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Capacite Infrapojects Limited Petitioner v. Ramprastha Promoters & Developers Limited

Delhi High Court
Nov 30, 2017
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Navin Chawla, J. — Oral)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed by the petitioner seeking appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising under an agreement dated 22.03.2013 for the "Construction of Multistoried Housing Complex, 'Rise' at Ramprastha City, Sector 37-D, Gurgaon, Haryana".

The petitioner relied on Clauses 68, 69 and 70 of the agreement, asserting that Clause 69 is an arbitration agreement designating the Chairman of the respondent as arbitrator and that Clause 70 fixes the venue at New Delhi (invoking the court's jurisdiction). The petitioner served a notice invoking the arbitration on 06.02.2017 and filed the present Section 11 petition because the respondent had not appointed an arbitrator.

The respondent opposed the petition, contending that Clause 69 is not an arbitration agreement but a further mode of settlement and that the Chairman cannot act as an arbitrator. The respondent relied on several precedents to support its submission. The court reproduced Clauses 68–70 and considered the parties' submissions.

Outcome (procedural): The petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Clause 69 of the agreement constitutes a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.
  2. Whether the designation of the Chairman of the respondent as the arbitrator is permissible, or whether he is disqualified from acting under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
  3. Whether the presence of the heading "Arbitration" (Clause 69) and the phrase "venue of arbitration" (Clause 70) are sufficient to convert the clause into a binding arbitration agreement.
  4. If the person named as arbitrator cannot act, whether the arbitration clause survives or stands terminated (i.e., whether parties can be referred to another arbitrator despite the original designate being disqualified).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The agreement contains an Arbitration Agreement in Clause 69 of the General Conditions (Part‑1).
  • Clause 68 provides for initial settlement by the Chairman; Clause 69 provides for resolution through arbitration and designates the Chairman as the arbitrator.
  • Clause 70 provides that the venue of arbitration is New Delhi, which supports this Court's jurisdiction to entertain the Section 11 petition.
  • The petitioner invoked arbitration by notice dated 06.02.2017; the respondent failed to appoint an arbitrator, justifying the Section 11 application.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Clause 69 is not an arbitration agreement but a mode of further settlement; it refers disputes to the Chairman and speaks of his "decision", not an arbitral award.
  • Mere labeling of the clause as "Arbitration" does not make it an arbitration agreement; headings cannot control the plain meaning of the clause.
  • The use of the words "venue of arbitration" alone cannot convert the clause into an arbitration agreement.
  • Relied upon several authorities (Supreme Court and High Court) to support the view that clauses of this nature do not amount to arbitration agreements and to support the contention that a person in supervisory control cannot act as an arbitrator in such circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Dasaratharama Reddy Complex v. Government of Karnataka, (2014) 2 SCC 201 Clauses referring disputes to an official (e.g., Chief Engineer) who is not independent and whose "decision" is non‑adjudicatory do not constitute an arbitration clause. The court relied on this authority to hold that Clauses 68 and 69, which refer disputes to the Chairman and use the term "decision", cannot be treated as an arbitration clause.
International Amusement Ltd. v. India Trade Promotion Organization, (2015) 12 SCC 677 A clause referring disputes to the sole arbitration of the Chairman (or equivalent) whose decision is final and binding did not constitute an arbitration agreement in that case. The court cited this decision to support the view that similar clauses do not amount to an arbitration agreement.
Master Tours and Travels v. The Chairman, Shri Amarnath Ji Shrine Board, 2016 (1) SCALE 69 A clause referring disputes to a Chief Executive Officer whose decision is final cannot be construed as an arbitration agreement. The court relied on this authority to reinforce that Clause 69's reference to the Chairman's "decision" points to a settlement mechanism rather than arbitration.
H.M Kamaluddin Ansari and Co. v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 417 The heading of a clause does not control the plain meaning of the words of the clause. The court used this principle to reject the argument that the heading "ARBITRATION" converts Clause 69 into an arbitration agreement.
Durha Constructions Private Limited v. Bateman Engineering (India) Private Limited (Karnataka High Court) Support for the proposition that use of the term "venue of arbitration" or similar wording alone does not create an arbitration agreement. The court relied on this High Court decision to support the view that Clause 70's reference to "venue of arbitration" is insufficient to establish an arbitration agreement.
Newton Engineering and Chemicals v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 4 SCC 44 If a person named as arbitrator in the arbitration agreement cannot act as an arbitrator (is disqualified), the arbitration agreement stands terminated and the parties cannot be referred to an arbitrator they never intended to appoint. The court applied this principle to conclude that even if Clause 69 were treated as an arbitration agreement, the Chairman would be disqualified under Section 12(5) and the clause would thereby cease to operate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reproducing Clauses 68, 69 and 70. Both Clauses 68 and 69 refer disputes to the Chairman of the respondent and use the word "decision" (stating that his decision shall be final and binding). The court observed that Clause 68 provides for settlement of disputes under the aegis of the Chairman, and Clause 69 — although headed "ARBITRATION" — likewise refers disputes to the Chairman and uses the term "decision".

Relying on P. Dasaratharama Reddy and similar authorities, the court explained that where a dispute is first to be referred to an officer who has supervisory control over the work and whose function is not adjudicatory (and who is not independent), such a clause cannot be treated as an arbitration clause. The court emphasized that the expression "in the first place" and the description of the role as one giving a "decision" point to a non‑adjudicatory, settlement mechanism rather than arbitral adjudication.

The court found it impermissible for the same person to act as both the settlement officer (under Clause 68) and as an adjudicator in arbitration (under Clause 69): "No one can be a judge of his own cause." Thus Clause 69 was viewed as an extension of the settlement mechanism in Clause 68 rather than an independent arbitration agreement. The court also held that mere headings (the word "ARBITRATION") or the phrase "venue of arbitration" in Clause 70 cannot convert the clause into an arbitration agreement, applying H.M. Kamaluddin and the Karnataka High Court decision cited.

Finally, the court noted an alternative ground: even if Clause 69 were to be construed as an arbitration agreement, the Chairman — being the person to whom disputes were referred — would be disqualified to act as an arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Act. Applying Newton Engineering, the court observed that where a person named as arbitrator cannot act, the arbitration agreement stands terminated and the parties cannot be referred to an arbitrator they never intended to appoint.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The court concluded that Clauses 68 and 69, as drafted, do not constitute a valid arbitration agreement because they refer disputes to the Chairman for a "decision" and amount to a settlement mechanism rather than an arbitral adjudicatory process.
  • The court further held that, even assuming Clause 69 were an arbitration clause, the Chairman would be disqualified under Section 12(5) and, under Newton Engineering, the arbitration clause would stand terminated. As a result, the petitioner cannot secure appointment of the Chairman (or be referred to an arbitrator by operation of Clause 69 as drafted).
  • No broader precedent beyond the application of the cited authorities was announced; the decision operates to deny the specific Section 11 relief sought by the petitioner in this case.
Show all summary ...

Navin Chawla, J. (Oral):— This petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to the ‘Act’) has been filed by the petitioner praying for appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes that have arisen between the parties under the agreement dated 22.03.2013 for “Construction of Multistoried Housing Complex, “Rise” at Ramprastha City, Sector 37-D, Gurgaon, Haryana”.

2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said agreement contains an Arbitration Agreement in Clause 69 of the General Condition of Contract-Part-1 of the Agreement. Relying upon the Clause 68, 69 and 70, it is submitted that while Clause 68 provides for settlement of disputes through the intervention of the Chairman of the respondent, Clause 69 provides for resolution of the disputes through Arbitration and the Chairman of the respondent has been designated as the Arbitrator. He further submits that Clause 70 of the Agreement provides for venue for the arbitration to be at New Delhi and therefore this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain this request for appointment of an Arbitrator. It is further submitted that the petitioner had invoked the Arbitration Agreement vide its notice dated 06.02.2017, however, as respondent has failed to appoint an arbitrator, the present petition under Section 11 of the Act has been filed.

3. Learned senior counsel for the respondent submits that, in fact, there is no Arbitration Agreement between the parties. It is submitted that Clause 69 of the Agreement referred by the petitioner is not an Arbitration Agreement; it is only a mode of further settlement of the disputes. He relies upon the judgments of Supreme Court in P. Dasaratharama Reddy Complex v. Government of Karnataka, (2014) 2 SCC 201; International Amusement Ltd. v. India Trade Promotion Organization, (2015) 12 SCC 677 and Master Tours and Travels v. The Chairman, Shri Amarnath Ji Shrine Board, 2016 (1) SCALE 69 in support of his submission. He further submits that merely because the heading of Clause 69 of the Agreement reads “Arbitration”, the same would not make this an Arbitration Agreement. He relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in H.M Kamaluddin Ansari and Co. v. Union of India (1983) 4 SCC 417 to submit that the heading of a Clause will not control the plain meaning of the words of the Clause. He submits that use of words “venue of Arbitration”, by themselves cannot amount to an Arbitration Agreement. In this regard, he relies upon the judgment of Karnataka High Court in Durha Constructions Private Limited v. Bateman Engineering (India) Private Limited. Ltd..

4. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. For answering the submissions made by the parties, I first reproduced Clause 68, 69 and 70 of the Agreement as under:

“68. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN EMPLOYER & CONTRACT:

If any dispute or difference of any kind whatsoever arises between the Employer and the Contractor in connection with, or arising out of the Contract, whether during the progress of the works or after their completion and whether during the progress of the works or after their completion and whether before or after the termination, abandonment or breach of the Contract, it shall in the first place, be referred to and settled by the Chairman of M/s. Ramprastha Promotors and Developers Pvt. Ltd.(Employer) who shall, within a period of thirty days after being requested by the contractor to do so, give written notice of his decision to the Contractor and the employer. Upon receipt of the written notice of the decision of the Employer the Contractor shall promptly proceed without delay to comply with such notice of decision.

69. ARBITRATION

All question & dispute relating to the meaning of specification, designs, drawings and instructions and to the quality of workmanship or materials used in the work or as to any other question, claim, right, matter of thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to Contract, specifications, instructions whether arising during the progress of work or after the completion or abandonment of work cannot be settled between the parties, it shall be referred to the Chairman of M/s. Ramprastha Promotors and Developers Pvt. Ltd.(Employer) and his decision will be final and binding to the Contractor.

70. JURISDICTION

The venue of arbitration shall be New Delhi

Only the courts in Delhi shall have jurisdiction in any cases related to this contract.”

(emphasis supplied)

5. There is no dispute that Clause 68 merely provides for settlement of the disputes between the parties under an aegis of the Chairman of the respondent. Clause 69 of the Agreement which has the heading “Arbitration”, again refers the ‘disputes’ to the Chairman of the respondent. Both Clauses 68 and 69 use the words “decision”. In P. Dasaratharama Reddy Complex (supra) Supreme Court after analyzing various judgments on the issue of existence of Arbitration Agreement under different contracts, held as under:

“27. To the aforesaid proposition, we may add that in terms of Clause 29(a) and similar other clauses, any dispute or difference irrespective of its nomenclature in matters relating to specifications, designs, drawings, quality of workmanship or material used or any question relating to claim, right in any way arising out of or relating to the contract designs, drawings etc. or failure on the contractor's part to execute the work, whether arising during the progress of the work or after its completion, termination or abandonment has to be first referred to the Chief Engineer or the Designated Officer of the Department. The Chief Engineer or the Designated Officer is not an independent authority or person, who has no connection or control over the work. As a matter of fact, he is having over all supervision and charge of the execution of the work. He is not required to hear the parties or to take evidence, oral or documentary. He is not invested with the power to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties to the dispute or difference and his decision is subject to the right of the aggrieved party to seek relief in a Court of Law. The decision of the Chief Engineer or the Designated Officer is treated as binding on the contractor subject to his right to avail remedy before an appropriate Court. The use of the expression ‘in the first place’ unmistakably shows that non-adjudicatory decision of the Chief Engineer is subject to the right of the aggrieved party to seek remedy. Therefore, Clause 29 which is subject matter of consideration in most of the appeals and similar clauses cannot be treated as an Arbitration Clause.”

6. In International Amusement Limited (supra) Supreme Court construed the following Clauses and held that the same do not amount to an Arbitration Agreement between the parties therein:

“28. In case of any dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement the disputes shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chairman, India Trade Promotion Organization or his nominee whose decision/award shall be final, conclusive and binding on the parties. Application for reference to arbitration shall be made by either party within two months of arising of the dispute”.

7. Similarly, in Master Tours and Travel (supra) Supreme Court held that Clause 13 of the work order therein, which read as under, cannot be construed an Arbitration Agreement:

“In case of any dispute the matter shall be referred to the Chief Executive Officer-Shri Amarnathiji Shrine Board, whose decision in the matter shall be final.”

8. In the present case, under Clause 68 and 69, the disputes are to be “referred” to the Chairman of the respondent. As noted above, both the clauses state that his “decision” shall be final and binding. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that Clause 69 was inserted in the agreement to provide the power of arbitration to the same person against whose decision, which he would take under Clause 68 first trying under settlement procedure, would be under challenge. No one can be a judge of his own cause. Clause 69, to my mind, therefore, appears to be an extension of Clause 68 which is a settlement process. It cannot be disputed that the agreement, as far as these two clauses is concerned, is not happily drafted. Given the fact that the power to thrive at a settlement under Clause 68 is given to the same person who then, if the submission of the petitioner is to be accepted, is vested with the power to adjudicate the disputes against his own decision, it would be an antitheses in terms and cannot be accepted. As rightly contended by the learned senior counsel for the respondent, merely because Clause 69 has a heading “arbitration” or Clause 70 uses words “venue of the arbitration”, the said Clause cannot amount to an Arbitration Agreement between the parties.

9. Even if I assume that Clause 69 is an Arbitration Agreement between the parties in terms thereof, the disputes are to be referred to the Chairman of the respondent, who would be disqualified to act as an Arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Act. In Newton Engineering and Chemicals v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 4 SCC 44 Supreme Court held that if a person named as an Arbitrator in the Arbitration Agreement cannot act as an Arbitrator, the Arbitration Agreement between the parties would stand terminated and the parties cannot be referred to an Arbitrator who they never intended to appoint as an Arbitrator. In such circumstances, the arbitration clause would not survive and has to be treated as having worked its course.

10. In view of the above, the present petition is dismissed with no order as to cost.