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Union Of India v. Randhir Singh And Others

Himachal Pradesh High Court
May 30, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents, S/Shri Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh, employed as Drivers in the Beas Satluj Link Project, Sundernagar, were convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, under Section 379 IPC (FIR No. 137 of 1975) for theft of diesel from vehicle No. RL-165. They were released on probation of good conduct for one year under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. On 24.11.1976 the Superintending Engineer, Beas Satluj Link Construction Circle No. 2, Sundernagar, passed an order terminating their services. The respondents filed a suit seeking a declaration that the termination was bad, that they continued in service and were entitled to consequential benefits. The Sub Judge, Sundernagar, decreed the suit on 1.11.1979; the decree was confirmed by the Additional District Judge, Mandi, on 16.8.1980. The Union of India appealed in a Regular Second Appeal before Kamlesh Sharma, J., challenging the confirmation of the decree and the original decree in favour of the respondents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the respondents' suit challenging their termination, given the remedial machinery under industrial law (as argued with reference to Jitendra Nath Biswas).
  2. Whether the termination order was in accordance with the Standing Orders applicable to the Project, specifically whether conviction by a criminal court automatically constituted misconduct permitting dismissal without notice under the Standing Orders (clauses 16(b)(v), 17(b)(xv), and 17(c)).
  3. Whether the disciplinary authority was required to apply its mind to the effect of the respondents' release on probation and independently determine the quantum of punishment or whether dismissal on conviction was proper notwithstanding probation (including reliance on Union of India v. Bakshi Ram).
  4. What is the role of Article 311 of the Constitution (and related Supreme Court authority such as Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel) in respect of the requirement to consider penalty after conviction and the scope of judicial review of departmental punishment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Union of India) Arguments

  • The Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to try the suit because the relief of reinstatement and back wages is essentially industrial in nature and falls within the exclusive/appropriate machinery of the Industrial Disputes Act (relying on Jitendra Nath Biswas).
  • The termination order was passed in accordance with the Standing Orders; conviction by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude constitutes misconduct and, under the Standing Orders, permits dismissal/discharge without notice (clauses 16(b)(v), 17(b)(xv), 17(c)).
  • The disciplinary authority was not required to consider the effect of the respondents' release on probation, because probation did not obliterate the stigma of conviction or entitle the employees to reinstatement (relying on Union of India v. Bakshi Ram).

Respondents' (Randhir Singh & Kuldip Singh) Arguments

  • Their employment was not purely contractual but had a statutory element; they could invoke the Civil Court to challenge termination alleging breach of Standing Orders and violations of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and seek reinstatement and back wages.
  • The disciplinary authority was required to apply its mind independently to the effect of their release on probation and to the quantum of punishment to be imposed; dismissal was not an automatic consequence of conviction (relying on Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel and Article 311 principles).
  • They attempted to distinguish Jitendra Nath Biswas on the facts, arguing civil forum remained appropriate given their statutory protections and the particulars of their employment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co., (1989) 3 SCC 582; AIR 1990 SC 255 Where remedies and reliefs (reinstatement and back wages) are provided and governed by the Industrial Disputes Act and standing orders, civil court jurisdiction is impliedly barred; employment contracts for personal service cannot be specifically enforced in ordinary civil courts. The Union of India relied on this case to argue lack of civil jurisdiction. The Court considered the authority but held it was not fully applicable because the respondents were Central Government employees governed by terms of appointment and certified Standing Orders; thus Jitendra Nath Biswas did not dispose of the present case in full vigour.
Jaswant Singh v. Union of India, 1979 (2) SLR 375 (SC) Employees of Beas Satluj Link Project were held to be employees of the Central Government and their service conditions were governed primarily by terms of employment. The Court relied on this to conclude that the respondents were Central Government employees and their conditions of service were governed by appointment terms and certified Standing Orders, establishing that they were workmen/workcharged employees covered under industrial law.
Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, 1990 (2) SLR 65 (SC) Release on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act removes certain disqualifications but does not entitle a person dismissed for a conviction to reinstatement; Section 12 (as discussed) does not mean that dismissal consequent to conviction is automatically cured by probation. The Union relied on this case to argue that the disciplinary authority need not consider the respondents' release on probation because probation did not obliterate the stigma of conviction. The Court accepted that position and held the disciplinary authority was right to dismiss without considering probation.
Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 Under Article 311(2) proviso, when a disciplinary authority learns of a conviction it must consider whether the conduct warrants penalty and which penalty is appropriate; conviction does not automatically entail dismissal, and courts have limited judicial review to correct arbitrary or excessive penalties. The respondents relied on this authority to argue that dismissal is not automatic and disciplinary authority must consider the appropriate punishment. The Court noted the principle but observed that where Standing Orders expressly prescribe dismissal for conviction involving moral turpitude there was no scope for independent application of mind as contemplated in Tulsi Ram Patel.
Shankar Dass v. Union of India (as cited in Tulsi Ram Patel) Illustrative authority where the Court set aside a penalty of dismissal found to be whimsical or disproportionate and ordered reinstatement with back wages. Mentioned in the Tulsi Ram Patel exposition as an example of judicial intervention; the present Court recited the principle but distinguished the facts because the Standing Orders in the instant case prescribed dismissal for the relevant misconduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal stages: jurisdictional analysis and merits/disciplinary law analysis.

Jurisdictional analysis:

  • The Union contended that the civil court lacked jurisdiction in view of Jitendra Nath Biswas where the Supreme Court held that reliefs of reinstatement and back wages are essentially industrial and the Industrial Disputes Act provides the proper machinery for such reliefs. The Court examined Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure as considered in that authority.
  • The Court then examined the nature of the respondents' employment. Relying on Jaswant Singh, it found that the employees of the Beas Satluj Link Project were Central Government employees whose conditions of service were governed by terms of appointment and certified Standing Orders. It was undisputed the respondents were workmen and workcharged employees covered under industrial law.
  • On that basis the Court concluded that Jitendra Nath Biswas was not applicable in full vigour to the present case. The Court also indicated it would be unfair and unjust to dismiss the respondents' civil suit purely on jurisdictional grounds given the long lapse of time since their termination (24.11.1976).

Merits / Standing Orders and disciplinary action:

  • The Court examined the Standing Orders: clause 16(b)(v) (authorising dismissal/discharge), clause 17(b)(xv) (conviction in any court of law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude constitutes misconduct), and clause 17(c) (gross misconduct renders an employee liable to dismissal/discharge without notice and disqualifies for future employment on Government Project).
  • The Union's submission that conviction itself amounted to misconduct and allowed dismissal without notice was considered. The Court held there was no force in the respondents' contention that the disciplinary authority was required to apply its mind to the effect of the release on probation. The Court relied on Union of India v. Bakshi Ram to support the proposition that release on probation does not erase the stigma of conviction nor entitle a dismissed person automatically to reinstatement.
  • The Court addressed Article 311 jurisprudence as explained in Tulsi Ram Patel, which requires a disciplinary authority, upon learning of a criminal conviction, to consider whether the conduct warrants penalty and to decide upon the appropriate penalty ex parte (subject to the limited scope of judicial review). However, the Court distinguished Tulsi Ram Patel on the facts: since the Standing Orders expressly prescribed dismissal for conviction involving moral turpitude, there was no scope for the disciplinary authority to exercise an independent discretion as contemplated by Tulsi Ram Patel regarding quantum of punishment.
  • Weighing these authorities and the content of the Standing Orders, the Court concluded that dismissal on the ground of conviction involving moral turpitude was permissible without further independent consideration of probation or quantum of punishment by the disciplinary authority.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment dated 16.8.1980 of the District Judge, which had confirmed the trial court's decree, is set aside and the suit of S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The termination of the respondents' services (order dated 24.11.1976) is upheld by this Court's allowance of the appeal; the respondents' suit seeking a declaration of continued service and consequential benefits is dismissed.
  • Legal consequence as applied in this case: The Court affirmed that when certified Standing Orders expressly provide that conviction for offences involving moral turpitude constitutes misconduct attracting dismissal without notice, a disciplinary authority may dismiss on that ground and is not required to treat release on probation as obliterating the conviction's effect. The Court also distinguished authorities on the scope of civil jurisdiction and Article 311 applicability based on the factual matrix and the terms of the Standing Orders.
  • No new precedent was pronounced by this Court beyond its application and reconciliation of existing authorities to the facts before it; the decision resolves the dispute between these parties by applying cited Supreme Court authorities and the Project's Standing Orders.

This summary has been prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments or authorities beyond those appearing in the opinion have been added or inferred.

Show all summary ...

Kamlesh Sharma, J.:— This is a R???gular Second Appeal at the instance of Union of India challenging the d???cree and judgment dated 16-8-1980 of Addl. District Judge, Mandi, whereby the decree and judgment dated 1.11.1979 of Sub Judge, Sundernagar, was confirmed and the suit of the respondents-plaintiffs, Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh, was decreed.

2. S/Shri Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh had filed a suit for declaration that their termination from the service of Beas Satluj Link Project, Sundernagar, by the appellants-defendants vide order dated 24.11.1976 passed by the Superintending Engineer, Beas Satluj Link Construction Circle No. 2, Sundernagar, was bad and they continued to be in service and entitled to all consequential benefits thereof. They were working as Drivers in the Beas Satluj Link Project, Sundernagar. In a case under Sec. 379 IPC (FIR No. 137 of 1975) they were convicted for the commission of theft of diesel oil f???om vehicle No. RL- 165 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi but were released on probation of good conduct for one year under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The case of S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh was that their termination order was passed on conviction alone and the disciplinary authority had not applied its mind to the effect of their release on probation and also to quantum of punishment to be imposed keeping in view the gravity of their mis-conduct. The Union of India and others resisted the suit and took a number of preliminary objections. One of the preliminary objections was that the Civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. On merits, it was alleged that the impugned termination order was passed in accordance with law. The trial court decreed the suit for declaration and quashed the impugned termination order. S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh were declared to be in continuous service of Beas Satluj Link Project and entitled to their pay and allowance etc. In appeal, the District Judge affirmed the decree. Before the District Judge, findings, of the trial court on Issue No. 5 alone were challenged and the findings on other issues were not disputed as mentioned in Para 5 of his judgment.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. One of the points raised by Sh. R.L Sood, learnned counsel for Union of India and others, is that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the present suit. He submits that though this point was not urged by the counsel who appeared for the Union of India and others before the District Judge, yet, it being the point of jurisdiction, this Court is competent to go into it and examine the matter in view of the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co., (1989) 3 SCC 582 : AIR 1990 S.C 255. On the other hand, Sh. D.D Sood, learned counsel for Sh. Randhir Singh urges that the employment of respondents was not purely contractual but was also statutory. They could file civil suit challenging their termination order alleging violation of Standing Order and also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and ask for decree of reinstatement as well as backwages. He has tried to distinguish the judgment of Jitendra Nath Biswas (supra) on facts.

4. In the above matter before the Supreme Court, the appellant was an employee of M/s Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. and his service conditions were gov???rned by contract and Standing Orders framed under Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act. After taking into consideration Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court held:—

“It is clear that wherever the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly or impliedly barred, the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. It could not be disputed that a contract of employment for personal service could not be specifically ennforced and it is also clear that except the industrial law, under the law of contract and the civil law, an employee whose services are terminated could not seek the relief of reinstatement or back wages. At best he could seek the relief of damages for breach of contract. The manner in which the relief has been framed by the appellan??? plaintiff in this case, although he seeks a declaration and injunction but in substance it is nothing but the relief of reinstatement and back wages. The relief which could only be available to a Workman under the Industrial Disputes Act.”

5. Thereafter the learned Judges of the Supreme Court considered various provisions o??? Industrial Disputes Act and held:—

“It is therefore clear that this Act, i.e Industrial Disputes Act not only confer the right on a worker for reinstatement and back wages if the order of termination or dismissal is not in accordance with the Standing Orders but also provides a detailed procedure and machinery for getting this relief. Under these circumstances therefore there is an apparent implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court………..

It is therefore clear that the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Court by implication in respect of remedies which are available under this Act and for which a complete procedure and machinery has been provided in this Act.”

6. So far as the respondents-plaintiffs, S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh are concerned, they were employees of Beas Satluj Link Project Sundernagar. In Jaswant Singh v. Union of India, 1979 (2) SLR 375 (SC), the employees of Beas Satluj Link Project, Sundernagar, were held to be employees of Central Governmen??? and it was observed that their conditions of service were primarily governed by the terms of their employment. As such, S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh were also Central Government employees and their conditions of service were governed by the terms of their appointment besides certified Standing Orders. It is not in dispute that S/Shri Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh were workmen as well as workcharged employees and were covered under the Industrial Law.

7. They are entitled to protection under Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution. Therefore the above referred case of Jitendra Nath Biswas (supra) is not applicable to present case in its full vigour. Moreover, it is not fair and just to dismiss this case on the ground of jurisdiction and relegate the plaintiffs, who were terminated as far back as on 24.11.1976, to the forum provided under the industrial law.

8. The next point raised by Sh. R.L Sood is that the termination order of S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh was in accordance with Standing Orders and there is no infirmity in them. According to him, conviction by criminal court is by itself misconduct which entails dismissal/discharge without any notice. The services of S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh were terminated under clause 16(b)(v) of the Standing Orders. Under Clause 17(b) of the Standing Orders, act of omission constituting mis-conduct have been enumerated. Conviction in any court of law for any Criminal offence involving moral turpitude constitutes mis-conduct under sub-clause (xv) of Clause 17(b) of the Standing Order. It is further provided under clause 17(c) of the Standing Orders that an employee shall be liable to be dismissed/discharged if he has been found guilty of gross-misconduct, without notice or pay in lieu thereof and he will be disqualified for future employment on this Project or any other Government Project. There is no dispute that S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh were convicted by the Chie??? Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, for the commission of theft of diesel oil which involved moral turpitude and they were guilty of gross misconduct and could be dismissed under Standing Order 16(b)(v) without any notice to them. In view of this Standing Order, there is no force in the contention of Sh. D.D Sood, learned counsel for Sh. Randhir Singh that the disciplinary authority was required to apply its mind independently to the quantum of punishment to be imposed upon them. When law is clear and it takes away the opportunity of notice or hearing, it cannot be said that principles of natural justice are applied and the employee is entitled to hearing.

9. Sh. R.L Sood, learned counsel for the appellants, has further pointed out that the disciplinary authority was not required to consider the effect of release of S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh on probation as it did not absolve them of their conviction. He has placed reliance on Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, 1990 (2) SLR 65 (SC), wherein effect of release on probation was considered and it was held that:—

“Section 12 is thus clear and it only directs that the offender “shall not suffer disqualifcation, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law”. Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction. For instance, if a law provides for disqualification of a person for being appointed in any office o??? for seeking election to any authority or body in view of his conviction, that disqualification by virtue of S. 12 stands removed. That in effect is the Scope and effect of S. 12 of the Act. But that is not the same thing to state that the person who has been dismissed from service in view of his conviction is entitled to reinstatement upon getting the benefit of probation of good conduct. Apparently, such a view has no support by the terms of S. 12 and the order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained.”

10. In view of the settled legal position, I find no force in the contention raised on behalf of Sh. Randhir Singh that the disciplinary authority was required to apply its mind to the effect of release of S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh on probation. I hold that the disciplinary authority was right in straightway dismissing them for the mis-conduct of their conviction by a criminal court as the stigma of conviction did not obliterate on account of their release on probation.

11. Another point raised by Sh. D.D Sood, learned counsel for Sh. Randhir Singh is that besides the Standing Orders, the terms and conditions of these employees were governed by Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. He placed reliance upon Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 to urge that dismissal was not automatic after conviction and the disciplinary authority was required to consider whether it involved misconduct and what punishment would be proportionate to its gravity. In Tulsi Ram's case (supra), the Court has observed:—

“Not much remains to be said about clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2). To recapitulate briefly, where a disciplinary authority comes to know that a government servant has been convicted on a criminnal charge it must consider whether his conduct which has led to his conviction was such as warrants the imposition of a penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be. For that purpose it will have to peruse the judgment of the criminal court and consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and the various factors set out in Challappan case. This however, has to be done by it ex parte and by itself. Once the disciplinary authority reaches the conclusion that the government servant's conduct was such as to require his dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank he must decide which of these three penalties should be imposed on him. This too it has to do by itself and without hearing the concerned government servant by reason of the exclusionary effect of the second proviso. The disciplinary authority must, however, bear in mind that a conviction on a criminal charge does not automatically entail dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of the concerned government servant. Having decided which of these three penalties is required to be imposed, he has to pass the requisite order. A government servant who is aggrieved by the penalty imposed can agitate in appeal, revision or review, as the case may be, that the penalty was too severe or excessive and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. If it is his case that he is not the government servant who has been in fact convicted, he can also agitate this question in appeal, revision or review. If he fails in the departmental remedies and still wants to pursue the matter, he can invoke the court's power of judicial review subject to the court permitting it. If the court finds that he was not in fact the person convicted, it will strike down the impugned order and order him to be reinstated in service. Where the court finds that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or the requirements of that particular government service the court will also strike down the impugned order. Thus, in Shankar Dass v. Union of India this Court set aside the impugned order of penalty on the ground that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant was whimsical and ordered his reinstatement in service with full back wages. It is, however, not necessary that the court should always order reinstatement. The court can instead substitute a penalty which in its opinion would be just and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

12. From the above observations of the Supreme Court, in the case of Tulsi Ram (Supra), it is clear that penalty of dismissal could be imposed by the disciplinary authority without hearing the employee. No doubt, judicial review against the order passed by the disciplinary authority is available but its scope is very much limited. Since in the present case, it is provided in the Standing Orders that conviction involving moral turpitude is a mis-conduct for which dismissal/discharge is the penalty, there was no scope for the disciplinary authority to apply its mind independently to the quantum of penalty.

13. In view of this, the appeal is allowed and the decree and judgment dated 16.8.1980 of District Judge is set aside and the suit of S/Sh. Randhir Singh and Kuldip Singh is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. There is no order as to costs.

14. Appeal allowed.