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State Of Madhya Pradesh v. State Bank Of Indore
Tiwari, J.:— The defendants No. 4 and 5 of Civil Original Suit No. 1-B/93 are the appellants in this appeal presented under Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedur against the judgment and decree dated 2.5.1984 rendered by Tenth Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore in the aforesaid suit.
2. Facts lie in a narrow compass. The respondent No. 3 obtained the loan for respondent No. 2 from respondent No. 1 on 5.9.74 who obtained the pledge of the machines as security for repayment of the loan. The Respondent No. 4 stood as guarantor. The appellants have to recover the amount of tax-penalty from respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 1 filed the aforesaid suit against respondent No. 2 to 4 and the appellants as defendants No. 4 and 5. The defendants No. 4 and 5 were impleaded in the suit to show that the tax-penalty is not the first charge in favour of them as regards the machinery pledged with respondent No. 1 for security of repayment of loan. The Trial Court, framed the issues as under:
“Hindi matter omitted”
3. Issue No. 1 (Aa) was answered in favour of the Respondent No. 1 and against the respondents No. 2 to 4. Issue No. 2(Ba) was answered in favour of Respondent No. 1, but against the appellants. It was held that the appellants did not have any preference of first charge in terms of Section 33-C of the M.P General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Aggrieved, by declaration through issue No. 1(Ba) against the appellants, this appeal has been filed. We have heard Mr. Kulshreshtha, Learned Additional Advocate General for the appellants and Mr. S.C Consul, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1. None appeared for the other respondents.
4. Mr. Kulshreshtha submitted that the finding on issue No. 1(Ba) is contrary to the facts and law and as such, it deserves to be dislodged in favour of the appellants. Mr. Consul, on the other hand, supported the decree passed by the Court below.
5. The factual matrix manifests that Respondent No. 2 obtained the medium term loan to the limit of Rs. 40,000/- on 6.7.74 on execution of the demand-promissory note and on pledge of the machines purchased by it. The rate of interest payable on the aforesaid loan was 14 per cent for annum with quarterly rest. The second loan was taken on 23.1.79 and the third loan was taken on 26.1.79 The respondent No. 2 was thus, liable to pay a total sum of Rs. 1,15,877/-. Section 33-C was inserted in M.P General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (for short the Act) vide Act No. 20 of 1976 with effect from 19.1.76 This was, however, made effective from 16.3.1976
6. It is not disputed before us that the aforesaid newly inserted provision is not retrospective in operation and that the transactions prior to 15.3.76 are not attracted by this provision.
7. Section 33-C of the Act provides as under:
“Tax to be first charge — Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, any amount of tax and or penalty if, any payable by a dealer or other person under this Act shall be a first charge on the property of the dealer or such person.”
8. The Trial Court negatived the question of first charge on the conclusion recorded as under:
“Hindi matter omitted”
9. Mr. Consul submitted that part of the decretal liability is already discharged by the Respondent No. 4 as a guarantor and if remaining amount is also paid by Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, then machinery, under pledge, will become fetter-free and the appellants should take proper steps to safeguard their right of recovery as second charge on it. He urged that appellants, should chase Respondents No. 2 and 3 instead of Respondent No. 1. On facts, the appeal, is thus, without merit.
10. Two factors stare in the face. One: Non-existence of factual position to attract Section 33-C of the Act and Two: untenability of appeal being against finding on one issue only when the Respondent No. 2 made pledge of its property before 15.3.76 i.e on 5.9.74 The interest so transferred in favour of the Respondent No. 1 i.e Pawnee, which is itself property, would not be impaired or incinerated by the subsequent codification of provision like Section 33-C. Position is free from conundrum or tenebrosity. The “interest” created before the date in favour of the mortgagee or pawnee would cease to be the property of the dealer, and therefore, could not be affected by Section 33-C of the Act. State Bank of Indore v. The Additional Tehsildar Cum Sales Tax Officer, Dewas, (1982) Tax Marg Darshika (4) 47 is pertinent. Appellants evidently failed to demonstrate that interest admittedly created on 5.9.74 before the date (15.3.76) of enforcement suffered any cessation after 15.3.1976 and earned revivification at any time after the date. Respondent No. 2 is a Nationalised Bank and cannot be flagellated by erroneous application of new provision. Ratio thus turns to be an exercise in futility by reason of this incontestable factual matrix. Later loans after subsisting prior charge i.e interest are features of irrelevance and do not tilt the balance in favour of the appellants. We have tautologized the texture.
11. It luculently emerges that the charge in favour of Respondent No. 1, so far as the machines are concerned, was created on 5.9.74 i.e prior to the enforcement of the aforesaid provision from 16.3.76 The subsequent loans taken on 23.1.79 and 25.1.79 did not alter the position in favour of the appellants. The charge created once, remained valid and operative bill repayment of the loan as borrowed.
12. Section 33-C of the Act as reproduced above, speaks of first charge on the property of the dealer or such person. In our view, the machines, in the face of the charge, ceased to be the property of Respondent No. 2 and no such property was in existence on 15.3.76 That being so, it is inutile and futile to slip under the umbrella, deeming it to be protective of Section 33-C of the Act. The finding is thus, not found to be vitiated in any manner.
13. That apart, it emerges that this appeal has been filed against the finding and not against the decree. The Court fee of Rs. 30/- only has been paid. The relief claimed in the memorandum of appeal is reproduced below:
“For the reasons submitted above, it is prayed that this appeal be accepted with costs and judgment and decree passed by the Court below be set-aside in so far as the finding on issue No. 1 (Ba) is concerned.”
14. The prayer is that the finding on issue No. 1(Ba) be set aside. The Single Bench of this Court held in Second Appeal No. 285 of 1969(J) (Alopabai v. Milapbai) decided on 18.9.76 (1976 MPWN 171) that “appeal lies against a decree and not against a finding.”
15. On the question of law as regards tenability of the appeal, Mr. Kulshreshtha, when questioned, contended that appellants could file the regular appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure on Court fee of Rs. 30/- only for demolition of adverse declaration against the invocation of Section 33-C of the Act. This argument seemed to be one of despair and is not exactly in accord with the relief Clause. In essence, it is an appeal against the finding and not against the decree as such. We remain unimpressed. The appellants ought to have put valuation as per the “charge” sought to be sustained.
16. Still we did not deem it proper to mortalise the appeal on this indicated flaw but found it fit to analyse the position. As concluded, the appeal, even on facts, is found to be devoid of substance and the finding under impugnment is shown to be not perishable.
17. In the result; we hold that the appeal is acarpous and deserves the fate of dismissal. Accordingly, we uphold the finding on issue No. 1 (Ba) leaving the judgment, and decree undisturbed and dismiss this appeal, but without any orders as to costs.
18. A decree be drawn up. Counsel fee for the appellants' and Respondent No. 1 is quantified as Rs. 1,000/- on certification. Record of the Trial Court be returned.
19. Appeal dismissed.
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