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Guru Bachan Singh v. State Of Bihar And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash an order dated 29 September 1967 (Annexure F) passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Palamau acting as a Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It was alleged that an accident occurred on 17 May 1966. On 30 August 1966 the Inspector of Factories filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner (as Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act) for payment of compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased, Mr. Rajendra Prasad. A notice dated 15 September (presumably under section 10-A(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act) was issued to the petitioner, who replied disclaiming liability to deposit compensation. The matter was sent for enquiry to a Sub-divisional Magistrate and later to Magistrate R.N. Raha. The petitioner filed further objections on 7 and 12 September 1967. Despite these events, by the impugned order dated 29 September 1967 the Commissioner held Sardar Guru Bachan Singh liable to pay Rs. 7,000 to the legal heirs as compensation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Commissioner (Deputy Commissioner of Palamau acting as Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act) had jurisdiction and power to determine liability and the amount of compensation after the employer had disclaimed liability under section 10-A(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Whether the procedure followed by the Commissioner complied with section 10-A(4) and related provisions (including the effect of a State Government notification under section 20 limiting which officers may act as ex‑officio Commissioners in contested cases).
- Whether this Court should entertain a writ petition at this stage, given the availability of an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to pass the impugned order determining compensation after the petitioner had disclaimed liability.
- Reliance on section 10-A(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act: the procedure followed was illegal because, upon disclaimer, the Commissioner should have followed the statutory procedure contemplated by that provision instead of finally determining compensation.
- Reliance on a State Government notification under section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act which, it was argued, makes only presiding officers of Labour Courts ex‑officio Commissioners for contested cases; other officers are ex‑officio Commissioners limited to uncontested cases.
Opposite Party No. 3's Arguments
- This Court should not exercise writ jurisdiction because the aggrieved party could have pursued an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- It was also urged (in relation to a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, opposite party No. 1) that in the absence of the heirs mentioned in that counter-affidavit no relief could be granted to the petitioner.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B. Rowell Roy v. Kathili Nonglyar | The High Court held, in an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, that when an employer denies liability on notice there is no power given to the Commissioner under section 10-A to determine the amount of compensation and the liability of the employer; where a dependant prefers an application, it must be treated as one under section 22 and thereafter the Compensation Officer acts as a civil court. | The court relied on this authority to conclude that the Commissioner in the present case lacked jurisdiction to determine liability and the amount after the employer's disclaimer, and that the impugned order was therefore illegal and without jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the scheme of section 10-A(4). It noted that the provision contemplates a specific procedure when the employer disclaims liability: the Commissioner, after such inquiry as he thinks fit, must inform the dependants that they may prefer a claim for compensation and may give them further information as appropriate; the matter should then proceed according to the other sections of the Act.
Applying that statutory scheme to the facts, the court found that the Commissioner did not follow the procedure required by section 10-A(4). Instead of informing the dependants and allowing the statutory claim process to be invoked (including treatment of any dependant's application under section 22 and the Compensation Officer's civil‑court‑like role), the Commissioner proceeded to determine finally the employer's liability and the amount of compensation.
The court accepted the principle stated in B. Rowell Roy v. Kathili Nonglyar that where an employer denies liability the Commissioner has no power under section 10-A to determine liability and compensation; instead the statutory claim procedure must be followed. On the question of jurisdiction to entertain a writ, the court held that when the law is clear there is no bar to entertaining a writ petition even if an appeal under section 30 is available.
Regarding the objection based on the absence of heirs in the State's counter-affidavit, the court rejected that as a bar to relief, observing that the dependants retain their own right to proceed after the Commissioner acts under section 10-A(4).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court ordered that the impugned order of the Commissioner dated 29 September 1967 be quashed and the case be remanded to the Commissioner to proceed according to law. Petition allowed.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the Commissioner's order determining liability and awarding Rs. 7,000 is set aside and the matter returns to the Commissioner to follow the procedure mandated by section 10-A(4) and related provisions (including giving dependants the opportunity to prefer a claim and proceeding under the relevant sections such as section 22).
- The court declined to make any order as to costs.
- The opinion applies existing precedent rather than announcing a new legal principle; no broader precedent beyond this application of section 10-A(4) and the cited authority is set out in the text of the opinion.
U.N Sinha, J.:— This writ application Under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, praying that the order passed on the 29th September, 1967 (Annexure F to the application) by the Deputy Commissioner of Palamau, acting as a Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act may be quashed.
2. The argument is that the officer had to jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The facts may be stated briefly. It was alleged that an accident had occurred on the 17th May, 1966, in which connection a petition was filed by the Inspector of Factories before the Deputy Commissioner, as Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, on the 30th August, 1966.
3. The subject matter of this petition was payment of compensation to the legal heirs of Mr. Rajendra Prasad, deceased. A notice dated the 15th September, was issued to the petitioner before this court, presumably under section 10-A(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In reply to this notice the petitioner before us sent his reply contending that he was not at all liable to deposit any compensation on account of the death of Mr. Rajendra Prasad, on the facts and circumstances stated in the reply.
4. It appears that the matter was then sent for enquiry to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, and later, to a Magistrate named Mr. R.N Raha, as mentioned in paras. 11 and 12 of this application. It appears, further, that in this connection further objections had been filed by the petitioner, before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau on the 7th and 12th September, 1967. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, acting as a Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, on the 29th September, 1967. By his order the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act has held that Sardar Guru Bachan Singh is liable to pay to the legal heirs of the deceased, Mr. Rajendra Prasad, an amount of Rs. 7,000 by way of compensation.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon section 10-A(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and has contended that the procedure which has been followed by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is illegal and that after the present petitioner had disclaimed his liability, no order could be passed by the Commissioner determining finally the compensation to be given to the heirs of the deceased. Our attention has also been drawn to a notification of the State Government under section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, according to which, in contested cases, only the presiding officers of the Labour Courts are ex-officio Commissioners for workmen's compensation. The other officers mentioned in the notification were ex-officio Commissioners who could deal only with uncontested cases. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 3, father of the deceased, has argued that this court should not interfere in its writ jurisdiction when the aggrieved party could have filed an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that when, the law on the subject is quite clear, there is no bar to this court in entertaining a writ application at this stage. Section 10A(4) lays down that where the employer has disclaimed the liability, the Commissioner, after such enquiry as he may think fit, may inform the dependants of the deceased workman, that it is open to the dependants to prefer a claim for compensation and may give them such other further information as he may think fit. In this case, the Commissioner had not done what he should have done under the provision of law. It is clear that section 10-A(4) contemplates that when a contest has arisen before the Commissioner, the procedure to be followed is that the dependants will be given an opportunity to prefer a claim for compensation upon which the matter will proceed according to various sections mentioned in this Act.
7. In the case of B. Rowell Roy v. Kathili Nonglyar, in an appeal arising under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the High Court pointed out the procedure to be followed in a contested case. It was held that when an employer, on notice, denies his liability, there was no power given to the Commissioner, under section 10-A to determine the amount of compensation and the liability of the employer. It was stated that in case there is an application preferred by the dependant claiming compensation, then the application has to be treated as one under section 22 of the Act and thereafter the Compensation Officer acts as a civil Court in deciding the application. The procedure to be followed thereafter has also been indicated in this judgment. Therefore, in my opinion, the order passed in this case by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act was illegal and without jurisdiction and it should be quashed.
8. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 3 has also urged that in the absence of the heirs mentioned in a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, opposite party No. I, no relief can be given to the present petitioner. I do not think that it is a valid objection and the dependants will have their own right to proceed with their case after the Commissioner has taken action under section 10-A(4) of the Act. The impugned order of the Commissioner (Annexure F) is, therefore, quashed and the case is remanded to him for proceeding according to law. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.
B.N Jha, J.:— I agree.
9. Petition allowed.
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