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Roop Basant v. Durga Prasad And Another
K.C Agrawal, J.:— This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the District Judge, Bulandshahr, dated February 20, 1976, rejecting the revision of the petitioner filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
2. Suit No. 46 of 1973 was filed by Durga Prasad, respondent no. 1, for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profit against the petitioner, Roop Basant, and Miss Vedwati, respondent no. 2. It was decreed ex parte on November 1, 1974. The decree was passed for recovery of Rs. 1525/- plus costs and damages for use and occupation pendente lite and future at the rate of Rs. 35/- per month. The petitioner filed an application on November 4, 1974 for setting aside the ex parte decree. The application was resisted by respondent no. 1 on the ground that there was no compliance with the Proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The objection prevailed with the Judge Small Causes and the application filed by the petitioner was rejected. Against this order, the petitioner went in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The revision was dismissed of February 20, 1976. Against the order, the petitioner preferred a civil revision which was no. 686 of 1976. As a full bench of this Court held that an order passed by the District Judge under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was not revisable, that revision was dismissed. Against this order, the petitioner went to the Supreme Court by means of Special Appeal. The appeal was allowed and the High Court was directed to treat the revision filed by the petitioner as a writ petition and to decide the same as such. It is in this way that this case has against come to the High Court. The controversy involved in the instant case is about the non-compliance of the Proviso to Section 17(1). This proviso reads as under:—
“Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of judgment or give, such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.”
3. Under this proviso, the petitioner was required to deposit the amount due from him under the decree. The decree was for recovery of Rs. 1525/- plus costs and damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 35/- per month. In the decree, the amount of costs was shown as Rs. 314/-. The petitioner deposited Rs. 1725/- earlier and thereafter Rs. 114/- by tender at the time of moving of the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. In this way, the total deposit made by the petitioner was Rs. 1839/-.
4. The argument of respondent no. 1 was that as the suit was instituted on 4-1-73 upto 4-11-74 on which date it was decreed ex parte, he was entitled to twenty-two months damages for use and occupation amounted to Rs. 770/-. This amount had since not been deposited in case or security in respect of it had not been furnished, the mandate of proviso to Section 17(1) had not been complied with. It has been disputed before me that the proviso is mandatory in character and its non-compliance could result in the rejection of the application for setting aside the ex parte decree.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, urged before me that as the mesne profit had not been calculated in the decree and was payable subject to the payment of court fee by respondent no. 1, the application could not be rejected on the ground of non-compliance of the Proviso. His submission was that under the Proviso the amount which had been quantified in decree that alone was payable.
6. I do not find any substance in this submission.
7. The requirement of the Proviso is that the “amount due” was to be deposited along with the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The deposit should have been made within the statutory period provided for the same. The decree was not only in respect of arrears of rent but also for mesne profit for use and occupation. The amount payable as mesne profit was also due from the petitioner under the decree and that was required to be deposited under the aforesaid Proviso. If the interpretation made by the petitioner's learned counsel is accepted, the same would result in defeating the object of the Proviso. This provision cuts down the very wide discretion which the courts have under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The person against whom the decree is passed should either deposit the decretal amount or give security. No other alternative is allowed. It may be true that a decree of mesne profit becomes operative on payment of court fee but that could not change the interpretation of the Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 which requires the person liable under the judgment to deposit the amount due from him. It may be correct that a decree-holder cannot realise any mesne profit which had been awarded to him on payment of the court fee till the court fee is paid, but that does not have the effect of wipping of the liability of the person applying for its setting aside. The obligation was on the defendant-petitioner to pay the amount.
8. This controversy has been a subject-matter or decision in this court in a number of cases. Consistently all the learned Judges have taken the view that without deposit of mesne profit, proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 could not be deemed to have been complied with. In Salig Ram v. Sita Ram,1 the view taken was that the amount had not been actually worked out or calculated, did not discharge the defendant of his obligation to deposit the amount due.
9. In Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ram Chandra Ji Birajman Mandir . 1978 1 SCC 44, a the Supreme Court was required to interprete the words “entire amount due” used in Sec. 20(4) of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. The controversy in that case was whether a tenant, in order to get the benefit of the aforesaid provision, was required to deposit even the time barred rent. The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative and held that though payment of a time-barred debt could not be enforced by action but still in taking benefit of Section 20(4) the deposit was necessary.
10. In Smt. Gayatri Devi v. District Judge,3 Nekse Ram v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Aligarh,4 Ravi Shanker v. Vth Addl. District Judge, Aligarh,5 and R.C Duadasham and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Aligarh . 1982 2 Alld. Rent Cases 176. the same view has been taken. Accordingly, I find no merit in the first submission of the petitioner's counsel and reject the same.
11. The learned counsel next contended that as the amount deposited had been accepted by the Judge Small Cause courts when he issued notice on the application of setting aside the ex parte decree, the court could not reject the application filed by the petitioner for the aforesaid purpose on the ground of non-compliance of the proviso to Section 17(1). The learned Counsel also invited my attention to an order of Hon'ble N.D Ojha, J., in Civil Misc. Writ No. 2939 of 1980, decided on 25th January, 1983 (See 1983 Alld. Rent Cases 374) in which the following question had been referred:—
“Whether in a case where an ex parte decree has been passed by the Judge Small Causes and the defendant makes an application under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act for permission to furnish security along with his application for setting aside the ex parte decree, permission is granted and security is furnished in pursuance thereof and notice of the application for setting aside the ex parte decree is issued to the plaintiff but ultimately on the plaintiff's objection not sufficient, the application for setting aside ex parte decree is to be dismissed straight away or in view of the fact that notice was issued on the aforesaid application, the court has to grant a reasonable opportunity to the defendant-applicant to furnish a proper security bond before passing final orders on the application for setting aside the ex parte decree?”
12. On the basis of reference, the learned counsel submitted that the decision of this case be deferred till the question referred to by Hon. N.D Ojha, J., had been answered. The question that arises for decision in the present case is altogether different than which has been referred to. In that case the deposit had been made by a security bond whereas in our case the deposit was made in cash. The petitioner knew about his liability. Merely because of the issuing of the notice on the application for setting aside the ex parte decree, he could not be said to have misled. Hence, the principle that no one I should be prejudiced on account of the mistake of the court, could not apply to the present case. At the time of issuing notice, the court was not called upon to give any concluded judgment on the controversy. It had a limited duty to perform. Hence, the petitioner's second submission also fails.
13. In the result, the writ petition falls and is dismissed with costs. The petitioner is given one month's time to vacate the premises. The respondent no. 1 will be entitled to get costs of this petition from the petitioner.
14. Petition dismissed.
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