Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Shri S.D Gulzar, Pri... v. Hon'Ble The Chief Ju...

Himachal Pradesh High Court
Nov 28, 1988
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (V.K. Mehrotra, A.C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Shri S.D. Gulzar was appointed as Personal Assistant-cum-Judgment Writer in the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, effective 1 January 1964; later posted as a Judgment Writer at the Himachal Bench of the Delhi High Court on 1 May 1967. He received the status of Class II Gazetted Private Secretary effective 30 December 1967 (Notification dated 23 January 1968) and continued as Class II Gazetted Private Secretary after the Himachal Pradesh High Court was established on 25 January 1971 until his retirement on 30 April 1988.

Petitioner Gulzar filed the writ petition on 12 September 1978 challenging an order dated 31 July 1978 by which selection grade was granted to certain other incumbents but not to him.

The Government of Himachal Pradesh issued an Office Memorandum dated 16 June 1978 (effective from 7 July 1976) sanctioning selection grade (Rs. 900–1100) to Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents of the High Court—admissible to 20% of permanent posts and temporary posts in existence for three years or more—with arrears (upto 31.1.1978) to be credited to the General Provident Fund on a two-year non-withdrawal basis. Prior correspondence between the High Court and the State Government, and an earlier Government office memorandum dated 1 March 1977 (stating principles for selection grade release), form part of the procedural history that the court examined.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in granting selection grade to certain incumbents while denying it to petitioner S.D. Gulzar—specifically whether the High Court ignored the Government's principles (seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit; minimum service requirement) contained in the 1 March 1977 office memorandum.
  2. Whether Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries are distinct categories (cadres) for the purpose of releasing 20% selection grade posts separately for each category, or whether they form a single cadre where 20% should be computed on the combined strength.
  3. Whether the High Court was competent to adopt a criterion of merit-cum-seniority (as opposed to seniority-cum-merit) for the grant of selection grade and whether the State Government's acquiescence affects the validity of that approach.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Shri S.D. Gulzar) — Arguments

  • The High Court ignored the principles set out in the Government office memorandum dated 1 March 1977: (a) selection grade must be released on the basis of seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit, and (b) a minimum service requirement (10 years or 2/3rd of the pay span) for eligibility.
  • The High Court wrongly adopted merit-cum-seniority rather than seniority-cum-merit when granting selection grade.
  • The High Court erroneously treated Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries as three separate categories; in truth they constitute a single cadre for purposes of calculating the 20% posts entitled to selection grade—treating them as separate increased the number of selection-grade posts from what would be two (on combined strength) to three.
  • The High Court ignored the length of service of the selected respondents and granted selection grade to persons not eligible by service length.
  • Because the grant of selection grade increases financial burden, concurrence of the Governor (or proper procedure) was necessary before departing from the March 1, 1977 principles.

Respondent / High Court — Arguments and Position

  • The High Court consistently took the position in correspondence with the State Government that Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries are different categories and that selection grade should be released separately for each category, following the Punjab and Haryana High Court pattern.
  • The Chief Justice had examined the matter earlier, recorded that selection grade should be given on the basis of merit-cum-seniority, and made appointments to selection grade posts on that basis.
  • The State Government asked for details (number of posts in each category, posts proposed for selection grade, financial implications) and the High Court provided those category-wise details; the Government's Office Memorandum of 16 June 1978 authorised selection grade admissible to 20% of posts of Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents (expressed by the court to be category-wise as requested by the High Court).
  • The State Government, after receiving information and the High Court's explanations and notifications, did not object or require withdrawal of the High Court's notification dated 31 July 1978.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
All India Backward Classes and Minorities Welfare Association v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1322 The Supreme Court held that refusal of selection grade to a petitioner after comparison of service records, where juniors were found more suitable, could not be said to be unreasonable. The court relied on this precedent to support the proposition that selection based on comparative service records and suitability (i.e., allowing merit to prevail) can be reasonable; it reinforced the acceptability of the High Court's merit-centric approach.
Lalit Mohan Deb v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 995 Observations that selection grades are created to prevent stagnation and to ensure efficiency; the adoption of one of the recognised promotion principles (such as seniority-cum-merit) is permissible; selection grades may be based on tests and procedure where applicable. The court cited these observations to note that selection grades aim at greater efficiency and that adopting merit-based elements is permissible; the court inferred that giving primacy to merit could further the object of selection grades and found no error in the High Court's criterion.
Lakshmidhar Mallick v. State of Orissa, 1974 (1) S.L.R. 165 (Full Bench, Orissa High Court) Adoption of the principle that selection grade is intended to prevent stagnation among capable employees who cannot be promoted due to limited outlets; selection grade gives higher pay in the same cadre. The court referenced the Full Bench's similar exposition to corroborate the purposive understanding of selection grades but did not treat it as precluding merit-based selection.
D.K. Bhatnagar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1979 (2) S.L.R. 693 (Division Bench of this Court) If rules do not show that promotion should be principally based on selection, the formula of merit-cum-seniority should not be applied; the normal principle is seniority-cum-merit. The court noted this authority to acknowledge contexts where seniority-cum-merit is appropriate; it distinguished the present case on the basis of the Chief Justice's exclusive competence over High Court officers' conditions and the High Court's prior decision to apply merit-cum-seniority.
Dayaram Asanand Gursahani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 850 Observation that the mere nomenclature "selection grade" does not necessarily imply a selection process; an extended pay scale may be automatic and refusing such scale when due on the ground of fitness may be erroneous. The court cited this to illustrate that selection-grade nomenclature does not always entail selection and to show that an automatic entitlement view exists, but also observed that this does not prohibit granting selection grade on merit where appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step analysis grounded in the documentary record, the relevant staffing rules and schedules, prior administrative correspondence, and the role of the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution:

  • Interpretation of the Government's Office Memorandum (16 June 1978): The court read the memorandum in the context of prior correspondence between the High Court and the State Government and concluded that the sanction was intended to apply to 20% of posts in each of the three categories (Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents) separately, rather than to 20% of the combined strength. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the wording implied a combined cadre interpretation.
  • Cadre distinction: The court examined the High Court (Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1975 (framed under Article 229) and the First Schedule which listed Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers separately (with specified numbers). It noted Rule 3(c)'s definition of "Court servant" tied to the First Schedule and Rule 10(b)(i) then providing that seniority is determined separately for each category carrying the same grade of pay. The court concluded the rules treated the three posts as distinct cadres for the purposes relevant to selection grade.
  • Role and competence of the Chief Justice: The opinion emphasized Article 229, noting that the Chief Justice may lay down norms for selection grade. The Chief Justice had earlier considered the Government's March 1, 1977 memorandum and recorded a decision that appointments to selection grade posts should follow the principle of "merit-cum-seniority." That administrative decision by the Chief Justice guided the High Court's appointments.
  • Government's conduct and acquiescence: The court reviewed subsequent correspondence including government requests for particulars and the High Court's provision of category-wise statements showing the appointments and basic pay. The State Government, after receiving details, did not object or require withdrawal of the High Court's notification; the court treated this as acquiescence supporting the validity of the High Court's action.
  • On the applicability of the March 1, 1977 memorandum: The court noted that the June 16, 1978 Office Memorandum did not incorporate the March 1, 1977 principles or impose conditions like minimum years of service. The court recorded that the State Government later asked the High Court whether the March 1, 1977 principles had been kept in view; the High Court replied that the Chief Justice had kept those principles in mind but appointments were made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. The court found no legal error in that approach given the Chief Justice's competence and the Government's subsequent non-objection.
  • Precedent and principles: The court surveyed case law indicating selection grades are intended to prevent stagnation and promote efficiency and that different approaches (seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority) have been recognised depending on circumstances. The court concluded that the cited precedents do not prohibit the grant of selection grade on merit-cum-seniority and that the High Court's adoption of merit-cum-seniority was lawful and supportable.
  • Conclusion of law: Taking the documentary record, the staffing rules, the Chief Justice's prior decision, and the State Government's behaviour together, the court concluded the High Court did not err in granting selection grade to the respondents or in refusing it to petitioner Gulzar.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding (core ruling): The writ petition filed by Shri S.D. Gulzar challenging the High Court's order of 31 July 1978 granting selection grade to certain incumbents (and not to him) was dismissed. The court found no legal error in the High Court's decision to grant selection grade to the respondents on the basis and in the manner adopted.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The High Court's grant of selection grade to the respondents stands; petitioner Gulzar's challenge fails. The court dismissed the petition and left the parties to bear their own costs.
  • On broader precedent: The opinion reviews and applies existing authorities concerning selection grade criteria (seniority-cum-merit versus merit-cum-seniority) but does not purport to lay down a novel rule displacing existing authorities. It holds that selection grade may legitimately be granted on merit-cum-seniority in the circumstances found (including the Chief Justice's administrative competence and government acquiescence), and it does not announce a sweeping new principle beyond the facts and authorities discussed.
Show all summary ...

V.K Mehrotra, A.C.J:— Shri S.D Gulzar was taken on transfer as Personal Assistant-cum-Judgment Writer in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, with effect from January 1, 1964. He was posted in the Himachal Bench of the Delhi High Court on May 1, 1967 as a judgment Writer. The status of a Class II Gazetted Private Secretary was given to him with effect from December 30, 1967 through a Notification of the Delhi High Court dated January 23, 1968. He continued as a Class II Gazetted Private Secretary, after the setting up of the Himachal Pradesh High Court with effect from January 25, 1971, till he retired (on April 30, 1988). The present writ petition was filed by Shri Gulzar on September 12, 1978. In it, he assailed the order dated July 31, 1978, by which selection grade was granted to some of the respondents to the petition, though it was not granted to him.

2. The provision for grant of selection grade to its employees was made by the Government of Himachal Pradesh through an order dated July 31, 1976, with effect from July 7, 1976. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana also made a provision in the High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1973, for grant of selection grade, inter alia, to Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries through a Notification published in the Chandigarh Administration Gazette dated July 1, 1977. On September 19, 1977, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh addressed a letter to the Government of Himachal Pradesh with a request that incumbents of the posts of Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents, both permanent and temporary, which had been inexistence for three years, be allowed selection grade to the extent of 20% of the posts. On September 29, 1977, the Government of Himachal Pradesh addressed a letter to the High Court, in reply to the letter aforesaid, seeking complete proposal for grant of selection grade to all the eligible categories of the staff on the analogy of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and also asking for the total number of posts in each category and number of posts proposed for the grant of selection grade, together with the financial implications involved in the matter, to be communicated to it. The High Court wrote back on December 7, 1977. It said that on the pattern of the contemporary staff of the Punjab and Haryana High Court the three distinct classes of the staff, namely, Readers, Private Secretaries and Superintendents were eligible for the grant of selection grade and requested that “selection grade for three posts, namely, Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents, as given below be…….. ordered to be released separately for each category and the approval of the Government in this behalf communicated…… ‘. In a tabular chart was mentioned in this letter the number of posts and the release of selection grade was requested category-wise on the Punjab pattern in respect of one post each of Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents. Some clarification was sought by the State Government through its letter of February 27, 1978, which was furnished by the High Court to it through its communication of March 28, 1978. In this letter again the High Court made a request that the orders of the Government granting selection grade to each of the categories of Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries with effect from July 7, 1976, on the Punjab pattern be issued, after furnishing the information asked for by the Government in some detail. The State Government then issued an Office Memorandum dated June 16, 1973, which read thus:—

“Government of Himachal Pradesh

(Finance Department)

(Regulation Section)

No. 18/3/71-Fin-Reg.II Dated Shimla, 171002, the 16th June, 1978.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject: Introduction of Selection Grade in the cadre of Superintendents, Private ‘Secretaries and Readers of High Court of Himachal Pradesh.

“The Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to sanction selection grade of Rs. 900-1100 to the Private Secretaries, Readers/Superintendents of High Court of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 7.7.1976 subject to the condition that the amount of arrears upto 31.1.1978 will not be paid in cash but credited to the General Provident Fund Account of the individual concerned, on two years non-withdrawal basis. The selection grade will be admissible to 20% of permanent posts and temporary post of Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents which have been in existence for 3 years or more.

2. Hindi version of the above is also enclosed.

(R.C Kushesh)

Deputy Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.”

3. It is after the issuance of this office memorandum that the question of grant of selection grade was considered by the High Court. Then followed the order dated July 31, 1978, which is under challenge in this application.

4. The grievance of petitioner Gulzar is generally founded upon the principles mentioned in the office memorandum dated March 1, 1977, issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh in the matter of grant of selection grades. Its copy has been filed by him As Annexure-PH to the petition. In its relevant part this office memorandum says that the Government had decided that while releasing selection grade in respect of all the categories of posts/services (except All India Services, Himachal Administrative Services, Himachal Police Services and Himachal Judicial Services), the principles and procedure to be followed was that:

(1) the selection grade shall be released on the basis of seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit;

(2) the minimum service for the release of selection grade 10 years of service equivalent to 2/3rd of span of the pay scale in the service or post concerned whichever is less. For the purpose of calculation of 2/3rd of the span, half or more than half year will be rounded upto one year whereas less than half year will be ignored.

5. What was urged by Shri D.K Khanna, appearing for petitioner Gulzar, in the man was that both the above principles were ignored by the High Court in releasing selection grade, apart from the fact that the High Court erroneously took the view that Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries constituted separate categories though, in reality, they constituted a single cadre. In other words, what was emphasised on behalf of the petitioner was that the principle of seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit should have been the guiding factor for the grant of selection grade and not merit-cum-seniority which was the basis on which the High Court examined the question of the grant of selection grade. Also, that the High Court committed an error in ignoring the length of service of the various respondents to whom it had granted the selection grade and thus released the selection grade in favour of persons who were not eligible, having regard to their length of service, therefor. It was further emphasised that, inasmuch as, the grant of selection grade involved an increased financial burden, the High Court could not legitimately have treated Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries as distinct categories for purposes of determining the number of posts which would have the benefit of selection grade. Thus construed, three posts came to have the benefit of selection grade though having regard to the total number of permanent and temporary posts of Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries, taking them as forming one cadre, the number of posts in the selection grade could only be two when 20% of these posts were to be treated as entitled to be in the selection grade.

6. Taking up the last contention first, we may recall that in the various letters exchanged between the High Court and the State Government to which a reference has already been made by us, (their copies having been filed as Annexures R-1.A to R-1.F to the reply filed on behalf of the High Court in the writ petition) the consistent stand taken by the High Court was that the posts of Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries were of different categories and that selection grade be released separately for each category. The Government had also specifically required the High Court (through its letter of September 29, 1977, Annexure-R-1.C) to mention the total number of posts in each category and the number of posts proposed for the grant of selection grade. In its later latter of February 27, 1978, the Government had pointed out to the High Court that from the Notification dated June 11, 1977, issued by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana it appeared that the post of Private Secretaries was not covered and that the provisions of Rules 8, 9 and 10 in that notification were only in respect of Superintendents and Readers. Also, that the particular date from which the Government of India had sanctioned selection grade for the post of Private Secretaries, Superintendents and Readers in the Punjab and Haryana High Court be furnished to it. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh gave this information to the Government of Himachal Pradesh through its letter dated March 28, 1978. Then came the office memorandum (Annexure-PG to the petition) of June 16, 1978.

7. A look at the office memorandum of June 16, 1978, would show that the decision conveyed through it was that “selection grade will be admissible to 20% of permanent posts and temporary post of Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents which have been in existence for 3 years or more”. In terms, therefore, the sanction of selection grade was to 20% posts of the three categories. It was not confined to 20% posts of the combined strength of the three categories as was suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner on account of the use of ‘oblique’ between the words ‘Private Secretaries, Readers and Superintendents’ in the office memorandum. The form in which the office memorandum was issued by the Government, having regard to the earlier correspondence between it and the High Court, makes it clear that it was not intended by the State Government that 20% posts of the combined strength of the three categories will be in the selection grade. If it had that intention, it would have said so in the office memorandum itself.

8. Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the opening part of the office memorandum where it mentions that the subject of the office memorandum was “introduction of selection grade in the cadre of Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers of High Court of Himachal Pradesh”. He urged that this indicated that notwithstanding the demand made by the High Court for the grant of selection grade separately in respect of each category, the State Government chose to do so in respect of a combined cadre of these posts. This submission is not sound. Firstly, the office memorandum does not contain any such indication in its body. Secondly, cadre as defined in Fundamental Rule 9(4) means “the strength of a service or a part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit”. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1975, (framed under Article 229. of the Constitution and in force with effect from January 10, 1976), contains a clear indication that the posts of Readers, Superintendents and Private Secretaries are treated as being in separate cadres. A “Court servant” has been defined in Rule 3(c) to mean “an officer or servant appointed, or borne on the cadre of the staff of the High Court shown in the First Schedule as amended from time to time.” Schedule I appended to the Rules deals with permanent posts. It refers to Superintendents (serial No. 4), Private Secretaries (serial Nos. 5 and 6) and Readers (serial No. 7) separately, (though in the same scale of pay) and specifies the number of permanent posts in each category. For purposes of the definition of cadre, as contained in Fundamental Rule 9(4), the number of posts in these categories which have been sanctioned as separate units will be deemed to constitute a cadre. The distinction between these three posts, having regard to qualifications therefor and the mode of recruitment thereto, including the source of recruitment, becomes more than clear when one looks at Schedule II appended to the Rules. One has only to look at entries 5 (Superintendents), 6 (Private Secretaries), and 7 (Readers). Rule 10 (b) (i) (as it then stood) provided that seniority shall be determined separately tor each category of posts carrying the same grade of pay. By its Explanation, this Rule gives equivalence to the Personal Assistant to the Registrar with Assistants and to Junior Translators with clerks. The provision contained in Rule 12 that “incumbents of posts carrying corresponding scales and grades of pay shall be subject to inter-se transfer to be effected in the discretion of the Chief Justice”, cannot be read as providing equivalence to the three categories or making them part of the same cadre as canvassed on behalf of the petitioner. This Rule only provides for their inter-changeability solely for administrative convenience.

9. The fact that the State Government has not raised any objection till now to the grant of selection grade to incumbents of one post each in the three categories separately also makes it abundantly clear that it had sanctioned release of selection grade to 20% of posts in each of the categories separately as asked for by the High Court. The consequence of the acceptance of the submission made on behalf of petitioner Gulzar on this aspect of the case would be a reduction in the number of the posts in selection grade. It would not be desirable, after the lapse of a period of over ten years, to accept an interpretation of the office memorandum dated June 16, 1978, (Annexure-PG), which may result in that consequence.

10. The plea that it was not open to the High Court to depart from the principles contained in the office memorandum dated March 1, 1977 (Annexure-PH to the petition) may now be examined. The two principles in this office memorandum, as noticed earlier, are that selection grade is to be released on the basis of seniority-cum-merit subject to rejection of unfit and that the minimum service for the release of selection grade should be ten years or service equivalent to 2/3rd of span of the pay scale in the service or post concerned whichever is less.

11. The office memorandum of June 16, 1978, (Annexure-PG) does not contain any reference to the office memorandum of March 1, 1977, (Annexure-PH). It also does not say that the grant of selection grade would be subject to any condition, apart from the fact that the amount of arrears upto January 31, 1978, would not be paid in cash but would be credited to the General Provident Fund Account of the concerned on two years non-withdrawal basis. All that this office memorandum provides is that the selection grade would be admissible to 20% of posts. |t is true, as pointed out on behalf of the petitioner, that in its letter of August 17, 1978 (Annexure-PN) the State Government had requested the High Court to intimate it whether the general principles and procedure laid down by the State Government in the office memorandum dated March 1, 1977, for release of selection grade to individual Government servants, had been kept in view by the High Court while issuing the impugned notification of July 31, 1978 or not. Also, that if they had not been kept in view, the notification will have to be withdrawn. The High Court sent a reply to this letter on September 14, 1978, (Annexure PO). In this reply it is mentioned that the principles contained in the office memorandum of March 1, 1977, were brought to the notice of the Chief Justice who had kept them in view while making appointments to the selection grade posts “but appointments to the selection grade posts were made by the Hon'ble Chief Justice on the basis of merit-cum-seniority”. A copy of the reply was also endorsed to the Under Secretary (Home) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh with reference to his letter dated August 4, 1978. By this letter a reminder had been issued by the Government to the Registrar of the High Court in respect of the information sought through the letter dated August 17, 1978. The State Government did not pursue the matter any further, nor insisted upon the withdrawal of the notification dated July 31, 1978 (Annexure-PJ) by which selection grade to some of the respondents had been granted by the High Court as per the proposal contained in its letter of August 17, 1978. The State Government thus acquiesced in the view taken by the Chief Justice in regard to the basis on which grant of selection grade was to be made.

12. During the hearing of the petition the original records relating to the grant of selection grade, as also the further correspondence between the High Court and the Government in that regard, was placed before the learned counsel, appearing for the High Court, as desired by us. Our attention was, in particular, drawn to three letters. Copies of these letters were also made available to the learned counsel for the petitioner under our direction. The first of these letters was the one dated October 7, 1978. It had been sent by the State Government to the Registrar of the Court with reference to the High Court's letter of September 14, 1978. The Government had desired, through this letter, that copies of the orders of the grant of selection grade be forwarded to it. Also, the date of appointment of the persons to whom selection grade has been granted, in the previous grade as also the basic salary of each of them on the date of the grant of selection grade, was requested to be intimated to the Government. No objection, whatsoever, was made by the Government in this letter to the grant of selection grade to the persons concerned. A reminder to this letter of October 7, 1978, was also sent by the Government through its letter of November 17, 1978, to the High Court. The High Court wrote back to the Government, with reference to the letters of October 7 and November 17, 1978, to the State Government, on November 27, 1978. Along with this letter (No. HHC/Admn. 3(13)/74-V-8078 dated November 27, 1978) the information asked for by the Government was furnished in the form of a statement which accompanied the letter. In this statement the names of the persons to whom selection grade bad been granted were mentioned separately category-wise and the dates of the appointment of each of them in the old scale and in the selection grade were also shown. The basic pay in the old scale, on the date of the grant of selection grade, was also mentioned in this statement in respect of each of the officers. The State Government did not, even thereafter, raise any objection to the grant of selection grade to respondents. They have not done so till now.

13. The grant of selection grade to the officers of the High Court of the category to which petitioner Gulzar and the respondents in the petition belong is not governed by any statutory rules. It is governed only by executive instructions. Article 229 of the Constitution enables the Chief Justice to lay down the norms on which selection grade may be granted. As far as the High Court of Himachal Pradesh is concerned, the question of grant of selection grade was considered by Chief Justice R.S Pathak as far back as in March 1977. The Office Memorandum dated March 1, 1977, was placed before him. On March 5, 1977, he recorded a note on the relevant file saying:

“Perused Government Memorandum No. PEP (AP-II)-B(11)-1/76 dated 1st March, 1977. Selection grade to be allowed on the basis of merit-cum-seniority…….

R.S Pathak, C.J

5.3.1977”

14. The matter appears to have been discussed by the Chief Justice with T.U Mehta, J. On March 9, 1977, a note was recorded by the Chief Justice that he had discussed the matter of adopting a principle for the grant of selection grades and that “the principle in all cases should be merit-cum-seniority”.

15. The matter appears to have been considered further by the Court after the State Government had sanctioned selection grade to the posts of Assistants and Senior Scale Stenographers by Office Memorandum No. 5/9/72-Fin.-Reg. dated November 17, 1976. On April 2, 1977, the then Chief Justice (R.S Pathak) examined the matter and, amongst other things, said that:

“……My attention has been drawn to the Office Memorandum of the Himachal Pradesh Government dated March 1, 1977, prescribing the basis for appointment to the Selection Grade posts and the qualifying period for eligibility to such appointment. In my opinion, so far as the officers and servants of the High Court are concerned their conditions of service fall within the exclusive competence of the Chief Justice, and the State Government has no power to prescribe such conditions of service. Accordingly, the Office Memorandum dated March 1, 1977, must be ignored so far as it seeks to operate in respect of the officers and servants of the High Court. I am further of opinion that appointment to the selection grade posts of Assistants and Senior Scale Stenographers in the High Court should be made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority.”

16. The Chief Justice directed the Registry to examine the question of amendment in the 1975 Rules and of proposing a Rule incorporating criteria of merit-cum-seniority for appointment to selection grade posts and also to examine whether the qualifying period should be prescribed. However, no such Rule was actually framed.

17. When the grant of selection grade was sanctioned for the posts of Private Secretaries, Superintendents and Readers of the High Court, the question of criterion to be adopted was examined again. Some representations, including one made by petitioner Gulzar, in regard to the basis for the grant of selection grade, had been made to the High Court. They were also examined and eventually an order was recorded, on July 22, 1978, by the Chief Justice for the grant of selection grade to the various respondents in this petition. It was noticed in this order that the question whether selection grade should be given on the basis of seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority had been considered in the past and it had been decided that the selection grade can be given only on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. It was reiterated that the same principle should be followed even in the present case. While examining the case of grant of selection grade in the posts of Private Secretaries it was said in the order by the Chief Justice, inter-alia, that:

“Out of the 5 posts of Private Secretaries one post would be that of selection grade. Sarvshri S.D Gulzar, K.N Awasthi, G.D Sehgal, T.R Thakur, Bishan Dass and Maya Datt Kaushal are in the list and their seniority is in the order in which their names are stated here. The principle of merit-cum-seniority is to be followed in selecting one of these persons for the selection post. So far Shri S.D Gulzar is concerned he is senior most but after referring to his service record it is held that he cannot be given the selection grade….. It is found that having regard to the seniority of Shri G.D Sehgal and having regard to the fact that his performance is outstanding he should be given selection grade…..”

18. In All India Backward Classes and Minorities Welfare Association v. Union of India, (AIR 1988 SC 1322), the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the question of grant of selection grade on the criterion of merit. The Supreme Court took the view that the refusal of selection grade to the petitioner, after his case had also been considered with those of others, on comparison of the service record, on the ground that some officers junior to the petitioner before the Supreme Court were more suitable for the grant, could not be said to be unreasonable.

19. What was stressed on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel was that the grant of selection grade was made with a view to avoid stagnation amongst those who cannot be promoted. It does not involve a process of selection because the post, duties and responsibilities continued to be the same. Consequently, the reasonable criterion for making the grant can only be seniority-cum-merit and not merit-cum-seniority. Our attention was drawn to some decisions. The first of these was in Lalit Mohan Deb v. Union of India, (AIR 1972 SC 995). The observations that the Supreme Court made (in paragraph 7 of the report) amongst others, are that:

“……It is well recognised that a promotion post is a higher post with a higher pay. A selection grade has higher pay but in the same post. A selection grade is intended to ensure that capable employees who may not get a chance of promotion on account of limited outlets of promotions should at least be placed in the selection grade to prevent stagnation on the maximum of the scale. Selection grades are therefore created in the interest of greater efficiency. In the present case it is explained in the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the Administration that the basis for selection of some of the Assistants to the higher scale is seniority-cum-merit which is one of the two or three principles of promotion widely accented in the Administration and duly recognised by the Pay Commission in Chapter XXXXV of the report.”

20. It is noticeable that, according to the observations of the Supreme Court, selection grades are created in the interest of greater efficiency. Also, that adoption of one of the two or three principles of promotion widely accepted in the Administration was permissible. We may also observe that in paragraph 9 of the report the Supreme Court also noticed the fact that the appointment to the selection grade was made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit based upon a test open to all Assistants carried out in accordance with a prescribed procedure. Further, that the appellants before the Supreme Court had not appeared for those tests and, therefore, could have no complaint about selection.

21. A Full Bench of the Orissa high Court almost borrowed the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmidhar Mallick v. State of Orissa, [1974 (1) Services Law Reporter 165] when it said (in paragraph 8 of the report) that:

“………It is well recognised that a promotion post is a higher post with a higher pay and higher responsibility. A selection grade has higher pay but in the same cadre. A selection grade is intended to ensure that capable employees who may not get a chance of promotion on account of limited outlets of promotion should atleast be placed in the selection grade to prevent stagnation on the maximum of the scale.”

22. In D.K Bhatnagar v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, [1979 (2) S.L.R 693] a Division Bench of this Court, speaking through T.U Mehta, C.J, said (in paragraph 41 of the report) that:

“…..Unless the rules show that a particular promotion should be based principally on the principle of selection, the formula of merit-cum-seniority should not be applied, and the normal principle of seniority-cum-merit should be followed.”

23. The Division Bench was examining the question of inter-se seniority between the petitioners and some others as Assistants. By the order impugned in the Writ Petition the name, inter-alia, of petitioner Bhatnagar was removed from the seniority list of Assistants and inserted in the lower category of posts. The. petitioner had sought a declaration that he was entitled to be retained on the post of an Assistant. The Bench noticed that while considering the case of regularisation of an official like Bhatnagar the Promotion Committee was not entitled to import, in the absence of any statutory rules, the principle of merit-cum-seniority while examining the matter.

24. In Dayaram Asanand Gursahani v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 850), while examining the question whether appellant Gursahani, while working in the cadre of District Judges, was entitled to get the salary and allowances in the selection grade observed (in paragraph 17 of the report) in the case before them that:

“……the mere nomenclature given to the extended pay scale as the selection grade pay scale does not lead to the inference that there is an element of selection involved in sanctioning it. In the circumstances it should be treated as just an extended pay scale……… the refusal on the part of the High Court to sanction the selection grade pay scale to the appellant when it became due automatically on the ground that he was not found fit to be sanctioned that scale of pay is erroneous……..”

25. These decisions do not lay down that the grant of selection grade cannot be made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. In fact, the observations in Lalit Mohan Deb which we have quoted earlier seem to suggest that the grant of selection grade is created in the interest of greater efficiency. This object, we feel, would be furthered more if the element of merit took primacy in determining the question of grant of selection grade. We can find no error in the criterion which this Court chose to adopt in the matter of grant of selection grade in the instant case. The argument that the norms of eligibility, having regard to the length of service of the incumbents of the posts who were to be considered for grant of selection grade, or the criterion therefor and the number of posts which would be eligible for such grant could not be altered by the High Court on its own, and concurrence of the Governor was necessary before doing so as it involved greater financial burden, need not detain us for long. As noticed by us earlier, the State Government did not subject the sanction of selection grade to any of the conditions which have now been put forward on behalf of the petitioner. It is clear from a plain reading of the Office Memorandum dated June 16, 1978. The Office Memorandum does not mention any requirement of eligibility in the matter of number of years of service, it does not contain any criterion for the grant and, on its plain language, it says that selection grade will be admissible to 20% of permanent posts and temporary post of Private Secretaries/Readers/Superintendents, which had been in existence for three years or more, without saying that the combined strength of these three categories was to be taken into consideration for determining the number of 20% posts. Besides, after the grant of selection grade to the number of posts to which it was made admissible by the High Court and on the basis on which it was granted, the State Government was apprised of the position by the High Court repeatedly. It did not raise any objection to the grant made by the High Court. A challenge on the ground that the action of the High Court resulted in higher financial burden and the concurrence of the Governor was, necessary, cannot legitimately be made by the petitioner in these circumstances.

26. In conclusion, we are unable to accept that the grant of selection grade to the respondents and refusal thereof to petitioner Gulzar, was in anyway erroneous in law. We are, therefore, unable to interpose any relief in favour of the petitioner in the present writ petition which deserves to be dismissed. We dismiss it but leave the parties to bear their own costs.

27. Petition dismissed.