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Chellaperumal (S.) v. Government Of Tamil ...

Madras High Court
Feb 16, 1987
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ramaswami, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal challenges an order of a learned Single Judge dismissing Writ Petition No. 2755 of 1979. The writ petition was filed by the appellant (a driver in the Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd.), praying for a mandamus directing the Government to reconsider G.O. Ms. No. 1631 dated 27 December 1978, which declined to refer the appellant's dispute for adjudication. The factual basis was that on 26 July 1976 the bus driven by the appellant struck a 6‑year‑old boy. The appellant was prosecuted for rash and negligent driving and acquitted by the Criminal Court. Separately, the transport corporation conducted a departmental enquiry and, finding the appellant guilty of rash and negligent driving, removed him from service. After conciliation failed, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 1631 refusing to refer the dispute regarding non‑employment for adjudication, and the appellant sought judicial relief against that refusal. The Single Judge upheld the Government's refusal, finding the departmental enquiry not vitiated and the Government's reasoning valid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appropriate Government, when exercising the power under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, may delve into the merits of a dispute (for example, by treating a departmental enquiry's findings as a reason to decline reference) or whether it is limited to determining the prima facie existence of an industrial dispute.
  2. Whether reasons given by the Government for declining to refer a dispute (specifically reasons that amount to findings on the merits of the case) are extraneous, irrelevant or not germane to the exercise of the power under S. 10(1), thereby rendering the Government's decision amenable to judicial review and justifying issuance of a writ of mandamus directing reconsideration.
  3. Whether the Tribunal's powers (as affected by Section 11A) to examine the merits of discharge/dismissal and adequacy of punishment mean that the Government should not give reasons tantamount to adjudication when declining reference.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (through learned counsel) relied on recent Supreme Court decisions contending that the Government cannot go into the merits of the dispute when exercising its power under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and cannot decline a reference on grounds other than the non‑existence of an industrial dispute.
  • Counsel argued that if the Government refuses reference on the basis that charges were proved in a departmental enquiry or that the enquiry was proper, that would effectively preclude almost all terminations from being adjudicated and would deprive the workman of the Tribunal's role under S. 11A (as explained in the cited precedents).

Government's / Management's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The Government's order (G.O. Ms. No. 1631 dated 27 December 1978) stated that the case involved rash and negligent driving, that the worker had prior accidents, and that the management had conducted a proper enquiry before terminating service; on these grounds the Government considered there was no case to refer the issue for adjudication.
  • The learned Single Judge accepted the Government's position, holding that the departmental enquiry was not vitiated and that the reasoning in the impugned order was valid and not subject to interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, 1985 — (II) L.L.N 280 While exercising power under S. 10(1) the Government performs an administrative function and cannot delve into merits; it may only determine prima facie existence of industrial dispute and must base its administrative determination on grounds germane to the power; if reasons are extraneous/irrelevant the decision is open to judicial review. The Court relied on these principles to conclude that the Government must not give reasons tantamount to adjudication when declining reference and that such reasoning renders the refusal susceptible to judicial intervention. These principles guided the Court in setting aside the impugned order.
State of Bombay v. K.P. Krishnan, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1223 Established that a writ of mandamus would lie against the Government if an order under S. 10(1) is based on reasons which are extraneous, irrelevant or not germane to the determination. Cited within the analysis (via Ram Avtar Sharma) as authority for issuing mandamus where Government reasons are irrelevant/extraneous; the Court applied this proposition in evaluating the Government's order.
Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1617 Supports the proposition that where Government purports to give reasons which tantamount to adjudication and refuses to make a reference, it is acting on extraneous/irrelevant grounds and a writ of mandamus would lie. Used as supporting authority to the effect that governmental refusal based on adjudicative reasons is impermissible and may be set aside; the Court treated it as reinforcing the ratio in the other cited decisions.
Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India, 1985 — I L.L.N 589 It is impermissible for the Government to refuse to make a reference on the sole ground that charges were proved in a departmental enquiry and penalty followed proper procedure, since that would allow management to avoid adjudication even where the enquiry's finding or penalty might be unreasonable, perverse or mala fide. The Court applied this principle to conclude that refusal to refer based on the fact that a departmental enquiry found charges proved is an irrelevant ground and directed that the Government must reconsider without taking that ground into account.
Balakrishnan (N.) v. Government of Tamil Nadu (by Secretary, Labour and Employment Department, Madras), 1987 — I L.L.N 580 Reiterated that while considering S. 10 the Government cannot give findings as if adjudicating; its role is limited to determining prima facie existence of an industrial dispute and whether the claim is frivolous or bogus; refusal based on adjudicative reasoning is liable to be set aside. The Court observed that the impugned order in the present case was similar to that in Balakrishnan and applied the reasoning of that decision to set aside the Government order and to direct reconsideration in accordance with the principles laid down.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined earlier Supreme Court decisions and a recent High Court decision dealing with the scope of the Government's power under S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court summarized and relied on the following lines of authority and reasoning contained in those precedents:

  • Under S. 10(1) the Government performs an administrative function and may determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists, but it must not "delve into the merits" and assume an adjudicative role.
  • If the Government's refusal to refer is based on reasons that are extraneous, irrelevant or not germane to the statutory task (for example, treating a departmental enquiry's finding as conclusively disposing of the dispute), that refusal is open to judicial review and a writ of mandamus may be appropriate to require reconsideration.
  • Section 11A (as explained in the precedents) empowers Tribunals to examine the merits, adequacy of punishment and the fairness of enquiries; therefore, the Government must not give reasons that amount to adjudication of those matters when deciding whether to refer under S.10.

Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court found the impugned Government order similar in character to those previously disapproved by the courts; specifically, the Government's reasons (that the case was one of rash and negligent driving, the worker had prior accidents, and that management had conducted a proper enquiry) amounted to considerations that effectively determined the merits and thereby precluded adjudication. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the impugned order could not be regarded as having been decided on relevant considerations germane to S. 10 and therefore was liable to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the writ appeal, set aside the impugned Government order (G.O. Ms. No. 1631 dated 27 December 1978) and directed the first respondent to dispose of the dispute raised by the workman under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in the light of this judgment and the decision in Writ Petition No. 831 of 1981 (reported at 1987—(I) L.L.N 580) within eight weeks from receipt of the judgment. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence for the parties is that the Government's refusal to refer has been set aside and the dispute must be reconsidered for possible reference under S. 10 without relying on the impugned adjudicative grounds.
  • The opinion applies and follows existing Supreme Court and High Court authority limiting the Government's role under S. 10 to prima facie determination and precluding it from giving reasons amounting to adjudication; the Court did not purport to establish a new precedent beyond applying those authorities.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Ramaswami, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissing Writ Petition No. 2755 of 1979, filed by the appellant praying for a mandamus directing the Government to reconsider their order in G.O Ms. No. 1631, dated 27 December 1978, declining to refer the dispute of the petitioner for adjudication and dispose of the dispute in accordance with law. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition agreeing with the Government that the enquiry by the management is not vitiated in any manner and that the reasoning given by the Government in the impugned order was valid and cannot be interfered with. The appellant is a driver in the Pallavan Transport Corporation, Ltd., which is a Government of Tamil Nadu undertaking. It appears that on 26 July 1976, the bus which he was driving met with an accident in Coonur High Road when a pedestrain boy aged 6 years was hit by the bus. The appellant was prosecuted for rash and negligent driving in a Criminal Court and the Criminal Court acquitted him, finding him not guilty of rash and negligent driving. However, the transport corporation initiated departmental enquiry and finding him guilty of rash and negligent driving, ordered the removal of the appellant from service. On receipt of conciliation failure report, the Government refused to refer the dispute relating to non-employment for adjudication in G.O.Ms No. 1631, dated 27 December 1978. It is against this order the writ petition has been filed. The Government order declining to refer the dispute for adjudication read as follows:

“The Government have examined the conciliation report of the Labour Officer first cited in regard to an industrial dispute raised by S. Chellaperumal, driver, against the management of Pallavan Transport Corporation, Ltd., Madras 2, over the issue of his non-employment and they pass the following orders:

It is seen that this is a case of rash and negligent driving. Moreover, the worker had a number of accidents before. The management also conducted a proper enquiry before terminating the service of the worker. For these reasons, the Government consider that there is no case to refer the issue in dispute for adjudication.”

Learned counsel for the appellant relied on two recent judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that neither the Government can go into the merits of the dispute nor can it decline a reference on any ground other than the non-existence of an industrial dispute. In Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, [1985—(II) L.L.N 280], considering the scope of S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the Supreme Court after holding that while exercising the power under S. 10 of the Act, the function performed by the appropriate Government is an administrative function, and not a judicial or a quasi-judicial function, observed in Para. 7, at page 284:

“If the Government performs an administrative act while either making or refusing to make a reference under S. 10(1), it cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of lis. That would certainly be in excess of the power conferred by S. 10. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate Government to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons not for justice or industrial peace and harmony. Every administrative determination must be based on grounds relevant and germane to the exercise of power. If the administrative determination is based on the irrelevant, extraneous or grounds not germane to the exercise of power, it is liable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review. In State of Bombay v. K.P Krishnan, [A.I.R 1960 S.C 1223], it was held that a writ of mandamus would lie against the Government if the order passed by it under S. 10(1) is based or induced by reasons which, as given by the Government are extraneous, irrelevant and not germane to the determination. In such a situation, the Court would be justified in issuing a writ of mandamus even in respect of an administrative order. May be, the Court may not issue a writ of mandamus, directing the Government to make a reference but the Court can after examining the reasons given by the appropriate Government for refusing to make a reference come to a conclusion that they are irrelevant, extraneous or not germane to the determination and then can direct the Government to reconsider the matter.”

Again, in the same judgment, with reference to the effect of the amendment of the Act introducing S. 11A, the Supreme Court further observed in Para. 9, at page 284:

“It confers power on the Tribunal not only to examine the order of discharge or dismissal on merits, as also to determine whether the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct charged. In other words, S. 11A confers power on the Tribunal/Labour Court to examine the case of the workman whose service has been terminated either by discharge or dismissal qualitatively in the matter of nature of enquiry and quantitatively in the matter of adequacy or otherwise of punishment. The workman questioned the legality and validity of the enquiry which aspect the Tribunal in a quasi-judicial determination was required to examine. A bare statement that a domestic enquiry was held in which charges were held to be proved, if it is considered sufficient for not exercising power of making a reference under S. 10(1) almost all cases of termination of services cannot go before the Tribunal. And it would render S. 2A of the Act denuded of all its content and meaning. The reasons given by the Government would show that the Government examined the relevant papers of enquiry and the Government was satisfied that it was legally valid and that there was sufficient and adequate evidence to hold the charges proved. It would further appear that the Government was satisfied that the enquiry was not based against the workman and the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct charged. All these relevant and vital aspects have to be examined by the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating upon the reference made to it. In other words, the reasons given by the Government would tantamount to adjudication which is impermissible. That is the function of the Tribunal and the Government cannot arrogate to itself that function. Therefore, if the grounds on which or the reasons for which the Government declined to make a reference under S. 10 are irrelevant, extraneous or not germane to the determination, it is well settled that the party aggrieved thereby would be entitled to move the Court for a writ of mandamus. See Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617]. It is equally well settled that where the Government purports to give reasons which tantamount to adjudication and refuse to make a reference, the appropriate Government could be said to have acted on extraneous, irrelevant grounds or grounds not germane to the determination and a writ of mandamus would lie calling upon the Government to reconsider its decision. In this case, a clear case for grant of writ of mandamus is made out.”

In that case, the reasons given by the Government in Para. 9, at page 284 of 1985 — II L.L.N read:

“The Government does not consider your case to be fit for reference for adjudication to the Tribunal as it has been learnt that your services were terminated only sifter charges against you were proved in a domestic enquiry.”

Ultimately, the writ petition in that case was allowed and mandamus was issued to the Government to exercise the powers under S. 10 on relevant considerations germane to the decision. In another recent decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India, [1985 — I L.L.N 589], the management of the Syndicate Bank imposed the punishment of stoppage of three increments to one of its workmen. An industrial dispute was raised by the Syndicate Bank Staff Union and the Central Government declined to refer the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication on the ground that the charges of this conduct against the worker were proved in a duly constituted departmental enquiry and the penalty was imposed following the required procedure. While setting aside this order declining to refer the dispute, the Supreme Court made the following observations in Para. 1, at page 590:

“It would not be right for the Government of India to refuse to make the reference on the ground that the charges of misconduct against the worker were proved during a duly constituted departmental inquiry and penalty was imposed on the worker after following the required procedure. If such a ground were permissible it would be the easiest thing for the management to avoid a reference to adjudication and to deprive the worker of the opportunity of having the dispute referred for adjudication even if the order holding the charges of misconduct proved was unreasonable or perverse or was actuated by mala fides or even if the penalty imposed on the worker was totally disproportionate to the offence said to have been proved. The management has simply to show that it has held a proper inquiry after complying with the requisite procedure and that would be enough to defeat the worker's claim for adjudication. Such a situation cannot be countenanced by law. We must, therefore, set aside the order, dated 2 April 1981, passed by the Government of India, declining to make a reference of the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. We would direct the Government of India to consider the question of making reference of the industrial dispute for adjudication without taking into account the aforesaid irrelevant ground which seems to have prevailed with them in declining to make a reference.”…

In Balakrishnan (N.) v. Government of Tamil Nadu (by Secretary, Labour and Employment Department, Madras), [1987 — I L.L.N 580], one of us had to consider similar question. The impugned order in that case also was similar to the one which we are now considering. After a consideration of the above two judgments of the Supreme Court and also the other decisions relevant on the question, by order, dated 10 December 1986, Writ Petition No. 831 of 1981 was allowed and the order of the Government was set aside on the ground that it is not open to the Government while considering the question under S. 10 of the Act to give any finding on the dispute, as if it were adjudicated upon and that the only jurisdiction of the Government was to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons and not for industrial peace and harmony. The impugned order in this case could not be considered as having been decided on relevant considerations having regard to industrial peace and harmony and hence it is liable to be set aside. We accordingly allow the writ appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Government and direct the first respondent to dispose of the dispute raised by the workman under S. 10 of the Act in the light of this judgment and the decision rendered in Writ Petition No. 831 of 1981 on 10 December 1986 report in 1987—(I) L.L.N 580 (vide supra), within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the judgment. There will, however, be no order as to costs.