Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Odisha Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Pitabasa Mishra And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 19, 2018
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

M/s Sai Sankar Associates (Respondent 7) had been in unauthorised possession of 6300 sq ft (0.415 acre) of Government land located within the Commercial Estate at Rourkela since 1996, where it operated a small-scale industry. After repeated unanswered representations (28-9-1996, 27-1-1999 and 25-7-2002) requesting regularisation, Respondent 7 filed WP (C) No. 6969 of 2008. On 13-5-2008 the Orissa High Court directed Odisha Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (“IDCO”/“the Corporation”) to consider the request within three months.

In its 74th Board Meeting (20-9-2008) the Corporation regularised the land for Rs 7,89,350. Respondents 1–6, who owned nearby shop-cum-residences, challenged that decision in WP (C) No. 12408 of 2009, alleging environmental hazards and procedural illegality. On 24-12-2010 the High Court allowed the writ petition and cancelled the allotment.

The Corporation (SLP (C) No. 8427 of 2011) and Respondent 7 (separate SLP) appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subject land fell under Section 31 (acquired land) or Section 32 (Government land) of the Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1980, and the extent to which Section 33 applied.
  2. Whether the Corporation could regularise an encroached industrial plot in the absence of regulations framed under Section 59 of the Act.
  3. Whether public auction is a mandatory constitutional or statutory requirement for disposal of such public land.
  4. Whether the consideration of Rs 7,89,350 for 6300 sq ft was inadequate or contrary to policy.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents 1–6 (Writ Petitioners before High Court)

  • The industrial activity of Respondent 7 was environmentally hazardous and prejudicial to their business.
  • Section 34(4) of the Act entitled them to prior notice before any such allotment.
  • No regulations existed; therefore regularisation was impermissible.
  • Transfer of public property required public auction; the price fixed (Rs 7,89,350) was far below the alleged market value (≈ Rs 2 crore).

Respondent 7 (Sai Sankar Associates)

  • Sections 31 and 33 concern acquired land; the plot was Government land leased to the Corporation under Section 32, so Section 33 was inapplicable.
  • Absence of regulations does not bar regularisation; relied on several Supreme Court precedents.
  • Auction is not the sole permissible mode of alienating public land (Natural Resources Allocation case).
  • Respondents 1–6 had themselves benefitted from earlier regularisations and lacked locus standi.
  • The allotment followed the Corporation’s 2004 policy, which was never challenged.

The Appellant Corporation (IDCO)

  • Adopted Respondent 7’s submissions in full.
  • Emphasised that the price was calculated at the latest auction rate of Rs 54.44 lakh per acre, substantially above the concessional industrial rate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath Gundachar Char, (1968) 1 SCR 767 Statutory power can be exercised even before regulations are framed. Relied upon to hold that IDCO could regularise land despite absence of regulations.
U.P. SEB v. City Board, Mussoorie, (1985) 2 SCC 16 Where a statute says “subject to regulations”, action may still be taken without regulations. Used to analogise Section 32(2) of the Act; regulations are not a condition precedent.
Surinder Singh v. Union of India, (1986) 4 SCC 667 “Subject to rules” means “in accordance with rules, if any”; absence of rules is no bar. Cited to sustain the validity of regularisation without regulations.
V. Balasubramaniam v. T.N. Housing Board, (1987) 4 SCC 738 Same principle as Surinder Singh regarding operation without framed rules. Reinforced the above reasoning; mentioned in arguments, accepted in principle.
Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 Auction is not constitutionally mandated for every alienation of public resources. Applied to reject the High Court’s view that auction was compulsory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Nature of the land and applicability of Sections 31–33: The deed of 1-1-1986 showed the plot was Government land leased to the Corporation; therefore Section 32, not Section 31, applied. Consequently, Section 33’s stringent disposal procedures were irrelevant, and the High Court erred.

2. Absence of regulations: Drawing on Mysore SRTC, U.P. SEB and Surinder Singh, the Court held that regulatory lacunae do not inhibit statutory powers. Section 32(2) merely requires compliance with regulations “if any”. Hence IDCO could regularise the plot pending formal regulations.

3. Requirement of public auction: Referring to Natural Resources Allocation, the Court reiterated that auction is a preferred but not obligatory method. Since IDCO’s 2004 policy authorised regularisation at the last auction price and had not been challenged or shown arbitrary, the High Court’s insistence on auction was misplaced.

4. Adequacy of consideration: The price (Rs 7,89,350) reflected the last auction rate (Rs 54.44 lakh/acre), well above the concessional industrial rate (Rs 18.21 lakh/acre). Respondent 7’s long-pending request since 1996 and comparable regularisations supported equitable treatment. The 2008 policy barring outsider regularisation was held inapplicable because the decision originated from a 2004 policy and a Judicial direction predating 2008.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE.

Immediate effect: the allotment/regularisation in favour of M/s Sai Sankar Associates stands restored. The Court clarified that IDCO can regularise Government land without pre-existing regulations and need not invariably resort to public auction, so long as its policy is non-discriminatory and consistent with Article 14. No new precedent was expressly created, but the judgment reinforces existing principles on statutory discretion and disposal of public property.

Show all summary ...

L. Nageswara Rao, J.— Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. These appeals are filed against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 24-12-2010 in Pitabasa Mishra v. Odisha IIDC Ltd. 2010 SCC OnLine Ori 485, (2011) 111 CLT 821 filed by Respondents 1 to 6 by which the allotment of an industrial plot in the Commercial Estate at Rourkela in favour of M/s Sai Sankar Associates (Respondent 7) was set aside.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred to as arrayed in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8427 of 2011 filed by Odisha Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd. (for short “the Corporation”/“the appellant Corporation”).

3. M/s Sai Sankar Associates (Respondent 7) was an unauthorised occupant of an extent of 14 decimals of land which is equivalent to 6300 sq ft in the Commercial Estate at Rourkela and was carrying on a small-scale industry since 1996. Respondent 7 made representations dated 28-9-1996, 27-1-1999 and 25-7-2002 seeking regularisation of the industrial plot which was in their unauthorised occupation. Due to the failure of the appellant Corporation in considering the said representations, Respondent 7 filed Writ Petition No. 6969 of 2008 in the High Court of Orissa seeking a direction to regularise the land which was in its occupation. The High Court by a judgment dated 13-5-2008 WP (C) No. 6969 of 2008 directed the appellant to consider and dispose of the representation expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of the certified copy of the order.

4. Pursuant to the order passed by the High Court dated 13-5-2008 in Satyanarayan Mohanty v. IDCO WP (C) No. 6969 of 2008 the regularisation of the industrial plot was considered in the 74th Board Meeting of IDCO held on 20-9-2008. The Board approved the proposal to regularise land measuring 6300 sq ft on payment of Rs 7,89,350. Respondents 1 to 6 herein challenged the order dated 20-9-2008 by filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12408 of 2009 and sought a direction to quash the allotment of land made in favour of Respondent 7.

5. It was submitted on behalf of Respondents 1 to 6 who filed the writ petition before the High Court that they were allottees of shops-cum-residences in the Commercial Estate at Rourkela. They contended that the outright sale in favour of Respondent 7 for carrying on saree polishing and dyeing of garments and fabric unit would not be conducive to their business activity as the unit of Respondent 7 was environmentally hazardous. It was urged by Respondents 1 to 6 before the High Court that they were entitled for issuance of notice as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). They further submitted that regularisation of the industrial plot was not permissible without regulations being framed under the Act. They further argued that, in any event, public property could not have been transferred without conducting a public auction. Finally, it was submitted on behalf of Respondents 1 to 6 that the allotment of 6300 sq ft of land was made for a paltry sum of Rs 7,89,350 whereas the market value was around Rs 2,00,00,000. The appellant's case before the High Court was that the regularisation of 6300 sq ft of land was made at the auction price for a similarly situated plot @ Rs 54,44,000 per acre as against the prevailing concessional industrial rate of Rs 18,21,000 per acre. The price fixed for the plot of land which was regularised was in accordance with the prevalent policy decision of the appellant. A submission was made on behalf of the appellant before the High Court that Sections 33 and 34 of the Act are not applicable to the regularisation of the industrial plot in question.

6. It was contended on behalf of Respondent 7 before the High Court that Respondents 1 to 6 were also encroachers and were beneficiaries of regularisation of the encroachments made by them in the year 2006 at a concessional rate. Having got the benefit of the regularisation of the encroachments made by them at a concessional rate, they did not have locus to question the allotment made in favour of Respondent 7. It was further contended that there was no infringement of any legal right of Respondents 1 to 6 and the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. The High Court allowed 2010 SCC OnLine Ori 485, (2011) 111 CLT 821 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12408 of 2009 and set aside the order dated 20-9-2008 passed by the appellant Corporation in favour of Respondent 7.

7. Before we proceed further, it would be beneficial to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act was promulgated to provide for the establishment of a Corporation for the development of industrial infrastructure in the State of Orissa. The functions of the Corporation as provided in Section 14 of the Act are to promote and assist in the rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development of industries, trade and commerce in the State. Apart from the other functions, the Corporation is also required to develop industrial areas notified by the State Government and make them available for undertakings to establish themselves. Section 15 of the Act provides for the general powers of the Corporation one of which is to allot plots, factory sheds or buildings or part of buildings, including residential tenements, to suitable persons in the industrial estates. Chapter VI of the Act deals with acquisition and disposal of land. In case the Corporation is unable to acquire any land by agreement, the State Government may acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on behalf of the Corporation as if such land were needed for public purpose as per Section 31(1) of the Act. Section 31(2) of the Act provides for payment of the compensation awarded for acquisition of land by the Government and all other charges incurred therein. On such payment, the land shall vest in the Corporation. Any land belonging to the State Government can also be placed at the disposal of the Corporation for furtherance of the objects of the Act according to Section 32(1) of the

Act. Section 32(2) provides that the land transferred by the State Government shall be dealt with by the Corporation in accordance with the regulations made under the Act and directions given by the State Government in that behalf.

8. Section 33(1) of the Act permits the Corporation to dispose of any land acquired by the State Government and transferred to it, without undertaking or carrying out any development thereon. The Corporation can also transfer the land after undertaking or carrying out such development as it thinks fit. The transfer as mentioned above shall be subject to the terms and conditions as it considers expedient for securing the purposes of the Act. If the Corporation proposes to dispose of any land which is surplus to its requirement by way of sale, the Corporation, as per Section 33(2) of the Act, is obligated to offer the land in the first instance to the persons from whom it was acquired. Section 33(3) of the Act prohibits any disposal of land by way of gift. But, the Corporation is empowered to dispose of land in any manner whether by way of sale, mortgage, exchange, lease or by creation of any easement, right, privilege or otherwise. Section 34 of the Act obligates the Corporation to carry out a periodical review to ensure that the allotment of land is utilised. In case the land is unutilised, suitable steps are to be taken by the Corporation as provided under Section 34. The State Government has the power to make rules in consultation with the Corporation under Section 58 of the Act. The power to make regulations is dealt with in Section 59 of the Act and the terms under which the Corporation may dispose of land, buildings and amenities can be the subject-matter of such regulations as per Section 59(1)(d). Additional terms and conditions subject to which land, buildings, industrial estates and industrial areas may be held or used, can be regulated as per Section 59(1)(e) by the Corporation.

9. Shri Jayant K. Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent 7 submitted that the scope of Sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Act has been misconstrued by the High Court. According to him, the High Court committed an error in applying Section 33 to the land in question. He submitted that Section 31 deals with acquisition of the land by the State Government at the request made by the Corporation. Section 33 refers to disposal of such land which was acquired by the State Government. The land belonging to the State Government which is transferred to the Corporation is to be dealt with in accordance with Section 32 of the Act. He relied upon the lease deed executed by the State Government in favour of the appellant Corporation in the year 1986 in which it was categorically mentioned that the land in issue belongs to the Government. Shri Bhushan argued that the High Court committed an error in holding that regularisation was impermissible in the absence of regulations being made as per Section 32 of the Act. He relied upon the judgments in Surinder Singh v. Union of India (1986) 4 SCC 667; V. Balasubramaniam v. T.N. Housing Board (1987) 4 SCC 738; Mysore SRTC v. Gopinath Gundachar Char (1968) 1 SCR 767, AIR 1968 SC 464 in support of his submission that the absence of regulations does prevent the Corporation to regularise the industrial plots. He also placed reliance upon Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1 to submit that auction is not the only mode for transfer of public land. Shri Bhushan urged that Respondents 1 to 6 were beneficiaries of regularisation of the encroachments made by them at concessional rates and that the writ petition was not maintainable as no legal right of theirs was violated. Another submission made on behalf of Respondent 7 is that regularisation of the industrial plots is governed by the policy decisions of the appellant Corporation which were not challenged by Respondents 1 to 6. In the absence of any challenge to the policy decision, the High Court ought not to have set aside the regularisation.

10. Mr Raj Kumar Mehta, counsel for the appellant Corporation submitted a synopsis and adopted the submissions made on behalf of Respondent 7.

11. Shri Suresh C. Gupta, Counsel appearing for Respondents 1 to 6 submitted that Respondent 7 has encroached on the entire plot of land and is not entitled to any relief for regularisation. He submitted that the policy of regularisation of industrial plots framed in 2008 does not permit the regularisation of encroachments made by outsiders/trespassers under any circumstance. In other words, where the entire plot of land is encroached, regularisation is not permissible. As the regularisation of the plot of Respondent 7 was after 1-1-2008, Respondent 7 could not have been given the benefit of regularisation. He also submitted that Respondents 1 to 6 are not similarly situated to Respondent 7 as the encroachments made by them were of land adjacent to their allotted plots.

12. On the basis of the contentions urged, the points that arise for our consideration are:

I. Acquisition and disposal of the land,
II. Regularisation in the absence of regulations,
III. Transfer of land without conducting public auction; and
IV. Consideration for the land not commensurate

I. Power of acquisition and disposal of the land

13. The High Court held that the plot in question was acquired by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 31 of the Act following the procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on behalf of the appellant to form industrial estates in the industrial area. A deed of agreement dated 1-1-1986 under Section 32 of the Act between the State of Orissa and the appellant is placed on record by Respondent 7. By the said agreement, government land measuring 4.710 acres was given on lease for a term of 99 years to the appellant Corporation for development of infrastructure for small, medium and large industries. There is no dispute that the land allotted to Respondent 7 is part of the said government land that was leased out to the appellant. Hence, the finding of the High Court that the plot in question was acquired by the State Government under Section 31 of the Act is not correct as the land belonged to the Government. The High Court proceeded to record a finding that the land was transferred by the Government under Section 32 of the Act and that such land could not have been regularised without regulations being framed. The High Court further held that the land which was regularised in favour of Respondent 7 is surplus land and the procedure prescribed in Section 33 of the Act ought to have been followed.

14. The High Court has not appreciated Sections 31, 32 and 33 in their proper perspective. The land acquired by the State Government at the request of the Corporation is dealt with in Section 31 and the disposal of such land is governed by Section 33 of the Act. Government land which is transferred to the Corporation for development in accordance with the provisions of the Act is covered by Section 32 of the Act. Though there is no basis, the High Court recorded a finding that the plot in question was acquired by the Government and thereafter proceeded to hold that Section 32 is applicable and in the absence of regulations, the appellant could not have regularised the encroachments.

15. The land transferred by the Government under Section 32 shall be dealt with by the Corporation in accordance with the regulations made under the Act and the directions given by the State Government in that behalf and the procedure prescribed for disposal of land by the Corporation in Section 33 is not applicable to government land. As the land allotted to Respondent 7 is government land which was transferred to the appellant, we are of the considered opinion that Section 33 of the Act is not applicable to the land in question.

II. Regularisation in the absence of regulations

16. Section 59 of the Act provides for regulations to be made in respect of disposal of land and buildings by the Corporation. There is no dispute that no regulations have been made for disposal of land. The question that arises for our consideration is whether the appellant could have regularised the encroachment in the absence of regulations.

17. The exercise of power by an authority in the absence of regulations has been the subject-matter of discussion earlier by this Court. It will be useful to refer to some of those judgments. In Mysore SRTC (1968) 1 SCR 767, AIR 1968 SC 464, no regulations were framed by the Corporation under Section 45(2)(c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 prescribing the conditions of appointment in service and the scales of pay of its officers and servants. It was held by this Court that until the regulations are framed or directions given by the Government, the Corporation had the right to appoint officers and servants as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its functions on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit.

18. In U.P. SEB v. City Board, Mussoorie (1985) 2 SCC 16 this Court considered the scope of Section 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 which provided that the tariff known as the grid tariff shall be fixed from time to time “in accordance with any regulations made in that behalf”. This Court rejected the submission that tariff could not be fixed in the absence of regulations. It was held that the provision did not contemplate that no grid tariff could be fixed unless regulations were made. It was held that the grid tariff should be fixed in accordance with the regulations only if there is any regulation and framing of regulations cannot be a condition precedent for fixing a grid tariff. It is relevant to note Section 32(2) which is as follows:

“32. (2) After any such land had been developed by or under the control and supervision of the Corporation it shall be dealt with by the Corporation in accordance with the regulations made under this Act and the directions given by the State Government in that behalf.”
(emphasis supplied)

The language of Section 32(2) of the Act is in pari materia to Section 46(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.

19. In Surinder Singh (1986) 4 SCC 667 framing of rules regulating the mode and manner of disposal of urban agricultural property by sale to displaced persons came up for consideration. Section 8 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 provides that the displaced persons shall be paid compensation as determined under Section 7 thereof “subject to any rules that may be made under this Act”. Interpreting the said provision, this Court held as follows:

“6. … Where a statute confers powers on an authority to do certain acts or exercise power in respect of certain matters, subject to rules, the exercise of power conferred by the statute does not depend on the existence of rules unless the statute expressly provides for the same. In other words, framing of the rules is not condition precedent to the exercise of the power expressly and unconditionally conferred by the statute. The expression “subject to the rules” only means, in accordance with the rules, if any.”

20. It was further held that if the legislative intent was that the power conferred on the authority under Section 8 could not be exercised, that intent could have been made clearer by using the expression “except in accordance with the rules framed” a displaced person shall not be paid compensation by sale of pooled property.

21. It is clear from the above judgments of this Court that framing of regulations is not sine qua non for land being dealt with by the Corporation. On the basis of the judgments of this Court, it can be safely held that the appellant has the power to deal with the land, to develop and promote the object of the Act even in the absence of regulations.

III. Transfer of land without conducting public auction

22. The appellant framed a policy for disposal of lands in industrial estates/industrial areas in its 63rd meeting of the Board of Directors of IDCO on 30-6-2004. According to the said policy, encroachments by outsiders could be regularised under the following terms:

“3. Existing encroachments by outsiders, who wish to regularise the same for using the land encroached for industrial use or for use as an amenity facilitating industrial growth may be considered subject to the condition that such regularisation does not hamper overall planning of the IE nor inconvenience units in the vicinity. Such regularisation shall be at the rate per acre as determined by the last auction for plots/similarly placed and a one-time affair and the allottees concerned shall not be eligible for any further allotment of land in the said IE in future. No regularisation of encroachment shall be allowed for non-industrial institutional/commercial use under this policy.”

23. A change in the policy of regularisation was made by a Circular on 23-2-2008 by the appellant. According to the said Circular, encroachments made by outsiders/trespassers shall not be allowed by it under any circumstances.

24. Regularisation of encroached land is dealt with by policy decisions of the appellant Corporation which have not been challenged before any court. The regularisation of the plot in favour of Respondent 7 has been set aside by the High Court on the ground that it was done otherwise than by way of public auction. The High Court found that such action on the part of the appellant was impermissible. It is no more res integra that auction cannot be the only method for disposal of public property. This Court in Natural Resources Allocation (2012) 10 SCC 1 held as follows:

“146. To summarise in the context of the present Reference, it needs to be emphasised that this Court cannot conduct a comparative study of the various methods of distribution of natural resources and suggest the most efficacious mode, if there is one universal efficacious method in the first place. It respects the mandate and wisdom of the executive for such matters. The methodology pertaining to disposal of natural resources is clearly an economic policy. It entails intricate economic choices and the Court lacks the necessary expertise to make them. As has been repeatedly said, it cannot, and shall not, be the endeavour of this Court to evaluate the efficacy of auction vis-à-vis other methods of disposal of natural resources. The Court cannot mandate one method to be followed in all facts and circumstances. Therefore, auction, an economic choice of disposal of natural resources, is not a constitutional mandate. We may, however, hasten to add that the Court can test the legality and constitutionality of these methods. When questioned, the courts are entitled to analyse the legal validity of different means of distribution and give a constitutional answer as to which methods are ultra vires and intra vires the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it cannot and will not compare which policy is fairer than the other, but, if a policy or law is patently unfair to the extent that it falls foul of the fairness requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court would not hesitate in striking it down.
147. Finally, market price, in economics, is an index of the value that a market prescribes to a good. However, this valuation is a function of several dynamic variables: it is a science and not a law. Auction is just one of the several price discovery mechanisms. Since multiple variables are involved in such valuations, auction or any other form of competitive bidding, cannot constitute even an economic mandate, much less a constitutional mandate.
148. In our opinion, auction despite being a more preferable method of alienation/allotment of natural resources, cannot be held to be a constitutional requirement or limitation for alienation of all natural resources and therefore, every method other than auction cannot be struck down as ultra vires the constitutional mandate.”

25. In the absence of a finding that the policy of regularisation falls afoul of the fairness requirement under Article 14 of the Constitution, the allotment of the plot to Respondent 7 could not have been set aside by the High Court on the ground that no public auction was conducted by the appellant Corporation.

IV. Consideration for the land not commensurate

26. The regularisation of the plot in favour of Respondent 7 was in terms of the policy decision of 2004. As per the said policy decision, the price fetched for a similar plot of land in the auction conducted at the time of regularisation would have to be paid by the person in whose favour the allotment is made. The appellant stated that Rs 7,89,350 was directed to be paid by Respondent 7 on the basis of the auction which fetched Rs 54,44,000 per acre. It was also stated that the concessional rate at that point of time was Rs 18,21,000 per acre. We do not find any fault with the appellant charging Rs 7,89,350 for 0.415 acres of land on the basis of the prevailing policy decision. It was contended by Respondents 1 to 6 that the allotment was made after the 2008 policy came into force and in view of the bar in the said policy of regularisation of plots by authorities, Respondent 7 could not have been given the benefit. Respondent 7 was seeking regularisation since 1996 but his representations were not being considered by the appellant Corporation. Ultimately, the decision of regularisation was taken by the appellant Corporation, pursuant to a direction given by the High Court to consider the representations made by Respondent 7. Hence the bar under the 2008 policy was inapplicable to the case of Respondent 7. It is also brought to our notice that a number of plots have been regularised in favour of persons similarly situated to Respondent 7. Therefore, it cannot be said that Respondent 7 was showered with any undue benefit.

27. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment 2010 SCC OnLine Ori 485, (2011) 111 CLT 821 of the High Court is set aside and the appeals are allowed accordingly.