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A.R. Vaikunta Raja v. State Of Tamil Nadu

Madras High Court
Jan 19, 1994
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petitions arise from the employment relationship between the petitioner and the North Arcot District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Ltd. (the second respondent). The petitioner joined the society (as a clerk, later promoted to Branch Manager) and was placed under suspension on 2–3 July 1966 pending charges of breach of trust, negligence and alleged misappropriation. Criminal proceedings (five cases) were instituted and later the petitioner was acquitted after trial. The society also instituted surcharge/recovery/arbitration proceedings under provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act; arbitration proceedings were dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on 31 August 1977.

The petitioner repeatedly sought reinstatement and payment of subsistence/wages. After various interlocutory proceedings in this Court (including a subsistence allowance of Rs. 300 per month directed by this Court and appeals therefrom), the second respondent on 4 January 1989 issued an order directing an enquiry under RC No. 799 of 1983 E., 1 to call the petitioner for a departmental enquiry into the original charge memo dated 27 June 1966. The petitioner challenged that order by filing Writ Petition No. 552 of 1989 (seeking certiorari and reinstatement) and renewed his earlier writ petition (Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984) seeking mandamus for reinstatement with continuity of service and attendant benefits from 3 July 1966.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order dated 4 January 1989 directing the petitioner to appear for a departmental enquiry (based on a charge memo dated 27 June 1966) is liable to be quashed.
  2. Whether the petitioner can be reinstated in service with continuity of service and attendant benefits despite (a) acquittal in the criminal cases and (b) dismissal of arbitration proceedings.
  3. Whether it is permissible and/or expedient to hold a departmental enquiry more than twenty years after the charge memo was issued.
  4. Whether the respondent's actions (including reinstating a co-accused but not the petitioner) amount to discriminatory treatment violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
  5. Whether the ratio laid down by a Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 801 of 1992 (dated 6 August 1992) can be extended to these writ petitions, without deciding the maintainability question against a co-operative society.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner was placed under suspension by an order dated 3 July 1966 and charged with breach of trust and negligence; those charges were vague and baseless in substance.
  • Five criminal cases were instituted but the petitioner was honourably acquitted in all of them after trial.
  • The society instituted surcharge/arbitration proceedings before the Deputy Registrar in 1965, which were dismissed on 31 August 1977 for non-appearance by the society.
  • Despite acquittal and dismissal of arbitration proceedings, the management repeatedly refused reinstatement, citing pendency of surcharge proceedings; petitioner contends surcharge/recovery proceedings are not a bar to reinstatement.
  • The co-accused Rajagopal was reinstated though acquitted; petitioner alleges discrimination (Rajagopal being a relative of the then President) and victimisation prevented witnesses coming forward for petitioner’s defence.
  • There was inordinate delay (22 years) in ordering an enquiry after the charge memo; such delay denies reasonable opportunity to the employee and is contrary to settled law. The impugned 4 January 1989 order is arbitrary, illegal and violative of Article 16 and Article 14.
  • Petitioner sought subsistence/wages and filed a claim petition (Claim Petition No. 690 of 1983) for wages from 1 January 1966 to 30 June 1983; management did not contest and did not pay salary from 1 January 1966 to filing of writ petitions.
  • Relief sought: quash the 4 January 1989 order, direct reinstatement with continuity and attendant benefits, award back-wages and costs.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent denied misstatements in the petitioner's affidavits and contended the petitioner mismanaged the Gudiyatham Branch and misappropriated funds (specific amounts pleaded: Rs. 16,241.28 by wrong/over payments and stocks deficits of Rs. 44,666.81).
  • A charge memo was issued on 27 June 1966 and the petitioner was placed under suspension on 2 July 1966; the petitioner did not submit an explanation nor appear for the enquiry when directed.
  • Recovery/surcharge proceedings were instituted against the petitioner and fifteen directors; those surcharge proceedings are still pending and are a basis for not reinstating the petitioner.
  • The co-accused Rajagopal was not liable in the same way as the petitioner and thus his reinstatement does not indicate discriminatory treatment; Rajagopal was an assistant without liability attaching to his post.
  • The petitioner applied for piecemeal leave from 1 June 1966 though he was not eligible for leave with wages and hence cannot claim wages from 1 January 1966 onwards.
  • The respondent asserted the petition is not maintainable (alleging abandonment of service and seeking employment elsewhere) and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C. Marianandam v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1989 - I L.L.N 728] Support for the proposition that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised even against non-statutory/private bodies / co-operative societies when orders are passed in violation of principles of natural justice. The Court referred to this decision to justify issuing writ relief against a co-operative society because the impugned order was passed without observing principles of natural justice.
Rohtas Industries v. Its Union (Supreme Court) [cited within C. Marianandam] Art. 226 is wide enough to affect any person (even private individuals); however, the writ power must be exercised with restraint and only in exceptional/monstrous situations. The Court relied on the Supreme Court proposition to hold that despite the private character of a respondent, the writ jurisdiction could be invoked because the situation warranted judicial intervention for justice.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh [1990 - I L.L.N 780] Inordinate delay and laches in initiating disciplinary proceedings (a delay of many years) is a valid ground to prevent continuation of departmental enquiry; lack of satisfactory explanation for delay may make enquiry unfair. The Court applied this principle to conclude that long delay (over two decades) in proceeding against the petitioner was inordinate and unjustified, supporting quashing of the impugned proceedings.
George v. State of Tamil Nadu [1980 T.N.L.J 356] Delay (nearly 13 years in that case) can lead to an inference that charges were abandoned; promotion during the delay may indicate nothing adverse against the employee. The Court cited this authority to illustrate that prolonged delay in disciplinary action suggests abandonment and that such delay can render subsequent action unsustainable.
Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Ram Chandra [1982 - I L.L.N 277] Although acquittal in a criminal court does not automatically take away the power to continue departmental enquiry, it is generally not expedient to continue departmental enquiry on the same charges once the accused is honourably and completely acquitted. The Court noted this balance: while departmental enquiry power survives acquittal, the convenience and fairness of continuing such enquiry after acquittal must be considered; applied to the facts to support quashing the late-ordered enquiry.
Palani Co-operative Sale Society v. Labour Court, Madurai [1975 - I L.L.N 330] Interpretation of suspension provisions (bye-law (h)): suspension pending enquiry is permissible; subsistence allowance is discretionary but must be exercised reasonably; suspension should be expedited and ordinarily limited periods (three months at a time) are contemplated. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to observe that suspension pending enquiry must be reasonable, not whimsical, and that prolonged suspension without proper exercise of discretion and without expediting enquiry is improper — a factor favoring relief to the petitioner.
Division Bench decision in Writ Petition No. 13874 of 1991 and Writ Appeal Nos. 919 & 968 of 1992 (referenced) Held that writ petitions may be maintainable against co-operative societies where impugned orders violate principles of natural justice; reiterated that violation of natural justice can justify exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court said the ratio in that Division Bench decision was squarely applicable to the present facts because the impugned proceedings were issued without complying with mandatory requirements and principles of natural justice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining (a) the factual record of suspension, criminal proceedings, arbitration/surcharge proceedings and the chronology of events, and (b) whether the late-ordered departmental enquiry (4 January 1989) could be sustained.

Key steps in the Court's analysis (as set out in the opinion):

  • The Court accepted the admitted facts: petitioner promoted to Branch Manager in 1963, suspended in July 1966, subject to a charge memo of 27 June 1966, and acquitted in five criminal cases after trial; a co-accused Rajagopal was also acquitted and was reinstated.
  • The Court noted the arbitration/recovery proceedings before the Deputy Registrar were dismissed on 31 August 1977 for non-appearance by the society; yet despite acquittal and dismissal of arbitration proceedings, the society did not reinstate the petitioner.
  • The Court found the issuance of the 4 January 1989 order — ordering a departmental enquiry some twenty-two years after the charge memo — to be inordinate delay and arbitrary in context. The Court considered the petitioner’s inability effectively to defend events so long ago and the possibility of victimisation deterring witnesses.
  • The Court identified discrimination: co-accused Rajagopal was reinstated while the petitioner was not; on the admitted facts this amounted to unequal treatment that weighed against continuing adverse proceedings.
  • The Court applied binding and persuasive precedent: (i) Rohtas/related authority on the scope of Article 226 and exceptional circumstances; (ii) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and George v. State of Tamil Nadu regarding laches/delay and abandonment of charges; (iii) Nagpur v. Ram Chandra on the effect of acquittal on departmental enquiries; and (iv) Palani Co-operative Sale Society on the need for reasonable exercise of suspension power and expedition of enquiries.
  • Relying on these authorities and on the admitted facts (acquittal, dismissal of arbitration proceedings, long delay, discrimination), the Court concluded that the impugned proceedings of 4 January 1989 were liable to be quashed as violative of principles of natural justice and on grounds of inordinate delay and discrimination.
  • On relief, the Court balanced interests and directed reinstatement with all benefits and limited back-wages to a specific starting point (see Holding), while quashing the 4 January 1989 order.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The impugned order dated 4 January 1989 directing the petitioner to appear for a departmental enquiry is quashed.
  • The petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service in the second respondent society with all the benefits as prayed for by the petitioner.
  • The petitioner is entitled to claim back-wages from the respondents "from the date of filing of the earlier writ petition, viz., Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984 on 23 April 1986" (as stated in the judgment).
  • These writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above and there is no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the departmental enquiry initiated by the respondent on 4 January 1989 is annulled; the petitioner must be reinstated with benefits and may claim back-wages from the specified date; there is no costs order against either party.
  • Broader implications: the Court applied established principles (delay/laches, the effect of acquittal, discrimination, and the requirement of natural justice) to deny the legitimacy of a belated departmental enquiry. The judgment relies on existing authorities to support intervention against a co-operative society when mandatory procedural requirements and natural justice are breached. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond application of those precedents to the facts at hand.
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JUDGMENT

1. Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984 has been filed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity of service and other attendant benefits from 3 July 1966 and to award costs. During the pendency of this writ petition, Writ Petition No. 552 of 1989 was filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records from the respondent, viz., the Special Officer, North Arcot District Consumers Co-operative Wholesale Stores Ltd., Vellore, relating to the Order No. RC 799 of 1983 E., 1 dated 4 January 1989 and to quash the said order, dated 4 January 1989 and to direct the respondent (the Special Officer North Arcot District Consumers Co-operative Wholesale Stores, Ltd.,) and reinstate the petitioner in service with all benefits and award costs.

2. The case of the petitioner as seen from the affidavits filed in support of Writ Petition No. 4863 of 1984 can be briefly stated as follows: The petitioner joined the service of the North Arcot District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society, Ltd., the second respondent in Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984, as a clerk and subsequently, he was promoted as Branch Manager in 1963. In July 1963, the petitioner was transferred and posted in the head office of the second respondent at Vellore and he was carrying on his duties diligently and to the satisfaction of his superiors. While so, the second respondent society (in Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984) placed the petitioner under suspension. The society was under the control of the Board of Directors at that time. The suspension order, dated 3 July 1966 was served on the petitioner pending certain charges. According to the petitioner, the said charges were vague and they were not in the real sense. It is alleged in the affidavit that the said charges were to the effect that the petitioner committed breach of trust and negligence, the society had also filed a complaint against the petitioner and one Rajagopal, who was working as a clerk with the petitioner, in Gudiyatham Police Station. As many as five criminal cases in Criminal Cases Nos. 33 of 1968, 101 of 1969, 278 of 1973 and 279 of 1973 and 280 of 1973 were also filed against the petitioner before the First Class Magistrate, Vellore. The petitioner was honourably acquitted in all these cases, after an elaborate trial. While these cases were pending against the petitioner, the Board of Directors of the society had instituted proceedings under S. 73 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative societies, Vellore, in the year 1965. Since the society did not appear before the Deputy Registrar and substantiated their case, the Deputy Registrar by order, dated 31 August 1977, dismissed the proceedings instituted by the society. Even after the acquittal of the criminal charge and in spite of the repeated requests made by the petitioner to reinstate him in service, the management was evading reinstatement of the petitioner on the ground that since the case filed before the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies was pending the management could not reinstate the petitioner in service. After the dismissal of the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner had again approached the second respondent for the reinstatement, but the second respondent refused to reinstate the petitioner in service on the ground that since the surcharge proceedings instituted by them before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies were not over, they could not do anything in the petitioner's case. According to the petitioner, it was the President who was responsible for the irregularities in the functioning of the second respondent society. Based on the Audit Report pertaining to 1964 to 1966, the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies superseded the Board of Directors and in 1972 surcharge proceedings were filed against the Board of Directors and the petitioner by the Special Officer of the second respondent society. It is also submitted by the petitioner that after the acquittal by the criminal Court and after dismissal of the arbitration proceedings, whenever the petitioner made any request for reinstatement, his request was denied by the second respondent society on the only ground that the surcharge proceedings were not yet over, that even after acquittal by the criminal Court, the management did not proceed against Rajagopal who was the co-accused in the criminal case and reinstated him in service because he happened to be a relative of the then President, P.S Rajagopal Naidu, that the surcharge proceedings are nothing but recovery proceedings and they need not be a bar to the petitioner's reinstatement, that the second respondent without any justification continues to deny reinstatement on the untenable plea and that the surcharge proceedings are still pending. It is also submitted by the petitioner that after the original order of suspension, dated 3 July 1966. an order has been passed so far extending the period of suspension, that when once there is no order extending the period of suspension, the employee who was placed under suspension will be deemed to be in service, that since the management did not even pay the petitioner subsistence allowance for all these years and since the second respondent management has not even paid the petitioner his salary for six months from 1 January 1966 till the date of filing of the present writ petitions, the petitioner had sent several representations to the second respondent for reinstatement or in the alternative for payment of wages, but his requests were of no avail, that thereafter the petitioner had again made several representations to the second respondent for his reinstatement, but since they were all of no avail, the petitioner had also caused a lawyer's notice to the second respondent on 14 March 1983 for which also no reply has been received by the writ petitioner, that thereafter the petitioner had filed a claim petition before the Second Additional Labour Court, Madras, being Criminal Petition No. 690 of 1983, claiming wages from 1 January 1966 to 30 June 1983, that the second respondent did not file any counter affidavit and that it was only under such circumstances, the earlier writ petition No. 4963 of 1984 for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity of service and other attendent benefits from 3 July 1966 and to direct the second respondent to pay the petitioner wages every month with effect from 1 July 1983. The said Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984 was admitted on 3 June 1984. The writ-petitioner has also filed a Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 11389 of 1984 for passing an order granting interim direction directing the second respondent to pay the petitioner at least subsistence allowance from the date of filing the Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984. This Court by order, dated 25 January 1985, passed an interim order directing the management to pay a sum of Rs. 300 per month to the petitioner towards the subsistence allowance pending disposal of the writ petition. As against the said interim order, the management had filed a Writ Miscellaneous Petition No, 2320 of 1985 to modify the earlier order, dated 23 January 1985, passed by this Court and by order, dated 28 March 1985, this Court dismissed the said Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 2328 of 1985. As against the said interim order, dated 23 January 1985, directing the management to pay the subsistence allowance to the petitioner, the management filed a Writ Appeal No. 354 of 1985 and the said writ appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 19 September 1985. The enquiry in the Claim Petition No. 690 of 1983 was also over and the matter had been posted for arguments. It was at this stage, the management had chosen to issue the impugned order, dated 4 January 1989, ordering an enquiry in respect of the charges levelled against the writ-petitioner in the charge memo, dated 27 June 1966. The said order, dated 4 January 1989, was received by the writ-petitioner on 9 January 1989. According to the petitioner, the said impugned order, dated 4 January 1989, is arbitrary, illegal and unjust and the arbitrariness of the action of the respondent can very well be seen from the fact that the impugned proceedings have been issued after twenty two years after the issue of the chargememo and as such, the arbitrary action of the respondent is violative of Art. 16 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted in the affidavit filed in support of the above writ petition that it has been well settled by several decisions of this Court that the inordinate delay on the part of the respondent in ordering an enquiry after the issue of the chargememo would itself constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to the chargesheeted employee to effectively defend himself, that since all the records were not available the petitioner was not in a position to explain the alleged negligence with regard to the matters that had happened twenty-two years back, that no one who worked with the writ-petitioner had chosen to come forward to give evidence against the management on the petitioner's side at that point of time for fear of victimisation and that, therefore, the impugned order is Liable to be quashed. Further, according to the writ-petitioner, the criminal case filed against him on the very same charge of breach of trust and negligence ended in acquittal and, therefore, the management which waited for the result of the criminal cases is estopped from proceeding against the petitioner on the very same charge and the management ought to have reinstated him in service and the refusal of the management to reinstate the petitioner in service is arbitrary, illegal and unjust. It was under these circumstances, Writ Petition No. 552 of 1989 had been field by the petitioner for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for and quash the proceedings in RC. No. 799 of 1983 E., 1 dated 4 January 1989 and to direct the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service.

3. The second respondent Special Officer. North Arcot District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society, Ltd., Vellore, has filed a detailed counter-affidavit in Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984 in connection with Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 7831 of 1984 wherein while denying the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the said writ petition and the writ miscellaneous petition, it is inter alia contended that it is a fact that the writ-petitioner joined service as a temporary clerk on 7 July 1962 and subsequently he was transferred and posted as manager of the Branch at Gudiyatham on 24 September 1962 he was sent to Gudiyatham as Branch Manager and he was working there from 1963 to 1965 as Branch Manager, that while so employed, he mismanaged the affairs of the Branch and misappropriated the funds of the second respondent society to the tune of Rs. 16,241.28 by wrong and over payments, causing deficits in stock to the extent of Rs. 44,666.81 that a memorandum of charges was issued to the writ-petitioner on 27 June 1966 and the writ-petitioner was also placed under suspension, pending enquiry into the charges on 2 July 1966, that the petitioner did not submit any explanation to the said memorandum of charges, that, therefore, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, that he was directed to appear for an enquiry before the president, but the petitioner failed to do so, that it is true that the petitioner was acquitted in all the five criminal cases filed against him, that mere acquittal has not absolved him of his liability, that besides filing the criminal cases, recovery proceedings were also instituted against the petitioner in the Court of Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, that the surcharge proceedings are all still pending against him, and fifteen Directors for mismanagement and suppression of the fact of deficiency having been caused to the assets of the society by the petitioner, that the arbitration cases filed against the petitioner were rejected as they were barred by limitation, that, therefore, the surcharge proceedings were instituted. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that the second respondent society was superseded by the Government for gross mismanagement and abuse of authority by the President and Special Officer was appointed by the Government to manage the affairs of the society, that thereafter the Board of Directors was reconstituted and its management was vested in the Board, that one Rajagopal another employee was an accused in Criminal Case No. 101 of 1968, that he was allowed to continue in service even after his acquittal because the writ-petitioner alone was liable for all commissions of the offense and not the said Rajagopal, that the said Rajagopal was only the assistant of the writ-petitioner without any liability attaching to his post. That the writ petitioner applied for leave in piecemeal from 1 June 1966 onwards even though he was not eligible for any leave with wages, that, therefore, the petitioner has no right to claim any wages from 1 January 1966 onwards, that the petitioner was also responsible for unauthorised and excess expenditure incurred in the period from 1963 to 1965 and for the deficits in stocks, that, therefore, surcharge proceedings were to be instituted against him as also against the 15 other Directors for suppressing and inaction, that the question of reinstatement does not arise in the instant case, as the petitioner abondones service seeking employment elsewhere and that, therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable in law. Hence, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition.

4. The petitioner also filed a reply-affidavit wherein he denied the allegations made by the respondents in the counter-affidavit. It is stated in the reply-affidavit that he strangely denies the allegations of the second respondent that the petitioner mismanaged the affairs of the Gudiyatham Branch of the society and misappropriated the funds of the second respondent society, that after the issuance of the chargememo, the petitioner requested the management to furnish him with certain documents, that the management instead of furnishing the records asked the petitioner to come to the office and peruse the records, that when he went to the office to peruse the records, the petitioner was not permitted to do so on the ground that those records had been sent back to the police officials in connection with the criminal case instituted against the petitioner, that, therefore, the alleged failure on his part to submit his explanation was neither intentional nor deliberate but due to the circumstances stated above, and that since the writ-petitioner could not appear before the president for enquiry. According to the writ-petitioner, the arbitration claim was dismissed as not pressed because the second respondent did not choose to file any reply to the counter-statement fded by the writ-petitioner and to produce the records called for by the Deputy Registrar and did not choose to appear before him. The petitioner has further stated in the reply affidavit that immediately after the aquittal he presented himself for reinstatement, but he was not reinstated for the reason of the pendency of the arbitration proceedings and that even though the petitioner has approached the management for reinstatement, the management turned down his request by citing the pendency of the cases filed against him even after the acquittal by the criminal Court. It is also stated in the reply affidavit that the petitioner has been repeatedly approaching the second respondent for the payment of subsistence allowance but the same was refused on the ground of pendency of the cases instituted against the writ-petitioner. Hence, according to the petitioner he is entitled to the relief as prayed for by him in the present writ petition.

5. The question that arises for consideration in these writ petitions is whether the order impugned in these writ petitions is liable to be quashed and whether the reinstatement as sought for by the writ-petitioner can be ordered and whether the petitioner can be asked to appear for a departmental enquiry even after twenty years from the date of issuance of the chargememo, in respect of the various charges framed against him though he was acquitted in the criminal case and even though the arbitration proceedings were dismissed and whether it is expedient to hold a departmental enquiry in respect of the very same charges that were framed against a co-accused who was reinstated in service by the second respondent, as the said co-accused happened to be the relative of the then President P.S Rajagopal Naidu and whether the management is justified in not reinstating the petitioner in service with all the benefits and whether the action of the respondent in issuing the order impugned in these writ petitions would amount to discrimination and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and whether the ratio laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 801 of 1992, dated 6 August 1992, can be extended to these writ petitions without going into the question of maintainability of these writ petitions, as they were filed against a co-operative society.

6. Admittedly, the writ-petitioner joined the service of the second respondent in 1966 as a clerk. According to the respondent management, the petitioner joined the service of the second respondent in 1962. But it is an admitted fact that the petitioner was promoted as a Branch Manager in the year 1963 and had acted so at the Gudiyatham Branch till 1965. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred and posted in the head office of the second respondent at Vellore. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 2 July 1966. Thereafter, five criminal cases were instituted against the petitioner in respect of the charges of breach of trust and misappropriation of funds. On the very same allegations in respect of which the petitioner was placed under suspension another co-accused by name Rajagopal was also placed under suspension and he was also acquitted along with the petitioner. The said Rajagopal was reinstated in service. But according to the writ-petitioner, the said Rajagopal was reinstated in service as he happened to be the relative of the then president of the respondent stores. Even after the acquittal, viz., on 30 November 1983, the petitioner was not reinstated in service in spite of his repeated representations and requests and his requests were turned down on the ground that arbitration proceedings under S. 75 of the Co-operative Societies Act were pending and as such, it was not possible for the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service. But it could be seen from the records that those arbitration proceedings were dismissed as early as on 31 August 1977 and even thereafter the petitioner was not reinstated in service. On behalf of the respondent, it is stated that in view of the audit report of the society for the year 1964–66 surcharge proceedings were instituted against the writ-petitioner and fifteen other Directors as the second respondent society was superseded by the Government for gross mismanagement and abuse of authority by them and as such, the petitioner was not reinstated in service. The petitioner had issued a notice through his lawyer as early as on 14 March 1983 to which he received no reply from the management. Thereafter, the petitioner had chosen to file a claim petition under S. 33-C in Civil Petition No. 690 of 1983 before the Second Additional Labour Court, Madras, claiming wages from 1 January 1966 to 30 June 1983 to the tune of Rs. 20,000. The respondent-management had not filed any counter-affidavit, but the respondent-management had been taking adjournments of the case. It was under these circumstances, the petitioner had filed a Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 11385 of 1984 and has also obtained interim order, from this Court, directing the respondent to pay him a sum of Rs. 300 every month towards subsistence allowance and as against the said interim orders, the respondent-society has preferred a Writ Appeal No. 345 of 1985. The said Writ Appeal No. 354 of 1985 was dismissed by this Court by order, dated 19 September 1985. The second respondent-management has not even paid any salary to the petitioner from 1 January 1966 till the date of filing of the present writ petitions. It was only thereafter, the proceedings, dated 4 January 1989 impugned in these writ petitions came to be issued calling upon the petitioner to appear for a departmental enquiry in respect of the various charges levelled against the petitioner in the chargememo, dated 27 June 1966. The grievance of the petitioner is that even after acquittal by the criminal Court and even after the dismissal of the arbitration proceedings, he was not reinstated in service, in spite of his repeated requests made by him.

7. Now, we have to consider the important question whether the petitioner can still be kept under suspension even after the dismissal of the arbitration proceedings and even after the acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal proceedings instituted against him, on account of the laches on the part of the respondents in not reinstating the petitioner in service though the co-employee who was accused for same charges was reinstated and whether the impugned order, dated 4 January 1989, is liable to be quashed.

8. Sri N.G.R Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the writ-petitioner, drew my attention to certain decisions of this Court in support of his contention that this Court has extraordinary jurisdiction in disposing of a writ petition under exceptional circumstances and monstrous situation. Learned counsel first cited a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 13874 of 1991 and Writ Appeal No. 919 and 968 of 1992, wherein the Division Bench of this Court had an occasion whether a writ against a co-operative society is maintainable. The said proceedings were filed challenging the orders of the Special Officer, Kadambattur Co-operative Land Development Bank, Tiruvallur, In the said decision the Division Bench of this Court has held as follows:

“7. Sri R. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the writ petition against co-operative societies is not maintainable as per the Full Bench of this Court, and the writ petition is also not maintainable on the other ground that Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988 is still pending. However, he is not in a position to say whether any steps are taken to further prosecute the criminal case against the petitioner by preferring any appeal revision against the acquittal. He fairly admitted that the impugned order of dismissal without observing the principles of natural justice is, of course, not sustainable.

8. In reply Sri N.G.R Prasad submitted that if any impugned order is passed against the principles of natural justice, this Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not taken away notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy or otherwise. In support of that, he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in C. Marianandam v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1989 - I L.L.N 728]. He also submitted that the question whether a writ lies against the Co-operative Society or not, need not detain us, as the impugned order is admittedly one passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, applying the ratio laid down in the above judgment, the impugned order will have to be set aside. He also submitted that it is not the fault of the petitioner for not passing any orders on the application filed by him to withdraw Industrial Dispute No. 392 of 1988 as the petitioner has done his part of the work, but for want of Presiding Officer, no order had been passed on that petition.

9. We have considered the rival submissions.

10. As pointed out earlier, it is not in dispute that the impugned order passed without giving any opportunity to the petitioner, and, therefore, it is in violation of the principles of natural justice. Srinivasan, J., in 1989 - I L.L.N 728 (vide supra), after referring to a Supreme Court judgment while answering a point regarding the maintainability of a writ petition has observed as follows, in Para. 11, at page 733:

‘Before dealing with the third contention put forward by learned counsel for the third respondent, it is necessary to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court on the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In Rohtas Industries v. Its Union [1976 - I L.L.N 165], the Court held that Art. 226 of the Constitution of India was wide enough to affect even a private individual. The relevant portion of the judgment is in the following terms at page 169:

‘Constitution of India… is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person — even a private individual — and be available for any (other) purpose even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Art. 226 in 1965 inserting Art. 226(1) A reiterate the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any persons by the expressive reference to the residence of such person. But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise it is free exercise like a bull in a china shop. This Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and a potent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and pretentous protest, the writ power has, by and large, has been the people's sentinel on the qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. We hold that the award here is not beyond the legal reach of Art. 226, although this power must be kept in severely judicious leash.’

In my view the monstrosity of the situation in the present case would undoubtedly warrant the issue of a writ to the third respondent even if its a private institution on the admitted facts of the case. It is seen that the services of the headmaster of the school are terminated on a very serious charge of misbehaviour with a lady teacher and other charges without giving an opportunity to him to drop the same. It is a shocking stage of affairs that the management of an educational institution should throw to the winds the elementary principles of natural justice in dealing with its headmaster, who is at the helm of affairs on the academic side. This is a case in which the Court should exercise its prerogative power and would be failing in its duty if it chooses to remain a mute witness to the situation on the ground that the third respondent is not a statutory authority.”

In these cases we do not find any difficulty in applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court as refereed to above as admittedly the impugned order was passed without observing the principles of natural justice. Therefore, on that simple ground, we are inclined to allow the writ petitions and accordingly, the impugned order of the respondent, dated 31 July 1991, is quashed.

9. In my considered opinion, the above rulings made by the Division Bench of this Court will be, in all fours, applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the instant case, both the petitioner and another co-accused were acquitted in the criminal case in respect of the very same allegations. But the respondent had reinstated the co-accused only in service, without reinstating the petitioner, in spite of his repeated requests and representations. Therefore, there is discrimination in the case of the petitioner alone. Further, even after the dismissal of the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner was not reinstated and given the relief as prayed for by him even though he is entitled. The mandatory requirements have not been complied with by the respondents in issuing the impugned order. For all these reasons, the impugned proceedings, dated 4 January 1989 are liable to be quashed. In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer to the following decision:

(1) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh [1990 - I L.L.N 780]. wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows, in Para. 4, at page 782:

‘The appeal against the order, dated 16 December 1987, has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975 and 1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them, in April 1977, there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think threat they would have taken more than twelve years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the chargememo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case, there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's order and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.’

2. George v. State of Tamil Nadu [1980 T.N.L.J 356], before a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows:

‘Apart from the question of delay which led to the inference, that the department had abandoned or given up the charges, the fact that the petitioner had been promoted in the year 1966 would also lead to the inference that there is nothing against the petitioner, which would stand in his way of getting a promotion. Therefore, the delay of nearly 13 years would clearly suggest that the charges which were originally framed against the petitioner on 6 October 1958 and repeated in 1964 and 1966 had been abandoned and it was only on that basis the petitioner could have been promoted in the year 1966.’

In view of the peculiar facts of this case, where action in disciplinary proceedings had been taken after 13 years since the charge had been framed, the impugned order could not be sustained especially when no acceptable reason (?) had been given in the counter-affidavit as to why no action was taken for a period of 13 years.

3. Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Ram Chandra [1982 - I L.L.N 277], wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows, in Para. 7, at page 280:

‘Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably acquitted and completely acquitted, it would not be expedient to continue the departmental enquiry on the very same charges grounds of evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is not taken away nor is its discretion in any way fettered…’

4. Palani Co-operative Sale Society v. Labour Court, Madurai [1975 - I L.L.N 330], wherein a Full Bench of this Court has held as follows, in Para. 4, at page 332:

‘There was no need to specify any period of suspension as a punishment. The bye-laws do not lay down any maximum period for suspension as punishment. It is true that the bye-law contemplates suspension both as punishment and suspension pending enquiry… I do not think there is any difficulty at all in holding that bye-law (h) deals with suspension pending enquiry also.’

In the instant case, Sub-cl. (h) visualises the powers of suspension. In our opinion, it is not confined to suspension by way of punishment. It is also applicable to a case of suspension pending an enquiry. Discretion is given in the case of such suspension to allow subsistence allowance at a rate of one-fourth of substantive pay during the period of suspension, if no order of sanction has been made, it may appear that during the period of suspension no remuneration will be permissible. But this discretion coupled as it is with a benefit has to be exercised in every case reasonably and according to law and justice and not whimsically or arbitrarily. It is only for stated reasons that the authority suspending a member pending an enquiry can deny subsistence allowance to him. We construe the provision in that way, more especially because of the last sentence in the sub-clause which has restricted the power of suspension to a period not exceeding three months at a time. This means that the enquiry has to be expedited and the suspension cannot be for more than three months at a time. The last words ‘at a time’ signify or indicate that the power can be exercised in suitable cases for extending the period of suspension beyond three months, every time restricting it only to three months.’ (vide Para. 3, at page 334 of the Full Bench judment)

10. I have also heard learned Government Advocate appearing for the first respondent and Sri A.R Jagadesan for the second respondent in both the writ petitions in extenso. They have simply reiterated the stand taken by the respondent in the counter-affidavit and they were able to rebut the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the writ-petitioner, especially with regard to the discrimination shown by the respondent in the case of the petitioner and the delay inordinate delay and laches on the part of the respondent in issuing the impugned proceedings calling upon the petitioner to appear for a departmental enquiry with regard to the charges framed against him as early as in 1966 in the chargememo, dated 27 June 1966. Therefore, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case on hand and applying the ratio laid down both by this Court as well as by the Apex Court, cited supra, I am of the view that in view of patent violation of principles of natural justice, interest of justice would better be served if the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service in the second respondent society with all benefits as sought for by him in these writ petitions.

11. In the result,

(a) the impugned order, dated 4 January 1989, directing the petitioner to appear for a departmental enquiry is quashed;

(b) the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service in the second respondent with all the benefits as prayed for by the petitioner. However, it is made clear that the writ-petitioner is entitled to claim back-wages from the respondents from the date of filing of the earlier writ petition, viz., Writ Petition No. 4963 of 1984 on 23 April 1986;

(c) these writ petitions shall stand allowed to the extent indicated in (a) and (b); and

(d) there will be no order as to costs.