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Des Raj Gupta v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, And Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was employed as an assistant cashier by Rampur Zila Sahkari Bank, Ltd., Rampur, and was a "workman" under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act). A reference under S.4-K of the Act had been made by the State Government on 20 June 1975 in respect of a general dispute concerning service conditions of employees of a number of District Co-operative Banks (55 banks). During the pendency of that reference, the employer, in disciplinary proceedings unrelated to the reference, dismissed the petitioner without paying one month's wages and without making an application to the Tribunal for approval of the action as required by the proviso to S.6-E(2)(b) of the Act.
The petitioner filed a complaint under S.6-F of the Act. On 23 February 1979 the Tribunal found that the inquiry against the petitioner did not conform to the principles of natural justice and directed the employer to justify the punishment. On 28 July 1980 the Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's S.6-F application. The petitioner challenged both Tribunal orders by way of the present writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to suo motu direct the employer to justify the order of punishment passed against the petitioner.
- Whether the Tribunal could record a finding on the merits that the dismissal was justified without first recording an express finding that the proviso to S.6-E(2)(b) had been observed or breached.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to suo motu direct the employer to justify its order of punishment.
- The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to record a merit-based finding that dismissal was justified unless it had first recorded a finding that the proviso to S.6-E(2)(b) had been observed in its breach (i.e., had clearly found non-compliance before going into merits).
Employer's Position / Respondent's Pleadings
- In its written statement the employer stated that approval under S.6-E was not necessary and explicitly invited the Tribunal to examine the facts and merits if the Tribunal concluded S.6-E applied. (Para. 23 of the employer's written statement was quoted in the opinion.)
- Thus, the employer requested the Tribunal to consider and justify its order of punishment before the Tribunal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company Ltd., [1979 — II L.L.N 72] | Held that there is no legal duty on a Tribunal suo motu to call upon an employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate charges after deciding a preliminary issue; it is the employer's right/obligation to seek such an opportunity by specific pleading or request. | The Court acknowledged the principle but distinguished the instant case on the facts because the employer had itself requested the Tribunal to examine merits; therefore the petitioner's contention based on an absolute prohibition was not tenable. |
| Equitable Coal Company Ltd. v. Algu Singh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 761 | Explained analogous provisions: breach of the procedural provision is a condition precedent giving the employee the right to have the employer's conduct tested; however breach does not automatically render the punitive order void — merits must still be considered. | Relied upon to show that once the condition precedent (contravention) is satisfied, the Tribunal may examine both (a) whether contravention occurred and (b) whether the employer's order is justified on merits; supports the Tribunal's procedure in the present case. |
| Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Workmen's Federation, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 160 | Construction of S.33-A: an aggrieved employee may complain and the Tribunal shall adjudicate as if a dispute referred; contravention alone does not entitle automatic reinstatement — Tribunal must also examine merits. | Applied to reject the petitioner's contention that breach alone renders dismissal void and to support the Tribunal's examination on merits even after finding procedural contravention. |
| Hindustan General Electrical Corporation Ltd. v. Bishwanath Prasad, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2417 | Explained that S.33-A enables a workman to prefer a complaint treated as a dispute; even if contravention of S.33 is found, the Tribunal must examine merits (including good faith, victimization, and principles in Indian Iron & Steel Co. case). | Used to reinforce the view that Tribunal must consider merits and that a finding of contravention is not by itself sufficient for reinstatement. |
| Punjab Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd., Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand, [1978 — I L.L.N 655] | Held that mere contravention of S.33 does not entitle reinstatement; Tribunal must go on to consider the merits; contravention is often a technical breach and does not invalidate the dismissal automatically. | Followed and cited to summarize the consistent principle that contravention does not render punitive orders void and that merits must be adjudicated. |
| High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lal, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 121 | Holds that dismissal of a civil servant without complying with mandatory statutory safeguards (S.240, Government of India Act 1935) is void and the civil servant remains in service until validly removed. | Referred to in the judgment as part of earlier arguments in other cases; the Court noted the distinction in statutory contexts and relied instead on the Industrial Disputes Act jurisprudence which treats breach as not automatically invalidating dismissal. |
| Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300 | Held that an order of dismissal passed against a public servant without complying with mandatory Art.311(2) is void and the public servant continues in service until the defect is cured. | Referenced in submissions recited by the Court from earlier authorities; the Court indicated that these authorities were considered but that the statutory scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act leads to a different legal consequence regarding reinstatement and relief. |
| Indian Iron & Steel Company case, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 130 (referenced) | Principles to be applied when considering whether an employer's action was justified in light of good faith, victimization, or unfair labour practices. | Cited as guiding the Tribunal's duty to examine merits and whether allegations (want of good faith, victimization, violation of natural justice) were baseless or justified the punishment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner, strictly applying the statutory text and relevant precedents:
- Statutory framework: The court explained the scope and objects of S.6-E and S.6-F of the Uttar Pradesh Act. S.6-E restricts the employer's power to take disciplinary action during proceedings relating to a referred industrial dispute; the restriction is not absolute and varies between S.6-E(1) and S.6-E(2). For S.6-E(2)(b) three requirements were highlighted: (a) action must conform to standing orders, (b) wages for one month must be paid prior to discharge/dismissal, and (c) employer must apply to the authority before which an industrial dispute is pending for approval.
- Purpose of S.6-E and S.6-F: The twin objects of S.6-E were described — (i) protection of workmen from victimization, and (ii) preventing actions that might exacerbate industrial relations while a reference is pending. S.6-F was characterized as providing a speedy remedy: if S.6-E is contravened, a workman may complaint to the Tribunal which will treat the complaint as a dispute under S.4-K for adjudication.
- Application to facts: It was not in dispute that the employer dismissed the petitioner without complying with the statutory requirements (no wages for one month paid and no application for approval). The Tribunal on 23 Feb 1979 recorded that the inquiry was not in accordance with natural justice and directed the employer to justify the punishment.
- On the first contention (no jurisdiction to suo motu call for justification): the court observed that the employer itself, in its written statement, asked the Tribunal to go into merits if the Tribunal considered S.6-E applicable. There is no express or implied prohibition in the Act preventing the Tribunal from directing an employer to justify its order. A court/tribunal may adopt procedures necessary to advance justice unless prohibited. The Tribunal acted to advance the petitioner's interest by making the employer's conduct the subject-matter of an industrial dispute; therefore the Tribunal committed no illegality.
- On the second contention (Tribunal must record express finding of contravention before adjudicating merits): the court reasoned that it was already clear on the record and from the Tribunal's order of 23 Feb 1979 that the Tribunal had concluded that the inquiry was unfair; thus the condition precedent (contravention of S.6-E) existed. When contravention is undisputed or implicitly found by the Tribunal, proceeding to examine the merits is appropriate. The court noted that a formal or express recital that S.6-E was contravened was unnecessary where the Tribunal's orders and reasoning make the conclusion plain.
- Precedential support: The court relied on and discussed authorities construing analogous provisions (Ss.22/23, 33/33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act). The precedents consistently establish that: (a) contravention of procedural protections under those statutes is a condition precedent to the Tribunal's special jurisdiction, (b) contravention does not automatically render the disciplinary order void, and (c) the Tribunal must go on to examine whether the employer's order was justified on merits.
- Distinction from other contexts: The court noted prior authorities (e.g., Privy Council and Article 311 cases) where dismissal without compliance with mandatory provisions rendered the dismissal void in the context of civil/public servants. It observed that the Industrial Disputes Act scheme produces a different legal result: the statutory remedy under S.6-F/S.33-A treats the complaint as a dispute and requires merits-based adjudication rather than automatic invalidation.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is dismissed.
Implications and consequences:
- The Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in directing the employer to justify the punishment and in proceeding to examine the merits of the dismissal after concluding (expressly or implicitly) that the inquiry was unfair and that S.6-E had been contravened.
- A contravention of S.6-E (or analogous S.33 provisions) is a condition precedent enabling a workman to invoke the Tribunal's special jurisdiction under S.6-F, but such contravention does not automatically invalidate the employer's punitive order; the Tribunal must also adjudicate on the merits of the employer's action.
- The decision applies existing Supreme Court authorities construing similar statutory regimes (Equitable Coal Co., Punjab National Bank, Hindustan General Electrical, Punjab Beverages, etc.) and does not purport to create a new precedent or to alter the established principle that the Tribunal must consider merits after finding a contravention.
- Practical outcome here: the writ petition challenging the Tribunal's orders was dismissed and the parties were directed to bear their own costs. No further or broader remedy (such as automatic reinstatement) was ordered by this court in the present petition.
This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
1. The petitioner was in the employment of the Rampur Zila Sahkari Bank, Ltd., Rampur (hereinafter referred to as the employer), as an assistant cashier. He was a workman for the purposes of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). A reference of an industrial dispute between a number of District Co-operative Banks including the employer was made under S. 4-K of the Act. The dispute related to the service conditions of the employees of the banks. The employer, during the pendency of the dispute before the Tribunal in disciplinary proceedings unconnected with the dispute, passed an order dismissing the petitioner from service. This was done without paying wages for one month and without making an application to the Tribunal for obtaining its approval of the action taken by the employer against the petitioner as required by the provisions of the proviso to S. 6-E(2)(b) of the Act. The petitioner made a complaint purporting to be under S. 6-F of the Act to the Tribunal. On 23 February, 1979, the Tribunal took the view that the inquiry held against the petitioner was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It directed the employer to justify before it the punishment awarded to the petitioner. On 28 July, 1980, the Tribunal dismissed the application made by the petitioner under S. 6-F of the Act. In this petition the two orders passed by the Tribunal are being impugned.
2. The provisions contained in S. 6-E of the Act are in pari materia with those of S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In S. 6-E of the Act the general right of an employer to take action against the employee has been restricted. In fact a ban has been imposed upon the right of the employer. However, the ban is not an absolute one and it may be lifted. In cases covered by the provisions of S. 6(1) of the Act no action as enumerated in Cls. (a) and (b) can be taken by the employer unless an express permission in writing has been obtained by it from the authorities mentioned in Sub-sec. (1) of that provision. In cases covered by Sub-cl.(a) of S. 6-E(2) of the Act the employer can straightway take action against the employee, the only limitation being that the action of the employer should be in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a particular employee. For cases covered by Cl. (b) of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 6-E there are three requirements:
(1) The action should be in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a particular employee;
(2) no employee shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month; and
(3) an application is made by the employer to the authority mentioned in Sub-sec. (1) of S. 6-E, and before which an industrial dispute is pending, for the approval of the action taken by the employer.
3. It will thus be seen that the limitation on the power of the employer is not so vigorous in S. 6-E(2) as it is in S. 6-E(1) of the Act.
4. Section 6-E of the Act has twin objects. First, to provide protection to the workman concerned against victimization by the employer on account of his having raised an industrial dispute and then continuing the proceedings. Secondly, the pending proceeding in connexion with the industrial disputes should be determined in a peaceful manner and the employer should not take any action, of the type mentioned in this section, which may create fresh disputes—
“likely to further exacerbate the already strained relation between the employer and the workman”.
5. The purpose of enacting S. 6-F is to provide a speedy remedy to the workman, in a situation, where an order adverse to him has been passed in contravention of the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act. The normal remedy provided to a workman under S. 4-K of the Act, namely, a reference of an industrial dispute by the State Government for adjudication, will entail delay. Further it is in the discretion of the State Government to make or not to make a reference. The State Government is not bound to make a reference in every case. On the contrary, S. 6-F of the Act gives an unfettered right to a workman to make a complaint to the Tribunal concerned and, if he succeeds in establishing that the provisions of S. 6-E have been violated, the Tribunal has to treat the complaint as a dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the provisions of S. 4-K of the Act, The violation of the provisions of S. 6-E in itself will not result in an award reinstating the workman. The order of discharge or dismissal passed in contravention of S. 6-E will not be invalidated. If contravention of S. 6-E is not established the complaint is liable to be dismissed. However, if such a contravention is established the next question will be as to whether the order passed against the workman is justified on merits. Section 6-F enables a workman to get the conduct of an employer examined in the same manner as is done in the case of adjudication of an industrial dispute under S. 4-K of the Act. It also gives a chance to the employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it, against a workman, as if it is a party to a dispute pending before a Tribunal in a reference under S. 4-K of the Act.
6. Sri S.P Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has advanced two contentions before me to assail the orders of the Tribunal. They are:
(i) The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to suo motu direct the employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it; and
(ii) the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to record a finding that on merits the order of dismissal passed against the workman stood justified unless it had recorded a finding that the provisions of the proviso to S. 6-E(2)(b) of the Act had been observed in their breach.
In my opinion, there is no force in either of the two contentions. Before the Tribunal there was no dispute that the employer had passed the order without complying with the requirements of this statute. In Para. 23 of the written statement filed by and on behalf of the employer before the Tribunal it was mentioned;
“That the original petition was advised that approval under S. 6-E is not necessary. If the Hon'ble Tribunal concludes that S. 6-E of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act is applicable to the original petition the facts of the case may kindly be gone into by the Hon'ble Tribunal”.
Thus the employer had requested the Tribunal to examine the merits of the order passed by it (the employer).
7. There is neither any express or any implied prohibition in the Act debarring the Tribunal from asking an employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it (the employer). It is well settled that a Court or Tribunal, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition, may adopt any procedure to advance the cause of Justice and fair play. Procedure is a mere handmaid of justice. The Tribunal committed neither any illegality nor any impropriety in directing the employer to justify its action. The Tribunal gave a chance to the petitioner of “making the employer's conduct the subject-matter of an industrial dispute”.
It also gave an opportunity to the employer to get his conduct examined as if it was the subject-matter of an industrial dispute. The Tribunal, therefore, acted in the interest of the petitioner and not to his detriment when it passed an order,” therefore, call upon the employers to justify the order of punishment before this Tribunal…”
8. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on a decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company, Ltd., [1979 — II L.L.N 72. In that case the argument before the Supreme Court was that in proceedings under S. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Tribunal was under a legal obligation to suo motu issue a direction to the employer to justify the order of punishment passed by it against a workman. The Court repelled this contention and held that no such duty was cast on any Tribunal. The Court speaking through Hon'ble Justice Sri Desai in Para. 12, at page 76, observed:
“It must be specifically noticed that respondent 1 company in its application seeking approval of its action has set out in its application the charges preferred by it and the domestic enquiry held in respect of the charges. A prayer was made in the application that its action terminating service of the appellant be approved. Nowhere in this application either in express terms or by implication it was averred that in the event the Tribunal comes to the conclusion the enquiry was defective, the employer-respondent 1 company proposes to offer evidence for substantiating the charges. Neither such an averment was made in the application made to the Industrial Tribunal nor till the Industrial Tribunal concluded its proceedings by saying that the matter is set down for making the award any oral or written application was made on behalf of the company that over and above the record of enquiry it proposed to lead evidence in its possession in respect of the charges to substantiate the same to the satisfaction o??? the Tribunal. Not only no such request was made at any time before the award was made by the Industrial Tribunal…”
The Court in Para. 33, at page 87, concluded its opinion:
“Having given our most anxious consideration to the question raised before us, and minutely examining the decision in Cooper Engineering, Ltd. case, [1975 — II L.L.N 321] (vide supra), to ascertain the ratio as well as the question raised both on precedent and on principle, it is undeniable that there is no duty cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court while adjudicating upon a penal termination of service of a workman either under S. 10 or under S. 33 to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct by giving some specific opportunity after decision on the preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry was at all held, or if held, was defective, in favour of the workman. Cooper Engineering, Ltd. case (vide supra), merely specifies the stage at which such opportunity is to be given, if sought. It is both the right and obligation of the employer, if it so chooses, to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges of misconduct. It is for the employer to avail of such opportunity by a specific pleading or by a specific request. If such an opportunity is sought in the course of the proceeding the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, should grant the opportunity to lead additional evidence to substantiate the charges. But if no such opportunity is sought nor there is any pleading to that effect no duty is cast on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal suo motu to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges”.
9. No other decision was cited before me. The first contention of the learned counsel is not tenable either on facts or on principle or on authority.
10. As regards the second contention, as indicated above, it was not in dispute that the petitioner had bean dismissed from service in contravention of the statute. In such a situation a finding by the Tribunal that the statute had been contravened would have been meaningless. The occasion for recording such a finding could arise only when the party before the Tribunal were at variance on the question as to whether the requirements of the statute had been complied with. Moreover, when the Tribunal in its order, dated 23 February, 1979, recorded a finding that the inquiry against the petitioner had not been conducted in a fair manner and the Tribunal had called upon the employer to justify its action before it, it was implicit in its order that it had come to the conclusion that the order of punishment had been passed against the petitioner in violation of statute. On or before 23 February, 1979, there were only two possible situations before the Tribunal. Either the disciplinary action had been taken by the employer after complying with the conditions or the order had been passed in breach of the conditions mentioned in the statute. If the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the employer had complied with the terms of the statute that was the end of the matter so far the complaint made by the petitioner was concerned. The complaint had to be dismissed and nothing further was required to be done by the Tribunal. Here, the Tribunal proceeded to examine the preliminary question as to whether the employer had conducted the enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the principles of natural justice. This shows that the Tribunal was clear in its mind that the employer had not complied with the requirements of the statute. In other words, the Tribunal was satisfied that the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act had been contravened by the employer. When the Tribunal proceeded to adjudicate upon the preliminary question, as to whether the enquiry against the petitioner had been conducted in a fait manner, it was clear in its mind that the condition precedent for the exercise of its jurisdiction under S. 6-F of the Act, namely, the contravention of S. 6-E was in existence. In my opinion, the petitioner cannot make any grievance of the fact that, in the absence of an express finding by the Tribunal that the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act had been violated, it (the Tribunal) had no jurisdiction to examine the merits of the order passed against the petitioner.
11. Let us now consider some authorities to examine the correctness of the second contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The provisions of Ss. 6-E and 6-F of the Act correspond to provisions of Ss. 33 and 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
12. In Equitable Coal Company, Ltd. v. Algu Singh, [A.I.R 1958 S.C 761], the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Ss. 22 and 23 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which were analogous to the provisions of Ss. 6-E and 6-F of the Act. It may be stated here that in the Act Ss. 6-E and 6-F were inserted by Uttar Pradesh Act 1 of 1957. Speaking through Hon'ble Justice Sri Gajendragadkar, as he then was, in Para. 4, the Court observed:
“…If the employer contravenes the provision of S. 22, the employee is entitled to make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to the Appellate Tribunal and, on receiving such complaint, the Appellate Tribunal has to decide the complaint as if it is an appeal pending before it. The breach of the provisions of S. 22 by the employer is in a sense a condition precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Appellate Tribunal by S. 23. As soon as this condition precedent is satisfied the employee is given an additional right of making the employer's conduct the subject-matter of an industrial dispute without having to follow the normal procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act. In an enquiry held under S. 23, two questions fall to be considered. Is the fact of contravention by the employer of the provisions of S. 22 proved? If yes, is the order passed by the employer against the employee justified on merits? If both these questions are answered in favour of the employee, the Appellate Tribunal would no doubt be entitled to pass an appropriate order in favour of the employee. If the first point is answered in favour of the employee, but on the second point the finding is that, on merits, the order passed by the employer against the employee is justified, then the breach of S. 22 proved against the employer may ordinarily be regarded as a technical breach and it may not, unless there are compelling facts in favour of the employee, justify any substantial order of compensation in favour of the employee. It is unnecessary to add that, if the first issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done under S. 23”.
It will be seen that the Supreme Court emphasized, firstly, that the satisfaction of the condition precedent, namely, the breach of the provisions of S. 22 by the employer conferred upon the employee the right of getting the validity of the order of punishment passed against him tested, as if an industrial dispute had come into existence without, of course, following the normal procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act, secondly, that the non-observance of the provisions of S. 22 did not render the order of punishment void. Such a breach was a technical one. Thus, the Tribunal, in the case before me, acted in the interest of the petitioner-workman when it proceeded to examine the preliminary question as to whether the enquiry against the workman had been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and thereafter directed the employer to justify the order of punishment passed against the workman.
13. In Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Workmen.' Federation, [A.I.R 1960 S.C 160], the Supreme Court examined the provisions of S. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court speaking through Hon'ble Justice Sri Gajendragadkar, as he then was, observed in Para. 31:
“This contention is, however, untenable in view of the decision of this Court where the provisions of S. 33-A have been construed and considered, and so we must now turn to S. 33-A. This section was inserted in the Act in 1950. Before it was enacted the only remedy available to the employees against the breach of S. 33 was to raise an industrial dispute in that behalf and to move the appropriate Government for its reference to the adjudication of a Tribunal under S. 10 of the Act. The trade union movement in the country complained that the remedy of asking for a reference under S. 10 involved delay and left the redress of the grievance of the employees entirely in the discretion of the appropriate Government; because even in cases of contravention of S. 33 the appropriate Government was bound to refer the dispute under S. 10. That is why S. 33-A was enacted for making a special provision for adjudication as to whether S. 33 has been contravened. This section enables an employee aggrieved by such contravention to make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to the Tribunal and it adds that on receipt of such complaint the Tribunal shall adjudicate upon it as if it is a dispute referred to it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It also requires the Tribunal to submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of the Act shall then apply to the said award. It would thus be noticed that by this section an employee aggrieved by a wrongful order of dismissal passed against him in contravention of S. 33 is given a right to move the Tribunal in redress of his grievance without having to take recourse to S. 10 of the Act”.
Again in Para. 33, the Court observed:
“… Thus there can be no doubt that in an enquiry under S. 33-A the employee would not succeed in obtaining an order of reinstatement merely by proving contravention of S. 33 by the employer. After such contravention is proved it would still be open to the employer to justify the impugned dismissal on the merits. That is a part of a dispute which the Tribunal has to consider because the complaint made by the employee is treated as an industrial dispute and all the relevant aspects of the said dispute fall to be considered under S. 33-A. Therefore, we cannot accede to the argument that the enquiry under S. 33-A is confined only to the determination of the question as to whether the alleged contravention by the employer of the provisions of S. 33 has been proved or not”.
14. In Hindustan General Electrical Corporation, Ltd. v. Bishwanath Prasad, [(1971) 2 SCC 605 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 2417], the Court in Para. 9, observed;
“.. Section 33-A enables a workman who has been punished by dismissal or discharge, etc., to make a complaint in writing to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal when an employee contravenes the provisions of S. 33 during the pendency of proceedings before Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, etc. If such a complaint is made, the Labour Court, Tribunal, etc., is to adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it and in accordance with the provisions of the Act submit its award to the appropriate Government. In other words, then the conditions laid down in S. 33-A apply a workman who is punished as mentioned therein does not have to wait for a reference of an industrial dispute by an appropriate authority under S. 10 of the Act for adjudication of the dispute but can himself prefer his complaint which is to be treated in the same way as a dispute under S. 10. These sections do not lend themselves to the construction that as soon as the Labour Court, Tribunal, etc., finds that there has been a violation of S. 33 it should award reinstatement. It must go through the proceedings which would have to be taken under S. 10 and it would be the duty of the Labour Court, etc., to examine the merits of the case in the light of the principles formulated in Indian Iron and Steel Company case, [A.I.R 1958 S.C 130]”.
In Para. 12, the Court observed:
“The Tribunal in our view rightly refused to go into the question of the pendency of any conciliation proceeding; but even if there was any such proceeding, it would make no difference to the result in this case. The Tribunal would still have to consider whether the employer's action was justified in the light of the decision in Indian Iron and Steel Company case, [A.I.R 1958 S.C 130]. In other words the Tribunal would have to be satisfied that the allegations, if any, about want of good faith or victimization or unfair labour practice were baseless. The Tribunal would also have to be satisfied whether any complaint was made on the score that the enquiry was vitiated by basic error or violation of any principle of natural justice and its finding on which the order of dismissal was passed was, therefore, perverse or without any foundation”.
15. In Punjab Beverages (Private) Ltd., Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand, [1978 — I L.L.N 655], the contents of Paras. 11 to 13 of the judgment are relevant. They have been aptly summarized in the headnote on pages 665 and 666. It reads:
“… It will be seen that mere contravention of S. 33 by the employer will not entitle the workman to an order of reinstatement, because inquiry under S. 33-A is not confined only to the determination of the question as to whether the employer has contravened S. 33, but even if such contravention is proved, the Tribunal has to go further and deal also with the merits of the order of discharge or dismissal.
The very fact that even after the contravention of S. 33 is proved, the Tribunal is required to go into the further question whether the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is justified on the merits, clearly indicates that the order of discharge is not rendered void and inoperative by such contravention…
It is also significant to note that if the contravention of S. 33 were construed as having an invalidating effect on the order of discharge or dismissal, S. 33-A would be rendered meaningless and futile … Such a highly anomalous result would never have been intended by the Legislature …
[A.I.R 1958 S.C 761 and [A.I.R 1960 S.C 160 … Followed.]”
To sum up, factually the employer had made a request to the Tribunal to permit it to justify its order of punishment. The Tribunal committed neither any illegality nor irregularity nor impropriety in calling upon the employer to justify the order of punishment. The condition precedent for the examination of the order of dismissal, passed against the petitioner, on merits by the Tribunal existed. The Tribunal was satisfied that the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act had been violated. The petitioner cannot make any grievance of the conduct of the Tribunal, as it acted in his interest and not to his detriment, in examining the order of punishment passed against him (the petitioner) on merits.
16. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are:
(1) In fact, and in substance, the case of the petitioner fell under S. 6-E(1) of the Act and not under S. 6-E(2) of the Act. A pleading in the writ petition that the case fell under S. 6-E (2) of the Act cannot constitute any estoppel against the petitioner. It is a question of law and not of fact.
(2) If the case falls under S. 6-E(1) of the Act, prior permission of the Labour Court was necessary before pasting the order of dismissal. In the absence of the requisite permission the order of dismissal was void ab initio.
(3) Since the employer passed the order of dismissal against the petitioner in violation of the principles of natural justice, its order was ab initio void and it will be treated as non est in law.
17. It has been the consistent case of both the parties throughout that on 20 June, 1975, the State Government made a reference under S. 4-K of the Act relating to all the District Co-operative Banks in the State, which were 55 in number. The dispute referred was of a general nature concerning the service conditions in all the banks. This position is admitted in Para. 6 of the writ petition which reads;
“That the dispute referred to was in respect of fixing uniform conditions of service and pay-scales in all the District Co-operative Banks in Uttar Pradesh”.
It was the consistent case of both the parties throughout that the disciplinary proceedings taken by the employer against the petitioner were unconnected with the dispute referred by the State Government for adjudication. Even if the clear admissions made by the petitioner in the averments in the petition that to his case the provisions of S. 6-E(2) of the Act were applicable are ignored, the fact remains that to the facts and circumstances of his case the provisions of S. 6-E(2) of the Act alone would be attracted. Assuming, without conceding, that the provisions of S. 6-E(1) of the Act are attracted the position in law will remain the same. Section 6-F of the Act talks of the contravention of the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act. It, therefore, has in its ambit both the provisions of Ss. 6-E(1) and 6-E(2) of the Act. As stated above, it was the admitted case of the employer that it had not complied with the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act at all. Therefore, it contravened the provisions of S. 6-E of the Act. The submissions made by the learned counsel are fully met by the decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank case, [A.I.R 1960 S.C 160] (vide supra). There, the precise argument was repelled by the Supreme Court. The arguments advanced there are to be found in Paras. 21 and 22 of the judgment which run thus:
“It is next contended that the bank does not dispute the fact that it had held no enquiry into the alleged misconduct of its employees before it passed the impugned orders of dismissal against them. It is well-established that even where an employer is justified in terminating the services of his employees he is bound to give them a chargesheet and hold a proper enquiry at which they would have a chance to meet the said chargesheet. This requirement is universally treated as consistent with natural justice and fair-play and since the bank has not complied with it the impugned orders of dismissal are wholly invalid for this additional reason and the result again would be that the said orders are inoperative and void and the employees are entitled to reinstatement as a matter of course”.
22. In support of this argument reliance has been placed on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of High Commissioner for India v. I.M Lal, [A.I.R 1948 P.C 121]. This decision holds that the order of dismissal passed against a person who is a member of the Civil Service of the Crown in India without complying with the mandatory relevant provisions of S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is void and inoperative, and that the civil servant against whom such an order is passed is entitled to a declaration that he remained a member the Indian Civil Service at the date of the institution of the suit in which ha challenged the validity of the impugned order. Similarly in Khem Chand v. Union of India, [A.I.R 1958 S.C 300], this Court has held that an order of dismissal passed against a public servant specified in Art. 311(a) without comply ng with the mandatory provisions of Art. 311(2) is void and that the public servant sought to be dismissed by such an invalid order continued to be a member of the service at the date of the institution of the suit. It is in the light of these decisions that the learned Attorney-General asks us to hold that the relationship between the bank and its employees re nains wholly unaffected by the orders of dismissal passed by the bank against them and so, as soon as the orders are held to be void nothing more remains to be done but to make a declaration of master and servant between the parties and to direct reinstatement. Thus presented, the argument no doubt appears prima facie to be attractive, but in our opinion, a careful examination of the relevant sections of the Act shows that it is not valid”.
The answer to the aforequoted arguments is to be found in the succeeding paragraphs and particularly in Para. 31 and 33, quoted above.
17. In the result, I find no merits in this petition and it is dismissed. However, the parties are directed to bear their own costs
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