Hira Lal v. State Of U.P And Others

Yashoda Nandan, J.:— The opposite party no. 4, claiming to be the landlord of the premises in dispute, applied under Section 3 of the U.P Act No. III of 1947 for permission to evict the petitioners. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer accorded the permission prayed for. A revision was preferred by the petitioners under section 3(2) of the Act which was dismissed by the learned Commissioner on May 15, 1972 and the findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer were confirmed. On July 18, 1972, it appears that the petitioners applied for staying the operation of the order passed by the learned Commissioner who was pleased to pass an order staying operation of his order dated 13-5-1972 for a period of one month. Before the expiry of the period of one month, however, the landlord opposite party no. 4 instituted a suit against the petitioners for their eviction on the basis of order dated May 15, 1972. The petitioners challenged the order of the learned Commissioner by means of a representation under Section 7-F of the Act on June 12, 1972. His State Government dismissed the representation firstly on the grounds that the proceedings under Section 7-F had become futile since that suit had already been instituted by the opposite party no. 4 on the basis of the permission granted by the learned Commissioner, and secondly that the findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the learned Commissioner, to the effect that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide as also more pressing than that of the applicant, was correct.

2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, and have gone through the impuguned orders.

3. The learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, primarily contended that the order of the Mate Government was patently erroneous, in as far as it had held that the petitioners representation had become infructuous on account of the suit already having been instituted on the basis of the permission granted by the learned Commissioner. It was urged that by the order dated May 18, 1972, the learned Commissioner had postponed the effectiveness of the order passed by him for a period of one month and consequently the suit instituted by the respondent no. 4 before the expiry of the period of one month was not competent. The contention, in our opinion, is without any merit and is unsound. When the revision was disposed of by the learned Commissioner on May 15, 1972, he became functous officio and ceased to have any power either to review his order or to pass any other orders except to correct any clerical error. What the Commissioner aid by means of the order dated May 18, 1972, staying the operation of the order dated May 15, 1972, amounted to a variation of his order of that date. This, the Commissioner was not competent to do since he could not review his order in the absence of any statutory provision permitting him to do so. By the time the suit had been instituted, the petitioners had not filed the revision. It was open to them either to obtain from the Commissioner an order postponing the operation of his order at the time when he passed the order dated May 13, 1972, or to have filed a representation, before the suit was instituted, under Section 7-F and to have obtained a stay from the State Government. Neither of these Steps were taken by the petitioner tenants before institution of the suit.

4. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das v. Parasnath,1 the powers to the State Government to revoke the permission granted under Section 3(1) got exhausted once the suit had been validly instituted. The view taken by the State Government is sound and does not call for any interference.

5. The learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, further contended, relying upon the decision in Smt Prabhawati v. Dr Pritam Kaur . Kaur,2 that a landlord cannot be permitted to defeat the statutory right of a tenant to Invoke the powers of the State Government under Section 7-F. The decision, relied upon, is of no avail to the petitioners because the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable.

6. In that decision the relevant facts leading to the decision were that against an order, passed under Section 7-F of the Act, the tenant had filed a writ petition in this court. The writ petition was allowed and the case was remanded to the State Government for decision of the representation under Section 7-F, afresh, in accordance with the judgment of this Court and immediately after the order of remand was passed by this court, the landlord instituted a suit for the eviction of the tenant. Before the State Government an objection was taken to the effect, on behalf of the landlord, that since a suit had already been filed the powers of the State Government to interfere with the permission granted under Section 3 of the Act stood exhausted. The State Government accepted the contention. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court observed;

“No party to a litigation can be permitted to frustrate the decision rendered by having, recourse to trickery. The true effect of the order made by the High Court in the writ petition was that the question whether the respondent should be permitted to file a suit for ejectment of the appellant or not must be gone into and decided afresh by the State Government. One of the implications flowing from that order is that the respondent is precluded from filing the intended suit for eviction till the State Government decides the revision petition.”

7. As already stated, these observations have no relevants in the context in which the present revision was dismissed.

8. For the reasons given, the petition is hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. Interim order, if any, is hereby vacated.