B.N Katju, J.:— This is a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. It has been referred to us for decision as it involves questions of law of general importance.

2. The District Magistrate, Allahabad passed an order under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the petitioner on 9-8-1984. The aforesaid order was approved by the State Government on 18-8-1984 and was served on the petitioner on 19-8-1984. The petitioner filed Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 10256 of 1984 on 22-8-1984 challenging the validity of his detention under the aforesaid order. The District Magistrate, Allahabad revoked the aforesaid order on 9-9-1984 and passed the second order against the petitioner under S. 3(2) of the Act on 10-9-1984, which was served on the petitioner in jail on the same day along with the grounds of detention and other relevant material. The petitioner is confined in central jail, Naini under the order of detention dated 10-9-1984.

3. The orders of detention were passed with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

4. There are two grounds of detention, on which the second order dated 10-9-1984 is based. In the first ground it is mentioned that on 6-1-1984 at about 5.30 p.m the petitioner along with his brother and father fired at Binda Prasad Misra Advocate at the crossing of Baluwa Ghat which resulted in his death. Immediately after the aforesaid incident people closed their shops and houses and ran away out of fear and terror and an atmosphere of fear and terror gripped the public. Case Crime No. 6 of 1984 under Ss. 302/114 IPC was registered at P.S Mutthiganj, Allahabad regarding the aforesaid incident and after investigation charge-sheet has been filed in court and the case is pending.

5. In the second ground it is mentioned that the petitioner threatened the witnesses of the aforesaid case (crime No. 6 of 1984) and told them that they would be killed and compelled them to file affidavits. Information regarding this was given by constable Kailash Narain on his return to the Police Station after patrol duty, which was recorded in General Diary entry No. 2 of 15-5-1984 and General Diary entry No. 15 of 20-6-1984. The complainant of the aforesaid case (crime No. 6 of 1984) Jagannath Prasad Misra lodged first information report No. 138 under Ss. 504/506 I.P.C, in which it was alleged that the petitioner had threatened and abused him and had told him not to give evidence in the aforesaid case. A similar report No. 140 of 1984 was lodged by Suresh Chandra Pandey, who was a witness in the aforesaid case (crime No. 6 of 1984), under Ss. 504/506 IPC against the petitioner, in which it was alleged that the petitioner had terrorised and threatened him so that he may not depose against him. In this manner the petitioner spread terror and fear in the public and disturbed the public order.

6. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the District Magistrate had no power to revoke the first order of detention passed by him on 9-8-1984 after it had been approved by the State Government on 18-8-1984, for the reasons given by me in my judgment in the connected Habeas Corpus Petition No. 12439 of 1984 Manni Lal v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, there is no force in this contention.

7. It was next contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that as no reason was given by the detaining authority for revoking the first order of detention dated 9-8-1984, the second order of detention was passed by the detaining authority in a mechanical manner without application of mind. There is no force in this contention. No reasons are required to be given by the detaining authority for revoking an order of detention passed by it either under S. 21 of the General Clauses Act or under the Act. Moreover, in the present case, the second order of detention has been passed on a fresh report of the police authorities and on only two grounds whereas the first order of detention was passed on the same two grounds, on which the second order was passed, and also on a third ground, which was omitted. It cannot, therefore, be held that the second order of detention was passed by the detaining authority in a mechanical manner without application of mind.

8. It was next contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the grounds of detention do not relate to public order but only relate to law and order. There is no force in this contention. It is mentioned in the first ground of detention that the firing by the petitioner and his brother at Binda Prasad Misra Advocate on 6-1-1984 at about 8.45 p.m at the crossing of Baluwa Ghat resulted in people closing their shops and houses and running away out of fear and terror and an atmosphere of terror and fear gripped the public.

9. It was held in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration reported in (1982) 2 SCC 403 : AIR 1982 SC 1143:—

“The true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’ and ‘Law and order’ lira not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”

10. In the case of Arun Ghosh v. State Of West Bengal reported in (1970) 1 SCC 98 : AIR 1970 SC 1228 it has held:—

“In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case, (1966) 1 SCR 709 : AIR 1966 SC 740 examples were given by Sarkar and Hidayatullah, JJ. They show how similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another.”

11. In the case of Jadunandan Sah v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad reported in (1983) 4 SCC 301 : AIR 1983 SC 1130 it was held:—

“These concentric concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ may have a common ‘epicentre’, but it is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting ‘public order’ from that concerning ‘law and order.”

12. In the case of Ramesh Roy Alias Ramsha v. State Of West Bengal reported in (1972) 3 SCC 829 : AIR 1972 SC 1678, the order of detention was based on the undermentioned grounds—

“That on the night of 1-6-1971 at about 01.30 hours, while committing theft of rice from wagon No. SE 39751 at Bongaon Rly. Station yard, you and your associates charged bombs upon the on duty R.P.F Party with a view to do away with their lives, when challenged by them. As a result of your bomb charge, SR 3179 Himangshu Bhushan Dhar Shamia of the R.P.F Party sustained bum injury on his person. By explosion of bombs you and your associates created panic in the station area and in the adjoining locality. You created disturbance of public order thereby.”

13. It was held by the Supreme Court that the incident mentioned in the above mentioned ground disturbed public order.

14. In the case of Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta reported in (1969) 2 SCC 426 : (AIR 1970 SC 269) the first and second grounds of detention were as follows:—

“That on 28-6-68 at about 6 p.m you along with your associates being armed with lathis iron rods, acid bulbs etc. committed a not in Kumartuli Park in course of which you severely assaulted Shri Amal Krishna Roy of 20-A, Abhoy Mitra Street and iron rods, acid bulbs etc. were indiscriminately used endangering human lives.”

“That on 23-7-68 at about 6.10 p.m you along with your associates armed with lathis, iron rods, hockey sticks etc. attacked constables Shankar Lal Bose and Jagdish Singh both of Shyampukur P.S on Kaliprosad Chakraborty Street near the Gaudiya Math who went there to discharge their lawful duties, as a result of which constable Sankar Lal Bose sustained bleeding injuries on his person.”

15. It was held by the Supreme Court:—

“The question which arises is this: do the grounds reproduced above relate merely to maintenance of order or do they relate to the maintenance of public order? It will be noticed that the detenu in each of these cases acted along with associates who were armed with lathis, iron rods, acid bulbs etc. It is clearly said in ground No. 1 that he committed a not and indiscriminately used acid bulbs, iron rods, lathis etc. endangering human lives. This ground cannot be said to have reference merely to maintenance of order because it affects the locality and everybody who lives in the locality. Similarly, in the second ground, he along with his associates prevented the police constables from discharging their lawful duties and thus affected everybody living in the locality.

16. It is clear that on account of the incident mentioned in ground No. 1 (crime No. 6 of 1984) the even tempo of the life of the people of the locality was affected, which disturbed public order. This ground thus relates to public order and not to law and order.

17. In my opinion, ground No. 2 is intimately connected with ground No. 1 as it relates to the witnesses of the incident mentioned in ground No. 1. Terrorising witnesses of the case relating to the murder of Binda Prasad Misra, Advocate in a crowded locality like the crossing of Baluwa Ghat, which had disturbed public order, in my opinion, also disturbs public order as all those who hear about it are afraid to depose against the accused of that case, which affects the public at large by infusing fear in them. This ground thus also relates to public order, and not to law and order.

18. It was next contended by learned counselor the petitioner that ground No. 2 is non-existent as the General Diary entries Nos. 2 of 15-5-1984 and 15 of 20-6-1984 mentioned in the said ground do not disclose that the petitioner threatened the witnesses of the incident mentioned in ground No. 1 (Crime No. 6 of 1984) and told them that they would be killed and compelled them to file affidavits. There is no force in this contention. It is mentioned in the second ground of detention that the petitioner after his release on bail threatened the witnesses of the incident mentioned in ground No. 1 and told them that they would be killed and compelled them to file affidavits. This is based on General Diary entries Nos. 2 of 15-5-1984 and 15 of 20-6-1984, report No. 138 under Sections 504/506, IPC, P.S Mutthiganj lodged by Jagannath Prasad Misra, the complainant of the aforesaid case (Crime No. 6 of 1984) and report No. 140 under Ss. 504/506, IPC, P.S Mutthiganj lodged by Suresh Chandra Pandey, who was a witness in the aforesaid case (Crime No. 6 of 1984). It is stated in the General Diary entry No. 2 of 15-5-1984 that the petitioner, in order to maintain his terror, was carrying unlicensed firearm and was threatening and terrorising shopkeepers and members of the general public and was also attempting to kill his opponents and by his acts members of the public were terror stricken.

19. In General Diary entry No. 15 of 20-6-84 it is stated that the petitioner fired in the air at the crossing of Baluwa Ghat in order to terrorise the witnesses against him and attempted to disturb the even tempo of the life of members of the general public and his opponents as a result of which the public of the locality is terror stricken. In report No. 138 lodged by Jagannath Prasad Misra it. Is stated that the petitioner and Mahesh Misra met him at the Baluwa Ghat crossing and told him that he was not acting in his interest by deposing against him and that he may be knowing that one of their witnesses Munni Lal had been coerced into filing an affidavit in court and has also been made to disappear. If he did not file an affidavit in court within ten days, then he will meet the same fate which his brother, the deceased Binda Prasad Misra, Advocate, had met.

20. The petitioner and his associates came to his locality frequently and terrorised people as a result of which no one is prepared to depose against them. Members of the general public are afraid of them and this has disturbed the even tempo of their life. It is stated in report No. 140 lodged by Suresh Chandra Pandey that the petitioner and Mahesh Chandra Misra met him at the crossing of Baluaghat and told him that he was a witness in the case relating to the murder of Binda Prasad Misra, Advocate but he had not filed an affidavit in court. In case he did not file an affidavit in court within ten days, he would meet the same fate which was met by Binda Prasad Misra, Advocate. He apprehended danger to his life and property at the hands of the petitioner and his associates.

21. The people of the locality are terror stricken and are not prepared to depose against them. They have created terror in the locality. If ground No. 2 of detention is read as a whole it would (sic) threatened the witnesses of the incident mentioned in ground No. 1 (Crime No. 6 of 1984) and told them that they would be killed and that he compelled them to file affidavits is not only based on the two General Diary entries mentioned therein but is also based on the reports lodged by Jagannath Prasad Misra and Suresh Chandra Pandey. If all these four documents are read together it is evident that the petitioner threatened the witnesses of the incident mentioned in ground No. 1 (Crime No. 6 of 1984) and told them that they would be killed and compelled them to file affidavits. It cannot, therefore, be held that this ground is non-existent.

22. Before concluding it may be mentioned that once it is held that the first ground of detention relates to public order, the order of detention could be validly passed on its basis in view of S. 5-A of the Act. From this incident alone it could be inferred by the detaining authority that the petitioner was likely to indulge in similar acts in future, which would disturb public order. It could, therefore, pass an order of detention under S. 3(2) of the Act against the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

23. There is no merit in this petition. I accordingly dismiss it.

24. K.N Singh, J.:— 20. I have read the judgment proposed by brother Katju, I find myself unable to agree with all that he has stated in his judgment. Therefore I consider it necessary to state my own reasons separately.

25. By means of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, Sheshdhar petitioner has challenged validity of his continued detention in pursuance of the order of the District Magistrate, Allahabad, dated 10-9-1984, passed in exercise of his powers under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The grounds served upon the petitioner indicate that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, was based on two grounds. Initially the District Magistrate, Allahabad has passed an order under S. 3(3) of the Act on 9-8-1984 for the petitioner's detention. That order was approved by the State Government on 18-8-1984. The petitioner filed a Habeas Corpus writ petition No. 10266 of 1984, challenging validity of his detention. While the earlier writ petition was pending in court the District Magistrate, Allahabad, revoked the detention order on 9-9-1984 and passed another order dated 10-9-84 directing the petitioner's detention.

26. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the earlier order of detention dated 9-8-1984 had been approved by the State Government on 18-8-1984, the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to revoke the first order of detention and pass another detention order against the petitioner. He further urged that no reasons were recorded by the detaining authority for revoking the first order and passing the second order of detention. This question has been dealt with in detail by brother Katju in Habeas Corpus writ petition No. 12439 of 1984, Manni Bal v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, and I fully agree with the view taken by him. I further agree with brother Katju that the District Magistrate, Allahabad, had jurisdiction to revoke the order dated 9-8-1984 and to pass a second order of detention on 10-9-1984. The submission made on behalf of the petitioner that as the order of revocation was illegal and void, the order of detention passed subsequently on 10-9-1984 is also rendered illegal, has no merit.

27. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the grounds of detention served on the petitioner do not relate to public order but they only relate to law and order. Brother Katju has considered the question and expressed the opinion that the two grounds of detention relate to public order and the petitioner's detention is valid in law. I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by brother Katju.

28. The petitioner has been detained on the following two grounds which translated in English are:—

(1) On 6-1-1984 you along with your brother and father at about 5.30 p.m shot dead Binda Prasad Misra, Advocate, at Balwaghat crossing. On the occurrence of the incident people closed the doors of their shops and houses and ran away on account of fear and an atmosphere of terror and fear gripped the public. After registration of case investigation was completed and charge-sheet was submitted to the court and the case is pending.

(2) You threatened the witnesses of Crime No. 6 of 1984 and compelled them to file affidavit. This fact was recorded by Constable Kailash Narain in G.D Entry No. 2 dated 15-5-1984 at Police Station Muthiganj on his return after patrol duty and entry in G.D No. 15 of 20-6-1984, Jagannath, complainant in Crime No. 6 of 1984 filed F.I.R No. 138 under Ss. 504, 506 I.P.C at Police Station in which he made allegations against you that you threatened and abused him telling him not to give evidence. Similarly, Suresh Chandra Pandey has also lodged a report No. 140/84 under Ss. 504/506, I.P.C to the effect that you terrorised him so that he may not depose against you in court. In this way you spread fear and terror among the people and disturbed the public order.

29. The aforesaid grounds are intimately connected with one single incident which occurred on 6-1-1984. In substance the petitioner is alleged to have committed murder of Binda Prasad Misra, Advocate, at a public place as a result of which local residents dossed the doors of their houses and shops and ran away, this disturbed public order. The petitioner is further alleged to have threatened the prosecution witnesses to desist from tendering evidence in the murder case pending against him.

30. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether the aforesaid two grounds have any nexus with public order. The scope and implication of public order and the circumstances in which public order is likely to be affected has been considered in detail by me in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 11151 of 1984, Ashok Dixit v. State of U.P It is not necessary to repeat the same here. I would consider the two grounds in the light of my judgment in the aforesaid case to determine the question as to whether the two grounds have any nexus with public order.

31. In Dipak Bose Alias Naripada v. State Of West Bengal, (1973) 4 SCC 43 : AIR 1972 SC 2686 the grounds of detention alleged that the detenu had along with his associates committed murder on two different dates on public road as a result of which fear and terror was created in the locality which disturbed public order. The Court held that since the even tempo of the life of the community was not disturbed the grounds were not related to disturbance of public order. The Court observed:—

“Every assault in a public place like a public road and terminating in the death of a victim is likely to cause horror and even panic and terror in those who are spectators but that does not mean that all such incidents do necessarily cause disturbance or dislocation of the community life of the localities in which they are committed. There is nothing in the two incidents set out in the grounds in the present case to suggest that either of them was of that kind and gravity which would jeopardise the maintenance of public order. No doubt bonbs were said to have been carried by those who are alleged to have committed the two acts stated in the grounds. Possibly that was done to terrify the respective victims to prevent them from offering resistance. But it is not alleged in the grounds that they were exploded to cause terror in the locality so that those living there would be prevented from following their usual avocations of life. The two incidents alleged against the petitioner thus pertain to specific individuals and therefore related and fell within the area of law and order. In respect of such acts the drastic provisions of the Act are not contemplated to be resorted to and the ordinary provisions of the penal laws would be sufficient to cope with them.”.

32. In Manu Bhushan v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 SCC 663 : AIR 1973 SC 295 it was held that a single incident of murderous assault on a person in a public place, though created panic among the people of the locality, could not be held to be an act prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The Court observed that a solitary assault on one individual which may well be equated with an ordinary murder can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. It can only raise a law and order problem and no more, its impact on the society as a whole cannot be said to be so extensive, widespread and forceful as to disturb the normal life of the community, thereby rudely shocking the balanced tempo of orderly life of the general public.

33. In Ajai Dixit v. State of U.P, (1984) 4 SCC 400 : AIR 1985 SC 18 the detenu was detained under the National Security Act on six different grounds. Ground No. 1 related to an offence under S.. 307, I.P.C allegation that the detenu had fired gun shot with the intention of killing Kanhaiyalal Sharma. Ground No. 4 related to murder of one Naresh Paliwal which alleged that the petitioner along with his brother shot dead Naresh Paliwal in respect of which a case was registered after, investigation. The case was pending trial in court. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the allegations mentioned in the grounds were not such as to lead to apprehension that the even tempo of the community will be endangered, as there may be no reasonable apprehension about the disturbance of public order on account of the aforesaid incidents.

34. The Court further held that the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be subjected to objective test and courts are not to exercise appellate powers over such authorities and an order proper on its face passed by a competent authority in good faith would be complete answer to a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus. But when from the order itself circumstances appear which raise a doubt whether the officer concerned had not misconceived his own power there is need to pause and enquire. The enquiry then is not with a view to investigate sufficiency of the materials, but into the officer's notions of his power. If the order passed by him shows that he thought his powers were more extensive than they actually were, the order may fail to be a good order. When the liberty of the citizens is put within the reach of the authority and the scrutiny by courts is barred, the action must comply not only with the substantive requirement of law but it should be with those forms which alone can indicate substance.

35. The first information report which was lodged by Jagannath brother of deceased Binda Prasad Misra, Advocate at the Police Station on the basis of which the ground was formulated, itself stated that there was a long standing enmity between the petitioner and Binda Prasad, Advocate, which clearly indicates that the murderous assault on Binda Prasad was made by the petitioner on account of personal animosity. The allegations contained in ground No. 1 do not suggest that the petitioner or his associates fired gun shots indiscriminately or that they intended to terrorise or kill the local residents. Since the murder was committed in a public place at a crossing of roads it was bound to have created some disorder temporarily as a result of which local residents closed the doors of their houses and shops. The question arises did this single incident cause such an impact that it disturbed the even tempo of the life of the community affecting public order? No such inference is possible on the facts stated in ground No. 1.

36. It is not possible to hold that the single act of murder alleged to have been committed by the petitioner on account of personal animosity had its impact on the society to such an extent as to disturb the normal life of the community, thereby rudely shocking the ordinary tempo of the normal life of the public. Merely because the local residents closed the doors of their houses and shops does not mean that the balanced tempo of the life of the general public was disturbed as a result of which the members of the public could not carry on normal avocation of their life.

37. The petitioner is alleged to have committed the murder of Binda Prasad on account of enmity. There is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner had inclination or tendency to commit murders in future also. It is true that we cannot sit in appeal over the satisfaction of the detaining authority but the satisfaction of the detaining authority must be based on material on the basis of which a reasonable person could come to the same kind of satisfaction. The material which was taken into account by the detaining authority in the instant case relates to a single incident of murderous assault on Binda Prasad. There was no material before the detaining authority, nor any such material has been placed before the Court to suggest that the petitioner if not detained would have indulged into similar activities of murder.

38. Section 3 of the Act confers power on the detaining authority to detain a person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This power can be exercised only if the detaining authority on the basis of the past prejudicial conduct of the detenu is satisfied about the probability of the detenu acting similarly in future. This means that the past activity of the detenu on the basis of which such a prognosis is made must be reasonably suggestive of a repetitive tendency or inclination on the part of the detenu to act likewise in future. These observations were made by the Supreme Court in Lal Kamal Das v. State Of West Bengal., (1975) 4 SCC 62 : AIR 1975 SC 753 where it was further held that a solitary incident can hardly be suggestive of a tendency or inclination of the detenu to indulge in an act likewise in future.

39. Ground No. 2 relates to threatening of witnesses. The question whether threatening of witnesses is related to public order has been discussed by me in detail in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 11151 of 1984 (Ashok Dixit v. State of U.P). The question whether holding out threats to witnesses is prejudicial to public order depends upon the facts of each case. The manner and the setting in which threat may have been given and the circumstances of the case together with likelihood of the extent of its impact on the witnesses and members of the public is necessary to be considered. If threat is given to witnesses publicly with show of force or by firing gun shots or use of bombs in a blatant and indiscriminate manner to overawe and terrorise them causing sense of insecurity among the witnesses and the members of the public, it may affect the even tempo of life of the community. But if threat is given to individual witnesses without any show of force or any other overt act, it would not affect the even tempo of the life of the community. Such a threat has no potentiality or propensity to affect public order.

40. Ground No. 2 refers to four instances. The first instance relates to the giving of threat by the petitioner to the witnesses and compelling them to file affidavit in the case arising out of Crime No. 6 of 1984. It is based on G.D Entry No. 2 dated 18-5-1984 recorded by Kailash Narain Constable. On a perusal of the entry, it is apparent that the allegations against the petitioner were made in the report in a vague and general manner. None of the persons or the witnesses who may have been threatened by the petitioner is mentioned in the report. There is further no reference that the threat given by the petitioner was in relation to crime No. 6 of 1984. The second instance as mentioned in the General Diary No. 15 dated June 20, 1984, is also vague and general in nature. The report does not contain the name of any witness who may have been threatened or terrorised as alleged. The third instance is founded on the first information report lodged be Jagannath Prasad. It must be kept in mind that Jagannath Prasad is brother of the deceased Binda Prasad and he had lodged the first information report in respect of Crime No. 6 of 1984.

41. In his report, Jagannath Prasad made allegation against the petitioner that he met him at Baluaghat crossing and told him that he was not acting in his interest by deposing against him and he may be knowing that one of the witnesses Munni Lal has been terrorised into filing an affidavit in court and has also been made to disappear and if he did not file affidavit within ten days he will meet the same fate as his brother Binda Prasad has met. The fourth incident relates to the first information report lodged by Suresh Chandra Pandey. The allegation in that report is almost identical to that made by Jagannath Prasad. The third and the fourth instances do not suggest that the petitioner gave threats accompanied by show of force to Jagannath Prasad complainant and Suresh Chandra Pandey a witness for the prosecution, in the case arising out of Crime No. 6 of 1984. The giving of threat to individual witnesses unaccompanied by any overt act could not have such an impact as to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. Moreover there is nothing on record to show that the police had after investigation ascertained the genuineness of the allegations made in the first information report lodged by Jagannath Prasad and Suresh Chandra Pandey. How could the District Magistrate form the requisite satisfaction on the basis of unascertained facts alleged by private individuals, that the petitioner's detention was necessary.

42. A single murderous assault on an individual on account of personal animosity and holding out threat to individual witnesses to desist from deposing in court do not justify exercise of power under S. 3(2) of the Act for detaining the petitioner. If a murder has been committed or if the witnesses have been threatened or compelled to file affidavit, the police have ample power under the ordinary laws of the land to proceed against the petitioner. Preventive detention under S. 3 of the Act cannot be invoked to deal with the crimes and criminals who can adequately be proceeded against under the Penal Code and under other ordinary laws of the land. If this is permitted it would be frought with great danger. The provisions of the Act conferring power for detention of a person without trial have to be used strictly in accordance with the Act to achieve the object and purpose designated under S. 3 of the Act. The detaining authority has no power to detain a citizen merely because he is alleged to have committed certain offences unless the offence has potentiality and propensity to disturb the public peace and order. In the instant case, I am of the opinion that the two grounds on which the petitioner was detained do not relate to public order.

43. Before concluding, I would like to make it clear that I do not subscribe to the view that one single incident cannot be sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority to exercise powers under S. 3(2) of the Act. It all depends on the nature of the incident. As was held by the Supreme Court in Ali Jan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, (1983) 4 SCC 301 : AIR 1983 SC 1130 if even a single incident is related to public order and its impact is such as to affect the even tempo of the life of the community, the detaining authority would be justified in drawing an inference that the detention of the detenu would be necessary to prevent him from acting prejudicially to public order. As already discussed the two grounds on which the petitioner's detention is founded do not relate to public order.

44. I would accordingly allow the petition and direct that the petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in connection with some other case.

45. H.N Seth, J.:— 37. I agree.

ORDER OF COURT

46. In view of the opinion of the majority, the petition succeeds and is allowed. We direct the respondents not to keep the petitioner under detention in pursuance of the order of the District Magistrate, Allahabad dated 10-9-1984 and to release him from custody forthwith unless he is required to be detained in connection with any other case.

47. While the judgment in the case was being delivered, learned Deputy Government Advocate prayed that a certificate that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court may be granted. In our judgment, we have merely applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases. In the circumstances, we do not think that in this case such a certificate should be granted. The oral prayer made for a certificate under Art. 134-A of the Constitution is rejected.

48. Writ petition allowed and leave to appeal to refused.