in such a case the plaintiff was not the landlord but the assignee of the landlord in respect of the arrear rent due. On the strength of the decision in Daya Devi's case (supra) Bachawat J. held that similarly the tenant was not required to deposit or pay any amount in respect of time-barred arrear rent which was not recoverable from him on account of the bar of limitation. The reason behind the decision in Daya Devi's case (supra) is that arrears of rent would lose the character of arrears of rent as soon as there is an assignment of the arrear due made by the landlord to another person. Further, it was pointed out in Daya Devi's case (supra) that when the suit for ejectment was instituted not by the landlord to whom the arrears became due but by his assignee there was no obligation on the part of the tenant to deposit arrears which became due to the ex-landlord. Thus, to my mind, the analogy drawn by Bachawat J. is not warranted. Further, Bachawat J. took the view referred to above, namely, that the tenant was not bound to pay or deposit that part of the arrear rent which stood barred by the law of limitation on the ground that the tenant was under no legal obligation to pay the time-barred arrear rent. In this connection it is significant to note that the words: “the amount of rent legally payable by the tenant and which is in arrears” which appeared in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, were not there in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The words “legally payable” were omitted obviously with a purpose. The relevant words appearing in S. 17(1) are—”……………………the tenant, shall within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him, deposit in Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made……………………”. Thus, according to the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the tenant is to deposit or pay as the case may be, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid and that in respect of the entire period for which the tenant may have made default. The omission of the words “legally payable” is significant. By said sub-s. (1) of S. 17 a tenant is given protection against eviction. This appears from the caption: “When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction.” Taking all this into consideration the only conclusion that may be arrived at is that the legislature intended to afford protection to the tenant only if he deposits or pays, as the case may be the entire amount of rent for the period for which the tenant may have made default. The whole or a part of such amount of arrear may be time barred and may not be recoverable by an action in a court of law. The law of limitation only bars the remedy to enforce realisation of that part of the arrear rent which is time-barred but the debt does not on that account cease to exist. Bachawat J. further observed in the case of Raghunath Singh (supra) that the word “payable” was of somewhat vague import but in the context of the section it means “legally enforceable”. After the omission of the words “legally payable” from the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 it would not perhaps be correct to say that the word “payable” appearing in sub-s. (2) of S. 17 is synonymous with the words “legally enforceable”. Bachawat J. referred in his judgment to the case of Nasiban Bibi v. Parulbala Dutta 62 CWN 778. But that was a case where the question involved was whether the tenant was to deposit under sub-s. (1) of S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, that part of the arrear rent which became due before the coming into force of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Though in the case of Nasiban Bibi (supra) Banerjee J. used the words “legally recoverable”, it cannot be said, having regard to the facts of that case and the question that arose for determination, that Banerjee J. laid it down that it was only that part of the arrear rent which was legally recoverable, should be deposited or paid as the case may be. In Ganga Kumar v. Chintamoni Roy 65 CWN 639 where the question arose whether all arrears, barred or not, should be taken into account in considering the arrear of rent referred to in Ss. 3 and 6 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, Chatterjee J. construed the word “due” as meaning “payable” and held that it did not mean recoverable. The word “payable” was taken as meaning that which ought to be paid but was not paid. It does not mean “legally payable” But Chatterjee J. in the case of Raghunath Singh (supra) concurred with Bachawat J. in holding that the word “payable” appearing in S. 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act would mean “legally payable”. Further Chatterjee J. observed that the Rent Act in 1950 contained a corresponding provision and only “arrears legally payable” were to be determined and that if it were held that barred arrear rent could be realised the effect would be, arrears which could not be realised under the 1950 Act could now be realised under the 1956 Act. According to Chatterjee J. this would result in inconsistencies. If under the provisions of the said Act of 1956 arrear rent which stood barred could be realised there is no point in saying that such arrears were not recoverable under the said 1950 Act and that it would result in inconsistency if such arrears are permitted to be realised under the said Act of 1956.

8. If the Supreme Court decision referred to above were not there I would be bound by the said Bench decision in Raghunath Singh's case (supra). But having regard to the Supreme Court decision which is in consonance with the view taken by me as aforesaid I cannot but hold that the principle laid down in the said Supreme Court decision would make it obligatory on my part to hold that both under sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of S. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the tenant would be bound to pay or deposit, as the case may be, the entire arrear rent, whether a part of it is time-barred or not.

9. In the circumstances, the impugned order ought to be set aside and the entire arrear rent, even though a part of it would be time-barred, should be recoverable by the plaintiff-petitioner from the defendant-opposite party.

10. The Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. The application under S. 17(2A) and the joint petition referred to above be disposed of by the Court below according to law.

Rule made absolute.