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Anurag Verma v. State Of Bihar

Patna High Court
Dec 16, 2011
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Shiva Kirti Singh, J.; Shivaji Pandey, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent arises from an order dated 9.11.2010 in Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 1866 of 2005, whereby the writ court quashed an appointment order (Annexure-5, No. 47 of 2004) in which the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur had promoted six Class-IV employees to six vacant Class-III clerk posts. The writ court directed that the result of an earlier examination (85 marks written + 15 marks interview) be declared for those candidates who had earlier participated.

Relevant background facts (not in dispute): both the six appellants (promoted employees) and the six writ petitioners (respondents 5 to 10 in the appeal) were Class-IV employees of the Civil Court, Muzaffarpur. The writ petitioners sought quashing of the promotions on the ground that the promotions violated Rule 6 of the Bihar Civil Courts Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) (Amendment) Rules, 2001 ("Amendment Rules, 2001").

Procedural timeline (as given in the opinion):

  • General Order No. 204/2003 (2.12.2003) invited applications for promotion on basis of written test (85 marks) + interview (15 marks). Written test: 20.4.2004; interview: 7.7.2004. Final results were not declared because the High Court, by letter dated 19.8.2004, directed fresh written examination to be held for 90 marks as full marks with 45 marks as qualifying marks.
  • District and Sessions Judge issued General Order No. 171/2004 (8.10.2004) directing a fresh written examination (90 marks full; 45 qualifying) and interview (10 marks). Fresh written exam: 7.11.2004; interview: 12.12.2004.
  • On the basis of the fresh process, six appellants were promoted vide order dated 31.12.2004. The writ petition challenging that order was filed on 8.2.2005. The writ court quashed the promotion order; the present appeal follows.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Rule 6 of the Bihar Civil Courts Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) (Amendment) Rules, 2001 — which deals with appointment by promotion — incorporates within itself a mandate to hold a separate examination with the same full marks for the written test and interview as are prescribed in Rule 5 for general recruitment (i.e., whether Rule 6 effectively adopts the provisions of Rule 5 insofar as full marks, interview marks and qualifying marks are concerned).
  2. Whether the writ petitioners, having participated in the fresh recruitment process called by General Order No. 171/2004 and having accepted that process without protest, are precluded (by estoppel or by the equitable principle applied in discretionary writ jurisdiction) from challenging the recruitment/selection process after being unsuccessful.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Amendment Rules, 2001 are silent on the question of full marks under Rule 6; therefore the High Court's earlier general direction (as reflected in General Order No. 171/2004) permitting a fresh written examination with 90 marks as full marks and 10 marks for interview was rightly applied.
  • Rule 6 did not change in substance by the Amendment Rules, 2001; consequently earlier general directions of the High Court remained relevant and could validly be issued under Rule 7(iii) & (iv) and Rule 10 of the Rules (Rule 10 confers power on the High Court to issue general or special directions to make the rules regarding appointment more effective or to clarify/supplement them).
  • The wording of Rule 6(3) (of the Amendment Rules, 2001) is vague in referring to the preceding Rule 5; Rule 5 relates to general recruitment, not promotion. At best, Rule 6 adopted the concept of holding a separate examination/interview but did not adopt the detailed provisions of Rule 5 (such as full marks for written/interview or qualifying marks or eligibility). Thus the District Judge's fresh recruitment process was properly authorized.
  • Alternatively, the writ petitioners had acquiesced in General Order No. 171/2004 by participating in the fresh process and therefore, having taken the opportunity, they cannot be permitted to challenge the advertisement/selection process afterward (relying on Supreme Court authority — University of Kochi v. N.S. Kanjoonjamma — that participation in a selection process estops challenge to that process).

Writ Petitioners' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The provisions of Rule 6 of the Amendment Rules, 2001 are statutory in nature; parties cannot be estopped from challenging an appointment if it violates statutory provisions (the writ petitioners contended that the promotions violated Rule 6).
  • By implication, the writ petitioners argued that illegality apparent from the notice/selection process could not be cured by their subsequent participation; where statutory provisions are infringed, estoppel should not operate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
University of Kochi v. N.S. Kanjoonjamma, (1997) 4 SCC 426 : AIR 1997 SC 2083 The principle that parties who participate in a selection process may be estopped from subsequently challenging the selection process (where participation constituted acceptance of the process). The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a candidate who accepted and participated in the fresh selection process could not later challenge that process after being unsuccessful.
Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam, (2009) 3 SCC 227 Discusses refusal to permit a party who has accepted a change in selection procedure silently to challenge that procedure later; paragraph 32 was quoted to the effect that acceptance sub silentio precludes later challenge. The court cited paragraph 32 to hold that the writ petitioners, having accepted the changed selection procedure and participated, could not be permitted to challenge it later; this authority formed a principal basis for dismissing the writ.
Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, 2008 (3) PLJR (SC) 271 Reiterates that candidates who participate in a selection process knowing the qualifications/criteria are estopped from challenging the process post facto. Used to reinforce the court's conclusion that participation in the process without demur precludes a later challenge to the selection criteria or procedure.
Marripati Nagaraja v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2007) 11 SCC 522 Earlier precedent approved in Dhananjay Malik; relates to estoppel/preclusion where candidates participate without objection. Noted by the court as part of the chain of authorities supporting the non-permissibility of a belated challenge by participants in the selection process.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in two linked strands, both of which are expressly set out in the opinion.

  1. Interpretation of Rules (Rule 5 and Rule 6 of the Amendment Rules, 2001):

    The court examined the text of Rule 5 and Rule 6 of the Amendment Rules, 2001 and acknowledged some ambiguity or "scope of interpretation" due to the phrasing of Rule 6(3) which refers to the preceding Rule 5. Notwithstanding that vagueness, the court concluded that "in effect the relevant terms of Rule 5 have been adopted for holding a separate examination and interview for the purpose of appointment to Class-III posts by promotion." The court therefore stated it was not inclined to differ from the writ court's view on this interpretive issue.

  2. Discretionary Writ Jurisdiction / Acceptance of Terms and Participation in Selection:

    Independently of the interpretive finding, the court addressed the equitable and discretionary dimension: whether persons who accepted the terms of an advertisement/notice (in this case General Order No. 171/2004) and participated in the selection process without protest can later challenge that process when unsuccessful. The court noted the settled proposition that one cannot be estopped against statute, but clarified that the present issue is not strictly one of estoppel against statute. Rather, it is the application of discretionary writ jurisdiction where a litigant had "accepted the terms of notices or advertisement and has taken his chance of success without any protest and then seeks exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction to challenge the terms" after losing.

    The court relied on Supreme Court authorities (including Amlan Jyoti Borooah, Dhananjay Malik, University of Kochi) which hold that a petitioner who participates in a selection process without timely protest ordinarily should not be allowed to succeed in a later challenge to the terms of the advertisement/notice. The court noted exceptions exist (for instance, where the selection process involves an illegality in the selection process contrary to law that cannot be cured by mere challenge to the advertisement), but on the facts before it the writ petitioners had accepted the fresh process and took their chance; they did not raise timely objection.

  3. Conclusion of reasoning:

    Applying the authorities and the discretionary doctrine, the court concluded that the writ petitioners who took part in the fresh examination (fixed at 90 marks for written and 10 marks for interview) cannot be permitted to turn around and challenge the recruitment process after being unsuccessful. Consequently, the writ petition should be dismissed despite the court's interpretive observations on Rule 5 and Rule 6.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The appeal is allowed and the writ petition is dismissed. (The opinion orders that the appeal stands allowed and that there shall be no order as to costs.)

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The writ court's order quashing the promotion order dated 31.12.2004 is set aside by this appellate decision, which effectively validates the promotions granted pursuant to the fresh selection process called by General Order No. 171/2004 (as the writ petition that sought quashing of those promotions has been dismissed).
  • The court's decision rests primarily on the principle that unsuccessful participants who accepted and participated in the revised recruitment process without timely protest cannot, in discretionary writ jurisdiction, later challenge that process; the court invoked binding Supreme Court authorities to reach this outcome.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent; it applies established principles from earlier Supreme Court decisions to the facts at hand. The court made interpretive observations about Rule 5 and Rule 6 but decided the case on the discretionary/participation ground rather than creating a new rule of law.

Administrative note from the judgment text: There shall be no order as to costs. Shivaji Pandey, J. agreed with the order.

Show all summary ...

Shiva Kirti Singh, J.:— Parties have been heard for the purpose of, final disposal of this appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court.

2. By the order under appeal dated 9.11.2010, writ petition bearing C.W.J.C No. 1866 of 2005 preferred by six petitioners was allowed. Annexure-5 which is an appointment order bearing no. 47 of 2004 whereby the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur after seeking approval of the High Court promoted and appointed six Class-IV employees to six vacant posts of Clerk in Class-III, was quashed. The District and Sessions Judge has been directed to declare the result of those candidates who had participated in an earlier examination and interview on the basis of 85 marks in the written examination and 15 marks in the interview. The facts relevant for deciding the case are not in dispute. All the writ petitioners (respondents 5 to 10 herein) as well as the six appellants whose promotion has been quashed are/were Class-IV employees of Civil Court, Muzaffarpur. The writ petitioners prayed for quashing of promotions of appellants on Class-III posts of Clerk on the ground that the promotions are in violation of Rule 6 of the Bihar Civil Courts Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) (Amendment) Rules, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Rules, 2001). Through a notice issued in the form of General Order bearing no. 204 of 2003 dated 2.12.2003, the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur invited applications from eligible Class-IV employees of Civil Court, Muzaffarpur for promotion to six Class-III posts on the basis of written test followed by interview. The writ petitioners applied and took the written examination on 20th April, 2004. The written examination was for a total of 85 marks. After publication of result, interview was held on 7.7.2004 It was for 15 marks. The final results were, however, not declared because the High Court through a letter dated 19.8.2004 directed for holding of fresh written examination for 90 marks as full marks and 45 marks as the qualifying marks, as per provisions contained in Court's general letter dated 22.11.1995 and the relevant, Rules of 1992, 1998 and 2001.

3. The District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur issued another General Order No. 171/2004 dated 8.10.2004, wherein it was clearly indicated that in view of directions of the High Court through letter dated 19.8.2004 and resolution of Appointment Committee, Civil Court, Muzaffarpur, a fresh written examination would be taken for promotion from Peons/Process Server to clerk for six vacant posts, fixing 90 marks as full marks, 45 marks as the qualifying marks and 10 marks for interview. Fresh applications were, accordingly, invited from eligible candidates with a relaxation that those who had applied earlier need not apply again. Fresh written examination was held on 7th November, 2004 followed by interview on 12.12.2004 On the basis of performance and merit six appellants were granted promotion vide order dated 31.12.2004 That order, as noted earlier was challenged by the writ petitioners through writ petition under consideration, filed on 8.2.2005 Since the writ court has quashed that order, the appellants have come in appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants tried to persuade us that the Amendment Rules, 2001 are silent so far as full marks for written examination provided under Rule 6 is concerned and therefore, the general order issued by the High Court earlier was rightly applied and fresh written examination was held with 90 marks as full marks. In this regard the writ court has extracted not only Rule 6 indicated above but also Rule 5(iv)(d) under which for general recruitment to Class-III posts written examination of 85 marks and viva-voce/person-ality test and interview for 15 marks is envisaged. The issue arising for determination is whether Rule 6 which is confined to appointment by promotion incorporates within itself a mandate to hold a separate examination but with the same full marks for written and interview as prescribed in Rule 5 for general recruitment or not. This issue is material only for the present case because prior to Amendment Rules, 2001 the written test and interview were to be for 90 marks and 10 marks respectively and the same position has been restored in the Bihar Civil Courts Staff (Class-III and Class IV) Rules, 2009 which is presently in force.

5. According to learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for High Court representing the respondents 2 to 4, since there was no change in Rule. 6 in the Amendment Rules, 2001, the earlier general order of the Court remained relevant and such order could be issued under Rule 7(iii) and (iv); They also highlighted Rule 10 under which the High Court has power to issue general or special directions from time to time to make the rules regarding appointment more effective or to clarify or supplement the same. It was further submitted that the wording of Rule 6(3) of the Amendment Rules, 2001 are vague and inappropriate in referring to the preceding rule which is Rule 5 and is confined to appointment of Class-III and Class-IV employees and is not at all related to promotion. As per submissions, at best, only the provision for holding a separate examination and interview was adopted but of the preceding Rule 5 but not the entire provisions specifying the full marks for written examination and interview or the qualifying marks or even the eligibility of the candidates. Hence, according to appellants the general order of the High Court and the provisions in the rules were properly construed while directing for a fresh written examination and interview.

6. On going through the provisions in Rule 5 and Rule 6 of the Amendment Rules, 2001, we find that although there is some scope of interpretation on account of vagueness but in effect the relevant terms of Rule 5 have been adopted for holding a separate examination and interview for the purpose of appointment to Class-III posts by promotion. Hence, we are not inclined to differ from the views of the writ court on this issue.

7. The other contention raised on behalf of appellants is to the effect that the writ petitioners have acquiesced and accepted without demur the General Order No. 171/2004 dated 8.10.2004 whereby the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur gave a general notice which had the effect of cancelling the earlier written test and interview and invited fresh applications for holding a fresh recruitment process for appointment by promotion to the same six vacant posts of clerk. As per submissions, instead of challenging the said order which provided for fresh examination fixing 90 marks in full for the written examination and 10 marks for interview, the writ petitioners took the fresh examination and a chance to get selected and hence they cannot be permitted to turn back and challenge the advertisement/selection process after they were unsuccessful. In support of this proposition, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of University of Kochi v. N.S Kanjoonjamma, (1997) 4 SCC 426 : AIR 1997 SC 2083 in which it was held that since the petitioners of that case had participated in selection, they were estopped from challenging the selection process. In that case the Supreme Court found that although there was some omissions in the advertisement in not mentioning that it was for special recruitment for reserved candidates, it was held to be of no significance because the power to make such recruitment was available with the concerned authority.

8. On behalf of writ petitioners who are respondents herein it was submitted that since the provisions of Rule 6 of the Amendment Rules, 2001 were of statutory nature, there could be no estoppel questioning this appointment on the ground that the selection process is in violation of statutory provisions. In our view, there can be no quarrel with the settled proposition of law that there can be no estoppel against statute. But we are also of the view that it is not strictly the principle of estoppel which is applicable in the present situation rather the issue involved is more basic and fundamental for exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction in a situation where a party has accepted the terms of notices or advertisement and has taken his chance of success without any protest and then seeks exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction to challenge the terms of advertisement/notice. In such a situation the Courts have held that the proper and lawful course for the affected persons is to challenge the violation of rules or law apparent from the notice or advertisement, instead of accepting the terms without any demur and then raising a grievance on being unsuccessful in the selection process. In such a situation, the Apex Court has clearly laid down the law that such petitioner should not be permitted to succeed in his challenge to the terms of advertisement/notice inviting applications. No doubt, there are exception to this rule such as a case where the authorities commit illegality in the selection process contrary to law but without there being any sanction for their such conduct in the terms of advertisement. In the case of Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam, (2009) 3 SCC 227 the law has been discussed in paragraphs 29 to 36 with due reference to earlier cases also for coming to the conclusion in paragraph-32 which is in the following words:—

“The appellant, in our opinion, having accepted the change in the selection procedure sub silentio, by not questioning the appointment of the 169 candidates, in our considered opinion, cannot now be permitted to turn round and contend that the procedure adopted was illegal. He is estopped and precluded from doing so.”

9. The same issue was involved in the case of Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, 2008 (3) PLJR (SC) 271. The Supreme Court not only approved an earlier judgment in the case of Marripati Nagaraja v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2007) 11 SCC 522 but also made a succinct exposes of the law in paragraphs in following terms:—

“It is not disputed that the writ petitioners-respondents herein participated in the process of selection knowing fully well that the educational qualification was clearly indicated in the advertisement itself as B.P.E or graduate with diploma in physical education. Having unsuccessfully participated in the process of selection without any demur they are estopped from challenging the selection criterion inter alia that the advertisement and selection with regard to requisite educational qualifications were contrary to the Rules.”

10. In view of the law laid, down by the Apex Court noticed above, we are of the considered view that writ petitioners who had taken the chance of success by accepting the order for fresh examination with full marks of 90 for the written examination cannot be permitted to turn round and challenge the recruitment process after being unsuccessful. On this ground the writ petition must be dismissed. We order accordingly. The appeal stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Shivaji Pandey, J.:— I agree.