Deokinandan Prasad And Others v. Narsing Raut Opposite Party.

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council in 14 appeals which were decided by this Court.

2. These cases in which the appeals arose were tried together with a number of other cases amounting to 49 in all before the Subordinate Judge of Patna. In one of those cases the present appellants or those whom they now represent were the plaintiffs and in the other cases there were a number of plaintiffs and the present appellants were the defendants or some of the defendants in each of those suits. With regard to the case in which the appellants were the plaintiffs that alone of the suits amounted to a sum of over Rs. 10,000. All the suits were tried together and were disposed of by the same judgment before the learned Subordinate Judge. The plaintiffs' case failed. That of all the other parties who were plaintiffs in the other suits succeeded. The result was that in the plaintiffs' suit an appeal came direct to this Court and that appeal affirmed the decision of the Court below. In the other suits in some of which there was also an appeal those appeals went to the District Judge and from his decision affirming that of the Court below an appeal was presented in certain of the cases to this Court. The High Court affirmed the decision of the District Judge.

3. The result was that the present appellants failed both in the suit in which they were plaintiffs and in the suits in which they were defendants each of those suits being claims far certain portions of diara lands. In the suit in which the present applicants were plaintiffs and which amounted to over Rs. 10,000 they have applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. There is no question about the valuation in that suit. In the other 14 cases in which they were defendants they have also applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. None of those suits amounts in value to Rs. 10,000 or anything near it and the value as found in the lower Court of the whole of those 14 cases amounts to only Rs. 7,290. For the purposes of pecuniary valuation we are asked to exercise our powers under Order XLV, rule 4, and to consolidate the 14 suits in which the petitioners were defendants with the other suit in which they were plaintiffs and if this can be done there can be no question that the pecuniary valuation of the consolidated appeal will be sufficient to justify us in granting a certificate.

4. Unfortunately, however, for the petitioners the appeal in which they were plaintiffs was not decided by the same judgment as the appeals in which they were defendants and which they now seek to have consolidated with the other appeal. They contend, however, that as these cases were decided in the first Court by the same judgment therefore they come under the provisions of Order XLV, rule 4. That rule provides that for purposes of pecuniary valuation suits involving substantially the same question for determination and decided by the same judgment may be consolidated, but suits decided by separate judgments, shall not be consolidated, notwithstanding that they involve substantially the same question for determination. Reading that rule I do not think that there can be any question bub that the word judgment there used refers to the judgment appealed against. That is the judgment which is being considered in rule 4 and to suggest that because the suits were originally in the Court of first instance decided in one judgment therefore, whatever may have happened to them subsequently and whether decided eventually in the High Court by the same judgment or by a number of judgments, there should in such case be power to consolidate for the purpose of appeal to His Majesty in Council is in my opinion to give a meaning to Order XLV, rule 4, which it was never intended to bear. The important thing is that the judgment which their Lordships have to consider and from which an appeal is brought should be the same judgment in the consolidated appeals and not that they should have in the same case or in the same appeal to consider the effect of several separate judgments of the High Court.

5. It is next contended that in spite of rule 4, we still have inherent powers to consolidate but where the consolidation is merely for the purposes of pecuniary valuation the rule expressly lays down that suits decided by separate judgments shall not be consolidated. I know of no case nor has any been brought to our notice where suits decided by separate judgments have been consolidated, nor can it, I think, be said that snob cases come within the provisions of the rule. Therefore, in my opinion, this application for consolidation must be rejected.

6. The next matter which arises is this: Although in the plaint and in the memorandum of appeal be this Court and to the lower appellate Court the suits were valued at a sum below Rs. 10,000, nevertheless the appellants contend that they can show if an inquiry is granted under Order XLV, rule 5, that the real value of the property in these 14 appeals when ascertained will amount to a sum of over Rs. 10,000 and they have put in a petition which has been verified stating that the value of the property is something like Rs. 150 per bigha and taken at this valuation it will amount to Rs. 16,000 or Rs. 17,000. Were we satisfied that there was any substance in this petition we might be justified in sending the case down to the Judge of the Trial Court to ascertain what the real value is notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners themselves have placed the value. In their memorandum of appeal at a much lower figure than Rs. 10,000 but it turn out that this very question of the valuation of the property was one which was gone into as one of the issues in the case and was determined by a preliminary inquiry before the other issues. In the case were gone into, and both the parties gave evidence as be the value of the property with the result that a decision was come be and the total value of the property in these 14 cases was assessed by the lower Court at a sum of Rs. 7,290. There has been no appeal on that matter and the parties have taken that valuation as accurate for the purposes of this case and court-fee have been paid thereon. It seems to us that it would be useless in such a case ??? send the matter down be the lower Court to re value the property when the property has already been valued after an inquiry by a competent tribunal and in the presence of the parties, and although it ??? not be necessary be decide whether who has happened amounts be res judicata ??? we are not satisfied that the petitioner have shown sufficient grounds be ??? the Court be allow the matter of valuation to be re-opened. In these circumstance we think that the petition in these appeal upon both the grounds mentioned should be rejected.

7. The respondents are entitled to the cost of these applications.

8. Applications rejected.