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M/S Kaur Sain Traders v. The Union Of India & Ors.

Patna High Court
May 5, 2005
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a partnership firm based in Ludhiana (Punjab) which imported polyester/texturised yarn from Nepal in bulk during the period 1.3.2000 to 28.9.2000. After the goods crossed the Indo‑Nepal border, the Assistant Commissioner of Land Customs Station, Jogbani (Respondent No. 2) levied Special Additional Duty (SAD) under Section 3A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and assessed SAD at Rs. 1,70,40,861/-. The petitioner paid this amount under protest and sought a refund from respondent No. 2, contending that the imports were exempt from basic customs duty under the Customs Act, 1962 and therefore SAD should not have been payable. Respondent No. 2 rejected the refund claim by Order No. VIII (20)7-Cus/Refund/Misc/2000/3571 dated 16.12.2000 (Annexure-6). The petitioner challenged that order by filing the present writ petition seeking quashal of the impugned order and direction for refund.

Relevant governmental notifications referred to in the opinion include Gazette Notification No. 37 of 1996-Cus. dated 23.7.1996 (exempting goods wholly manufactured in Nepal from basic customs duty subject to specified exceptions) and Gazette Notification No. 124/2000-CUSTOMS dated 29.9.2000 (exempting items covered by Annexure‑1 from imposition of SAD under Section 3A), the latter being later withdrawn by Notification No. 135/2001-Cus. dated 31.12.2001. The dispute concerns imports during 1.3.2000–28.9.2000 and the order dated 16.12.2000.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Special Additional Duty (SAD) under Section 3A of the Customs Tariff Act can be levied only in conjunction with the main customs duty chargeable under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962, or whether SAD may be imposed independently of the basic customs duty.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Appellant)

  • The goods imported from Nepal were exempt from payment of basic customs duty under Section 25 read with Section 12 of the Customs Act; therefore, SAD under Section 3A of the Tariff Act could not be levied on those imports.
  • The Additional Duties under the Tariff Act are leviable only in addition to the basic customs duty; the two Acts (the Customs Act and the Tariff Act) form a complementary composite and the Tariff Act duties cannot be effectively levied where basic customs duty is not chargeable.
  • Relied on Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs to support constructional/legal points; argued that the principle "nil duty is also duty" applies to Central Excise but not to the Customs Act.
  • Contended that certain authorities relied upon by respondents did not address the expression "in addition" in Section 3A and that Hyderabad Industries Ltd. dealt with Section 3 and not Section 3A.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Customs Act and the Customs Tariff Act are distinct and independent statutes; duties under the Tariff Act (including Section 3A) are independent in incidence and can be levied even if basic customs duty under Section 12 of the Customs Act is not leviable.
  • The incidence of duty under Section 12 of the Customs Act is fundamentally different and independent from the various duties under the Tariff Act. Sections such as 3, 3A, 8B, 9 and 9A of the Tariff Act are separable charging provisions which can operate independently.
  • Relied specifically on Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and several High Court decisions (Apar Private Ltd. — Bombay Full Bench; Kamaraj Spinning Mills Ltd. — Kerala; Eastern Spinning Mills — Calcutta) that support the proposition that additional duties under the Tariff Act may be levied even where exemption from basic customs duty has been granted under the Customs Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa (1983 SCR 363) The later Act (Orissa Additional Sales Tax Act, 1975) was in substance an amendment of the principal Act and had to be read together with it; the later Act did not have independent existence. The court found this judgment distinguishable and inapplicable because that case turned on a later statute being in pith and substance an amendment of a principal Act; the court rejected Ashok Service Centre as supporting the petitioner's position.
Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs ((2001) 4 SCC 593) Discussion that the principle "nil rate of duty is also duty" applies to Central Excise statutes and not necessarily to the Customs Act; where tariff itself states import is "free" such goods may not be dutiable. The court held that Associated Cement does not support the petitioner's contention that "nil duty is also duty" under the Customs Act; used the decision to distinguish excise principles from customs law and to reject petitioner's reliance on the "nil duty" argument.
Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC ((1921) 1 KB 64) Constructional principle for taxing statutes: one must look only at what is clearly said; no room for intendment or implication in a taxing Act. The court adopted this rule of strict construction for taxing statutes and applied it in construing the provisions of the Customs Act and the Tariff Act in the present case.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry v. Acer India Ltd. ((2004) 8 SCC 173) Quoted Cape Brandy Syndicate approvingly to emphasize rules of construction for taxing statutes. The court cited and followed the constructional approach reflected in this authority when interpreting the two enactments at issue.
Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India ((1999) 5 SCC 15) Held that Customs Act and Customs Tariff Act are separate independent statutes; duties under the Tariff Act (e.g., Section 3) are additional and can be levied independently of the basic customs duty under Section 12 of the Customs Act. The court relied on this decision as directly supporting respondents' position that duties under the Tariff Act (including Section 3A by analogy) can be levied even in the absence of basic customs duty; considered particularly persuasive for the proposition of independence of charging provisions.
Apar Private Ltd. v. Union of India (Bombay Full Bench) (1985 (22) E.L.T 644) Held that a notification under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act exempting goods from basic customs duty does not automatically exempt such goods from additional duties under the Tariff Act; exemptions operate only to the extent specified. The court viewed this Full Bench decision as strongly supporting the respondents' case and adopted its principle that additional duties under the Tariff Act may still be levied unless those additional duties are specifically exempted.
Kamaraj Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (Kerala) (1983 E.L.T 1751) High Court decision supporting the proposition that additional duties under the Tariff Act can be levied even if basic customs duty is exempted. The court held this authority to be consistent with the respondents' position and relied on it as supporting precedent.
Eastern Spinning Mills and Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (Calcutta) (1988 (37) E.L.T 14) High Court decision to the same effect as the Bombay and Kerala authorities regarding independence of additional duties under the Tariff Act. The court treated this decision as further support for the rule that duties under the Tariff Act can be levied notwithstanding exemption from basic customs duty under the Customs Act.
CCE v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. ((1996) 3 SCC 434) and Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd. v. CCE ((1989) 4 SCC 592) Authorities under the Excise law recognizing that where exemption reduces the rate to nil, the goods may still be regarded as excisable (i.e., "nil rate is also duty") for excise purposes. These excise authorities were discussed in Associated Cement; the court in the present opinion used them to underline the distinction between excise and customs law and to conclude that those excise principles are not directly apposite to the Customs Act situation relied upon by the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the relevant provisions of the Customs Act and the Customs Tariff Act: Section 12 (charging section) of the Customs Act; Section 25 power to exempt; Section 2 and Schedules of the Tariff Act; and the charging provisions of the Tariff Act (Sections 3, 3A, 8B, 9 and 9A). The court noted that Section 2 of the Tariff Act provides the First and Second Schedules which set out tariff rates and that those schedules are common reference points for the operation of the Acts.

The court analysed the scheme and purpose of the two statutes. It observed that while Section 12 of the Customs Act is the charging section for basic customs duty, that provision would be functionless in practice unless read with the tariff Schedules of the Tariff Act. However, on the specific question of whether duties under the Tariff Act can be levied independently, the court concluded that the various charging provisions in the Tariff Act (Sections 3, 3A, 8B, 9 and 9A) are independent of each other and equally independent of Section 12 of the Customs Act. Each of these charging provisions can be invoked separately and one such duty may be levied without the others.

The court applied the rule of strict construction for taxing statutes (as explained in Cape Brandy Syndicate and quoted in Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry), considering only what the statutes clearly provide, without importing intendments. It considered the precedents cited by both parties:

  • It found Ashok Service Centre distinguishable because that case concerned a later Act which in substance operated as an amendment of a principal Act and therefore had to be read together; that factual and legal matrix did not obtain here.
  • It found that Associated Cement Companies did not assist the petitioner: that decision confirmed that the "nil duty" principle applies in excise law and that the customs context is different; Associated Cement showed that if the tariff itself makes a heading "free" the goods are not chargeable under Customs, underscoring the difference between excise and customs.
  • The court regarded Hyderabad Industries Ltd. as directly supportive of respondents, since Hyderabad Industries held that duties under the Tariff Act are additional and independent and may be levied even where customs duty under the Customs Act is not chargeable.
  • The Bombay Full Bench decision in Apar Private Ltd. and the single‑judge decisions in Kerala and Calcutta (Kamaraj and Eastern Spinning Mills) were treated as consistent authorities holding that exemptions under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act do not automatically exempt goods from additional duties under the Tariff Act unless the exemption specifically so provides.

On that basis, and after considering the statutory language and the precedents, the court concluded that SAD under Section 3A can be levied independent of the basic customs duty under Section 12 of the Customs Act. The court therefore sustained the impugned administrative assessment and refund denial.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition is dismissed and the impugned order dated 16.12.2000 (Annexure‑6) passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Land Customs Station, Jogbani, is upheld.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the levy and collection of SAD in the amount of Rs. 1,70,40,861/- fails; the refund claim was lawfully rejected and no refund is directed.
  • The court applied existing precedent to hold that Special Additional Duty under Section 3A of the Tariff Act may be levied notwithstanding exemption from basic customs duty under the Customs Act, unless a specific exemption from SAD has been granted by the competent authority.
  • No order as to costs was made in the proceedings.
  • The opinion did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; it treated the question as one of statutory construction and applied prior decisions to the decided issue.
Show all summary ...

S.K Katriar, J.:—This writ petition has been preferred with the prayer to quash Order No. VIII (20)7-Cus/Refund/Misc/2000/3571, dated 16.12.2000 (Annexure-6), passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Land Customs Station, Jogbani (Respondent no. 2), and to direct the respondents to refund a sum of Rs. 1,70,40,861/-, levied and collected from the petitioner as Special Additional Duty (hereinafter referred to as ‘SAD’) under Section 3A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tariff Act’) on polyester/texturised yarn manufactured in Nepal and imported into India by the petitioner during the period 1.3.2000 to 28.9.2000

2. According to the writ petition, the petitioner is a partnership firm having its place of business in Ludhiana (Punjab). It had imported polyester/texturised yarn from Nepal in bulk quantity during the period 1.3.2000 to 28.9.2000 After the goods had crossed the Indo-Nepal border, respondent no. 2 levied SAD under section 3A of the Tariff Act and assessed it at Rs. 1,70,40,861/-. The petitioner paid the same under protest. Thereafter it raised an issue before respondent no. 2 for refund of the amount, taking the plea that since its imports were exempt from payment of Customs Duty under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), it was also not required to pay SAD. The contention has been rejected by the impugned order, wherein it is held that it was lawfully realised. Hence this writ petition.

3. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act, the Central Government exempted all the goods except those enumerated in the notification from the basic Customs Duty in terms of Section 12 of the Act, provided the goods were wholly manufactured in Nepal, vide Gazette Notification No. 37 of 1996-Cus., dated 23.7.1996, as amended by Notifications No. 99/96-Cus., dated 27.12.1996 and No. 5/97-Cus., dated 20.1.1999 (Annexure-1). The relevant extract from the notification is as follows:

B. All manufactured goods other than the following:

(i) Alcoholic Liquors or beverages and their concentrates, other than beer and Industrial spirits.

(ii) Perfumes and cosmetics with non-Nepalese or non-Indian brand names.

(iii) Cigarettes and Tobacco.

4. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (4) of section 3A of the Tariff Act, read with sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act, the Central Government exempted the items covered by Annexure-1 from imposition of SAD leviable under section 3A of the Tariff Act, vide Gazette Notification No. 124/2000-CUSTOMS, dated 29.9.2000 (Annexure-4). In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 25 of the Act, the Central Government in substance has withdrawn the aforesaid notification dated 29.9.2000 (Annexure-4) vide Notification No. 135/2001-Cus., dated 31.12.2001, with the result that SAD in terms of section 3A of the Tariff Act is leviable with effect from 31.12.2001 The net result, therefore, is that exemption from imposition of the basic customs duty on all goods wholly manufactured in Nepal and imported into India (except the items specified in Annexure-1) continues to be in operation, whereas exemption from payment of SAD in terms of Section-3A of the Tariff Act was in force only for the period 29.9.2000 to 31.12.2001

5. While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the goods manufactured in Nepal on being imported into this country do not attract basic customs duty under section 12 of the Act in view of the exemption granted under section 25 of the Act, any question of payment of SAD on those imports in terms of section 3A of the Tariff Act also does not arise. The Additional Duties levied under the Tariff Act are duties levied in addition to the basic customs duty under the Act. In other words, the Act and the Tariff Act form one composite legislation complementary to each other and the one cannot be effectuated without having recourse to the other. He relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1983 (2) S.C.R page 363 (Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa). Relying on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2001) 4 SCC 593 (Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Customs), he submitted that the principle “Nil duty is also duty” applies to the Central Excises and Salt Act and not in relation to the Act. The goods imported from Nepal are not dutiable goods within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act. He also relied on the observations in the judgment reported in (1921) 1 KB 64 (Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, and quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in its judgment reported in (2004) 8 SCC 173 (Commissioner Of Central Excise, Pondicherry v. Acer India Ltd..).

6. Learned Additional Standing Counsel opposed this writ petition and submitted that the two statutes are distinct and independent of each other. He relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1999) 5 SCC 15 (Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India). He further submitted that the incidence of duty under section 12 of the Act is fundamentally different and independent of the diverse incidence of duties under the Tariff Act. In his submission, separate duties are leviable under Sections 3, 3A, 8B, 9 and 9A of the Tariff Act, all of which can singly or in addition to the basic customs duty be levied independently or separately on any import of goods. He relies on the following reported judgments:

(i) 1985 (22) E.L.T 644 (Bom.) (F.B) (Apar Private Ltd. v. Union of India);

(ii) 1983 E.L.T 1751 (Ker.) (Kamaraj Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Union of India);

(iii) 1988 (37) E.L.T 14 (Cat.) (Eastern Spinning Mills and Industries Ltd. v. Union of India).

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply admitted that there are different/various charging sections under the Tariff Act, any one of those can be levied without the other but none of which can be levied without the basic customs duty under the Act. He submitted that neither the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hyderabad Industries Ltd. (supra), nor the three judgments reported in the Excise Law Times (supra), dealt with the expression “in addition” occurring in section 3A of the Tariff Act. He further submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hyderabad Industries Ltd. (supra) dealt with section 3, and not with Section 3A, of the Tariff Act.

8. Thus the area of dispute which falls for adjudication of this Court is whether or not SAD in terms of section 3A of the Tariff Act can be levied only in conjunction with the main customs duty in terms of Section 12 of the Act, or it can be imposed independent of the latter.

9. Section 2(14) of the Act provides that ‘dutiable goods’ means any goods which are chargeable to duty and on which duty has not been paid. Section 2(15) lays down that “duty” means a duty of customs leviable under the Act. Section 2(23) lays down that “Import” with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means bringing into India from a place outside India. Section 12 is the Charging section and reads as follows:

“12. Dutiable goods.—(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, duties of customs shall be levied at such rates as may be specified under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975), or any other law for the time being in force, on goods imported into, or exported from, India.”

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in respect of all goods belonging to Government as they apply in respect of goods not belonging to Government.

10. Section 25 of the Act confers on the Central Government the power to exempt from the whole or any part of the duty of customs’.

11. Section 2 of the Tariff Act reads as follows:

“Section 2: Duties specified in the Schedules to be levied.— The rates at which duties of customs shall be levied under the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), are specified in the First and Second Schedules.”

12. Schedule-I incorporates the duties on the imports, and Schedule-II on the exports.

13. Section 3 of the Tariff Act provides levy of additional duty equal to excise duty. The relevant portion is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference:

“Section 3. Levy of additional duty equal to excise duty.— (1) Any article which is imported into India shall, in addition, be liable to a duty (hereafter in this section referred to as the Additional duty) equal to the excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India and if such excise duty on a like article is leviable at any percentage of its value, the additional duty to which the imported article shall be so liable shall be calculated at that percentage of the value of the imported article.

Provided that in case of any alcoholic liquor for human consumption imported into India, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the rate of additional duty having regard to the excise duty for the time being leviable on a like alcoholic liquor produced or manufactured in different States, or, if a like alcoholic liquor is not produced or manufactured in any State, then, having regard to the excise duty which would be leviable for the time being in different States on the class or description of alcoholic liquor to which such imported alcoholic liquor belongs.”

14. Section 3A provides for imposition of special additional duty, the relevant portion of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference:

“3A. Special additional duty.—(1) Any article which is imported into India shall in addition be liable to a duty (hereinafter referred to in this section as the special additional duty), which shall be levied at a rate to be specified by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, having regard to the maximum sales tax, local tax or any other charges for the time being leviable on a like article on its sale or purchase in India:

Provided that until such rate is specified by the Central Government, the special additional duty shall be levied and collected at the rate of eight per cent of the value of the article imported into India.

15. Section 8B of the Tariff Act provides for imposition of Safeguard duty when such increased quantities of import of goods is causing or threatening to cause serious injury to domestic industry.

16. Section 9 of the Tariff Act provides for imposition of countervailing duty on goods which has been bestowed with any subsidy in the country of origin.

17. Section 9A empowers the Central Government to impose anti-dumping duty on dumped articles exported from any country or territory to India at less than its normal value.

18. On a thoughtful consideration of the schemes, the aims and objects and the relevant features of the two Acts, highlighted hereinabove, it appears to us that Section 12 of the Act, being the charging section, would be rendered functionless unless it is read with the First and Second Schedules of the Tariff Act. The incidence of duty on the imports in terms of Section 12 of the Act can take place without the levy of any one of the duties permissible under the Tariff Act. Sections 3, 3A, 8B, 9 and 9A of the Tariff Act are all charging sections independent of each other, equally independent of Section 12 of the Act, and each one of them (including Section 12) can be levied without the other. Section 2 of the Tariff Act, providing for the First and the Second schedules, being the lists of tariffs for imports and exports, are common to both the Acts. Till such time the Central Government specifies the rate of SAD, it shall be levied and collected at the rate of 8 per cent at the value of the imported article. The special duties in terms of Sections 8B, 9 and 9A of the Tariff Act can be levied only after the Central Government decides to levy the same by publication of the requisite notification in the official Gazette. It is another matter that the Central Government may, in exercise of its powers under Section 25 of the Act, exempt certain goods from the imposition of the duties of customs in terms of Section 12 of the Act or Sections 3 or 3A of the Tariff Act. It is equally another matter that, after having issued the requisite notification in the Official Gazette in terms of Sections 8B, 9 and 9A of the Tariff Act, imposing the levy, the same can be withdrawn.

19. We now proceed to consider the reported judgments cited by learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner informed us of the rules of construction with respect to taxing statutes. He relies on the judgment of (Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC) (supra), which was quoted with approval by our own Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry (supra), and is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference:

“………..In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.”

20. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the proposition of law is apposite and we propose to construe the provisions of the two enactments in question accordingly.

21. In order to support his submission that the two Acts are independent of each other, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Service Centre (supra). The Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, described in the judgment as the Principal Act, was enacted and brought into force in the year 1947, and continues to remain in force. It is a law intended for levying taxes on the sale and purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to provisions of Entry 92-A, of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Section 4(1) of the Principal Act is the charging section and imposes liability to pay tax on every dealer whose gross turn over during the fiscal period exceeds rupees fifty thousand. Levy of tax at a single prescribed point and prohibition against levy of tax at more than one point is an important characteristic of the scheme of the Principal Act. However, with a view to augmenting the resources of the State Government, the Orissa Legislature enacted the Orissa Additional sales Tax Act, 1975 (Orissa Act 24 of 1975), levying additional sales tax on certain classes of dealers. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that 1975 Act was virtually in the nature of amendment of the Principal Act and had no independent existence of its own. In that background, it was held that the Act was virtually in the nature of amendment of the Principal Act. Although the provisions of 1975 Act could have been incorporated in the Principal Act itself, the State Legislature instead passed a separate Act. Therefore, the two Acts had to be read together in order to make the provisions of the 1975 Act effective. The Supreme Court, therefore, disagreed with the view of the High Court that the two Acts were independent of each other. The Supreme Court found it necessary to read and construe the Principal Act and the 1975 Act together as if the two were one and while doing so, to give effect to the provisions of the 1975 Act, which has manifested an intention to modify the Principal Act. It was further held that the State Legislature intended not to depart substantially from the Principal Act except with regard to matters in respect of which express provision had been made in the 1975 Act. Though the Act had the usual features of a statute, it could not be considered as an independent statute but must be read together with the Principal Act to be effective. It is thus manifest that the judgment in Ashok Service Centre (supra) stood on a fundamentally different footing where the later Act was in pith and substance construed not to be independent of the Principal Act but practically as an amending Act. The judgment is, therefore, inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. (supra). That was a case under the Customs Act and the question for consideration was whether or not drawings, designs, etc. relating to machinery or industrial technology were goods which were leviable to duties of customs on the transaction value at the time of their import. The Supreme Court held that the principle nil rate of duty is also duty is applicable to the Central Excises and Salt Act and not the Customs Act. Paragraphs 78, 79 and 82 of the judgment are set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference:

“78. While dealing with the provisions of the Excise Act, this Court in CCE v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. [(1996) 3 SCC 434 : (1996) 83 ELT 3] referring to an earlier decision in the case of Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd. v. CCE [(1989) 4 SCC 592 : 1990 SCC (Tax) 10 : (1989) 44 ELT 598] had observed that if by virtue of an exemption notification the rate of duty was reduced to nil, the goods specified in the Tariff Act would still be regarded as excisable goods on which nil rate rate of duty was payable.”

“79. It appears to us that the aforesaid decisions, which were sought to be invoked by the respondent in an effort to submit that the drawings and designs, which came as a part of passenger baggage, were dutiable goods, would not be applicable.”

“82. Section 12 of the Customs Act provides that the duties of customs shall be levied at such rates as may be specified under the Customs Tariff Act. When the Customs Tariff Act itself provides that the import of drawings and designs under Heading 49.06 is “free”, it must follow that these drawings and designs, though goods, were not chargeable to duty. In view of the difference in the language of the Excise and Customs Acts, the decisions in the cases of Vazir Sultan and Wallace Flour Mills may not be very apposite and if no customs duty is chargeable either by reason of tariff not providing for it or because of the exemption notification, those goods will not be regarded as dutiable goods “on which duty has not been paid.” It is sufficient in the present case to observe that the drawings and designs which were imported by the appellant were correctly classifiable under Heading 49.06 and the tariff itself providing that the import of the same is free, the said drawings and designs were not dutiable articles and, therefore, no customs duty was leviable thereon even as a part of the passenger baggage. On this short ground alone the appeal of Videocon has to be allowed.

23. In view of the discussion hereinabove, it is manifest that, in so far as the incidence of duties are concerned, the two Acts are independent of each other, one duty can be levied without the other. The proposition submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that nil duty is also duty obtains under the Excise Act and not under the Customs Act. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. (supra) does not support the petitioner's case.

24. Learned Additional Standing Counsel has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hyderabad Industries Ltd. (supra) which lays down to the effect that the various in posts under the Tariff Act are additional to the basic customs duty and can be levied in the absence of the latter. Each one of these is independent of the other, and any one of those can be levied without the rest. Paragraphs 10 to 15 of the judgment are relevant for this case, paragraph 14 which is of special relevance and is quoted below:

“14. There are different types of customs duties levied under different Acts or rules. Some of them are:

(a) a duty of customs chargeable under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962;

(b) the duty in question, namely, under Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act;

(c) additional duty levied on raw materials, components and ingredients under Section 3(3) of the Customs Tariff Act, and

(d) duty chargeable under Section 9-A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

The Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 are two separate independent statutes. Merely because the incidence of tax under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 arises on the import of the articles into India it does not necessarily, mean that the Customs Tariff Act cannot provide for the charging of a duty which is independent of the customs duty leviable under the Customs Act.”

(Emphasis added).

25. The learned Additional Standing Counsel has rightly relied on the three judgments reported in Excise Law Times. The judgment in the case of Apar Private Ltd. (supra), rendered by a Full Bench of Bombay High Court, entirely supports the cases of the respondents wherein it has been held that duty under the Tariff Act can be levied even in a situation where there has been exemption from levy of the basic customs duty under section 12 of the Act. The Bombay High Court has held as follows:

“61………..A notification under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act read with Section 3(6) of the Customs Tariff Act may exempt such goods wholly or partially from the levy of additional duty as well. When exemption is granted by the Central Government under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, that can operate only in respect of such duty as is specifically mentioned in the particular notification. A notification under Section 25(1) exempting goods from levy of basic customs duty cannot by itself exempt such goods from the levy of countervailing duty or additional duty leviable under the Tariff Act or the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Merely because goods are exempted from levy of basic customs duty leviable under Section 12 of the Customs Act, it does not follow that they are also exempt from levy of countervailing duty or additional duty; nor does exemption from levy of countervailing duty or additional duty, wholly or partially, result in exemption of the goods from the levy of basic customs duty, wholly or partially. As exemption granted from the levy of basic customs duty under Section 25(1) read with Section 12 of the Customs Act does not by itself operate as exemption from the levy of countervailing duty or additional duty under the Tariff Act or the Customs Tariff Act, goods imported, even though exempted from basic customs duty, may still be subject to the levy of additional duty under the respective enactments and they would be so subject unless and until they are specifically exempted by the Competent Authority in exercise of the powers vested under those respective enactments from such additional duty. In fact, a reference to the notifications issued from time to time show that the Central Government in exercise of this power of exemption under Section 25(1) of the Customs; Act in some cases exempted the goods only from levy of basic customs duty, wholly or partially, and in some cases only from the levy of additional duty, wholly or partially. Some notifications may have even exempted the goods wholly or partially from the levy of both basic customs duty and additional Duty…….”

26. It is thus manifest that the additional duties under the Tariff Act can be levied even if the Central Government has issued a notification in the official gazette exemption levy of the basic customs duty in terms of Section 12 of the Act. The judgment principally dealt with Section 3 of the Tariff Act. There was no occasion for the Bombay High Court to consider the provisions of section 3A of the Tariff Act which was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 with effect from 1.4.1998, whereas the judgment was handed down on 17.10.1985 However, the judgment in principle wholly supports the respondents case.

27. The judgments of the Kerala High Court in Kamaraj Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra), the Calcutta High Court in Eastern Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra), both rendered by learned Single Judges, are to the same effect as that of the Bombay High Court, and fully support the respondents case.

28. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. The impugned order dated 16.12.2000 (Annexure-6) is hereby upheld. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Aftab Alam, J.:—I agree.