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Director, Aryabhatta... v. Devendra Joshi And O...

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 19, 2018
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 was selected for the post of Engineer-B (Civil) through an advertisement dated 10-8-2007 and joined service on 1-1-2008. Initially placed on two years’ probation, the period was later reduced to one year following an amendment. During 2008, the management issued several communications highlighting alleged shortcomings in his performance, including:

  • Office Note dated 24-7-2008 directing submission of a detailed report on infrastructure improvements.
  • Office Memorandum dated 18-8-2008 outlining deficiencies in duty performance and seeking explanations.

An Office Memorandum dated 23-12-2008 alleged misconduct involving unauthorised copying of data from a pen drive. On 31-12-2008 the employer terminated Respondent 1’s services, describing the action as discontinuance beyond the probation period. His representation for reinstatement was rejected on 2-4-2009.

Respondent 1 challenged the termination before the High Court of Uttarakhand, asserting mala fides linked to the appointment of Respondent 4 to a higher post (Engineer-C). The High Court set aside the termination, extended probation by one year, and directed reconsideration of Respondent 1’s representation. The employer appealed to the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 2926 of 2018), while Respondent 1 filed a cross-appeal seeking confirmation as Engineer-B (Civil) (Civil Appeal No. 2927 of 2018).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 31-12-2008 terminating Respondent 1’s services was a termination simpliciter of a probationer or a punitive dismissal founded on alleged misconduct, thereby requiring a departmental enquiry.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in holding that the termination was mala fide and linked to Respondent 1’s objection to Respondent 4’s appointment.
  3. In the cross-appeal, whether Respondent 1 was entitled to confirmation as Engineer-B (Civil).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Employer)

  • The termination was due to unsatisfactory performance during probation, not misconduct; hence it was an innocuous, non-stigmatic order.
  • A preliminary inquiry revealed prima facie misconduct, but the management chose not to pursue departmental proceedings; therefore no opportunity/hearing was obligatory.
  • The High Court should not have examined the validity of Respondent 4’s appointment, which was never challenged in the writ petition.

Respondent 1's Arguments

  • The foundation of the termination was the misconduct alleged in the Memorandum dated 23-12-2008; hence principles of natural justice mandated a full inquiry.
  • The order, though facially innocuous, was in substance punitive and motivated by his objection to Respondent 4’s higher appointment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 21; (2015) 15 SCC 151 Distinction between termination on probation for unsatisfactory work (motive) and punitive dismissal founded on misconduct (foundation). Relied on to hold that adverse assessment or preliminary inquiry can be the motive for termination without converting it into punitive action requiring enquiry.
Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 Assessment of work during probation does not amount to finding of misconduct. Cited within Radhey Shyam Gupta quotation to emphasise that such assessments are only motives.
Champaklal, AIR 1964 SC 1854 Preliminary inquiry’s limited purpose; termination after such inquiry can still be non-punitive. Quoted to confirm that absence of full departmental enquiry keeps order innocuous.
Sukh Raj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 Dropping enquiry before findings keeps subsequent termination non-punitive. Mentioned to illustrate permissible termination after incomplete enquiry.
Benjamin case, (1967) 15 FLR 347 (SC) Employer may opt for simple termination if unsure of establishing guilt. Reinforced principle that employee benefits from stigma-free termination.
Gujarat Steel Tubes v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 Concept of “cloud” over employee’s conduct justifying non-retention without punitive findings. Referenced in chain of authorities to distinguish motive from foundation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's conclusion that the termination was driven by Respondent 1's objection to Respondent 4’s appointment. Key points in the Court’s analysis include:

  • Letters dated 24-7-2008 and 18-8-2008, predating the representations against Respondent 4, evidenced concerns over Respondent 1’s performance, undermining the mala fide theory.
  • The Memorandum dated 23-12-2008 recorded only a prima facie finding in a preliminary inquiry; the employer consciously chose not to institute a departmental enquiry, thereby keeping the action non-punitive.
  • Applying Radhey Shyam Gupta and allied cases, the Court held that unsatisfactory performance or preliminary inquiries constitute merely the motive, not the foundation, for termination of a probationer.
  • Because the termination order itself contained no allegations or findings of misconduct, it carried no stigma and qualified as termination simpliciter.
  • The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in questioning Respondent 4’s appointment, an issue not raised in the writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 2926 of 2018, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and restored the termination order dated 31-12-2008. The cross-appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2927 of 2018) filed by Respondent 1 was dismissed.

Implications: The decision re-affirms that an employer may terminate a probationary employee for unsatisfactory performance through an innocuous order without conducting a full-fledged enquiry, provided the order itself is non-stigmatic and no definitive findings of misconduct precede it. The ruling leaves the parties as they stood at the time of termination and sets no new precedent beyond reinforcing established principles on probationary termination.

Show all summary ...

L. Nageswara Rao, J.—

Civil Appeal No. 2926 of 2018 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4208 of 2011

1. Leave granted. This appeal is filed against the judgment 2011 SCC OnLine Utt 26, (2011) 105 AIC 499 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital by which the order dated 31-12-2008 terminating the services of Respondent 1 was set aside.

2. Respondent 1 was offered appointment to the post of Engineer-B (Civil) on 1-11-2007 after he was selected pursuant to advertisement dated 10-8-2007. He had joined on 1-1-2008. Respondent 1 was placed on probation for a period of two years from the date of joining. Appellant 2 was informed by the competent authority on 22-5-2008 that the period of probation for Group ‘A’ officers had been reduced from two years to one year. By a letter dated 15-10-2008, Respondent 1 was informed that his period of probation had been reduced from two years to one year pursuant to an amendment to the bye-laws.

3. An internal Office Note dated 24-7-2008 was issued directing Respondent 1 to submit a detailed report regarding certain irregularities in improvements that were suggested in road infrastructure required for transportation of equipments. By Office Memorandum dated 18-8-2008, the Registrar communicated certain shortcomings in the discharge of duty by Respondent 1. Respondent 1 was directed to discharge his duties diligently and complete the allotted tasks within a given time-frame. Respondent 1 was also asked to submit his explanation regarding initiation and completion of the work relating to providing tanks for water supply for a building without prior intimation and without getting formal approval of the proposal/estimates for the construction of the same.

4. An Office Memorandum dated 23-12-2008 was issued calling for an explanation from Respondent 1 for an alleged misconduct. Reference was made to a preliminary inquiry which revealed that Respondent 1 was responsible for removal of a pen drive and copying the files available in the said pen drive to his personal computer without permission. By Office Memorandum dated 31-12-2008, Appellant 2 terminated the services of Respondent 1. It was mentioned in the said order that the services of Respondent 1 were discontinued beyond the period of probation of one year. Respondent 1 submitted a representation to the appellant for reinstatement which was rejected by an order dated 2-4-2009.

5. Respondent 1 filed a writ petition before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital challenging orders dated 31-12-2008 and 2-4-2009. It was averred in the said writ petition that Respondent 4, who was selected for appointment to the post of Engineer Group ‘B’ pursuant to an advertisement issued on 18-4-2008, was appointed as Engineer-C (Civil). Respondent 1 was aggrieved by the appointment of Respondent 4 to Group ‘C’, which was a post higher than what he was holding for which reason he made a representation on 8-10-2008. Respondent 1 sought for the benefits that were given to Respondent 4 and made a request for appointment as In-Charge/Project Engineer of the construction projects at Monora Peak and Devasthal. It was alleged by Respondent 1 that Respondent 4 was inimically disposed towards him in view of the representations made against his appointment to Group ‘C’ post. According to Respondent 1, the Office Memorandum dated 23-12-2008 was at the behest of Respondent 4 which formed the foundation of the order dated 31-12-2008 by which his services were terminated.

6. The appellant filed a reply in which the order dated 31-12-2008 was justified on the ground that the termination of the services of Respondent 1 at the end of the period of probation was due to unsatisfactory work and not for any misconduct. The appellant contended that there was no stigma attached to the order of termination as the discontinuance of the services of Respondent 1 was not due to misconduct. The appellant further alleged that it was decided not to proceed against Respondent 1 to prove misconduct though a prima facie finding of misconduct was recorded in the preliminary inquiry. Finally, it was submitted that the order dated 31-12-2008 was an order of termination simpliciter, not warranting any opportunity to be given to the delinquent employee.

7. The High Court held that the order dated 31-12-2008 being an innocuous order of termination did not cast any stigma against Respondent 1. The High Court further held that the order dated 31-12-2008 was challenged on the ground that it was vitiated by mala fides. The High Court found that Respondent 4 could not have been appointed to Group ‘C’ post when he was selected for appointment to Group ‘B’ Engineer post. The fact that there was no advertisement to Group ‘C’ post was also highlighted. It was also held that the services of Respondent 1 were terminated because of his objection to the appointment of Respondent 4 to a Group ‘C’ post. The Memorandum dated 23-12-2008 was issued at the behest of Respondent 4 who was holding a higher post than Respondent 1. On the said finding, the High Court set aside the order dated 31-12-2008 and extended the probationary period of Respondent 1 by one more year. There was a further direction to the appellant to consider the representation dated 8-10-2008 of Respondent 1 either by giving the post of Engineer-B (Civil) to Respondent 1 or by reverting Respondent 4 to the post of Engineer-C (Civil).

8. We have heard Mr Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel and Mr S.N. Bhat, Advocate appearing for Respondent 1. Mr Sinha submitted that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of termination dated 31-12-2008 on the ground that it was mala fide. He referred to letters written to Respondent 1 regarding his unsatisfactory performance even prior to the appointment of Respondent 4 to contend that the finding of the High Court that the termination of services of Respondent 1 was at the instance of Respondent 4 is not correct. Though, there was a preliminary inquiry that was conducted into the alleged misconduct, the appellant decided not to proceed further and hold a departmental enquiry to prove any misconduct of Respondent 1. However, it was decided to terminate the services on completion of the probation period due to unsatisfactory work. He also made an attempt to justify the appointment of Respondent 4 to the post of Engineer-B (Civil). He further submitted that the appointment of Respondent 4 was not challenged by Respondent 1 in the writ petition.

9. Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the point that arises for consideration is whether the order dated 31-12-2008 is sustainable as the foundation of the order is misconduct as mentioned in the Memorandum dated 23-12-2008. He submitted that the order of termination ought to have been preceded by a detailed inquiry after providing sufficient opportunity to Respondent 1.

10. The High Court held that the reason for the order dated 31-12-2008 was not to end the probation of the appellant but to punish him for objecting to the appointment of Respondent 4 to Engineer-B (Civil) post. The High Court referred to a representation made by Respondent 1 on 8-10-2008 pointing out that Respondent 4 could not have been appointed to Engineer-B (Civil) post. Without taking any action on the said representation, the appellants initiated a preliminary inquiry for misconduct and issued a Memorandum dated 23-12-2008 seeking an explanation from Respondent 1. Thereafter, an innocuous order of termination of probation was passed on 31-12-2008.

11. We do not agree with the findings of the High Court that the order dated 31-12-2008 was passed only to punish Respondent 1 for his objection to the appointment of Respondent 4 to the post of Engineer-C (Civil). As the appointment of Respondent 4 was not assailed by Respondent 1 in the writ petition, the High Court ought not to have adjudicated the issue of validity of the appointment of Respondent 4. The High Court committed an error in ignoring the letters dated 24-7-2008 and 18-8-2008 written by the Management to Respondent 1 pertaining to his unsatisfactory work. The said letters were issued prior to the representations made by Respondent 1 against the appointment of Respondent 4. A perusal of the Memorandum dated 23-12-2008 would show that there is a prima facie finding recorded in the preliminary inquiry against Respondent 1 which cannot be attributed to the representation made by Respondent 1 against the appointment of Respondent 4. We are constrained to hold that there is no basis for the finding of the High Court that the real reason for the order dated 31-12-2008 was to ensure that the manner in which Respondent 4 was appointed to the post of Engineer-C (Civil) remained concealed. We are satisfied that the order dated 31-12-2008 does not suffer from any infirmity and it is an order of termination simpliciter. There is sufficient material on record to indicate that Respondent 1 was informed about his unsatisfactory performance during the period of his probation.

12. A plain reading of the order dated 31-12-2008 would show that it is an innocuous order terminating the services of Respondent 1 at the end of the probation period. As no allegations of misconduct are made in the order, there is no stigma. Even the High Court is of the opinion that there is no stigma. The fact remains that there was a preliminary inquiry conducted by the Management in which there was a prima facie finding recorded against Respondent 1 of his involvement in an act of misconduct. The appellants decided not to proceed further and hold a detailed inquiry to prove the misconduct of Respondent 1. However, the service of Respondent 1 was terminated at the end of the period of probation which cannot be said punitive. Therefore, the order dated 31-12-2008 is an order of termination simpliciter. In view of the above, it cannot be said that misconduct was the foundation for the order of termination.

13. It will be useful to refer to the relevant portion of a judgment of this Court in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 21, (2015) 15 SCC 151, wherein it was held as follows:

“33. It will be noticed from the above decisions that the termination of the services of a temporary servant or one on probation, on the basis of adverse entries or on the basis of an assessment that his work is not satisfactory will not be punitive inasmuch as the above facts are merely the motive and not the foundation. The reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the officer, as stated by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Ram Narayan Das case AIR 1961 SC 177. It is done only with a view to decide whether he is to be retained or continued in service. The position is not different even if a preliminary enquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary enquiry is to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental enquiry. It has been so decided in Champaklal case AIR 1964 SC 1854. The purpose of the preliminary enquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of the officer and if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where a regular departmental enquiry is started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained, and an enquiry officer is appointed — if at that point of time, the enquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because the enquiry officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings on the charges. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur case AIR 1968 SC 1089 and in Benjamin case (1967) 15 FLR 347 (SC). In the latter case, the departmental enquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing the guilt of the employee. In all these cases, the allegations against the employee merely raised a cloud on his conduct and as pointed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes case (1980) 2 SCC 593 the employer was entitled to say that he would not continue an employee against whom allegations were made the truth of which the employer was not interested to ascertain. In fact, the employer by opting to pass a simple order of termination as permitted by the terms of appointment or as permitted by the rules was conferring a benefit on the employee by passing a simple order of termination so that the employee would not suffer from any stigma which would attach to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other punitive order was passed. The above are all examples where the allegations whose truth has not been found, and were merely the motive.
34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee — even though such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases.”
(emphasis in original)

14. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed accordingly.

Civil Appeal No. 2927 of 2018 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10679 of 2011

15. Leave granted. This appeal has been filed by Respondent 1 being aggrieved by the judgment 2011 SCC OnLine Utt 26, (2011) 105 AIC 499 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital by which the High Court has rejected the prayer of Respondent 1 to direct his confirmation as Engineer-B (Civil).

16. For the reasons mentioned in Civil Appeal No. 2926 of 2018 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4208 of 2011, the appeal is dismissed.