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The Federal Bank Limited v. Shree Hanuman Jute Mills Limited .
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Federal Bank Limited (the petitioner/plaintiff bank) applied for the appointment of a Receiver over securities described in Schedule 'J' to its petition and for sale of those securities by private contract or public auction. The bank also sought an injunction against the Receiver. Respondent No.1 is Shree Hanuman Jute Mills Limited, a company under the Companies Act, 1956. The bank alleges it granted cash-credit accommodation initially of Rs. 65,00,000 (with a packing credit sub-limit) which was later enhanced to Rs. 95,00,000. The company gave an unattested deed of hypothecation (dated 26 December 1983) and a supplemental deed (dated 24 January 1985) over present and future stocks, plant and machinery, book debts, and other assets as first charge security for the accommodation; the charge was registered with the Registrar of Companies. The company executed promissory notes (for Rs. 65,00,000 and later for Rs. 95,00,000) and certain individuals guaranteed repayment. The company allegedly paid off its foreign documentary bill purchase facility but defaulted on the cash-credit facility. The company acknowledged in writing on 1 January 1988 that Rs. 91,09,837.18 (with interest to 30 September 1987) was due to the bank. The company suspended business and closed its mill on 7 June 1987; the bank called up the loan and made demand on 7 January 1988 and instituted the suit seeking recovery and appointment of a Receiver. The bank relied on its contractual right to seek a Receiver; the company raised objections about the validity/effect of the hypothecation instrument and about statutory protection invoked under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the unattested deed of hypothecation (dated 26 December 1983, with a supplemental deed dated 24 January 1985) could be disregarded by the Court because it was not an attested document and not properly stamped as an attested instrument.
- Whether Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 bars the Court from appointing a Receiver or proceeding with execution/distress against the company's properties while a reference under Section 15(1) (or an inquiry under Section 16) is pending or related processes under the Act are in progress, absent the consent of the Board.
- Whether the existence of a reference made to the Board under Section 15(1) (and mere registration of that reference) is sufficient to attract the prohibition in Section 22(1), even if no inquiry under Section 16 has in fact commenced and no Special Director has been appointed under Section 16(4).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Petitioner (Federal Bank Limited) — Key Contentions
- The bank is entitled under the clear terms of its agreement to take necessary steps for appointment of a Receiver over the assets hypothecated as security for the loan.
- The loan in respect of the cash-credit facility remains unpaid despite the bank calling up the loan after the company closed its mill; therefore the bank should be permitted to obtain the relief sought.
- The charge over the company's assets was duly registered with the Registrar of Companies and the loan has been shown year after year in the company's balance sheet as a "Secured Loan" in favour of the bank; the company acknowledged its liability in writing on 1 January 1986 (and again on 1 January 1988 as to the amount due up to 30 September 1987).
Respondent / Company (Shree Hanuman Jute Mills Limited) — Key Contentions
- The deed of hypothecation is effectively an attested instrument (pointing to signatures at the foot of the agreement) and because it was not properly stamped as an attested document, the Court should not take any notice of this document.
- A reference has been made to the Board under Section 15(1) of SICA; while that reference is pending (or because it has been registered), an application for appointment of a Receiver cannot be made — Section 22(1) prohibits proceedings for appointment of a Receiver, execution, distress, or winding up except with the consent of the Board (or Appellate Authority).
- The word "shall" in Section 16(4) (requiring appointment of Special Director(s)) should be read as enabling rather than mandatory, meaning the Board is not bound to appoint Special Director(s) whenever an inquiry under Section 16 is to be made.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the parties' contentions in two main clusters: (A) the nature and evidentiary effect of the "unattested" deed of hypothecation; and (B) the impact of SICA (Sections 15, 16 and 22) on the bank's right to seek appointment of a Receiver.
A. Attestation and evidentiary materials:
- The Court rejected the company's first argument that the deed must be treated as attested merely because both parties (or their representatives) had signed it. The Court explained that to "attest" an instrument requires presence of disinterested witnesses capable of testifying to the execution (citing the definition from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary), and quoted the definition of "attested" from Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act which requires attestation by two or more witnesses (or seeing another person sign in the executant's presence and by his direction).
- The Court concluded that mere signatures by the contracting parties do not amount to attestation under the relevant definition; therefore the deed remained "unattested" in that technical sense.
- Further, the Court observed that the unattested deed was not the sole evidence of the loan and security: the charge had been registered with the Registrar of Companies, the loan was shown as a secured loan in the company's balance sheet year after year, and the company had given written acknowledgements of liability (including on 1 January 1986 and 1 January 1988). These facts reinforced the bank's substantive claim despite the attestation/stamping contention.
B. Effect of reference to the Board under SICA and the scope of Section 22(1):
- The Court set out the statutory framework: Section 15 prescribes how a reference to the Board is made in cases of a "sick industrial company"; Section 16 empowers the Board to make an inquiry "as it deems fit" whether a company is a sick industrial company; Section 16(4) provides that where the Board deems it fit to make or cause an inquiry, it "shall appoint" one or more persons as Special Director(s) to safeguard financial and other interests; and Section 22(1) prohibits proceedings for winding up, execution, distress or appointment of a Receiver while an inquiry under Section 16 is pending (or related schemes are under preparation/consideration) except with the consent of the Board or Appellate Authority.
- The Court analyzed the respondents' contention that the Board's appointment of Special Directors is not mandatory (i.e., that "shall" in Section 16(4) should be treated as enabling). The Court rejected this construction, noting the deliberate use of "shall" in sub-section (4) as distinct from the permissive "may" in sub-sections (1)–(3), and concluded the legislature intended a mandatory appointment of Special Director(s) once the Board decides to make or cause an inquiry.
- The Court emphasized the interrelationship between Sections 16(4) and 22(1): the statutory prohibition on proceedings against company properties (in Section 22(1)) makes sense only if the Board has actually taken tangible steps to commence an inquiry and appointed Special Director(s); otherwise, a company could merely lodge a reference under Section 15 to shield itself from creditors indefinitely.
- However, the Court also held that the mere registration of a reference under Section 15 does not, by itself, mean an inquiry under Section 16 has commenced or that the bar in Section 22(1) automatically applies. The power to make an inquiry is discretionary for the Board; some tangible step or evidence that an inquiry is pending (such as appointment of Special Director(s) or equivalent indicia of an inquiry in progress) is necessary before Section 22(1) operates to restrain creditors' remedies.
- In the present case, the respondents failed to show that any inquiry under Section 16(1) had actually commenced, or that any of the conditions enumerated in Section 22(1) (inquiry pending, scheme under consideration, or appeal under Section 25 pending) were fulfilled. Consequently Section 22(1)'s prohibition was not attracted, and the Court retained power to appoint a Receiver on the bank's application.
Holding and Implications
Holding: PETITION GRANTED.
Implications and direct effects:
- The petition by Federal Bank Limited for appointment of a Receiver over the securities described in Schedule 'J' succeeds; the Court ordered relief in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the petition (as requested by the bank).
- The petitioner (bank) is entitled to the costs of this application.
- Mr. Rabi Prosad Mukharji and Mr. S.P. Majumdar, Advocates, are appointed as Joint Receivers. The Joint Receivers are entitled to remuneration of 100 G.Ms each to be paid by the bank.
- The Joint Receivers are directed not to take possession before 4 April 1988 (4.4.88). All parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of the judgment.
- The Court indicated that its decision did not permit the respondents to invoke Section 22(1) merely by registering a reference under Section 15; only once the Board takes tangible steps to commence an inquiry (including appointment of Special Director(s) under Section 16(4)) will the prohibition on proceedings in Section 22(1) be engaged.
Note: The opinion does not announce a new broad precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and the application of those provisions to the facts before the Court; the ruling resolves the particular application for appointing a Receiver in the circumstances described.
End of summary — generated strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion excerpt.
1. Federal Bank Limited has made an application for appointment of a Receiver over the securities mentioned in Schedule ‘J’ to the petition and also for sale of the securities by private contract or public auction. There is also a prayer for injunction against the Receiver. The Respondent No. 1 is Shree Hanuman Jute Mills Limited, an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. The case of the plaintiff bank is that it had granted accommodation to the company to Page: 87the extent of Rs. 65,00,000/- by way of cash payment with a sub-limit of Rs. 40,00,000/- as and by way of packing credit limit. As a security for this accommodation, the whole of the company's present and future stocks of raw materials, stocks-in-process of manufacture, finished and semi finished goods, stores and all movable plants and machineries including their spares and various other assets including future book debts, bills, money receivables and various other things were hypothecated and charged by way of first charge in favour of the bank. It was agreed that the company will not, so long as the money is remained due to the bank, remove or cause of permit to be removed any of the hypothecated goods. An unattested deed of hypothecation dated December 26, 1983 was executed by the company embodying various terms and conditions on the basis of which the cash credit accommodation was granted.
2. By way of collateral security the company executed on demand promissory note for Rs. 65,00,000/- dated December 26, 1983 in favour of the bank or order payable with interest mentioned therein and duly delivered the same to the bank. A further accommodation to the tune of Rs. 30,00,000/- was granted by the bank to the company as Foreign Documentary Bill Purchase Facility to enable the company to carry on business of exports of goods manufactured by it. Sri Mahabir Prosad Jalan, Sri Tolaram Jalan and Bajrang Prosad Jalan, the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 guaranteed payment and discharge on demand of all amounts due and payable to the bank by the company in respect of the above mentioned accommodation facilities together with interest and other charges and expenses.
3. At the request of the company, on or about January 24, 1985 the bank increased the limit of the cash credit amount to Rs. 95,00,000/- with a sub-limit of Rs. 60,00,000/- as packing credit. A supplemental deed of hypothecation dated January 24, 1985 to the unattested deed of hypothecation dated December 26, 1983 was executed for this purpose. On January 24, 1985 as on demand promissory note for Rs. 95,00,000/- was executed by the company and delivered to the petitioner. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 by a writing dated January 24, 1985 besides confirming their liabilities and/or obligation under the guarantee dated December 26, 1983, also guaranteed repayment of the enhanced limit of Rs. 95,00,000/- together with interest, cost, charges and other expenses.
4. The charge created by the company over its assets and properties were duly registered with the Registrar of Companies.
5. It is the case of the bank that the company has liquidated its dues in respect of accommodation granted by way of Foreign Documentary Bill Purchase Facility. But the company has failed to pay its dues in respect of the cash credit facilities.
6. By a writing dated January 1, 1988 the company unconditionally acknowledged that a sum of Rs. 91,09,837.18 p. with interest calculated up to September 30, 1987 was due and payable to the Bank.
7. The company by a notice dated June 7, 1987 suspended its business and closed its entire Mill with effect from the said date. The bank thereupon called up the said loan and a demand was made by a letter dated January 7, 1988. Since payment was not made by the bank, a suit has been instituted in this Court praying for, inter alia, a decree for Rs. 91,68,392.18 against the company. It is the case of the bank under the clear terms of the agreement that the bank is entitled to take necessary, steps for appointment of a Receiver over the assets hypothecated as security for the loan. It has been stated that the loan-granted by the bank has not been repaid and the factory being closed, an order should be made as prayed.
8. On behalf of the company, Mr. Kapoor has advanced two arguments. The first is that the so called unattested deed of hypothecation is really attested. He has invited by attention to the signature at the foot of the agreement. It has been argued that since the document has not been, properly stamped as an attested document, the Court should not take any notice of this document.
9. I am unable to uphold this argument. To attest an instrument is “not merely to subscribe one's name to it as having been present at its execution but includes also, essentially, the presence, in fact, at its execution of some disinterested persons capable of giving evidence to what took place. To “attest” is to bear witness to a fact” (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Volume 1, pages 234-235).
10. The world “attested” has also been defined by Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, to mean “attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has been the executant sign or affix his mark to the instrument or has seen some other persons sign the instrument in the presence and by direction by the executant…………”.
11. Therefore, merely because the deed of hypothecation has been signed by or on behalf of both the parties does not mean that the deed has been attested. Moreover the unattested deed of hypothecation is not the only evidence of the loan transaction and the security given for the loan. It has been stated in the petition that the charge created over the assets and properties of the company was duly registered with the Registrar of Companies.
12. It has also been pointed out on behalf of the Bank that year after year this particular loan has been specifically shown in the company's Balance Sheet as “Secured Loan” in favour of the Bank. On January 1, 1986 the company acknowledged, in writing, its liability as on 31st September, 1986 for a sum of Rs. 91,09,837.18 P.
13. The second contention on behalf of the company is that a reference has already been made to the Board of Industrial and Financial Construction (hereinafter described as the Board) under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 for determination of the measures to be adopted with respect to the company. A “Sick Industrial Company” has been defined under the said Act as an industrial company which at the end of a financial year has accumulated losses equal to or exceeding its net worth and has also suffered cash losses in the relevant financial year and the financial year immediately proceeding such financial year. This provision on applies to a company which has been registered for not less than seven years.
14. It was argued that an application for appointment of Receiver can not be made while the case of the company was under investigation by the Board.
15. Section 22(1) of the Act provides:—
“Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956, or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be the Appellate Authority”.
16. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that an application for the appointment of a Receiver over the properties of the company will not lie by virtue of the provisions of Section 22(1) without the approval of the Board. Therefore, this application is misconceived.
17. The respondents have, however, failed to establish that an inquiry is actually pending under Section 16 in this case. Chapter 3 of the Act deals with Reference, Inquiries and Schemes. Section 15 lays down the manner in which reference application can be made to the Board in case the company has become a sick industrial company. Section 16 lays down the method of inquiry into working of sick industrial companies. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 is couched in permissive language and lays down that the Board may make “such inquiry as it deems fit for determining whether any industrial company has become a sick Page: 90indusrial company”. This can be done upon receipt of a reference with respect to such company under Section 15 or upon information received with respect to such company or upon its own knowledge as to the financial condition of the company.
18. In this case, a reference has been made by the Directors of the company under Section 15. The Board may make an inquiry on its own or require any operating agency to inquire into and make a report as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 16:—
“Where the Board deems it fit to make an inquiry of to cause an inquiry to be made into any industrial company under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, under sub-section (2), it shall appoint one or more persons to be a special director or special directors of the company for safeguarding the financial and other interests of the company.”
19. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the word “shall” has to be construed as an enabling expression. It is not mandatory for the Board to appoint special directors whenever an inquiry is to be made under Sub-section (1) of Section 16. The Board has been given power in an appropriate case to appoint one or more persons to be Special Director to safeguard the interest of the company.
20. I am unable to accept this contention on a number of grounds. Section 16 itself has used the expression “may” in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) where it has conferred power upon the Board to make inquiry or require an operating agency to make inquiry. But the language of sub-section (4) is quite different. It says that the Board “shall appoint one or more persons to be a Special Director or Special Directors of the company”. The legislature has consciously and deliberately used “shall” instead of “may” in sub-section (4).
21. Moreover, Section 16(4) has to be construed bearing in mind the provisions of Section 22(1) which unequivocally states that “no proceedings for the win ling up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a Receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further except with the consent of the Board as the case may be or the Appellate Authority”.
22. This prohibition on proceeding against the properties of an industrial company makes sense only if the provision of Section 16(4) is borne in mind. Otherwise, it will be open to an industrial company to make a reference under Section 15 and by that process shut out all the creditors, secured or unsecured, from enforcing their claim, against the company.
23. The construction suggested by the respondents is not warranted by the clear wording of the statute and is also in-equitable and should not be adopted. If the Board has appointed a Special Director or Special Directors of a company for safeguarding the financial and other interest of the company, it may not be permissible for a creditor to proceed against the company. The inquiry may result in framing of a scheme for the reconstruction, revival and rehabilitation of the industrial unit or even for the sale or lease of a part or whole of the industrial undertaking of the sick industrial company or for adoption or ameliorating or remedial measures as or for adoption or ameliorating or remedial measures as provided in Section 18 of the Act. Thereafter, when an inquiry has started in order to safeguard the financial and other interest of the company, one or more Special Directors have to be appointed. After the appointment of the Special Director, it may not be open to the Court to order winding up of the industrial company or appoint a Receiver over the assets of the company as the case may be except with the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority.
24. I am, however, unable to uphold the contention that even without appointment of Special Director, the Court is powerless to appoint a Receiver on an application made by a secured creditor merely because the company has made a reference under Section 15(1).
25. Nothing has been shown to establish that an inquiry has commenced into the working of the company under Section 16(1). It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the reference made by the Directors of the company has been registered. That however, does not mean starting of an inquiry. The making of an inquiry is, a matter of discretion of the Board. There has to be some evidence to show that inquiry has commenced. It is only when some tangible step is taken for making the inquiry that Section 22(1) comes into play. The provisions of Section 16 comes into operation only when “in inquiry under Section 16 is pending” or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or where an appeal relating to an industrial company is pending under Section 25.
26. The respondent have failed to establish that any of that there conditions has been fulfilled in this case. Therefore, the prohibition upon appointment of a Receiver in respect of the properties of the company is not attracted in this case.
27. The petition must succeed. There will be orders as prayed in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c). The petitioner will be entitled to costs of this application.
28. Mr. Rabi Prosad Mukharji, Advocate and Mr. S.P Majumdar Advocate are appointed Joint Receivers. Joint Receivers are entitled to Page: 92remuneration of 100 G.Ms each to be paid by the bank. Joint Receivers will not take possession before 4.4.88 All parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of the judgment.
29. S.K.G
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