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Tarachand Dalmia v. State Of West Bengal & Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Mar 19, 1993
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions raising common questions of law and fact were heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. The writ petitioners challenged orders passed by the Assistant Secretary, Metropolitan Development, Salt Lake Branch, Sech Bhawan, Government of West Bengal, which had rejected their applications for mutation of their names in respect of certain plots at Bidhan Nagar, Salt Lake City, Calcutta. The Assistant Secretary had refused mutation on the ground that transfers made to the writ petitioners by registered Deeds of Transfer executed by the original lessees were invalid in view of s. 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, which, it was held, excluded the application of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to transfers made by the Government.

The court noted an earlier reported decision (1992 (2) CLJ 261 — Prabir Kumar Kar v. The State of West Bengal) addressing related grounds, and, after hearing submissions (notably from Mr. Chatterjee for the State respondents), proceeded to re-explain and apply the law to the facts of the present petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether s. 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (which states that nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 shall apply in respect of a government grant) operates to render transfers by original lessees of leased land from the State void when the grant/lease itself contains no restriction on transfer/assignment.
  2. Whether Clause 7 (restriction on sub-division or sub-letting without Government consent) of the lease deeds operates as a prohibition on assignment or absolute transfer of the lessee's entire leasehold interest.
  3. Whether the particular leases in question are to be treated as "grants" falling within the operation of the Government Grants Act, 1895, or whether their contractual nature (consideration, premium, nominal rent, permission to construct buildings) renders them outside that Act's intended application for the purposes of the transfers challenged.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' (State) Arguments — as presented by Mr. Chatterjee

  • Reliance on the court's earlier decision reported in 1992 (2) CLJ 261 to contend that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act could not be applied to government grants/transfers, and hence transfers by the original lessees were ineffective.
  • Submission that paragraph 11 of the earlier decision supported the conclusion that government grants prohibit transfers by lessees, i.e., that no right vested in the original lessees to transfer the plots to the writ petitioners.
  • Reference to Clause VII of the Lease Deeds (Clause 7 in the present judgment) to show that lessees were not entitled to sub-divide or sub-let without prior written consent of the Government, and that the Government had absolute discretion to refuse consent — implying the Assistant Secretary properly refused mutation.
  • Reliance on s. 3 of the Government Grants Act to support the Assistant Secretary's right to refuse mutation in exercise of the statutory scheme.

Petitioners' Arguments

This opinion does not contain a detailed account of the petitioners' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1992 (2) CLJ 261 — Prabir Kumar Kar v. The State of West Bengal Held (as explained in the present opinion) that s. 2 of the Government Grants Act cannot be applied in cases of government grants where no restriction concerning transfer of interest was imposed in the grant itself; s. 3 and related analysis were explained in paragraphs 11–12 of that decision. The court relied on and re-explained this reported decision, stating that Mr. Chatterjee misapplied its principles. The present judgment clarifies that the earlier decision supports the proposition that s. 2 does not automatically render transfers void where the grant/lease contains no restriction.
Dost Mohammad Khan v. Upper India Bank Limited, III Allahabad Law Journal 628 Cited in support of the proposition that a government grant should be construed and take effect as if the Transfer of Property Act had not been passed (i.e., the grant is to be construed independently of the T.P. Act when construing the instrument). Used by the court to support its reading of s. 2 of the Government Grants Act — that construing a government grant "irrespective of" the T.P. Act does not mean all general legal principles are excluded; it is a direction as to construction of the grant instrument.
Lala Kishun Chand v. Sheo Dutta, AIR 1958 Allahabad 879 Cited alongside Dost Mohammad Khan for the same proposition regarding construction of government grants in light of s. 2 of the Government Grants Act. The court referenced this authority to support the interpretive approach that s. 2 directs how grants are to be construed, but does not automatically displace general legal rules (such as principles of assignment under s. 8 of the T.P. Act) where the grant itself contains no restriction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of textual, contextual and doctrinal steps, constrained strictly by the wording of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (the "Act"), the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (the "T.P. Act"), the lease-deeds involved, and the nature of the transactions:

  1. Statutory framework and purpose: The court examined the preamble and objects/reasons of the Government Grants Act, 1895, noting that it was enacted to explain the T.P. Act as it relates to government grants and to remove doubts about the powers of the Government to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and transfers made by it. This context guided statutory interpretation.
  2. Text of s. 2: Section 2 states that "in respect of a government grant nothing in the T.P. Act shall apply" but also clarifies that every such grant "shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act has not been passed." The court emphasized the latter phrase as a direction on how to construe a government grant instrument, not as a wholesale exclusion of all general legal principles.
  3. Limited scope of exclusion: Reading s. 2 with the preamble and object, the court held that not every provision of the T.P. Act is thereby excluded from application to government grants. Rather, s. 2 directs that the court should construe the grant itself independently of the T.P. Act when interpreting the instrument. It does not automatically extinguish other general legal principles that exist dehors the T.P. Act.
  4. Reliance on precedent for construction: The court cited Dost Mohammad Khan and Lala Kishun Chand in support of the interpretive approach that government grants should be construed without reference to the T.P. Act when construing the instrument itself, but observed that this does not render general principles of law inapplicable.
  5. Application of s. 3: The court recognized s. 3 of the Government Grants Act, which preserves prohibitions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in a grant; accordingly, if the Government intended to prohibit assignment, it could, and should, have included a specific clause in the deed itself to that effect.
  6. Role of s. 8 of the T.P. Act: The court reiterated that under s. 8, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer passes forthwith to the transferee with all the interest the transferor was capable of passing. The court held that the principles of s. 8 are applicable to a lease of the Government unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed in the instrument.
  7. Character of the leases: The court examined the lease-deeds and noted they were for valuable consideration — a lump sum premium plus a nominal annual rent — and permitted construction of buildings. Thus these transactions were contractual, with the Government in the position of a landlord, and in the court's view did not fall within the category of "grant" under the 1895 Act for purposes of applying s. 2 to invalidate the transfers.
  8. Construction of Clause 7 (Clause VII): The court quoted Clause 7, which prohibits sub-division or sub-letting without the Government's written consent and reserves the Government's right to refuse consent in absolute discretion. The court distinguished sub-letting/sub-division from assignment/transfer: sub-letting creates no privity of estate with the lessor, while assignment does. From the text of Clause 7, the court concluded it prohibits sub-dividing or sub-letting but does not amount to a prohibition on assignment or absolute transfer of the entire leasehold interest.
  9. Conclusion on Assistant Secretary's action: On these grounds—the limited scope of s. 2, applicability of s. 8 principles unless restricted by the grant, the contractual nature of the leases, and the textual meaning of Clause 7—the court concluded that the Assistant Secretary's reliance on s. 2 to declare the transfers invalid was incorrect, and that the Assistant Secretary acted illegally in refusing mutation.
  10. Additional factual note: The court observed that after 1974 the State Government altered the standard form of lease deeds to include a clause preventing assignment or transfer without prior permission, indicating the Government itself recognized the need for an express restriction when intended.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both writ petitions are allowed; the orders of the Assistant Secretary rejecting the prayers for mutation are set aside/quashed, and the State respondents are directed to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in respect of the plots in question forthwith.

Direct consequences and practical implications drawn from the opinion:

  • The Assistant Secretary's orders refusing mutation of the petitioners' names were declared illegal and quashed; the State is directed to effect mutation in favour of the writ petitioners immediately.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The court's reasoning underscores that s. 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 does not operate as an absolute exclusion of all provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or of general legal principles; rather, it governs how government grants are to be construed and preserves any prohibitions expressly contained in the grant itself (s. 3). Thus, absent an express restriction in the grant/lease prohibiting assignment, principles such as s. 8 of the T.P. Act (transfer passing immediately unless a contrary intention appears) will apply.
  • The court noted an important administrative consequence: the State Government has altered the standard form of lease deeds after 1974 to include express prohibition on assignment/transfer without prior permission, indicating that future leases will explicitly bar assignments (a change the court recorded as having been made by the State).

Final procedural disposition recorded in the judgment: "Both the writ applications allowed with direction." Xerox copies of the order to be given to the learned advocates on the usual undertaking.

Show all summary ...

1. Both the writ petitions have raised common questions of law and fact and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. In both the writ petitions, the writ petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the Assistant Secretary, Metropolitan Development, Salt Lake Branch, Sech Bhawan, Government of West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as the Assistant Secretary) rejecting the prayers of the writ petitioners for mutation of their names in respect of the plots in question at Bidhan Nagar, Salt Lake City, Calcutta. The prayers for mutation of the names of the writ petitioners, in respect of the plots in question, were rejected by the Assistant Secretary by holding that the transfers of the plots in question, made in favour of the writ petitioners by registered Deeds of Transfer executed by the original lessees, were not valid in view of s. 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) by which the application of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the T.P Act) had been excluded in respect of any transfer of land and interest thereon made by the Government.

3. The grounds on which the applications for mutation were rejected by the Assistant Secretary had been considered by me in a recent decision reported in 1992 (2) CLJ 261 (Prabir Kumar Kar v. The State of West Bengal). Ordinarily, I would have delivered a short order relying on my aforesaid decision. But in view of the argument advanced by Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the State respondents, I thought it fit to explain the reported decision and also to consider the submission rendered by Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents.

4. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents sought to argue that the aforesaid decision reported in 1992 (2) CLJ 261 really had helped the State respondents. He tried to persuade me to hold that in view of the said decision, the orders passed by the Assistant Secretary could not be interfered with in exercise of my power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of this submission, Mr. Chatterjee took me through paragraph 11 of the said decision. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that as I had held in the said decision that the provisions of the T.P Act could not be made applicable to grants and/or transfers made by the Government and that all prohibitions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any Government grant or transfer shall be valid and take effect according to the tenure, no right had been vested to the original lessees to transfer the plots in question to the writ petitioners. It was further submitted by Mr. Chattejee that Clause VII of the Lease Deeds would show that the lessees were not entitled to sub-divide or sub-let the plots in question or the buildings to be constructed without the consent in writing of the Government, and, therefore, the Government shall have the right to refuse to accept transfer of the plots in question in its absolute discretion. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that in view of s. 3 of the Act also, it was open to the Assistant Secretary to refuse such prayers for mutation.

5. So far as the first submission of Mr. Chatterjee is concerned, I am of the view that Mr. Chatterjee mis-applied the principles laid down in the said decision. If we read the entire judgment, particularly the paragraphs 11 and 12 of the same, there cannot be any difficulty in understanding that in the said decision, it has been held that s. 2 of the Act cannot be applied in case of Government grants where no restriction or limitation concerning the transfer of interest of a property relating to any grant of the Government has/had been imposed in the grant itself. Since an argument was advanced by the learned Advocate for the State respondents that my observations in paragraph 11 of the said decision would show that in case of Government grants, no transfer could be made by the lessee in respect of the plot in question, I take the opportunity, in this judgment, to explain the aforesaid decision. The Government Grants Act, 1895 (Act No. 15 of 1895) was passed on 10th of October, 1895. The preamble of the Act says that this Act has been enacted in the statute book to explain the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 so far as it relates to grants from the Government and to remove certain doubts as to the powers to the Government in relation to such grants. The objects and reasons of the Act would also show that as some doubts had arisen as to the extent of operation of the T.P Act 1882 and as to the power to the Government to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and other transfers of land made by it or under its authority, it was expedient to remove such doubts, the Act was enacted.

(Emphasis added).

Keeping the preamble of the Act and the objects and reasons for enacting the Act in mind, let me now see whether s. 2 prohibits transfer of interest of government land when no such restriction has been made in the Government grant and/or lease itself or in other words, s. 2 of the Act totally excludes application of all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, so far as the Government grants are concerned. Section 2 of the Act says that in respect of a government grant nothing in the T.P Act, 1882 shall apply but at the same time, it has been made clear in s. 2 of the Act that every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act has not been passed. Considering the preamble and objects and reasons of the Act and reading the words “that every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act has not been passed” as used in s. 2 of the Act, in my view, all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not excluded by operation of s. 2 of the Government Grant Act, 1895 and it does not render all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act inapplicable to lands held under grant from the Government but the meaning of the Section is that when the Court is called upon to construe an instrument granting land by the Government, it shall construe such grant irrespective of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. (See Dost Mohammad Khan v. Upper India Bank Limited, III Allahabad Law Journal 628 and AIR 1958 Allahabad 879 (Lala Kishun Chand v. Sheo Dutta)). Even assuming that in a case of a Government grant and/or Government lease, in respect of a particular plot in question, the T.P Act cannot be made applicable even then I am of the view that the effect of s. 2 of the Act cannot be held to have excluded the general provisions of law dehors the transfer under the T.P Act. Both before and after the enactment of the T.P Act, there has been the law in India that the lessee, as an ordinary incident of an Estate granted to him, can assign his right. Under s. 3 of the Act, all prohibitions, restrictions, conditions and limitations, contained in such grant shall be valid and take effect notwithstanding any law or enactment of the legislature. Accordingly, if the Government had intended to impose a restriction on assignment of a lease, a clause to that effect could have been included in the deed itself. As I have already held in my reported decision that under s. 8 of the T.P Act, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, the transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee with all the interest which the transferor is then capable in passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof and, therefore, the principles of s. 8 of the T.P Act, in my view, are applicable to a lease of the Government.

6. I have already explained s. 3 of the Act in the aforesaid reported decision in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the same. Therefore, I need not reiterate the same in this judgment.

7. In the aforesaid decision, I have already held that the Act is not applicable to the leases of present nature, even then, one more material fact needs to be considered in this connection. It appears from the lease deeds that all the leases in question are for valuable consideration i.e a lump sum premium is taken by the Government against the leases for entering into the aforesaid lease deeds and the Government also accepts nominal annual rent in respect of the lands in question. Therefore, it is a contractual transaction for a monetary consideration. The Government Grants Act, therefore, cannot be made applicable in so far as the present leases are concerned because in all these leases, lessees have been permitted to construct building on their lease-hold lands and therefore, the position of the Government is that of a landlord and accordingly, the lands in question cannot fall in the category of “grant” under the Act of 1895. Therefore, in view of the discussions made hereinabove the argument of Mr. Chatterjee that in view of s. 2 of the Act which excludes operation of the T.P Act in respect of a Government Grant or Lease, the transfer made by the original lessee in favour of the writ petitioners is void, cannot be accepted.

8. So far as the second submission of Mr. Chatterjee is concerned, I am of the view that the said submission of Mr. Chatterjee has no substance at all. Mr. Chatterjee, relying on Clause 7 of the lease-deeds, submitted that on a plain reading of the said clause in the lease deeds, it would be evident that the State Government restricted the lessee to transfer their plots without taking consent in writing from it. For proper appreciation of this submission of Mr. Chatterjee, it is necessary to quote Clause 7 of the relevant lease deeds which reads as follows:—

“The LESSEE shall not sub-divide or sub-let the demised land or the building to be constructed without the consent in writing of the Government first had and obtained and the Government shall have the right and be entitled to refuse its consent at its absolute discretion.”

9. From a bare reading of clause 7 of the lease deeds, it appears to me that only a restriction has been imposed on the lessee to sub-let or subdivide the demised land or the building to be constructed on such land. It only says that the said deeds of lease bar sub-division or sub-letting of the demised premises and/or building that would be constructed on the said land, without taking consent in writing from the Government. Therefore, from this, one can only say that the object of entering into a lease with the lessee is only to prevent further sub-division or fragmentation of the lease-hold land. In my view, from this it cannot be said that there is any bar for assignment or transfer of interest of the lessee in respect of his lease-hold land as a whole. It is well settled that sub-letting of a lease-hold property and assignment and/or transfer of the same are totally different concepts. There is no privity of contract between the head-lessor and the sub-lessee but an assingee or transferee is liable by privity of estate to the lessor. In my view, therefore, in case of absolute assignment or transfer of interest by a lessee, there is privity of estate between the Government, who is the lessor and the assignee, while the privity of contract between the lessor and the lessee continues to exist. The lessee shall remain liable for rent to the lessor but this privity of contract between the lessor and the lessee is extinguished when the lessor accepts rent from the assignee or otherwise recognises the lessee as a tenant. Therefore, in my view, prohibition against sub-division or sub-letting of the demised land does not amount to prohibition in respect of assignment and/or transfer in respect of the plots in question.

10. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, I am of the view that me Assistant Secretary acted illegally in holding that in view of s. 2 of the Act, the transfers made in favour of the writ petitioners must be held to be ineffective and invalid in law. Therefore, the aforesaid orders of the Assistant Secretary refusing to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in place of the original lessee must be set aside and the prayers for mutation of the names of the writ petitioners in respect of the plots in question must be allowed.

11. Before parting with this judgment, one more significant factor should also be considered. It has now been brought on record that subsequent to the execution of the lease deeds by the State Government, in favour of the original lessees in the year 1974, the State Government has altered the standard form of the lease deeds. Previously, the standard format was the one that was executed by the original lessees with the State Government and in the said format, as noted earlier there is no clause restraining assignment of the leasehold interest without previous permission of the Government in writing. However, from the standard format which is now being used by the State Government, it appears that the intending leases contain the clause preventing assignment and/or transfer of lease-hold interest without previous permission of the Government in writing. Taking into consideration of the aforesaid insertion of a clause in the present lease deeds, it is evident that the State Government also felt it necessary to make such changes and/or alterations in the clauses of the present lease deeds because of the aforesaid defects arising out of the lease deeds executed by them in the year 1974.

12. For the reasons aforesaid, s. 2 of the Government Grants Art, 1895 has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of these cases and therefore, the Assistant Secretary has acted illegally in rejecting the prayers for mutation of the writ petitioners by applying s. 2 of the Act against them.

13. Accordingly, both the writ petitions succeed.

14. The orders of the Assistant Secretary, Metropolitan Development, Salt Lake Branch, Sech Bhawan, rejecting the prayers of the writ petitioners for mutation of their names in respect of the plots in question are hereby set aside and/or quashed.

15. The State respondents are hereby directed to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in respect of the plots in question in favour of the writ petitioners forthwith.

16. There will be no order as to costs.

Let xerox copies of this order be given to the learned advocates, appearing for the parties, on usual undertaking.

Both the writ applications allowed with direction.