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Lahu Shrirang Gatkal v. State Of Maharashtra Through The Secretary And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a constable in the Maharashtra Police Department, was alleged to be involved in multiple criminal activities, with at least seven complaints/FIRs registered against him. Acting under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black Marketing of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (“the Act”), the Commissioner of Police passed a preventive detention order on 10-10-2016. Crucially, the order did not specify any period of detention.
The appellant challenged the detention before the Bombay High Court (Bench at Aurangabad) in Lahu Shrirang Gatkal v. State of Maharashtra, but the writ petition was dismissed. He then appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a preventive detention order issued under Section 3 of the Act is legally sustainable when it fails to specify the period of detention mandated by the statute.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The detention order is invalid because it omits the statutorily required specification of the detention period.
- Relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Cherukuri Mani v. State of A.P. (2015) 13 SCC 722, arguing that the Act is pari materia with the Andhra Pradesh statute construed in that case; therefore, the same reasoning—invalidating blanket detention periods—applies.
Respondent State's Arguments
- Supported the Bombay High Court’s decision and defended the validity of the detention order in toto.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Cherukuri Mani v. State of A.P. (2015) 13 SCC 722 | A detention order must specify a period; initial detention and each extension are capped (three months under the A.P. Act) and cannot be imposed in one blanket order. | Used as persuasive authority to interpret the similar proviso in Section 3 of the Maharashtra Act, leading the Court to conclude that a detention order without a specified period is invalid. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began by reproducing the relevant text of Section 3 of the Act, highlighting the proviso that the period “shall not, in the first instance, exceed six months.” The Court observed that:
- The Act is preventive and presumptive in nature; therefore, it must be strictly construed.
- Under the statutory scheme, the detaining authority is required to state a specific period of detention, subject to the six-month cap and subject to periodic review and extension, if necessary, in increments not exceeding three months.
- Cherukuri Mani, interpreting a pari materia Andhra Pradesh provision, held that a blanket twelve-month detention order violated the statutory mandate. The Court considered the reasoning directly applicable, notwithstanding the difference in the initial maximum period (six months vs. three months).
- Because Respondent 3 issued a “blanket order” without any period specified, the order deviated from the procedure prescribed by law and therefore could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Detention Order Dated 10-10-2016 Set Aside.
The appellant is to be released forthwith unless required in connection with any other case. The decision underscores that detaining authorities must strictly adhere to statutory requirements by specifying the period of detention in the initial order; failure to do so renders the order unsustainable. Beyond invalidating this particular detention, the judgment reiterates the necessity for compliance with procedural safeguards in preventive detention legislation but does not announce a new legal doctrine.
Order
1. Leave granted. The appellant had been detained under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black Marketing of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (hereinafter “the Act”, for brevity) by order dated 10-10-2016 passed by the Commissioner of Police (Respondent 3), which came to be challenged before the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Lahu Shrirang Gatkal v. State of Maharashtra 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 7203, wherein the High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the High Court, the appellant is before this Court challenging the detention order.
2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this case are that the appellant herein is a constable in the Maharashtra Police Department. He is alleged to have been involved in various criminal activities and at least seven complaints/FIRs are said to have been registered against him. On 10-10-2016, Respondent 3 passed a detention order under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act on being satisfied that the appellant was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and with a view to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner. It is important to note that the detention order does not specify the period of detention.
3. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, the learned counsel for the appellant mainly challenges the order of detention of the appellant on the ground that the order of the detention as passed by Respondent 3 does not mention the period of detention. Further, he places reliance on the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Cherukuri Mani v. State of A.P (2015) 13 SCC 722 (hereinafter “Cherukuri Mani case (2015) 13 SCC 722”, for brevity). The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Act as well as the Andhra Pradesh enactment, which was the subject-matter of Cherukuri Mani case (2015) 13 SCC 722, is similar except to the extent that the initial period of preventive detention is six months under the Act while under the Andhra Pradesh enactment it is for three months.
4. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent State has fully supported the reasoning of the High Court in entirety.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to reproduce Section 3 of the Act:
“3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.—(1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.
***
Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed six months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. This Court has already construed a pari materia provision under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, in Cherukuri Mani case (2015) 13 SCC 722, in the following manner:
“14. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions of law, without deviating from the prescribed procedure. When the provisions of Section 3 of the Act clearly mandated the authorities to pass an order of detention at one time for a period not exceeding three months only, the government order in the present case, directing detention of the husband of the appellant for a period of twelve months at a stretch is clear violation of the prescribed manner and contrary to the provisions of law. The Government cannot direct or extend the period of detention up to the maximum period of twelve months in one stroke, ignoring the cautious legislative intention that even the order of extension of detention must not exceed three months at any one time. One should not ignore the underlying principles while passing orders of detention or extending the detention period from time to time.
15. Normally, a person who is detained under the provisions of the Act is without facing trial which in other words amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial of civil rights. In such cases, whether continuous detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be assessed and reviewed from time to time. Taking into consideration these factors, the legislature has specifically provided the mechanism “Advisory Board” to review the detention of a person. Passing a detention order for a period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper review, is deterrent to the rights of the detenu. Hence, the impugned government order directing detention for the maximum period of twelve months straightaway cannot be sustained in law.”
7. It is well settled that a presumptive legislation such as the present Act needs to be given a strict interpretation. As noted above, the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure. Therefore, the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 envisages a period to be specified in the order with a maximum cap of six months at the first instant. From the above analysis it is clear that Respondent 3 could not have passed such a blanket order of detention without specifying the period of detention, as has been done in this case.
8. In light of the above discussion the appeal is allowed and the order of preventive detention dated 10-10-2016 is held to be unsustainable and accordingly set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case.
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