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Raja Bai Gorkar (Kumari) v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Another

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jan 5, 1987

The desperate bid made in this Court on desperate grounds, unfortunately to stagger and stall proceedings and decision in this appeal must be rebuffed today effectively. Indeed, it is necessary to do so to retain credibility of justicing system. This appeal was admitted on 23 September 1986, for expeditious hearing. It was heard on 3 December 1986, in part but adjourned to 12 December 1986, to accommodate State Counsel who was heard further on that date. Because counsel prayed for further postponement of hearing till 15 December 1986, he was again obliged and matter again remained part-heard.

2. The fact of the matter is also that it was brought to the notice of learned State Counsel on the first date of hearing that this appeal merits a very short order in view of the decision rendered by me in Smt. Sushila Shirdhonkar, Second Appeal No. 213 of 1974, on 28 October 1986, and learned counsel cited, in reply, the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. V.A Dikshitulu, [(1979) 2 SCC 34 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 193] and M. Gurumoorthy, [(1971) 2 SCC 137 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1850]. It is my judicial duty, therefore, to consider those decisions in disposing of this matter finally today.

3. The admitted facts of the case are so simple and so few that they bear easily a thumb-nail narration. The plaintiff who came in Government service on 26 March 1949 was absorbed in the post of upper division clerk by the erstwhile Madhya Bharat Government on and from 6 August 1952. It is also admitted in the written statement that on 9 November 1972 the plaintiff was so confirmed in the establishment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and she has served as such till 1 June 1980 when she lost her job pursuant to an order, dated 14 May 1980, as per exhibit PI. The validity of the said order has been challenged by the plaintiff and it is most unfortunate that both the Courts below have rejected her claim and dismissed her Page: 579suit ignoring and overlooking patent violation of the express statutory mandate and judicial mandates galore.

4. Because there is nothing in the written statement and nothing even in the evidence of the defendants' side, the best I can do is to extract in extenso the text of the impugned order, exhibit P1.

[Mattter in Hindi omitted.]

5. The short question is, whether the Courts below rightly took the view that the aforesaid order of compulsory retirement of the plaintiff could be accepted as legal and valid despite the fact that the order does not manifest on its face consideration of the express statutory requirement of “public interest” which is made a condition precedent for the exercise of power under R. 42(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 for short the rules. It is necessary, therefore, to extract also the concerned statutory provision, albeit the relevant portion thereof:

“42. “Retirement on completion of 20/25 years' qualifying service.

1. (a) …

(b) The appointing authority may in the public interest require a Government servant to retire from service at any time after he has completed 25 years' qualifying service, with the approval of the State Government by giving him three months' notice in Form 29:

Provided that such Government servant may be retired forthwith and on such retirement the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowance for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before his retirement or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months.”

6. The only argument advanced on behalf of the defendants/respondents is that the Courts below rightly took the view that mere reference to the statutory provisions in the order itself vested jurisdiction in the authority passing the order to do away with the services of the plaintiff and that there being no allegation in the plaint that the aforesaid order was not passed in the “public interest” it was not necessary for the defendants to adduce any evidence in support of their case. However, my attention is drawn by learned counsel for the appellant to Paras. 3 and 5 of the plaint as also to the special plea set up in the written statement by which, according to the learned Counsel, the defendants took upon themselves the burden of proving that the order was passed in public interest. By referring to Para. 10, Cl. (a), I have no hesitation to say that Sri Jain's contention is unanswerable inasmuch as the defendants expressly pleaded…

[Matter in Hindi omitted.]

7. However, I have no doubt that the constitutional compulsions of Arts. 14, 16, 21, 39(e), 41 and 43 did form the basis of special plea and the defendants were constitutionally required to discharge the burden which lay on them to prove the plea. It is no longer in doubt that Art. 16 embraces all matters relating to public employment whether before, during or after termination of such employment. This is positively expressed in the decision of their Lordships in Vijay Narayan case, [(1980) 3 SCC 459 : A.I.R 1980 S.C 840]. What is further to be emphasized is the view Constitutional Bench took in the case of Nakara (D.S) v. Union of India, [1981 — (I) L.L.N 289], that burden rests on the State to justify not only legislative but also administrative actions which are open to challenge as violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that the challenge has to be examined in the context of the Preamble and the Directive Principles also. I feel disposed to add that though Olga Tellis, [(1985) 3 SCC 545 : A.I.R 1986 S.C 180] has stopped short of extending constitutional guarantee to right to work by refusing to include the right in the right to life guaranteed under Art. 21, it is difficult to overlook that the decision guarantees still the right to livelihood and holds unconstitutional any arbitrary action of State resulting in deprivation of existing means of livelihood of any person being lawfully enjoyed by him. It is necessary to stress judicial equanimity, in this context, that pervades equally Minerva Mills, [(1980) 3 SCC 625 : A.I.R 1980 S.C 1789] and Randhir Page: 580Singh v. Union of India, [1982—(I) L.L.N 327], for the focus in both the decisions is on the “equality clause” of the Constitution. Any order of compulsory retirement is, ex-hypothesi, amenable to the tests envisaged by the constitutional imperatives of the Preamble (dignity of the individual) and Arts. 14, 16, 21, 39(e), 41, 43 and 311(2) of the Constitution. An order of compulsory retirement must be passed with a sense of responsibility, with due regard to the necessity of strict compliance, not only in form but in substance, with the statutory requirement to ensure that the order does not partake the character of penalty against a Government servant who had rendered long years of devoted service to the State. Mere mention in the order of the statutory provision empowering the authority concerned to pass such an order without the order speaking reasons or basis germane to the statutory requirement cannot in any view of the matter stand a constitutional cavil.

8. It is necessary now to indicate only what is held in Smt. Sushila Sridhonkar case (vide supra) because in that case the law settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court concerning compulsory retirement was discussed in detail and the tests which such an order must pass were extracted and capsulised as follows:

“(i) The power exercised under the relevant statutory rules must conform to the requirements laid down in the rule.

(ii) The authority passing the order must bona fide form the opinion that it was necessary to take action in ‘public interest.’

(iii) The requisite opinion must not be based on ‘collateral grounds’ and it must not be an ‘arbitrary decision.’

(iv) It must appear to the satisfaction of the Court that the requisite opinion to take such an action was in fact duly formed, in other words, there was proper material before the authority to form such an opinion.

(v) The power is usually exercised bona fide ‘in public interest to chop off the dead wood,’ to hold the balance evenly ‘between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interest of public’ because the power is given to Government’, to energise its machinery and make it more efficient.”

Indeed, in Union of India v. M.E Reddy, [1980 — (1) L.L.N 306], their Lordships, in testing exercise of power by the Government under rule 16(3) of All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, 1958, held that for making an order of compulsory retirement thereunder,

“it is not an entry here or an entry there which has to be taken into consideration by the Government, but the overall picture of the officer during the long years of his service that he has put in, has to be considered.”

9. Applying the above tests to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I have no hesitation at all to hold that the impugned order does not stand a moment's scrutiny. Indeed, the hesitation of the Courts below to nullify the order has rather created a piquant situation, to say the least. Lapses and breaches concerning the tests aforesaid are numerous and so vocal that it is necessary only to indicate a few of them. Because the power exercised in the instant case is evidently under Cl. (b) of rule 42(1) of the rules, as is extracted above, there is little doubt that the order should have at the least, manifested on its face satisfaction of the requirement of the rule, namely, that the order was passed in “public interest.” What, however, is manifested is total non-application of mind to the positive and affirmative and absolute requirement of the statutory provision. That there is no whisper at all of the consideration of the requirement of “public interest” is amply manifested by total omission of the statement in the order that it was passed in public interest. That being the position it is very difficult to take the view that the opinion of the authority passing the order to take action under the aforesaid provision was not an arbitrary decision. Indeed, no materials are placed before, the Court at any stage of these proceedings to satisfy any Court that the Page: 581opinion to take the action was formed on proper material. Unfortunately, what is to be read in the written statement supports the case of the plaintiff that the order was, not passed in public interest because it was necessary to terminate her services for the reason she was a “dead wood” or that she was not efficient and was a burden on the administration. In Para. 3 of the plaint the plaintiff stated that in her character roll there was no adverse entry and that she was even considered fit for promotion but due to want of suitable vacancy she was instead given stagnation allowance. To this there is a positive reply in Para. 3 of the written statement admitting the plaint averments.

10. In Smt. Sushila Shirdhonkar (vide supra), I reiterated the view taken in Murlidhar Balai, [1986 (2) M.P.W.N 57] that Art. 311(2) is attracted even to a case of compulsory retirement if it is ordered as a penalty because it would be a case of “removal” from service. This view was taken on the authority of Dilip Kumar, [1983 — (I) L.L.N 314] and Olga Tellis, [(1985) 3 SCC 545 : A.I.R 1986 S.C 180] (vide supra) on the premises that mere saving of pensionary benefit by such an order would be poor recompense for abrupt and premature end of a service career entailing loss of living wages as also status. I feel emboldened to say today that what is to be read in D.B Belliappa case, [1979 — (I) L.L.N 324], lends assurance to the view taken. Any termination of services of a Government servant without disclosing reasons would be violative of Art. 311(2) also because it would be an arbitrary action partaking the character of penalty, so it was held approving Lord Denning's dictum in the case of Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1971 (1) All E.R 1148]. “The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.”

It was further noted by their Lordships that in Khudi Ram, [(1975) 2 SCC 81 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 550], the same view was taken earlier holding “there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial review ability.” In the instant case, the order challenged manifests no reason at all except the reason that it was passed under the statutory provision quoted in the order. Such an order cannot in view of the matter pass the test laid down in D.B Belliappa (vide supra), and cannot countenance the constitutional cavil permitted by Arts. 14; 16, 21, 39(e), 41, 43 and 311(2) of the Constitution. If the order was really passed in “public interest” it was the bounden duty of the authority to state in the order that it was passed in “public interest” and for the reasons specified, or even later disclosed to the Court, to meet challenge to the order. Nothing indeed of any sort has been done in the instant case by the defendant.

11. Sri Sinha relied on M. Gurumoorthy, [(1979) 2 SCC 34 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1850] (vide supra), with the object merely to submit that the Chief Justice of this Court in whose name the order was expressed was the competent authority to pass the order and the requirement of approval of the State Government contemplated in the rule aforequoted did not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. I have no hesitation to accept learned counsel's contention and indeed Sri Jain, counsel appearing for the appellant, also does not contest this position seriously. The other decision cited by Sri Sinha is the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. V.A Dikshitulu, [(1979) 2 SCC 34 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 193] (vide supra), is also of the same import and satisfies the same purpose primarily. However, at Para. 39 of the report what is stated has to be taken note of. It was held by their Lordships that compulsory retirement, “simpliciter,” in accordance with the terms and conditions of service, does not amount to dismissal or removal or reduction in rank under Art. 311 or under the service rules because the Government servant does not lose the terminal benefits already earned by him. I would only say this much, which would suffice for the day, that the latest development in the service jurisprudence noticed in Murlidhar Bala, [1986 (2) M.P.W.N 57] (vide supra), as also in Smt. Sushila Shirdhonkar (vide supra), has amplified adequately the necessity to construe an order of compulsory retirement in terms of constitutional imperatives to test whether such an order is really an order “simpliciter” of compulsory retirement. I have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the decision cited does not at all support the proposition canvassed because special care was taken by Page: 582their Lordships not only by using the expression “simpliciter” but more importantly expressly adding emphasis to it. On the other hand, the view taken in the cases of Murlidhar Balai (vide supra), and Smt. Sushila Shirdnonkar (vide supra), which rests also on the latest judgment of their Lordships in H.C Gargi v. State Of Haryana., [1986 — (II) L.L.N 762] remains duly vindictive (vindiacted?). The benefit of holding in those cases cannot be denied, therefore, to the plaintiff. Indeed, it was held in Gargi case (vide supra), that when an order of compulsory retirement suffers from non-application of mind to the statutory requirement as also to the relevant facts the order must be struck down as an arbitrary order.

12. The upshot of the above discussion must result in the single conclusion that the plaintiff was illegally and arbitrarily non-suited by the two Courts below in the same manner as her services were compulsorily terminated arbitrarily by the defendants. The appeal must, therefore, be and is, allowed. The suit is decreed. The order, dated 14 May 1980, as per exhibit P1, is held void and illegal. I would be failing in due discharge of my constitutional duty if I do not stress the constitutional imperative that the judiciary at all levels must be truly independent. Any order passed by the High Court on the administrative side is challengeable even at the lowest level of the judiciary. There rests, therefore, heavy responsibility on the subordinate judiciary in such cases to display equally an independent and truly judicial approach as it is required to do in case in which administrative orders are passed by other authorities. Upholding the order for the mere mention therein of rule 42 has occasioned gross injustice.

13. The plaintiff having since attained the age of superannuation, her reinstatement cannot, however, be ordered. Still, she will definitely be entitled to consequential relief in the nature of all pecuniary benefits of which she has been deprived by the illegal order. It is not necessary for me to quantify her entitlement in this appeal. I leave that matter for determination at the stage of execution wherein both parties shall have an opportunity to state and contest respectively the claim, on account of salary and allowances of which the plaintiff has been illegally deprived on and from 1 June 1980, till 14 September 1986. The amount due payable to her by the defendants shall be quantified by the executing Court and the defendants shall be bound to discharge liability in respect of the decretal amount so determined as also costs of the suit and the appeals.

14. I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to costs throughout in the facts and circumstances of the case, which are so vocal as do not bear repetition once again save that it is a fit case rather for grant of exemplary costs under S. 35B, Civil Procedure Code, for unnecessarily and unceremoniously delaying proceedings in this Court as also compensatory costs under S. 35A, Civil Procedure Code, for vexatious defence. Accordingly, on account of costs I hold the plaintiff entitled to payment of a total sum of Rs. 5,000, (Rupees Five Thousand only) in lump sum in all Courts, in the suit and two appeals.