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Harakh Nath Singh And Another v. Lodha Singh And Others Opp. Party.
Case Summary — Application for Substitution of Heirs in Civil Revision
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter was heard by L.M. Sharma & Manoranjan Prasad, JJ. The principal application is a civil revision directed against an order dated 25 November 1976 and was filed on 22 December 1976. After filing of the civil revision, opposite party no. 1 died on 26 January 1977 and opposite party no. 7 died on 17 January 1977. An application for substitution of the heirs of those deceased opposite parties was filed on 8 July 1977. The substitution application raised the question whether Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to civil revision proceedings and, relatedly, whether the substitution petition was time-barred.
When initially placed before Mr. Justice Shambhu Prasad Singh sitting singly, the matter was referred to a Division Bench because the point had not been authoritatively decided by the High Court, and it was thereafter placed before the Court for orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deal with abatement and substitution on death of a party, apply to Civil Revision applications filed under Section 115 of the Code.
- Whether the terms "appellant" and "respondent" used in Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (and related abatement provisions) include a "petitioner" or "opposite party" in a civil revision, thereby making the shorter limitation and abatement rules applicable to revisions.
- Whether Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code (and its amended explanation) makes the procedure of Order 22 applicable to revision proceedings.
- If Order 22 does not apply, what is the appropriate provision under which substitution can be ordered and which Article of the Limitation Act prescribes the period for bringing a substitution application in a civil revision?
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments advanced on behalf of some of the heirs sought to be substituted (Mr. Shambhu Prasad)
- Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to a Civil Revision application; therefore the substitution petition filed after the expiry of the period of limitation under that framework cannot be allowed.
- The words "appellant" and "respondent" used in Article 120 of the Limitation Act include "petitioner" and "opposite party", making the Article 120 timetable applicable to substitution in revisions.
- Reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court (Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat) and Privy Council (Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey), and other High Court authorities, to support the contention that "appeal" may include "revision" in relevant contexts.
- Contended that Section 141 of the Code (as amended in 1976) supports application of Order 22 procedure to revision proceedings.
- Argued that as the case was admitted before substitution, the admission could not be said to have been in respect of the substituted heirs and that this caused a defect.
Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners seeking substitution (Mr. N.K. Prasad)
- Relied on a series of High Court Full Bench and other decisions (including Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai, Nani v. Manilal, Mohd. Sadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Union of India v. Ganga Datta, Manickan v. Ramanathan and the Division Bench decision Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh v. Satya Narain Singh) to argue that no question of abatement arises in a civil revision application and Order 22 does not apply to revisions.
- Asserted that the established decisions support the proposition that substitution in revision proceedings is governed otherwise (and the Court may exercise its inherent powers or other sections for substitution).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai (A.I.R. 1972 Allahabad 504 Full Bench) | Held on the question whether abatement/substitution rules apply to revision proceedings; directly decided the point now under consideration. | The Court observed this Full Bench decision had directly decided the question and treated its principle as directly applicable; the Division Bench decision of the present Court followed that principle (with a minor distinction noted elsewhere). |
| Nani v. Manilal (A.I.R. 1953 Rajasthan 169 Full Bench) | Supportive authority cited for the proposition that abatement rules (Order 22) do not apply to civil revision. | Placed by counsel in support; the Court treated it as part of authorities that support non-application of Order 22 to revisions. |
| Mohd. Sadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Corporation of City of Lahore (A.I.R. 1949 Lahore 186 Full Bench) | Considered the relationship between Order 22 and Section 141; held Order 22 could not be read with Section 141 for revisions because revision is unlike a suit. | The Court relied on this Full Bench holding to reject the argument that Section 141 makes Order 22 procedure applicable to revisions. |
| Union of India v. Ganga Datta (A.I.R. 1971 Delhi 65) | Cited as supportive authority for the petitioners' position that abatement rules do not apply to revisions. | Counted among decisions supporting the non-application of Order 22 to revisions; used as supportive precedent. |
| Manickan v. Mr. Ramanathan (A.I.R. 1949 Madras 435) | Supportive High Court authority cited for the petitioners' case. | Included by counsel among authorities supporting the petitioners; the Court regarded it as part of the body of enabling precedents. |
| Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh v. Satya Narain Singh (1973 B.B.C.J. 136) | Division Bench of this Court considered the period of limitation for substitution in relation to certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court and followed the Allahabad Full Bench with a minor modification. | The Court noted this Division Bench had followed the Allahabad Full Bench principle and observed the slight distinction made (regarding Section 151) but accepted the underlying principle. |
| Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1) | Supreme Court observations that the word "appeal" may include a revision when construing matters such as appellate/revisional jurisdiction and the High Court's power. | The Court examined and distinguished the decision, holding that the Supreme Court's observations arose in a context requiring a larger meaning of "appeal" and therefore were not directly applicable to the construction of Order 22 and Article 120 in the present case. |
| Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (A.I.R. 1932 Privy Council 165) | Interpretation of Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act (1908); Privy Council held that in that context a revision could be regarded as an "appeal" for the purpose of limitation. | The Court treated this decision as distinguishable on its facts and background: it was given a larger meaning of "appeal" because Article 182's object required it. The Court held this larger construction did not control the present question under Order 22 and Article 120. |
| P.P.P. Chidambara Nadar v. C.P.A. Rama Nadar (A.I.R. 1973 Madras 385 Full Bench) | Related to construction of Article 182 of the Limitation Act; covered by the interpretation given in Nagendra Nath. | The Court treated it as covered by the Privy Council interpretation and therefore not determinative of the present point about Order 22 and Article 120. |
| Bacharaj Nyahalchand Marwadi v. Babaji Tukaram Avati (21 Indian Cases 407) | Cited by counsel for the view that the term "appeal" includes revision; relied upon by some parties. | The Court observed that on the authority relied upon the point was not discussed and the conclusion was assumed in a single sentence; the decision was not binding and not of much assistance. |
| Decisions referred from Patna (A.I.R. 1957 Patna and A.I.R. 1950 Patna 470) | Illustrations of historical treatment under the old Limitation Act showing a distinction between "appeal" and "revision". | Used to support the Court's conclusion that Article 120 does not include revision and that a separate Article (Article 133) was inserted for revision in the present Limitation Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by textual and contextual analysis of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act, relying on the separation of concepts within the procedural code and the scheme of the Limitation Act.
- The Court emphasized that the Civil Procedure Code uses technical, limited meanings for terms such as "suit", "appeal", "revision" and sets out separate procedures for each. In particular, the Code deals with "appeal" by specific provisions (Sections 96, 100, 104 and Orders 41, 42 and 43) and deals with "revision" separately under Section 115.
- Because the Code makes distinct provision for appeals and revisions, the Court concluded that the expression "appeal" in Order 22 rule 11 ("In the application of this order to appeals ... the word 'plaintiff' shall be held to include an appellant... and the word 'suit' an appeal.") cannot be read as including a "revision". The existence of express separate provisions for revisions militates against reading "appeal" in Order 22 so broadly as to include revision.
- Turning to the Limitation Act, the Court noted that Article 120 (third column) prescribes the date in relation to "plaintiff, appellant, defendant or a respondent" and that Article 120 does not include the words "petitioner" or "opposite party". Under the old Limitation Act there was no period prescribed for civil revision and Article 182 (old Act) had been construed in earlier decisions in a way that equated appeals and revisions for the purpose of finality. The Court observed that the present Limitation Act has separately inserted Article 133 to prescribe limitation for revision, reinforcing that Article 120's reference to "appellant" does not extend to "petitioners" in revisions.
- The Court considered authorities relied upon by both sides. It distinguished the Privy Council decision in Nagendra Nath Dey and the Supreme Court decision in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar on the basis that those authorities construed "appeal" in a larger sense only because of the particular statutory context (for example, Article 182 of the old Limitation Act or the nature of revisional/writ jurisdiction interplay), and those contextual reasons for a larger meaning were absent in the interpretation of Order 22 and Article 120 here.
- The contention that Section 141 (and its 1976 amendment) renders Order 22 applicable to revision proceedings was rejected. The Court accepted the reasoning (including that of the Lahore Full Bench) that Section 141 applies to proceedings in pari materia with suits and original in character; a revision is not like a suit and is covered within the Code itself (Section 115), so Section 141 was not intended to make suit-procedures applicable to revisions.
- Having concluded that Order 22 procedure does not apply to substitution in a civil revision, the Court held that substitution can be effected under Section 146 of the Code or under the Court's inherent powers. The period of limitation applicable in such cases would therefore be three years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.
- Applying these conclusions to the facts, the Court found that the substitution application was filed within six months of the death and on the day following admission of the case, which did not constitute inordinate delay that should be rejected in the exercise of the Court's discretion. The Court also rejected the contention that the earlier admission created a procedural defect as to the substituted heirs because admission is a procedural step and does not decide rights of the parties.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court held that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to substitution applications in Civil Revision proceedings brought under Section 115 of the Code. Substitution may be ordered under Section 146 or under the Court's inherent powers, and the limitation period for such substitution is three years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.
Direct Consequences in this Case: The substitution application filed on 8 July 1977 was allowed. The heirs named in the petition were substituted in place of the deceased opposite parties. Additionally, on an affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party, the Court noted that opposite party no. 7 had left three daughters not mentioned by the petitioners and added them as opposite parties.
The opinion does not purport to establish a new broad precedent beyond its holding; it relies on and follows existing High Court Full Bench and other authorities in reaching its conclusion.
Application allowed.
L.M Sharma & Manoranjan Prasad, JJ.:— This is an application for substitution of the heirs of the opposite party no. 1 and 7 who have died after filling of the civil revision application. The main application is directed against the order dated the 25th November, 1976 and was filed on the 22nd of December, 1976. The opposite party no. 1 died on the 26th of January, 1977 and opposite party no. 7 on the 17th January, 1977. The substitution application has been filed on the 8th of July, 1977.
2. On behalf of some of the heirs sought to be substituted. Mr. Shambhu Prasad has contended that Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to a Civil Revision application and since the petition for substitution has been filed after the expiry of the period of limitation the same cannot be allowed.
3. When the present application was placed for orders before Mr. Justice Shambhu Prasad Singh, sitting singly, he referred it to a Division Bench, since the question has not been decided authoritatively by our High Court. It has, accordingly, been placed for orders before us.
4. In support of the proposition that no question of abatement arises in a civil revision application, Mr. N.K Prasad has relied upon the decisions of several High Courts, in the case of (1) Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai (A.I.R 1972, Allahabad 504 Full Bench). (2) Nani v. Manilal (A.I.R 1953 Rajasthan, 169 Full Bench), (3) Mohd. Sadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Corporation of City of Lahore (A.I.R 1949 Lahore, 186 Full Bench), (4) Union of India v. Ganga Datta (A.I.R 1971, Delhi 65) and (5) Manickan v. Mr. Ramanathan (A.I.R 1949 Madras, 435). He has further referred to a Division Bench decision of this court in (6) Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh v. Satya Narain Singh 1973 B.B.C.J 136) where, according to the learned counsel, the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court has been followed.
5. The decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioners do support their case. Mr. Shambhu Prasad, in reply thereto referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in (7) Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (A.I.R 1970 S.C 1) and contended that in view of the observations made there in that the expression ‘appeal’ in eludes a revision, Order 22 must be held to be applicable to the present case. He further relied on the judgment of the Privy Council in (8) Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (A.I.R 1932 Privy Council 165), (9) P.P.P Chidambara Nadar v. C.P.A Rama Nadar (A.I.R 1973 Madras, 385 Full Bench) and a decision of the Calcutta High Court in (10) Bacharaj Nyahalchand Marwadi v. Babaji Tukaram Avati (21 Indian Cases, 407). The corrections of the decisions mentioned by Mr. N.K Prasad has been challenged.
6. In Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (A.I.R 1932 Privy Council, 165), the question which arose related to the Interpretation of Article 182(2), of the Limitation Act, 1908. In the third column it was mentioned that period of limitation would, begin to run from the date of the final decree or order of the appellate court where there has been an appeal. While construing this article it was held that even in a case where a revision application had been filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the High Court, the Judgment therein would be included in the term the final decree or order of the appellate Court. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (A.I.R 1970 S.C 1) the question was whether the High Court could interfere under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with the order passed in a proceeding under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 when a petition for revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the same order had been previously dismissed by the High Court. The contention of the respondents in the writ application was based on the ground that the impugned order had merged in the judgment of the High Court in the Civil Revision case. While dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the aid of the High Court on the revisional side is invoked on the basis that it is a superior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error, and Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure subscribes the limit of that jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction which is exercised, is part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. In both these cases, strongly relied upon by Mr. Shambhu Prasad, the question which is arising before us did not precisely arose. Reliance is being placed upon the interpretation of the expression ‘appeal’ in including a revision. A close examination of the facts of the two cases would show that the observations made therein have no application to the point under consideration. The expression ‘appeal’ is capable of conveying two different ideas, one in the ordinary acceptation of the term which is wider and larger in its scope, and the other in a limited technical sense. As has been pointed out above, the background in the two cases before the Privy Council and the Supreme Court was such that the larger meaning of the expression had to be given. The purpose of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was to give extended time to the decree holder for executing a decree by reference to a stage when it becomes final. The pendency of an appeal against the decree or of a Civil Revision application stood on the same level for this aspect. It mattered little whether the decree was in jeopardy in a Civil Revision or in an appeal. For that reason the Privy Council had to Interpret the expression ‘appeal’ in the general larger sense, and while so doing their Lordships were conscious of this aspect, which is apparent from the following observation:—
“There is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but there is no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a Subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent.”
(emphasis is by us)
7. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (A.I.R 1970 S.C 1) the question was whether the High Court could examine under its writ jurisdiction, the correctness of an order, which had been earlier examined under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held, that by delivering the earlier judgment. In a Civil Revision, the High Court was exercising a jurisdiction as a superior court and in that context it was further observed that the revisional jurisdiction was part of the appellate jurisdiction. From the following observations in Paragraph 6 of the judgment it is manifest that the word ‘appeal’ is capable of being construed in different senses.
“..but the jurisdiction which is being exercised (under Section 115 C.P.C) is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense.”
(emphasis is ours)
8. In the context in which the question arose, before the Supreme Court it is obvious that the expression had to be construed in its larger sense. The decision of the Madras High Court in P.P.P Chdimbara Nadar v. C.P.A Rama Nadar (A.I.R 1973, Madras, 385 Full Bench) also related to the construction of Article 182 and was, therefore, covered by the interpretation given in Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra Dey (A.I.R 1932 Privy Council 165).
9. In the present case the question arises in relation to the interpretation of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 120 of the present Limitation Act, which read together lay down the law of Abatement. Order 22 applies to suits and by virtue of Rule 11 which is in the following terms also to appeals.
“11. Application of order to appeal—In the application of this order to appeals, so far as may be, the word “plaintiff” shall be held to include an appellant, the word “defendant” a “respondent”, and the word “suit” an appeal.”
10. The argument on behalf of the apposite party is that the term ‘appeal’ includes a revision. The Sub-rule (1) of Rules 3 and 4 of Order 22, dealing with the procedure in cases of death of a plaintiff or of a defendant, as the case may be, enjoin for filing of an application for substitution of the legal representative of the deceased, and Rule 3(2) and Rule 4(3) provide that if no such application is made within the time prescribed by law the suit shall abate so far as the deceased party is concerned. The period is prescribed under Article 120 of the limitation Act, 1963, and the third column of the Article is in the following terms:—
“The date of death of the plaintiff, appellant, defendant or a respondent as the case may be”.
11. Mr. Shambhu Prasad contended that the words ‘appellant’ and ‘respondent’ in Article 120 include ‘petitioner’ and ‘opposite party’.
12. The Civil Procedure Code deals with procedure in relation to civil litigation and the expressions ‘suit’, ‘appeal’, ‘revision’, ‘execution’ etc. in regard to which specific procedural requirements have been laid down, have been used as conveying precise technical limited meanings. While dealing with an ‘appeal’ the Code refers to an appeal under Section 96, or under Section 100 or Section 104 and does not refer to the general appellate jurisdiction in the wider sense. And since ‘revision’ has been dealt with separately under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it cannot be assumed that the Code intends to include the ‘revision’ in the expression ‘appeal’. ‘Appeal’ and ‘revision’ have been separately dealt with and the difference in their identity cannot be lost sight of while interpreting the provisions of the Code. This is the reason why in the Schedule, three separate Orders 41, 42 and 43 are included for dealing with the three kinds of appeals and there is no other order dealing with general appeals. We are, there fore, of the view that the expression ‘appeal’ in Order 22 rule 11, does not include a revision’.
13. In Article 120 of the limitation Act, 1963 although care has been taken to mention the four forms ‘plaintiffs', defendant’, ‘appellant’, ‘respondent’ separately there is a clear omission of the words ‘petitioner’ or ‘opposite party’. Mr. N.K Prasad rightly pointed out that under the old Limitation Act no period had been prescribed for filing a Civil Revision application, and the Act was making a distinction between an ‘appeal’ and a ‘revision’ [see A.I.R 1957 Patna (Sic) and A.I.R 1950 Patna 470]. The treatment, while prescribing the limitation for an ‘appeal’ was different that in Article 182 and for that reason it was consistently held that the Article prescribing the limitation for an appeal was not applicable to revision. When it was considered desirable to prescribe a period of limitation for a revision application also, a separate Article, namely, Article 133 has been inserted in the present Limitation Act. The conclusion is irresistible that for the purpose of Article 120 the expression ‘appeal’ does not Include a ‘revision.’ relied upon on behalf of the opposite patty, reported in 21 Indian Cases, 407, the point was not discussed at all and the conclusion was assumed in a single sentence. The decision which is not blading on us, is not of much help. Mr. Shambhu Prasad further said that a recent decision of the Calcutta High Court has been given on the same lines which is reported in 1975 (2) C.L.J 191. This decision could not be placed before us as the report is not available either with the learned counsel or in the High Court's library. We are, therefore, not in a position to say anything about it.
14. Mr. Shambhu Prasad next contended that the provisions of Order 22 should be applicable to revision applications by virtue of Section 141 of the Code. He placed reliance on the amendment of the Section in 1976 by the inclusion of the explanation which states that the expression “proceeding” in the section does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention is that this suggests that the section continues to apply to a Civil Revision application. The fallacy in the argument is that it is based on an assumption that the section earlier applied to Civil Revision applications. This question was raised and considered by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Mohd. Sadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Corporation of City of Lahore (A.I.R 1949 Lahore, 186 Full Bench) and it was held that Order 22 could not be read in conjunction with Section 141, as the section is so drafted as to enable a Court to apply the procedure in regard to suits to such proceedings as are in pari materia with suits and thus original in character. A revision is very much unlike a suit and, therefore, cannot attract the section, it will be noted.
15. In the Calcutta decision, in this regard that the procedure which Section 141 makes applicable to other proceedings is a procedure in regard to suits only. The word ‘appeal’ has been omitted from the section. Besides, the object of Section 141 is to enact in regard to, proceeding which are already not covered by the Code. In so far as revisions are concerned, a right in this regard has been created under the Code, and this is another reason as to why the application of Section 141 cannot be envisaged.
16. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad Court in Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai (A.I.R 1972 Allahabad, 504 Full Bench) has directly decided the question with which we are dealing. A Division Bench of out Court in Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh v. Satya Narayan Singh (1973 B.B.C.J, 136) was considering the period of limitation applicable to a substitution petition in regard to application for certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court and in that connection the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court was followed with a slight modification. Allahabad High Court had held that the substitution petition was maintainable under Section 151 of the Code and this Court observed that the Section 151 of the Code does not create any power and merely preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, it could not be said that the application was maintainable under Section 151. Except for this difference, the principle of the Allahabad decision was accepted.
17. In the result it has to be held that the provisions of the Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to a substitution application in Civil Revision applications filed under Section 115 of the Code. An order of substitution can be passed by the Court either under Section 146 or under its inherent powers and in both these cases the period of limitation would be three years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Since the present application was filed within six months of the death of the opposite party, and on the very next day of the admission, of the case, it is difficult to hold that the petitioners were guilty of such delay which should not be ignored in the Court's discretion.
18. Mr. Shambhu Prasad also mentioned that as the admission of the case was made before the substitution it cannot be said that it had been admitted in so far as the substituted heirs are concerned and the case suffers from a defect thereby. We do not see any merit in this argument since an order for admission does not decide any right of the parties and is only passed by way of a procedural step toward the final hearing of the case.
19. In the result the substitution is allowed and the heirs mentioned therein are substituted in place of the deceased parties. In an affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party it is mentioned that opposite party no. 7 has left behind three daughters besides the heirs as mentioned by the petitioners. In the circumstances we add them also as opposite parties.
Application allowed.
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