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M. Mohd. Obeidulla v. The Spl. Dy. Commissioner, Bangalore And Others

Karnataka High Court
Jun 4, 1981
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition under Article 226 challenges (a) the order dated 7 March 1981 of the Deputy Commissioner (DC), Bangalore (case No. HRC (Civil) A182/80-81), and (b) the order dated 20 April 1981 in Case No. HRC 676.ACC/80 of the House Rent and Accommodation Controller (the Controller), Civil Area, Bangalore.

The dispute concerns residential premises No. 46, Viviani Road, Bangalore. The premises were allotted in about 1964 under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 to respondent No. 3 (on a monthly rent of Rs. 180). The petitioner purchased the premises on 29 June 1979 from the then-owner (Smt. Noronha) and asserted that respondent No. 4 (wife of respondent No. 3) had been in occupation but had recognized the petitioner as landlord and had delivered possession in earlier proceedings.

On 18 December 1980 the petitioner intimated vacancy to the Controller and sought self-occupation. The Controller published a notice on 19 December 1980 (HRC 676 ACC/80) notifying the alleged vacancy and calling for applications. Respondent No. 3 filed an intervening objection before the Controller on 26 December 1980 asserting continuous tenancy and denial of vacancy; the Controller deferred final decision and stated the issues would be considered at hearing.

Before the Controller could decide those questions, respondent No. 3 filed an appeal on 29 December 1980 under Section 12 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act before the DC challenging the Controller's notification. The DC admitted the appeal, stayed the Controller's notification and fixed dates for hearing. The DC overruled the petitioner's preliminary objection to maintainability and, after hearing, on 7 March 1981 granted all reliefs sought by respondent No. 3.

The Controller, by reference to the DC (6 April 1981), sought instructions/clarification. The DC gave a note on 10 April 1981 directing eviction proceedings under Section 10-A. Acting on the DC's communication, the Controller found the petitioner in unauthorised occupation and on 20 April 1981 issued orders and a warrant for forcible delivery of possession to respondent No. 3.

The petitioner challenged these orders by way of the present writ petition. The Court had earlier issued an interim injunction (24 April 1981) restraining both the petitioner and respondent No. 3 from occupying the premises and directed the Controller not to open the lock and seal until disposal of the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal under Section 12 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act was maintainable against a mere notification (publication of an intimation of vacancy) issued by the Controller, or whether an appeal lies only against an order determining vacancy.
  2. Whether the DC, on appeal, could lawfully decide factual questions (vacancy, self-occupation, and possession) when the Controller had not yet recorded evidence or finally determined those questions.
  3. Whether it was proper for the Controller to make a reference to the DC on judicial/quasi‑judicial matters and for the DC to issue instructions to the Controller (i.e., the propriety of the Controller seeking guidance and the DC entertaining such a reference).
  4. Whether this Court should permit the petitioner to occupy the premises pending final decision by the Controller.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner (Sri S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar — counsel)

  • Contended that the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 before the DC was not maintainable because it was directed at a notice/notification (publication of an intimation of vacancy) and not against an order as required by the Act.
  • Argued that even if an appeal were maintainable, the DC should not have accepted respondent No. 3's factual claims before the original authority (the Controller) had considered the contested questions and made a determination.
  • Contended that the DC's summary overruling of maintainability objections was arbitrary and laconic and that the DC improperly accepted respondent No. 3's ipse dixit on fact and law.
  • Sought permission for the petitioner to occupy the premises pending final determination, emphasizing hardship (petitioner’s family of 18 persons).

Respondent No. 3 (Sri K. Jagannatha Shetty — counsel)

  • Supported the DC's order and the Controller's subsequent orders for delivery of possession.
  • Asserted that the Controller had already decided the question of vacancy so it was not open to the Controller to re-examine that issue, thereby justifying filing an appeal before the DC.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion cites statutory provisions but does not rely on or cite any case law precedents.

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the record of proceedings before the Controller and found that the Controller had only published the intimation of vacancy and had not made any final order determining vacancy, the petitioner's claim for self-occupation, or the ultimate question of allotment. The Controller had kept the question open for consideration and had not collected material, recorded evidence or expressed a concluded view.

The Court stressed the legal principle that an appeal under the Rent Control Act lies against an order and not merely against a notice or a notification publishing an intimation of vacancy. Because the Controller had not made an order on the disputed questions, the appeal admitted by the DC on 29 December 1980 was, in the Court's view, incompetent.

The Court criticised the DC's handling of the preliminary objection to maintainability as arbitrary and laconic — noting that the DC overruled objections without applying his mind ("the objections are overruled") and then proceeded to accept respondent No. 3's factual and legal contentions as if the Controller had already determined those matters. The Court observed that the DC "seems to blindly accept every one of the pleas urged by respondent No. 3" and that there was no lawful basis in the record for the DC's conclusions on fact and law.

Because the Controller's later orders (including the delivery warrant of 20 April 1981) derived their source from the DC's order on appeal, and because the DC's order was found to be without jurisdiction (insofar as the appeal was incompetent) or manifestly illegal even if assumed competent, the Court concluded that the DC's order and the Controller's consequent actions stood on no independent lawful basis and therefore required quashing.

The Court also analysed the propriety of the Controller seeking guidance from the DC on judicial/quasi‑judicial questions and found it improper for the Controller to have done so and improper for the DC to have entertained the reference and issued instructions to the Controller.

Addressing interim relief, the Court explained that neither it nor the Controller could permit the petitioner to occupy the premises while the Controller's proceedings were pending, because permitting one party occupation would prejudice the other's case. Accordingly, the Court refused the petitioner's request for permission to occupy.

The Court emphasised that the Controller must decide the pending proceedings after recording evidence and collecting such material as may be necessary, and that the Controller should decide all principal and incidental questions together (although law permits preliminary decisions on jurisdictional facts, such as vacancy). In light of judicial review, the Court recommended a fuller hearing with evidence rather than short-circuiting the process.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court quashed the challenged orders by issuing a writ of certiorari. Specifically, it quashed the orders dated 7 March 1981 and 10 April 1981 of the Deputy Commissioner and the consequential order No. HRC 676 ACC/80 dated 20 April 1981 made by the Controller.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The Controller, Civil Area, Bangalore (respondent No. 2) is directed to dispose of the proceeding in Case No. HRC 676.ACC/80 in accordance with law and in the light of the observations in this judgment, expeditiously and in any event within a period of three months from receipt of the order.
  • The earlier interim injunction issued by this Court (24 April 1981) restraining both the petitioner and respondent No. 3 from occupying the premises and directing the Controller not to open the lock and seal remains the operative interim position until final disposal by the Controller and this Court's order; the Court declined to permit the petitioner to occupy the premises pending the Controller's decision.
  • The rule issued was made absolute and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.
  • The record of the case is to be transmitted to the House Rent and Accommodation Controller, Bangalore within ten days; and the High Court Government Pleader was permitted to file a memo of appearance for respondents 1 and 2 within 15 days.

Broader implications: The opinion primarily provides relief in the particular administrative and appellate context of the Rent Control proceedings; it does not purport to set a novel legal precedent beyond affirming that appeals lie against orders and not mere notifications, and that quasi‑judicial authorities should not seek or receive judicial instructions that supplant their fact‑finding function. The Court emphasised procedural propriety and the need for the Controller to record evidence before reaching conclusions on vacancy and allotment.

Show all summary ...

Sri S.K Venkataranga Iyengar, Advocate for Petitioner.

Sri L. Srinivasa Reddy, H.C.G.P for R-1 and 2.
Sri K. Gopalakrishna, Advocate for R-4 and
Sri K.J Shetty, Advocate for R-3.

Puttaswamy, J.:—

1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challanged the order dated 7th March, 1981, of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred to as the DC) in case No. HRC (Civil) A182/80-81 (Annexure-B) and the order dated 20th April, 1981 in Case No. HRC 676 ACC/80 of the House Rent and Accommodation Controller, Civil Area, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Controller) (Annexure-A).

2. Residential premises bearing No. 46 of Viviyani Road, Bangalore City is the subject-matter of this writ petition. Prior to 29th June, 1979, one Cmt. Noronha was the owner of the said premises. Some time in 1964, the Controller allotted the premises to respondent No. 3 in accordance with the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (Karnataka Act No. 22 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on a rent of Rs. 180-00 per month.

3. On 29th June, 1979, the petitioner purchased the premises from Smt. Noronha for valuble consideration. According to the petitioner, on the date of purchase of the premises, respondent No. 4, who is no other than the wife of respondent No. 3 but whose relationship is not what it should be, was in occupation of the same as tenant and she has recognized him as her landlord and that during a proceeding instituted by him against her under the Act before the Civil Court, she had also delivered possession of the premises to him.

4. On the above basis, the petitioner on 18th December, 1980 intimated the vacancy of the premises to the Controller and sought for self occupation. On receipt of the said intimation of vacancy, the Controller notified the same by his notice or notification No. HRC 676 ACC 80, on 19th December, 1980. The relevant part of the said notice reads thus:

OFFICE OF THE RENT AND ACCOMMODATION CONTROLLER, CIVIL AREA, BANGALORE, No. 39, FOURTH FLOOR ‘UNITED MANSION’ MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD, BANGALORE—560001.

HRC Case No. No. and addsess of the vacant premises Accommodation reported to be available Rent Last Date for receiving applcations in this office in form No. II with challan upto 3.00 p.m and also Divl. Commr/Government Last date directions from Divl. Commr. Govt. Date of hearing at 3.00 p.m Owner's address 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 HRC 676 ACC 80. No. 46, Viviani Road, Richards Town, Bangalore. Residential Verandha, hall, Kitchen, garage, Lighting, facilities available. 27-12-1980 Hall, 4 bed rooms, water sanitary 31-12-1980 dining bath room and 11-1-1981 Rent Rs. 240-00 per month (Rupees Two hundred and Forty Only). (Purchaser landlords request for “self occupation)”. Sri Mohammed Obeidulla. Mohammed Nazarulla, Mohammed Sahanulla, Mohammed Safiulla, No. 38/7, Krishnarajapuram, Bangalore.

5. In the aforesaid proceeding before the Controller, respondent No. 3 on 26th December, 1980 made an intervening application or an objection statement inter alia contending that an order made by the Controller on 29th June, 1977 in favour of respondent No. 4 was nonest, that at all times he had continued to be, in occupation of the premises as tenant and that no vacancy had arisen and therefore the proceedings be dropped. On that application, the Controller made an order on the same day directing the relevant papers to be put up and thereafter on 31st December, 1980 made an order stating that the pleas urged by respondent No. 3 would be considered on the date of hearing, viz., on 11th January, 1981.

6. But, before the Controller could hold an enquiry and decide the matter, respondent No. 3 filed an appeal on 29th December, 1980 before the DC against the very notice of intimation issued by the Controller on the notice board itself under section 12 of the Act arraying the petitioner as respondent No. 2. In the preamble of the appeal-memo, respondent No. 3 stated thus:

“Under Section 12 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, the appellant above named begs to file the following appeal against the notification issued by the first respondent on 19th December, 1980 in respect of the alleged vacancy said to have been caused pertaining to the premises of the appellant, bearing No. 46, Viviani Road, Richards Town, Bangalore, in his notification No. HRC 676.ACC/80 for the following among other—Grounds.”

But, in the prayer of his appeal-memo, he sought for the following reliefs:

“Wherefore, the appellant humbly prays, that the Honourable Authority be pleased to call for the entire records from the first respondent and to further pleased to grant the following reliefs to the appellant:

(a) declare that the endorsement issued by the first respondent on 29th June, 1967 in favour of the appellant's wife Smt. Ramalakshmi Prasad, transferring the appellant's tenancy to her name as void ab initio and unenforceable;

(b) direct the first respondent to initiate action against the second respondent as per Section 10-A of the KRC Act for violation made by the second respondent, of Section 4(1) of the KRC Act and after taking possession of the premises to direct the first respondent to put the appellant in possession of the premises;

(c) set aside the notification issued in HRC 676.ACC/80, dated 19th December, 1980.

in the interest of justice and equity.”

On 29th December, 1980, the DC evidently without hearing the petitioner but hearing respondent No. 3, made an order on the Index-sheet accompanying appeal-memo itself in these terms:

“Appeal admitted. HRC. Notfn. No. 676 ACC 1980, dated 19th December, 1980 is stayed until this appeal is disposed of. Communicate the same and issue notices. Fix up for hearing on 5th January, 1981.

Adhip Chaudhuri,

27th December 1980.”

7. After entering appearance on 5th January, 1981, in the said appeal, the petitioner urged before the DC, that the appeal was not maintainable, which objection was overruled by him, in these terms:

“Counsel for App. and Resp. 2 present. Latter files power. Raises preliminary objections to the filing of the appeal itself. The objections are overruled. The stay granted continues. Adjonrned for hearing on 2nd February, 1981.”

Adhip Chaudhuri,

5th January 1981.”

In due course, the DC heard the said appeal and made an order on 7th March, 1981 granting all the reliefs sought by respondent No. 3.

8. On receipt of the order of the DC, the Controller made a reference to the DC on 6th April, 1981, seeking instructions or a clarification of the order made on 7th March, 1981. On that reference, a note was put up by the office on which the DC made an order on 10th April, 1981 in these terms:

“When we say there is no vacancy and the appellant should be put in possession the matter becomes simple. The Respondent is to be brought under 10-A and evicted.

Adhip Chaudhuri,

10th April 1981.”

In conformity with the aforesaid order of the DC, a communication was issued by his office to the Controller on 18th April, 1981 and on receipt of the same Controller made an order on 20th April, 1981, in which he found that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the premises and therefore he should be evicted from the same. On the same day an order or delivery warrant was issued to forcibly take possession of the premises from the petitioner and deliver the same to respondent No. 3 (Annexure-A).

9. Shri S.K Yenkataranga Iyengar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 before the DC was not maintainable and even if maintainable, he should not have blindly accepted the case of respondent No. 3 even before the original authority that was seized of the matter had decided the questions and made an order thereto.

10. Shri K. Jagannatha Shetty, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, sought to support the order made by the DC and the further orders made by the Controller.

11. Shri Shetty submits that on the petition presented by respondent No. 3, the Controller had observed that he has already decided the question of vacancy and it was not open to him to reexamine the same, for which reason his client rightly filed the appeal before the DC.

12. As noticed earlier, the Controller had mot made any order accepting the claim of the petitioner or rejecting the claim of respondent No. 3. Before the Controller the proceedings were pending in which he had even stated that he would consider every one of the questions to be urged by the parties.

13. All that had happened was a notice of intimation of vacancy given by the petitioner had been published by the Controller. A notice of intimation of vacancy by one person and initiation of proceedings thereto by the Controller under the Act, does not and cannot by itself determine the vacancy reported by one and disputed by another. A notice or notification issued by the Controller on his notice board, cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as an order determining the vacancy of a premises, that too in a case, as in the present one, in which there is a dispute on that very question before him. A mere publication of the intimation of a vacancy given by one would not amount to an order that can be agitated in an appeal under the Act. An appeal lies only against an order and not against a notice or a notification merely publishing an intimation of vacancy.

14. Along with his appeal, respondent No. 3 had only annexed an unauthenticated and an uncertified notification issued by the Controller publishing the intimation of a vacancy given by the Controller. A tenable and a serious objection raised by the petitioner on the maintainability was rejected by the DC, without really applying his mind and making an arbitrary and laconic order to the effect “the objections are overruled”. An appellate authority under the Act, whose order is reviewable by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot make such arbitrary and laconic orders. I am distressed at the same and I do hope that the DC will avoid making such orders in future.

15. From the foregoing, it follows that the criticism of Sri Iyengar that there was no order made by the Controller to be appealed under Section 12 of the Act and the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 before the DC was incompetent and the order made thereto is wholly without jurisdiction is well founded. On this ground alone, the order made by the DC is liable to be quashed without examining the other question. But, I will assume that the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 was maintainable and examine whether the order made by the DC is legally sustainable.

16. On the intimation of vacancy given by the petitioner, the Controller as required by the Act and the Rules, has only notified the same. When respondent No. 3 filed an intervening application or objections urging that there was no vacancy, the Controller, without making any order, has kept open that question for consideration and decision. An examination of the papers of the Office of the Controller, clearly shows that the Controller had not decided the question of vacancy, the plea of petitioner for self occupation or the final question that arises in such a proceeding, viz., allotment of the premises to a needy application if he had reached the conclusion that a vacancy had arisen and the request of the petitioner for self occupation should be rejected.

17. While the above is the position that emerges from the proceedings before the Controller, the DC in appeal holds that a vacancy had not arisen as urged by respondent No. 3 and accepts the other pleas urged by him, as if the Controller had determined all those questions and there was material to decide them finally. Before the DC, the petitioner had seriously urged that he had purchased the premises, that respondent No. 4 had lawfully delivered possession of the premises to him, that a vacancy in fact and law had arisen and, therefore, he should be permitted to occupy the premises. On these questions, the Controller had not collected any material, recorded any evidence, considered them and had not expressed his opinion. When this was the position, it passes my comprehension as to how it was open to the DC to accept the ipse dixit of respondent No. 3. As to how and on what basis the DC reached his conclusions is rather difficult to gather. All that I can gather is that the DC seems to blindly accept every one of the pleas urged by respondent No. 3 on fact and law, which was plainly impermissible.

18. On the above analysis, it follows that the order made by the DC, assuming that the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 was maintainable is manifestly illegal, and is liable to be quashed and the case has to be decided by the Controller.

19. Shri Iyengar next contends that the reference made by the Controller, the order made thereon on 10th April, 1981 by the DC, the instructions issued thereto to the Controller and the orders made thereto for delivery are manifestly illegal.

20. Earlier I have reached the conclusion that the order made by the DC on 7th March, 1981 on appeal cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. The reference made by the Controller, the order made thereon, the instructions issued thereto and the further orders made by the Controller depend and have their source to the, order made by the DC on appeal and have no independent existence. When that is so, the order made by the DC on 10th April, 1981 and the orders made by the Controller on 20th April, 1981, have to be quashed without any further examination. But, it is necessary to point out that it was improper for the Controller to have sought guidance or clarifications from the DC in judicial and quasi-judicial matters. A fortiori, it was improper for the DC to have entertained the reference made by the Controller, make an order on 10th April, 1981 and issued instructions to the Controller in conformity with that order. I fervently hope the authorities will avoid the same in future.

21. In this writ petition as also in certain civil and criminal proceedings, there is dispute between the contesting parties on the actual occupation of the premises. On 24th April, 1981, while directing issue of rule nisi in the case I made an interim order in these terms:

“While the petitioner asserts that respondent-3 is a trespasser, respondent-3 asserts that the petitioner is a trespasser and therefore they have no right to occupy the premises.

Whether the order is legal and valid and what rights the contesting parties derive from that order is a matter that has to be decided at the final hearing of the case. Admittedly both sides are not in occupation of the premises in dispute. In these circumstances, the proper order to be made is to restrain the petitioner and respondent-3 from occupying the premises till the disposal of the writ petition. I, therefore, issue injunction restraining the petitioner and respondent-3 from occupying the premises in dispute till the disposal of the case. Both sides admit that the premises has been looked and sealed by the Rent Controller. I direct the Rent Controller not to open the lock and seal till the disposal of the Writ petition.

Emergent notices to respondents 1 and 2 returnable in ten days.

Call for the records.

Statement of objections of respondent-3 if any to be filed on or before 25th May, 1981.

Post this W.P for hearing on 28th May, 1981 on the top of the hearing list subject to any part heard cases.”

According to the aforesaid interim order this Court had issued an injunction restraining the petitioner and respondent No. 3 from occupying the premises and that the Controller should continue to keep the lock of the premises with him. As to what was the factual position as on 24th April, 1981 or today cannot be decided by this Court in this petition and those questions have to be decided by the appropriate civil or criminal courts that are seized of the matter or the Controller along with the other questions that arise before him. In this view, I do not express any opinion on this question and leave open the same.

22. Sri Iyengar, lastly contends that this Court should permit the petitioner to occupy the premises till the matter is decided by the Controller. Sri Iyengar submits that the petitioner and his family consist of 18 members and they are in dire need of accommodation, which in the very nature of things, is seriously opposed by respondent No. 3.

23. Before the termination of the proceedings, the Controller cannot permit the petitioner or any other person to occupy the premises. When the Controller cannot make an order permitting the petitioner to occupy the premises, this Court cannot also permit the petitioner to occupy the permises, whatever may be the hardship that is caused to any of the parties. Any such order in favour of one, would seriously, prejudice the case of the other. For these reasons, I reject this prayer of Sri Iyengar.

24. In para-16 of this order, I have briefly indicated the principal questions that arise for determination before the Controller. A satisfactory decision, in particular on the question of vacancy and self occupation, cannot be reached in the absence of evidence, for which purpose it is necessary to give opportunity to the parties to place their evidence also. After recording all such evidence as may be placed by the parties and collecting such material, that he may deem necessary, it is proper for the Controller to decide all questions together though law permits him to decide any one of jurisdictional facts, like question of vacancy; as a preliminary question. But having regard to the fact, that the order of the Controller is subject to an appeal and judicial review, by this Court, it is more desirable for the Controller to follow the former course, though the question of permitting the petitioner to occupy the premises or allotting the same to others, would not arise if he accepts the case of respondent No. 3 on the question of vacancy. In deciding the principal questions, the Controller is bound to examine all other incidental questions that may be urged by the parties. I have no doubt that the Controller will bestow his earnest consideration and decide all questions satisfactorily.

25. As seen earlier, both the parties are agitating to occupy the premises and continue to live there. As to whose case has to be accepted has necessarily to be decided by the Controller. But, in deciding the questions, the Controller cannot allow the matters to drift and he is required to decide the same with utmost expedition.

26. Learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent No. 3 seek for a direction to the Controller to decide the matter within a month from this day. But, in my opinion, the period suggested by counsel is too short and it is necessary to allow at least three months time to decide the matter.

27. In the light of my above discussion, I make the following orders and directions:

(i) I quash the orders dated 7th March, 1981, 10th April, 1981 on the reference made by the Controller and the communication bearing No. Appl. (Civil) P.R 2/1981-1982, dated 18th April, 1981, of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, in HRC No. (Civil) A182/80-81 (Annexure-B) and the consequent orders No. HRC 676 ACC/80, dated 20th April, 1981 made by the Controller by issue of a writ of certiorari.

(ii) I direct the Controller, Civil Area, Bangalore respondent No. 2, to dispose of the proceeding in Case No. HRC 676.ACC/80 pending before him in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order with all such expedition as is possible in the circumstances of the case and in any event within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order.

28. Rule issued is made absolute.

29. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.

30. Let a copy of this order and records of the case be transmitted to the House Rent and Accommodation Controller, Bangalore within ten days from this day.

31. Sri L. Srinivasa Reddy, learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance for respondents 1 and 2 within 15 days from this day.