Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Union Bank Of India v. Dhian Pati & Others

Himachal Pradesh High Court
Jul 11, 1996
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of the Opinion (A.L. Vaidya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-bank sued defendant No.1, Shri Mehar Chand, for recovery of Rs. 41,019.50 being principal and interest on a short-term agricultural loan. A loan of Rs. 30,700 was sanctioned after the borrower submitted an application. The bank's case pleaded that defendant No.1 agreed to mortgage his land and hypothecate the potato crop, executed a demand promissory note, an agreement of hypothecation and a mortgage deed (all documents executed in February 1974), and withdrew the sanctioned amounts in March 1974. Payments totalling Rs. 22,000 were later made on specified dates. Defendant No.2 (Rachhpal Singh) and late Shri Charan Dass (predecessor of defendants 3–6) executed an indenture of indemnity and guarantee on 28.2.1974. Defendant No.1 admitted the plaintiff's claim at trial and obtained leave to pay in instalments; defendant No.2 was proceeded ex parte. Defendants 3–6 (successors of Charan Dass) contested the suit, denying guarantor status or alleging discharge of any liability by negligence/forbearance and pleading limitation and other preliminary objections.

The Trial Court framed numerous issues touching on execution of the guarantee/mortgage documents, liability of sureties, limitation, discharge of surety by creditor's acts, estoppel under Section 139 of the Contract Act, and effect of failure to obtain a valid mortgage. The Trial Court found the mortgage deed (Ex. P-4) was not validly executed because it did not bear defendant No.1's signature at the time of initial scribing, and held that the plaintiff's omission impaired the sureties' remedy and discharged them. Consequently the Trial Court decreed recovery against defendant No.1 alone and dismissed the suit against defendants 2 and 3–6.

The Bank appealed to the District Judge, who framed four points including whether mortgage security was impaired and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The first Appellate Court held that the mortgage security had been impaired, found the suit maintainable and not barred by limitation, and dismissed the Bank's appeal (thereby upholding the dismissal of the suit against the sureties). The present (second) appeal was then heard by A.L. Vaidya, J., who reviewed the validity of the mortgage deed Ex. P-4 and the consequences of its execution or non-execution for surety liability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disputed mortgage deed (Ex. P-4) is valid and binding and whether the securities were impaired.
  2. Whether the guarantors are liable for the payment of the debt and whether the Courts below have correctly interpreted the provisions of the Contract Act in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Bank's) Case

  • The Bank advanced a loan of Rs. 30,700 to defendant No.1 after he agreed to mortgage his land and hypothecate the potato crop and after execution of promissory note, hypothecation agreement and mortgage deed in February 1974.
  • Defendant No.1 executed the mortgage deed (Ex. P-4) and guarantee instruments, and admitted the debt; therefore the Bank was entitled to recover the balance (Rs. 41,019.50) including agreed interest.
  • The Bank's counsel agreed to payment by defendant No.1 in four annual instalments when that concession was sought after admission.

Defendants 3–6 (Successors of Shri Charan Dass) — Principal Contentions

  • Charan Dass had never stood as guarantor for the particular short-term loan; alternatively, if he did, his liability ended because of negligence, forbearance and indulgence by the Bank.
  • The Bank failed, through acts/omissions of its officers, to obtain a valid and legal mortgage deed from the principal debtor; this impaired the sureties' remedy.
  • The liability of Charan Dass terminated with his death and could not be fastened upon his successors beyond inheritance limits.
  • The claim against them was time-barred: limitation began to run from the date of the promissory note (18.2.1974) and no acknowledgement or part payment was made within three years; an acknowledgement by the principal debtor could not bind them.
  • Other preliminary objections and pleas of discharge of surety by creditor conduct were also raised.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1976 Allahabad 23 — Ch. Birbal Singh v. Harphool Khan Execution of a document consists in signing a document written out, read over and understood; execution does not consist of signing a blank paper. The Court relied on this authority to explain the proper meaning of "execution" and to support the conclusion that voluntary signing after reading/understanding the contents (including at registration) constitutes execution; this supported the finding that Ex. P-4 was validly executed when signatures were affixed at registration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps focused on whether Ex. P-4 (the alleged mortgage deed) had been validly executed by defendant No.1 and, if so, whether the lower courts' findings discharging the sureties were correct.

1. Meaning of "execution": The Court examined definitions of "execution" from authoritative sources quoted in the record — Prem's Judicial Dictionary and Law Lexicon — and the statutory definition in Section 2(12) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (which equates "executed" and "execution" with "signed" and "signature"). The Court emphasized that execution requires voluntary signing with free consent and knowledge of contents; execution includes signing in the presence of witnesses where required and delivery.

2. Role of the Registering Officer under the Registration Act: The court noted the Registration Act requires the registering officer to be satisfied as to the execution of the document and the identity of the executants before registration. Registration is therefore preceded by an inquiry into execution.

3. Examination of the register entries and signatures: The Registrar's endorsements on Ex. P-4 showed the mortgage deed was presented for registration on 29.1.1974, the contents were read over and explained to the executants, they admitted the contents to be true and correct, and signatures of the executants (including Mehar Chand) were recorded by the Sub-Registrar at registration. The Court interpreted these entries as establishing that the executants affixed their signatures at the time of registration after being satisfied as to the contents.

4. Validity of execution at the time of registration: The Court rejected the contention that signatures had to be present on the document prior to presentation for registration. It held there is no bar to validly effect execution at the time of registration if the Registering Officer satisfies himself regarding execution, and if the executants exhibit voluntary signatures and admission of contents in his presence. The Court found the signatures affixed at the time of registration cured any earlier absence of signatures on the scribed document.

5. Admission by the executant: The Court further relied on the fact that defendant No.1 admitted execution of Ex. P-4. Where the executant admits execution, the opportunity to challenge non-execution is substantially curtailed. Combining the Registrar's endorsement and defendant No.1's admission, the Court concluded Ex. P-4 was validly executed.

6. Consequence for sureties: Because Ex. P-4 was validly executed, the foundational premise of the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court — that the mortgage deed was not executed and that the plaintiff's omission discharged the sureties by impairing their remedy — was incorrect in law and fact. Accordingly, the lower courts' conclusions discharging the sureties were unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is accepted. The judgments and decrees of the two Courts below dismissing the suit of the plaintiff against defendants 2 and 3–6 are set aside. The suit of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 41,019.50 with costs is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Defendant No.1 and the guarantors (defendants 2 and 3–6) are held jointly and severally liable for payment of the decretal amount, subject to the qualification that defendants 3–6 are liable only to the extent of the estate they inherited from late Shri Charan Dass.

Implications:

  • The Court concluded Ex. P-4 was validly executed at the time of registration and that the lower courts erred in holding the mortgage deed invalid for want of prior signatures; this restored the Bank's security basis and the sureties' liability.
  • Direct consequences: The plaintiff obtains a decree for Rs. 41,019.50 against the principal debtor and the sureties (with the inheritance-limited liability of defendants 3–6). The earlier dismissals of the suit against the sureties are set aside.
  • The opinion does not indicate that the Court intended to lay down a new general precedent beyond applying established principles (definitions and statutory provisions) to the facts; the decision turns on the specific findings of registration, admission and the Registrar's endorsements in this case.

Disposition: Appeal disposed of.

Show all summary ...

A.L Vaidya, J.:— The present appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:

1. Whether the disputed mortgage deed is valid and binding and the securities were impaired?.

2. Whether the guarantors are liable for the payment of the debt and whether the Courts below have correctly interpreted the provisions of the Contract Act in the facts and circumstances of the case?

2. The plaintiff-Bank filed a suit against the defendant for recovery of Rs. 41,019.50 on account of principal and interest of the short-term agricultural loan advanced by the Bank in favour of defendant No. 1 Shri Mehar Chand. A loan to the tune of Rs. 30,700/- was sanctioned by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1 on latter's submitting an application in this behalf. As per case of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 had agreed to mortgage his land with the plaintiff and had also agreed to hypothecate the potato crops which he was to grow on the land after taking the said loan. The defendant No. 2 Rachhpal Singh and one Shri Charan Dass, Predecessors of defendants 3 to 6 stood guarantors for the repayment of loan which was taken by the defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 1 executed a demand promissory note for Rs. 30,700, an agreement of hypothecation of standing crops and also created mortgage over his land as detailed in the plaint. It has also been the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 executed a mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff. All these documents were executed in February 1974 and on 28th February, 1974; defendant No. 2 and late Shri Charan Dass, the Predecessor of the defendants 3 to 6 executed an indenture of indemnity and guarantee in favour of the plaintiff. Plaintiff also pleaded that the defendant No. 1 withdrew Rs. 6000/- on 2.3.1974 and Rs. 24,700/- on 13.3.1974 Thereafter, according to the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 paid Rs. 22,000/- on various dates, as detailed below:

(i) on 30.11.1974 Rs. 10,000/- (ii) on 18.8.1975 Rs. 2,000/- (iii) on 5.9.1975 Rs. 2,000/- (iv) on 1.3.1978 Rs. 4,000/- (v) on 15.3.1978 Rs. 4,000/- Total: Rs. 22,000/-

3. Plaintiff had also pleaded that the defendant had agreed that plaintiff would be entitled to charge interest @ 14.5% per annum besides charging interest @ 2% per annum on the amount becoming over-due. As the defendant No. 1 became irregular in the repayment of the loan, hence suit for recovery of Rs. 41,019.50 on account of balance principal amount and interest due thereon was preferred.

4. Defendant No. 1 admitted the claim of the plaintiff by making a statement through his Counsel. The defendant No. 1 sought the concession to pay the decretal money in four annual equal instalments, each payable on or before 30th of November of each year; the first being payable on 30th November, 1981. Plaintiff's Counsel agreed to the payment of the decretal money by defendant No. 1 in equal annual instalments as requested by defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 2 did not appear and accordingly was proceeded ex-parte.

5. Defendants 3 to 6, namely, the successors in interest of Charan Dass, the second surety, however contested the claim of the plaintiff. They alleged that Charan Dass had never stood as guarantor for the repayment of the short-term loan alleged to have been taken by defendant No. 1. They also pleaded that even if it was proved that said Charan Dass had given such a guarantee, his liability to pay the debt came to an end because of the acts of negligence, forbearance and indulgence of the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that though the plaintiff was to get the mortgage deed in respect of the landed property of defendant No. 1 executed in its favour; but on account of the acts of commission and negligence of its officers, a valid and, legal mortgage deed could not be obtained. The contesting defendants further pleaded that the liability, if any, of late Charan Dass came to an end with his death and they could not be made responsible of the liability of Charan Dass, which was a personal in nature. According to them, the suit against them was also barred by limitation, as neither their predecessor nor they themselves ever acknowledged their liability or made part payment within the period of limitation. According to them, the pronote was executed on 18.2.1974 and the alleged guarantee deed was executed on 28.2.1974 and in this behalf, the limitation started running on 18.2.1974 against defendant No. 1 and against the sureties also. According to them, the said liability was neither acknowledged by them or their predecessor within three years nor any part payment was made within this period. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim against them was barred by time. It was also pleaded by them that the acknowledgement of liability made by defendant No. 1 could not bind them. There were other preliminary objections taken by these contesting defendants.

6. Parties were put to trial on the following issues:

1. Whether Shri Charan Dass, deceased and defendant No. 2 executed the document in suit? OPP.

2. If issue No. 1 is proved in the affirmative, whether the documents in suit are not binding upon defendant Nos. 3 to 6? OPD 3-6

3. Whether the suit amount is not recoverable from defendants 3 to 6? OPD 3-6.

4. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable? OPD 3 to 6.

5. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of necesssary parties? OPD 3 to 6.

6. Whether the suit is time-barred against defendants 3 to 6? OPD 3 to 6.

7. Whether the obligation of surety stands discharged qua the defendants 3 to 6 as alleged in additional pleas? OPD 3 to 6.

8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to bring the present suit under the provisions of Section 139 of the Contract Act? OPD 3 to 6.

9. Whether the surety bond in question stands automatically revoked due to death of Shri Charan Dass, deceased? OPD.

10. Whether the defendants 3 to 6 are entitled to special cost? OPD 3 to 6.

11. Whether the debt in suit was to be secured against the property of defendant No. 1 by way of mortgage, if so, its effect? OPD.

12. If issue No. 11 is proved in the affirmative, whether the nucleus of the entire transaction stands frustrated and impaired due to acts of omission and commission of the plaintiff qua the rights of defendants 3 to 6? OPD 3 to 6.

13. Whether in case of decree the plaintiff is entitled to special cost against the defendants 3 to 6. If so, how much? OPP.

14. Relief

7. Issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the plaintiff and under issue No. 2 it was held that the agreement of suretyship bound defendants 3 to 6 to the extent to which they had inherited the estate of late Shri Charan Dass. Issues 4 and 5 were decided in the negative. Under issue No. 6, the Trial Court held the suit to be without limitation against defendants 2 and 3 to 6 and issue was accordingly disposed of Issue No. 7 was decided against defendants 3 to 6, while under issue No. 8 it was held that the liability of the surety defendants, i. e. defendants No. 2 and 3 to 6 stood discharged on account of omission of the plaintiff to get a proper and valid mortgage deed in respect of the land of the principal debtor. Accordingly, the issue was decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. Issue Nos. 9 and 10 were decided against the defendants for want of evidence. Under issue No. 11, it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to obtain a mortgage deed, has impaired the remedy of the sureties which they could enforce against the principal debtor on paying the debt to the plaintiff and accordingly, this issue was decided in favour of defendants 3 to 6. Issue No. 12 was disposed of in favour of defendants. Issue No. 13 was decided against the plaintiff and issue No. 3 also was disposed of against the plaintiff.

8. The Trial Court passed a decree for a sum of Rs. 41,019.50 in favour of the plaintiff and against defendant No. 1 Shri Mehar Chand, as he had admitted the claim of the plaintiff. However, the suit against defendants 2 and 3 to 6 was dismissed.

9. The Bank assailed the aforesaid judgment and decree before the first Appellate Court on various grounds. The learned District Judge framed the following points for consideration:

1. Whether the mortgage security has been impaired by the negligent acts of omission and misconduct on the part of the Bank, if so, its effect?

2. Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form?

3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

4. Final order.

10. After hearing the parties, the first Appellate Court disposed of the aforesaid points as under:

Point No. 1 Yes. In the circumstances of the case.

Point No. 2 Yes.

Point No. 3 No.

Point No. 4 The appeal was dismissed as per operative part of the judgment.

11. The aforesaid judgment and decree have been assailed in the present second appeal on various pleas.

12. Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard and the record has also been scrutinised.

13. Learned Senior Sub Judge, while disposing of issue No. 8, referred the mortgage deed Ex.P-4. The learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that this mortgage deed Ex. P-4 was undoubtedly not a valid and lawful deed of mortgage, rather it was no deed in the, eyes of law, because according to learned Judge, though purporting to be a duly registered, duly stamped and even attested by witnesses, it was not signed by defendant No. 1. Learned Court came to the conclusion that this deed was not executed by defendant No. 1 and, therefore, it could not bind him. It was also observed by the Trial Court that on account of the negligence and the acts of omission and commission of its servants, the plaintiff could not obtain a real and tengible security from the defendant No. 1 and this omission on the part of the plaintiff's servants discharged the sureties from their liability, because this omission to get the mortgage deed duly executed from the defendant No. 1 has impaired the eventual remedy of the surety defendants against the principal debtor. Learned Court also referred to the provisions of the Contract Act, as envisaged under Sections 139, 140 and 141. The main plea which has influenced the Trial Court to come to that conclusion was that the mortgage deed had not been legally executed by defendant No. 1, as it did not contain his signatures.

14. Learned District Judge, while dealing with this aspect of the matter, also observed that the only fault of the creditor in this case was that he did not get valid execution of the mortgage deed, as there were no signatures of the mortgagor and it was to be signed by the mortgagor. The learned Judge, on the basis of non-execution of the mortgage deed, accepted the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. However, learned Judge came to the conclusion that the suit against the contesting defendants and other surety was also within time.

15. Both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that because the mortgage deed was not executed by defendant No. 1, by not affixing his signatures thereto, therefore, the surety against the principal debtor was discharged, as the eventual-remedy of the surety himself against the principal debtor was thereby impaired, as provided under Section 139 of the Contract Act. Sections 140 and 141 of the Indian Contract Act have also been referred.

16. In order to deal with the proposition in hand, it has to be ascertained whether Ex. P-4, the mortgage deed his been validly executed by defendant No. 1. If so, the judgments of the two Courts below, in that event, have to be interfered with? In case Ex. P-4, the mortgage deed, is proved to have not been validly executed by defendant No. 1, the inferences arrived at by the two Courts below, have to be maintained. There is no dispute to this proposition by the learned Counsel for the parties. The words “execution of document” have not been defined in the Indian Contract Act/Registration Act. Ex. P-4, the alleged mortgage deed was a registered document. Under the provisions of the Registration Act, before a document is registered, the Registering Officer has to make an inquiry whether or not such document has been executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed and also the registering officer has to satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him and alleging that they have executed the document. Thus, the registering officer is debarred to register a document unless and until he was satisfied regarding the execution of the document to be registered by the person who executed the same.

17. The words “execution of document” have been explained in Prem's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. I Edition 1993 at page 635 as under:

“…….the ordinary meaning of executing a document is signing a document as a consenting party thereto. Where the document is required by law to be attested, execution includes the signature by the executant and the attestation thereof by the subscribing witnesses. Execution of a document means something more than the mere signing by the parties, it includes delivery and also includes signing in the presence of witnesses where witnesses are necessary. Executing consists in signing a document written out and read over and understood, and does not consist in merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper….”

18. The words “execution of documents” in 1986 IInd Edition Law Lexicon with Legal Maxims at page 799 has been defined as under:

“Execution of documents: The “execution” of a document means voluntary execution, i.e signing of the document of the executant's free Will. Therefore, where the signature of a person to a document is obtained by duress or intimidation, there is no “execution” of the document.”

19. The words. “executed” and “execution” have been defined in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 under Section 2(12) as under:

“Executed and execution: “Executed” and “execution”, used with reference to instruments, mean “signed” and “signature”.”

20. In AIR 1976 Allahabad 23, Ch. Birbal Singh v. Harphool Khan, it has been held that the execution of a document consists in signing a document written out, read over and understood and does not consist of merely signing a blank paper.

21. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid meaning of the words “execution of document” it only signifies that the person executing such a document should sign such a document with free consent. The execution of a document would be complete in case the executant had signed the document voluntarily, without any duress, knowing the contents of the document.

22. In the present case, the document involved on record is Ex. P-4, the alleged deed of simple mortgage. The original mortgage deed Ex. P-4, before it was presented for registration, was not having the name and signatures of the mortgagor therein. In a way, before this deed was presented for registration, as it did not contain the signatures of the mortgagor and his name, accordingly, it could not be said to have been executed in terms of law. At the time of registration of this deed, as referred to earlier, the law of registration required the satisfaction of the Registering Authority regarding the valid execution by the executant of this deed.

23. The Registering officer, who happened to be the Sub Registrar, Jubbal has registered this deed and his endorsements to this effect were as under:

“29.1.1974 Written up on 5 Non-Judicial stamps worth Rs. 465/-

(Vijay Singh Negi)

Sub Registrar, Jubbal.

29.1.1974 This simple Mortgage deed has been presented by S/Shri Mehar Chand Bali Ram and Samu today the 29th day of January, 1974 corresponding to 10th Magh Saka Sambat 1895 in my office for registration.

(Vijay Singh Negi)

Sub Registrar, Jubbal.

Bali Ram

Mehar Chand.

The contents of this Mortgage deed have been read over and explained to the Executants who are personally known to me and they have admitted them to be true and correct.

(Vijay Singh Negi)

Sub Registrar, Jubbal.

Bali Ram

Mehar Chand.

Certified that deed has been registered and entered at Sr. No. 4 in Book No. 1 Vol No. 11. A copy of the deed has been pasted in Additional Book No. 1 Vol. No. 10 from pages 47 to 51.

(Vijay Singh Negi)

Sub Registrar, Jubbal.”

24. The executants have affixed their signatures at the time of registration of this deed as referred to above. Not only that, the contents of the mortgage deed were read over and explained to the executants who, after admitting the same to be correct, affixed their signatures thereafter. Both the executants were known to the Sub Registrar.

25. The aforesaid signatures affixed by the executants at the time of registration amounted to the execution of the deed. It is being contended that the signatures should have been affixed on the deed prior to its presentation for registration. It may be correct that the execution would have been complete in case the signatures of the executants had been there on the document before it was presented for registration, but the fact remains that at the time of registration even, execution could be validly effected. There is no such bar to execute in that manner. As referred above, at the time of registration, the executants voluntarily put in their signatures on the aforesaid deed, the contents of which have been admitted to be correct. The only rider for registering such a document was that before registering the said document, the officer had to satisfy for its due execution, which was so done in the presence of the Sub Registrar by the executants. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said at all that the document did not bear any signatures of defendant No. 1 and as such, it was not validly executed but, on the other hand, as per evidence on record, this aspect of the matter has been established to be otherwise and as a consequence thereof, this document Ex. P-4 can easily be said to have been validly executed. Any carelessness on the part of the executants at the time of scribing of this document, was cured when the executants put their signatures at the time of registration, making the document to be a legal and duly executed.

26. Moreover, this is a case where the executant-defendant No. 1 has admitted the execution of this document and this execution is being assailed on behalf of the defendants 3 to 6 alone. In this view of the matter also, where the executant has admitted the execution, there does not remain any scope whatsoever to describe this document to be not validly executed, having not been signed by the executants. The two Courts below, as such, have wrongly interpreted the law while appreciating the valid execution of mortgage deed Ex. P-4.

27. Learned Counsel for the respondents have tried to submit that the suit was without limitation against the contesting defendants. This aspect of the matter has been, in detail, dealt with by the learned District Judge and those findings do not require any interference whatsoever.

28. No other point has been stressed.

29. In view of the fore-going reasons, the present appeal is accepted and the judgments and decrees passed by the two Courts below dismissing the suit of the plaintiff against defendants 2 and 3 to 6, are set aside and as a consequence thereof, the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 41,019.50 with costs is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Defendant No. 1 and the guarantors-defendants 2 and 3 to 6 are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforesaid decretal amount. However, it may be pointed out here that so far as defendants 3 to 6 are concerned, they shall be liable to the extent to which they have inherited the estate of late Shri Charan Dass. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

30. Appeal disposed of.