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Committee Of Management, Indira Gandhi Inter College v. District Inspector Of Schools

Allahabad High Court
Mar 25, 1992
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Summary of Legal Opinion — R.A. Sharma, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an order of the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad (referred to in the opinion variously as the D.T.O.S and D.I.O.S) that recognised a Committee of Management of Sarvodaya Shiksha Niketan, Jamha, Mau Aima, Allahabad (the College) headed by respondent no. 2. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition, and the petitioner filed this Special Appeal against that decision.

The appeal arises against the D.I.O.S.'s recognition of the respondents' Committee of Management and attestation of its manager's signature. The appellant's principal contentions were (i) that invocation of section 16-A(7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act does not require existence of rival Committees of Management, and (ii) that the appellant's Committee of Management continued to exist after the expiry of three years, so the D.I.O.S. had no jurisdiction to recognise the respondents' Committee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether invocation of section 16-A(7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act requires the existence of rival Committees of Management (i.e., whether two rival committees are a condition precedent to the Deputy/Regional Deputy Director of Education's jurisdiction under that sub‑section).
  2. Whether the appellant's Committee of Management continued to exist after the expiry of three years (by virtue of Clause-7 of the College's Scheme of Administration permitting office-bearers to continue until successors are elected), thereby ousting the D.I.O.S.'s jurisdiction to recognise the respondents' Committee.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Submission 1: For invoking the provisions of section 16-A(7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, existence of rival Committees of Management is not necessary.
  • Submission 2: The petitioner's Committee of Management continued to exist even after expiry of three years (relying on Clause-7 of the Scheme of Administration which permits office-bearers to continue till successors are elected); moreover, there were two rival Committees of Management before the D.I.O.S. when he passed the impugned order, so he had no jurisdiction to recognise the respondent's Committee and attest its manager's signature.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents' counsel disputed the appellant's submissions (the opinion records that the respondents disputed the appellant's two submissions, without detailing further specific arguments).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandra Kesh Rai v. Deputy Director of Education, 1985 UP LB EC 1124 The principle that before a dispute can be referred to the Deputy Director of Education under section 16-A(7) of the Intermediate Education Act, there should be two rival management committees. The court relied on this decision to hold that existence of two rival Committees of Management is a condition precedent for invoking the Deputy Director of Education's jurisdiction under section 16-A(7).
Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools, 1984 UP LB EC 610 Facts of that case showed two rival Committees existed at the time the D.I.O.S. passed the impugned order; the court in that case held the D.I.O.S. had no jurisdiction in those circumstances. The present court found that this decision did not assist the appellant because in that earlier matter there were two rival committees at the relevant time; the question whether existence of rival committees is a condition precedent to invoking section 16-A(7) was not raised or decided in that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed sub-section (7) of section 16-A of the Act, which empowers the (Regional) Deputy Director of Education to recognise the Committee of Management "whenever there is dispute with respect to the Management of an institution" by recognising the persons found to be in actual control until a court directs otherwise. The provision includes a safeguard requiring reasonable opportunity for rival claimants to make representations in writing, and an explanation that actual control should be judged with regard to control over the funds, administration, receipt of income, the Scheme of Administration approved under subsection (5), and other relevant circumstances.

The court observed that a Committee of Management is an independent legal entity and, under sub-section (1) of section 16-A, only a Committee constituted in accordance with the Scheme of Administration has authority to manage the institution. Because the Committee functions through the persons who constitute it, the reference in sub-section (7) to those who are in "actual control" must be understood as referring to persons elected to constitute the Managing Committee. A dispute about management therefore arises only when there is a claim and counter-claim between different sets of persons constituting rival managing committees over their right to manage the institution.

On that basis, the court concluded that existence of two rival Committees of Management is a condition precedent to invoking the Deputy Director of Education's jurisdiction under section 16-A(7). The court relied on Chandra Kesh Rai (1985) to support that conclusion and explained that the earlier decision in Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools (1984) did not decide the condition-precedent question because in that case two rival committees were in fact present at the relevant time.

Addressing the second submission, the court examined the College's Scheme of Administration, which provides the Committee consists of three sets of persons (office-bearers, ordinary members, and ex-officio members) and that the tenure of members other than office-bearers and ex-officio members is three years. Clause-7 permits office-bearers to continue to hold office until successors are elected after expiry of three years. The court held that if the tenure of any of the three sets of persons constituting the Committee comes to an end by efflux of time, the Committee of Management ceases to exist as a legal entity, even if office-bearers continue to function until successors are elected. The provision for office-bearers to continue is intended to prevent a vacuum in administration, not to extend the life of the Committee indefinitely.

The court further noted section 16-CC and the Third Schedule, which require that every Scheme of Administration provide for procedures for constituting the Committee, periodical elections and terms, and which prohibit creation of monopoly in favour of any particular person. Interpreting the Scheme in light of the Third Schedule, the court rejected the appellant's interpretation that the 1983-elected Committee could continue indefinitely merely because office-bearers were authorised to remain until successors were elected.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the committee elected in 1983 had its members' terms expire in 1986 and so ceased to exist (notwithstanding office-bearers continuing until successors were elected). Elections were held in 1987 and 1990; the respondents claimed their committee was validly elected in those years, while the appellant disputed that validity. Crucially, however, there were no rival Committees of Management in 1987 or 1990 — the only committee alleged to have been elected at those times was that of the respondents. Hence, because there were no rival committees, the Deputy Director's jurisdiction under section 16-A(7) could not have been invoked, and the D.I.O.S. was competent to recognise the respondents' Committee for day-to-day administration.

The court emphasised that the D.I.O.S.'s recognition is not final: an affected person may challenge the election before the Civil Court, and the Civil Court's decision will be binding on the D.I.O.S., who must act accordingly after that decision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Special Appeal is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The court held that existence of two rival Committees of Management is a condition precedent to invoking the Deputy/Regional Deputy Director of Education's jurisdiction under section 16-A(7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act.
  • Because the appellant's 1983-elected Committee's members' terms had expired in 1986 and thus that Committee had ceased to exist, and because there were no rival committees at the relevant times (1987 and 1990 elections), the D.I.O.S. was competent to recognise the respondents' Committee for day-to-day administration.
  • The D.I.O.S.'s order recognising the respondents' Committee is not final; an affected person may challenge the validity of the elections before a Civil Court, and the Civil Court's decision will be binding on the D.I.O.S.
  • The court ordered that there shall be no order as to costs in view of the facts and circumstances of the case.

This summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion and does not contain any information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

R.A Sharma, J.:— Petitioner's writ petition against the order of the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the D.T.O.S), recognising the Committee of Management of Sarvodaya Shiksha Niketan, Jamha, Mau Aima, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the College), headed by the respondent no. 2 having been dismissed by the learned Single Judge, he has filed this appeal against the aforesaid decision of the learned Judge. In support of this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant has made two submissions; namely, (i) for invoking the provisions of section 16-A, (7) of the U.P Intermediate Education Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) existence of rival Committees of Management is not necessary; and ii) the petitioner's Committee of Management still continue to exist even after expiry of three years and there were two rival Committees of Management before the D.I.O.S when he passed the impugned order and as such he has no jurisdiction to recognise the respondent's Committee of Management and attest the signature of its Manager. Learned counsel for respondents have disputed the aforesaid submissions.

2. Sub-section (7) of section 16-A of the Act, which empowers the Deputy Director of Education to recognise the Committee of Management, is reproduced below;

“Whenever there is dispute with respect to the Management of an institution persons found by the Regional Deputy Director of Education such enquiry as is deemed fit to be in actual control of its affairs may, for pur-poses of this Act. be recognised to constitute the Committee of Management of such institution until a Court of competent jurisdiction direct otherwise;

Provided that the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall, before making an order under this sub-section, afford reasonable opportunity to the rival claimants to make representations in writing.

Explanation In determining the question as to who is in actual con-trol of the affairs of the institution, the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall have regard to the control over the funds of the institution and over the administration, the receipt of income from its properties, the Scheme of Administration approved under sub-section (5) and other relevant circumstances.”

3. Sub-section (7) provides that whenever there is dispute with respect to the management of an educational institution persons found by Regional Deputy Director of Education to be in actual control of its affairs may be recognised to constitute the Committee of Management of such institution. The Com-mittee of Management has independent legal entity. In view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 16-A of the Act only a Committee of Management, constituted in accordance with the Scheme of Administration, has the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. No body else, except the managing committee, is thus entitled to be in actual control of the affairs of the institution. As the Committee of Management functions through the persons who constitute it, Sub Section (7) of section 16-A refers to those ‘persons’ only who have been elected to constitute the Managing Committee. Dispute with regard to management of the institution arises when there is claim and counter claim between different sets of per-sons, who constitute rival managing committees, about their right to manage the institution. Unless there are two rival Committees of Management claiming the right to manage the Institution, there cannot be dispute with respect to the management of the institution, which requires adjudication by the Deputy Director of Education.

4. Existence of two rival committees of Management is as such a condition precent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Education under sub-section (7) of section 16-A of the Act. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of a Divi-sion Bench of this Court in Chandra Kesh Rai v. Deputy Director of Education, 1985 UP LB EC 1124, wherein it was laid down that, “Before a dispute can be referred to the Deputy Director of Education under section 16-A (7) of the Intermediate Education Act, there should be two rival management committees.” The decision of this court in Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools, 1984 UP LB EC 610, on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, does not help him. In that case the term of the Committee of Management, which was elected on 9-7-1981, was for a period of three years and when other faction elected a rival Committee of Management on 4-9-1983 earlier Committee was in existence as it was to continue till 8-7-1984 and at the relevant time when the D.I.O.S passed the imougned order there were as such two rival Committees of Management, claiming right to manage the institution. Under these circumstances it was held by this Court that D.I.O.S has no jurisdiction to pass the order, impugned therein In that case the question as to whether exi tence of rival Committees of Management is condition precedent for referring the dispute to the Deputy Director of Education, under section 16-A (7) of the Act, neither arose nor was it raised and decided. For the reasons given above the first submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be sustained.

5. The second submission of the learned counsel is also liable to be rejected According to the Scheme of Administration of the college, the Committee of Management is to consist of three sets of persons viz. (1) 5 office-bearers, (2) II ordinary members and (3) 2 ex-officio members. Accor-ding to Clause-7 of this Scheme, the tenure of the members, other than the office bearers and ex-officio members, is three years. This clause further provides that after expiry of three years the office bearers shall continue to bold their offices till their successors are elected. Relying on the said Clause-7 learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the Committee of Management of the appellant continues to exist even after three years. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel. As mentioned here-in-before the Committee of Management consists of three sets of persons, viz., office-bearers, ordinary members and ex-officio members If the tenure of any of the three sets of persons, who go to constitute the Committee, come to an end by efflux of time, the Committee of Management ceases to exist in the eye of law. The position may be different when there is casual vacancy on account of death or resignation of any member or office-bearer before their tenure comes to an end. In such a contingency the Committee of Manage-ment continue to exist and the casual vacancies are liable to be filled in accordance with the Scheme of Administration. But where term of the members have come to an end by efflux of time the Committee of Manage-ment ceases to exist, even though its office-bearers have been authorised by the Scheme of Administration itself to continue to function till their succes-sors are elected Such a provision does not have the effect of extending the life of the Committee of Management after term of its members has come to an end. Object of Clause-7 is to prevent the vaccum in the administration of the institution.

6. Section 16-CC of the Act lays down that the Scheme of Adminis-tration of an institution, shall not be inconsistent with the principle laid down in Third Schedule. Third Schedule requires that every Scheme of Administration shall, inter alia, provide for procedure for constituting the Committee of Management of periodical electipn, the term of the members and office bearers of the Committee. The Schedule further prohibits creation of monopoly in favour of any particular person. Scheme of Administration of the College has to be interpreted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Third Schedule. If the appellant's submission is accepted his Committee of Management, which was constituted in 1983, will continue to exist and manage the institution till enternity, because there is nothing to compel those office-bearers to hold the fresh election after three years Such an interpretation has to be avoided in view of the principles contained in the Third Schedule

7. In the instant case, the election of appellant's managing committee was held in 1983. In view of the provisions of Scheme of Administration the terms of the members of the Committee of Management came to an end, after three years, in 1986 and thereafter this Committee has ceased to exist, although its office-bearers were permitted to continue till their succes-sors are elected. It is thus apparent that when the D.I.O.S passed the impugned order there was no second Committee of Management laying claim to manage the affairs of the College.

8. As term of the Committee of Management, elected in 1983 came to an end in 1986, the elections were held in 1987 and a new Committee of Management was elected. After expiry of further three years another election was held in 1990. In 1987 and 1990 the respondents claim that their Committee of Management was validly elected, which is disputed by the appellant Be that as it may, there were no rival Committees of Manage-ment in 1987 and 1990 and the only Committee which is alleged to have been elected was that of the respondents. In the absence of the rival Committees of Management the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Education, under section 16-A (7) of the Act could not have been invoked and reference could not have been made to him. Under the circumstances the D.I.O.S was fully competent to recognise the Committee of Management of the respondents for day-to-day administration of the institution. Hence no exception can be taken to the impugned orders of the D.I.O.S But such an order of the D.I.O.S is not final and it is always open to the affected person to challenge the election before the Civil Court. The decision of the Civil Court will be binding upon the D.I.O.S, who will act accordingly after the decision is given by the Civil Court.

9. The Special Appeal is accordingly dismissed. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

10. Appeal dismissed.