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Mukesh & Anr. Petitioner(S) v. State For Nct Of Delhi & Ors. (S)

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 6, 2017
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Supreme Court of India was seized of Special Leave Petitions (Criminal) Nos. 3119-20 of 2014 and 5027-28 of 2014 filed by four death-row convicts. Arguments on the merits of their convictions had already been heard. The present series of orders, dated 3-2-2017, 13-2-2017 and 6-3-2017, addresses the procedural question of sentencing, specifically whether the trial court and High Court complied with Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before affirming the death penalty. The Court issued directions for additional materials, scheduled further hearings, and organised jail access for defence counsel so that mitigating evidence could be gathered.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court and the High Court failed to comply with the mandatory hearing on sentence required by Section 235(2) CrPC.
  2. If such non-compliance occurred, whether the proper course is to remand the matter to the trial court or to allow the Supreme Court itself to receive evidence and hear the parties on the question of sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused Persons (through Mr. Raju Ramachandran and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, amici)

  • Section 235(2) CrPC demands an individual, meaningful hearing on sentence for each accused; the courts below did not examine aggravating and mitigating circumstances separately.
  • Reliance was placed on Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 to emphasise the need for a balancing exercise between aggravating and mitigating factors in capital cases.
  • Cited Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 to contend that failure to comply with Section 235(2) vitiates the sentence.
  • Submitted that the matter could be remanded, but if the Supreme Court chose otherwise, the accused should be given a full opportunity to present mitigating material.

State (through Mr. Siddharth Luthra, Senior Counsel)

  • Accepted that, should the Court deem additional material necessary, arrangements would be made for counsel to visit the jail and for the filing of affidavits.
  • Filed an affidavit including the Jail Superintendent’s report and agreed to facilitate weekend visits by defence counsel.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 “Rarest of rare” doctrine; requirement to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in capital sentencing. Cited to show that the courts below should have examined such factors before affirming the death penalty.
Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190 Non-compliance with Section 235(2) CrPC vitiates sentence. Relied upon to argue that each accused must be heard individually on sentencing.
Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68 Appellate court can itself rectify failure to hear the accused on sentence instead of remanding. Used by the Court to opt for obtaining affidavits rather than remanding the case.
Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 4 SCC 341 Accused and prosecution must be given adequate time to present sentencing materials. Guided the Court in setting timelines for filing affidavits.
Ajay Pandit v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 43 Remand ordered where Section 235(2) procedures were not followed. Cited but distinguished; the Court chose the alternative of collecting material itself.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench surveyed the statutory mandate of Section 235(2) CrPC and the case-law beginning with Santa Singh and Dagdu. Acknowledging two possible courses—remand or direct hearing—the Court preferred the latter, relying on Dagdu’s clarification that an appellate court may itself cure the procedural defect by granting a “real and effective” opportunity to the accused.

Consequently, the Court directed:

  • Defence counsel to visit the jail daily (including weekends) between specified hours to prepare individual affidavits covering mitigating circumstances.
  • Affidavits of the accused to be filed by 23-2-2017; the State’s affidavit by 2-3-2017.
  • The Jail Superintendent to submit a sealed report on each convict’s conduct while in custody.
  • Further dates fixed (3-3-2017 and 20-3-2017) exclusively for arguments on sentence.

By taking these steps, the Court sought to ensure compliance with Section 235(2) without delaying the proceedings through remand.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court did not dispose of the appeals but directed the filing of detailed affidavits on mitigating circumstances, authorised counsel–client meetings inside jail, ordered a conduct report from the Jail Superintendent, and scheduled subsequent hearings solely on the question of sentence.

IMPLICATIONS: The directions grant the accused a substantive opportunity to present mitigating evidence, thereby curing the alleged procedural defect while avoiding remand. The orders affect only the present case and create no new legal precedent.

Show all summary ...

(2017) 3 SCC 719

Order dated 3-2-2017

(Before Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.)

SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 3119-20 of 2014 with SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 5027-28 of 2014

1. Hearing resumed. Put up for further hearing at 10.30 a.m on 4-2-2017.

2. After the argument for the accused persons by Mr M.L Sharma and Mr A.P Singh, learned counsel, were advanced, we thought it appropriate to hear the learned friends of the Court and, accordingly, we have heard Mr Raju Ramachandran and Mr Sanjay R. Hegde, learned Senior Counsel. It is worthy to note here that Mr Hegde, learned Senior Counsel argued on the sustainability of the conviction on many a ground and submitted a written note of submission. Mr Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel, inter alia, emphasised on the aspect of sentence imposed by the trial court which has been confirmed under Section 366 CrPC. While arguing with regard to the imposition of the capital punishment on the accused persons, one of the main submissions of Mr Ramachandran was that neither the trial court nor the High Court 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1138, (2014) 212 DLT 99 has followed the mandate enshrined under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 235(2) CrPC reads as follows:

“235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction.—(1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case.
(2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.”

3. Referring to the procedure adopted by the trial court, it was urged by Mr Ramachandran that the learned trial Judge had not considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as are required to be considered in view of the Constitution Bench decision in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, and further there has been a failure of the substantive law, inasmuch as there has been weighing of the mitigating or the aggravating circumstances in respect of each individual accused. The learned Senior Counsel contended that Section 235(2) CrPC is not a mere formality and in a case when there are more than one accused, it is obligatory on the part of the learned trial Judge to hear the accused individually on the question of sentence and deal with him. As put forth by Mr Ramachandran, the High Court has also failed to take pains in that regard. To bolster his submission, he has commended us to the authority in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190. In the said case, Bhagwati, J. dealt with the anatomy of Section 235 CrPC, the purpose and purport behind it and, eventually, came to hold that:

“6. … Law strives to give them social and economic justice and it has, therefore, necessarily to be weighted in favour of the weak and the exposed. This is the new law which Judges are now called upon to administer and it is, therefore, essential that they should receive proper training which would bring about an orientation in their approach and outlook, stimulate sympathies in them for the vulnerable sections of the community and inject a new awareness and sense of public commitment in them. They should also be educated in the new trends in penology and sentencing procedures so that they may learn to use penal law as a tool for reforming and rehabilitating criminals and smoothening out the uneven texture of the social fabric and not as a weapon, fashioned by law, for protecting and perpetuating the hegemony of one class over the other. Be that as it may, it is clear that the learned Sessions Judge was not aware of the provision in Section 235(2) and so also was the lawyer of the appellant in the High Court unaware of it. No inference can, therefore, be drawn from the omission of the appellant to raise this point, that he had nothing to say in regard to the sentence and that consequently no prejudice was caused to him.”

4. Thereafter, the learned Judge opined that non-compliance goes to the very root of the matter and it results in vitiating the sentence imposed. Eventually, Bhagwati, J. set aside the sentence of death and remanded the case to the Court of Session with a direction to pass appropriate sentence after giving an opportunity to the appellant therein to be heard in regard to the question of sentence in accordance with the provision contained in Section 235(2) CrPC as interpreted by him.

5. In the concurring opinion, Fazal Ali, J., ruled thus: (Santa Singh case (1976) 4 SCC 190)

“14. The last point to be considered is the extent and import of the word “hear” used in Section 235(2) of the 1973 Code. Does it indicate, that the accused should enter into a fresh trial by producing oral and documentary evidence on the question of the sentence which naturally will result in further delay of the trial? Parliament does not appear to have intended that the accused should adopt dilatory tactics under the cover of this new provision but contemplated that a short and simple opportunity has to be given to the accused to place materials if necessary by leading evidence before the court bearing on the question of sentence and a consequent opportunity to the prosecution to rebut those materials. The Law Commission was fully aware of this anomaly and it accordingly suggested thus:
‘We are aware that a provision for an opportunity to give evidence in this respect may necessitate an adjournment; and to avoid delay adjournment, for the purpose should, ordinarily be for not more than 14 days. It may be so provided in the relevant clause.’
It may not be practicable to keep up to the time-limit suggested by the Law Commission with mathematical accuracy but the courts must be vigilant to exercise proper control over the proceedings so that the trial is not unavoidably or unnecessarily delayed.”

6. The said decision was considered by a three-Judge Bench in Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 68. The three-Judge Bench referred to the law laid down in Santa Singh (1976) 4 SCC 190 and opined that the mandate of Section 235(2) CrPC has to be obeyed in letter and spirit. However, the larger Bench thought that Santa Singh (1976) 4 SCC 190 does not lay down as a principle that failure on the part of the Court which convicts an accused, to hear him on the question of sentence must necessarily entail a remand to that Court in order to afford the accused an opportunity to be heard on the question of sentence. Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench ruled thus: (Dagdu case (1977) 3 SCC 68)

“79. … The Court, on convicting an accused, must unquestionably hear him on the question of sentence. But if, for any reason, it omits to do so and the accused makes a grievance of it in the higher court, it would be open to that Court to remedy the breach by giving a hearing to the accused on the question of sentence. That opportunity has to be real and effective, which means that the accused must be permitted to adduce before the Court all the data which he desires to adduce on the question of sentence. The accused may exercise that right either by instructing his counsel to make oral submissions to the Court or he may, on affidavit or otherwise, place in writing before the Court whatever he desires to place before it on the question of sentence. The Court may, in appropriate cases, have to adjourn the matter in order to give to the accused sufficient time to produce the necessary data and to make his contentions on the question of sentence. That, perhaps, must inevitably happen where the conviction is recorded for the first time by a higher court.”

7. It is seemly to note here that Mr Ramachandran has also commended us to a three-Judge Bench decision in Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341, wherein the three-Judge Bench ruled that sufficient time has to be given to the accused or the prosecution on the question of sentence, to show the grounds on which the prosecution may plead or the accused may show that the maximum sentence of death may be the appropriate sentence or the minimum sentence of life imprisonment may be awarded, as the case may be.

8. The learned Senior Counsel has also drawn our attention to a two-Judge Bench decision in Ajay Pandit v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 8 SCC 43, wherein the matter was remanded to the High Court. Mr Ramachandran has drawn our attention to para 47 of the said authority. It reads as follows:

“47. Awarding death sentence is an exception, not the rule, and only in the rarest of rare cases, the court could award death sentence. The state of mind of a person awaiting death sentence and the state of mind of a person who has been awarded life sentence may not be the same mentally and psychologically. The court has got a duty and obligation to elicit relevant facts even if the accused has kept totally silent in such situations. In the instant case, the High Court has not addressed 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 1543 the issue in the correct perspective bearing in mind those relevant factors, while questioning the accused and, therefore, committed a gross error of procedure in not properly assimilating and understanding the purpose and object behind Section 235(2) CrPC.”

9. Having considered all the authorities, we find that there are two modes, one is to remand the matter or to direct the accused persons to produce necessary data and advance the contention on the question of sentence. Regard being had to the nature of the case, we think it appropriate to adopt the second mode. To elaborate, we would like to give opportunity before conclusion of the hearing to the accused persons to file affidavits along with documents stating about the mitigating circumstances. Needless to say, for the said purpose, it is necessary that the learned counsel, Mr M.L Sharma and his associate Ms Suman and Mr A.P Singh and his associate Mr V.P Singh should be allowed to visit the jail and communicate with the accused persons and file the requisite affidavits and materials.

10. At this juncture, Mr M.L Sharma, learned counsel has submitted that on many an occasion, he has faced difficulty as he had to wait in the jail to have a dialogue with his clients. Mr Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that if this Court directs, Mr M.L Sharma and Mr A.P Singh, learned counsel and their associate advocates can visit the jail at 2.45 p.m each day and they shall be allowed to enter the jail between 3.00 p.m to 3.15 p.m and can spend time till 5.00 p.m Needless to say, they can commence their visits from 7-2-2017, and file the necessary separate affidavits and documents. After the affidavits are made ready by the learned counsel for the accused persons, they can intimate about the same to Mr Luthra, who in his turn, shall intimate the same to the Superintendent of Jail, who shall make arrangement for a Notary so that affidavits can be notarized, treating this as a direction of this Court. Needless to say, while the learned counsel will be discussing with the accused persons, the meeting shall be held in separate rooms inside the jail premises so that they can have a free discussion with the accused persons. Needless to say, they can reproduce in verbatim what the accused persons tell them in the affidavit. The affidavits shall be filed by 23-2-2017.

11. We may hasten to add that after the affidavits come on record, a date shall be fixed for hearing of the affidavits and pertaining to quantum of sentence if, eventually, the conviction is affirmed. The learned counsel for the prosecution, needless to say, is entitled to file necessary affidavits with regard to the circumstances or reasons for sustenance of the sentence. Additionally, the prosecution is given liberty to put forth in the affidavit any refutation, after the copies of the affidavits by the learned counsel for the accused persons are served on him. For the said purpose, a week's time is granted. Needless to say, the matter shall be heard on sentence, after affidavits from both the sides are brought on record. The date shall be given at 2.00 p.m on 6-2-2017. For the present, the matter stands adjourned to 4-2-2017, for hearing.

12. Let a copy of the order be handed over to Mr Sidharth Luthra by 4-2-2017, who shall get it translated in Hindi and give it to the Superintendent of Jail, who in his turn, shall hand over it to the accused persons and, simultaneously, explain the purport and effect of the order.

13. The Superintendent of Jail is also directed to submit a report with regard to the conduct of the accused persons while they are in custody.

(2017) 3 SCC 724 (1)

Order dated 13-2-2017

(Before Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.)

SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 3119-20 of 2014 with SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 5027-28 of 2014

14. Mr A.P Singh, learned counsel has concluded his arguments. After his conclusion of the arguments, as per our order, dated 3-2-2017, affidavits are required to be filed by 23-2-2017. Let the affidavits be filed by that date. Mr Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State shall file the affidavit by 2-3-2017. The Registry is directed to hand over copies of the affidavits to Mr K. Parameshwar, learned counsel assisting Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Anil Kumar Mishra-I, learned counsel assisting Mr Sanjay Kumar Hegde, learned Senior Counsel (Amicus Curiae).

15. Mr Luthra, learned Senior Counsel shall make arrangements for visit of Mr A.P Singh and Mr Manohar Lal Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners even on Saturday and Sunday. He shall intimate our order to the Jail Authorities so that they can arrange the visit of Mr A.P Singh and Mr Manohar Lal Sharma on Saturday and Sunday.

16. Let the matter be listed on 3-3-2017 for hearing on the question of sentence, aggravating and mitigating circumstances on the basis of the materials brought on record by the learned counsel for the parties.

(2017) 3 SCC 724 (2)

Order dated 6-3-2017

(Before Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.)

SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 3119-20 of 2014 with SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 5027-28 of 2014

17. In pursuance of our order dated 3-2-2017, affidavits on behalf of the petitioners have been filed. Mr A.P Singh, learned counsel has filed affidavits on behalf of the three accused persons, namely, Pawan Kumar Gupta, Vinay Sharma and Akshay Kumar Singh and Mr M.L Sharma, learned counsel has filed the affidavit on behalf of Mukesh. Be it noted, Mr A.P Singh, learned counsel has filed the translated version of the affidavits and Mr Manohar Lal Sharma, learned counsel has filed the original version in Hindi as well as the translated one.

18. At this juncture, Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel who has been appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court, submitted that two aspects are required to be further probed to comply with the order dated 3-2-2017 inasmuch as this Court has taken the burden on itself for compliance with Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Senior Counsel would point out that the affidavit filed by Mukesh does not cover many aspects, namely, socio-economic background, criminal antecedents, family particulars, personal habits, education, vocational skills, physical health and his conduct in the prison.

19. Mr Manohar Lal Sharma, learned counsel submits that a report was asked for from the Superintendent of Jail with regard to the conduct of the accused persons while they are in custody, but the same has not directly been filed by the Superintendent of Jail.

20. Mr Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent State, would, per contra, contend that he has filed the affidavit and the affidavit contains the report of the Superintendent of Jail.

21. In our considered opinion, the Superintendent of Jail should have filed the report with regard to the conduct of the accused persons since they are in custody for almost four years. That would have thrown light on their conduct. Let the report with regard to their conduct be filed by the Superintendent of Jail in a sealed cover in the Court on the next date of hearing.

22. As far as the affidavit filed by Mukesh is concerned, Mr Sharma, learned counsel stated that he will keep the aspects which are required to be highlighted in mind and file a further affidavit within a week hence.

23. The direction issued on the earlier occasion with regard to the visit of jail by the learned counsel for the parties shall remain in force till the next date of hearing.

24. Let the matter be listed at 2.00 p.m on 20-3-2017. The report of the Superintendent of Jail, as directed hereinabove, shall be filed in Court on that date.

Court Masters