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Kumar Housing & Land Development Ltd. v. Indian Bank & Ors.

Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
Apr 28, 2008
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant challenged the setting aside of the sale of immovable property auctioned in their favor due to non-deposit of the sale price. The property belonged to respondent No. 2, a borrower firm, and was auctioned on 23rd May 2007 with the appellant making the highest bid of Rs. 34 crores. The appellant was initially allowed to deposit 25% of the bid amount by 25th May 2007, which was extended to 31st May 2007 upon request. On 31st May, instead of depositing the amount, the appellant sought a further two-week extension, requesting clarification on title, ownership, encumbrances, and third-party rights before payment.

On 6th June 2007, the appellant submitted pay orders for the 25% payment minus the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD), but the Recovery Officer declined acceptance and returned the pay orders the next day. The Recovery Officer altered an earlier endorsement to negate the permission to deposit, despite having initially allowed it. The appellant produced a certified copy of the original endorsement permitting deposit.

The appellant also filed an application on 6th June seeking physical possession of the property and disclosure of title deeds and encumbrances, and requested permission to deposit the balance amount after resolving encumbrance issues. The Recovery Officer rejected this application and forfeited the EMD. The Presiding Officer dismissed the appellant's appeal against this order, confirming the forfeiture and refusal to extend the payment period. Both these orders are challenged in the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Recovery Officer had the discretion to extend the time for depositing the 25% bid amount beyond the prescribed period.
  2. Whether the alteration of the Recovery Officer’s endorsement regarding payment acceptance was proper.
  3. Whether the forfeiture of the appellant’s Earnest Money Deposit was justified given the circumstances.
  4. The applicability of the doctrine of "Caveat Emptor" in the sale of the property on "as is where is basis and what is basis".
  5. Whether the appellant was entitled to seek clear title or removal of encumbrances after the bid was accepted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that before depositing the bid amount, clarifications on title, ownership, and encumbrances were necessary.
  • They relied on a certified copy of the Recovery Officer’s endorsement dated 6th June 2007 allowing deposit of pay orders, arguing the subsequent return of pay orders was improper.
  • The appellant argued that the Recovery Officer had discretion to extend the time for deposit beyond the prescribed period.
  • They contended that the forfeiture of the EMD was unjustified as the title was not clear due to encumbrances.
  • Reliance was placed on judgments supporting extension of time and wide powers of the Recovery Officer under the RDDBFI Act.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents pointed out that the only encumbrances on the property were tenants, including banks and government departments, which did not prohibit sale.
  • The Recovery Officer had given one month's notice for inquiries about encumbrances, and intervention applications were dismissed.
  • The sale was clearly on "as is where is basis and what is basis", and the appellant bid at their own risk.
  • The Recovery Officer had no power to extend the time beyond the statutory limits, and the appellant failed to deposit the amount within the allowed period.
  • The forfeiture of the EMD was mandated by the terms and conditions of sale and relevant rules, meant to discourage buyers from defaulting after bid acceptance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, (1983) 2 SCC 127 Power of court to extend time for deposit under a consent decree. Distinguished as no consent decree existed here; auction governed by strict rules.
Maniklal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahamad, AIR 1954 SC 349 No discretion to extend time for deposit of money in public auction under CPC. Held applicable; the Recovery Officer had no power to extend time beyond prescribed limits.
Balram s/o Bhasa Ram v. Ham Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 705 Rules 84 and 85 of Order 21 CPC are mandatory; failure to deposit sale price voids sale. Reiterated mandatory nature of rules; non-compliance voids sale.
Shilpa Shares & Securities v. National Co-operative Bank Ltd., 2007 SLT 599 Sale null and void if payment not made within time; property to be re-auctioned. Supported mandatory nature of timely payment and necessity of re-auction.
Rao Mahmood Ahmed Khan v. Sh. Ranbir Singh, AIR 1995 SC 2195 Mandatory nature of timely deposit to avoid postponement and prejudice to judgment debtor. Explained rationale for mandatory rules; upheld forfeiture and resale requirements.
Hanu Reddy Realty India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jignesh, 2008 BC 190 Recovery Officer's wide powers under RDDBFI Act; discretion to extend time. Noted but distinguished as extension beyond 10 days not permissible here.
Smt. Rosali V. v. Nellai Small Match Producers Service Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd., AIR 1999 Knt. 167 Late deposit of 25% bid amount renders sale null and void. Applied principle of mandatory timely deposit; sale set aside for delay.
P. Mohan Reddy v. D.R.A.T, II (2004) BC 76 (DB) Discretion of Recovery Officer to extend time for deposit of amount. Discretion upheld only for limited extension; not unlimited.
Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, 2004 8 SCC 195 Interference with discretion only if illegal or irrational. Supported non-interference with Recovery Officer’s discretion exercised within limits.
Excise Commissioner of U.P v. Manmandir Singh, AIR 1983 SC 1051 Discretion exercised in public interest not to be interfered with. Supported discretionary re-auction to secure best price.
Ashok Kumar Kedia v. Balaji Builders, AIR 1990 Mad. 232 Not helpful to appellant regarding extension of time. Distinguished as not applicable to present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the statutory framework governing auction sales, particularly the mandatory nature of timely deposit of the bid amount under Rules 84 and 85 of Order 21 of the CPC, Rules 57 and 58 of the Schedule II to the Income Tax Act, and analogous provisions under other statutes. It emphasized that these rules are designed to prevent postponement and ensure prompt recovery of debts, with no discretion to extend time beyond prescribed limits, except a narrow discretion granted to the Recovery Officer to extend up to 10 days.

The appellant failed to deposit the 25% bid amount within the permissible period, having sought an indefinite extension based on unresolved title and encumbrance issues, which were known or could have been ascertained prior to bidding. The Court found that the doctrine of “Caveat Emptor” applied, given the sale was on “as is where is basis and what is basis”, placing the risk of encumbrances on the purchaser.

The Court criticized the Recovery Officer’s alteration of the endorsement post facto but held that this procedural irregularity did not confer any right on the appellant to delay payment or avoid forfeiture. The forfeiture of the EMD was held to be mandatory under the terms and conditions of sale and the governing rules, intended to discourage bidders from reneging after bid acceptance.

The Court also noted that intervention applications regarding encumbrances were dismissed and that the public notice clearly stated the sale conditions, including the possibility of encumbrances. The appellant's attempt to raise title issues post-bid was considered unjustified and an attempt to back out from the bid.

Reliance on precedents was examined, distinguishing cases allowing limited discretion to extend time from the present facts where the extension sought was beyond permitted limits. The Court upheld the Recovery Officer’s and Presiding Officer’s orders rejecting the extension and forfeiting the EMD as lawful and justified.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. The Court upheld the setting aside of the sale due to non-deposit of the sale price within the mandatory time limits. The forfeiture of the appellant’s Earnest Money Deposit was affirmed as per the terms of sale and statutory provisions. The decision confirms the strict application of auction sale rules under the CPC and related enactments, emphasizing the mandatory nature of timely payment and the principle of “Caveat Emptor” in sales on “as is where is basis.” No new precedent was set; the ruling reiterates established principles governing auction sales and the limited discretion of Recovery Officers.

Show all summary ...

S.S Parkar, Chairperson:— By this appeal the appellant has challenged setting side the sale of the property held at public auction in favour of the appellant for non-deposit of the sale price. The appeal arises in the following circumstances:

The auction of the immovable property of the respondent No. 2-borrower firm in execution proceeding was held on 23rd May, 2007 when the highest bid of the appellant in the sum of Rs. 34 crores was accepted. Initially, the appellant was given time to deposit 25% of the bid amount till 25th May, 2007. On that day the appellant gave a letter to the Recovery Officer seeking time up to 31st May, 2007 to make payment of 25% of the bid amount. Accordingly, the appellant was allowed to deposit the said amount by 31st May, 2007 On 31st May, 2007 instead of depositing the amount the appellant gave a letter to the Recovery Officer and sought extension of time by two weeks. In that letter the appellant had stated that before parting with money following points should be cleared; (1) the exclusive title/ownership of the property of the respondent No. 2 should be confirmed by the Recovery Officer, (2) right of the Indian Bank, i.e respondent No. 1 to bring the said property for sale by auction or otherwise should be confirmed, (3) any third-party rights, title or interest should not be created by the borrower firm in respect of the property, and (4) if there are other encumbrances on the property those should be brought to their notice. Then, it is stated in para 8 of the said letter that until the above issues are cleared the time to make the deposit of 25% of the bid should be extended by reasonable time or at least by two weeks without forfeiture clause being resorted to. The last condition put in the said letter was that in case the said property did not turn out to be free from any encumbrance or was not found to be in complete ownership of the borrower firm the appellant shall be entitled to claim right for refund of the E.M.D amount.

2. After addressing the aforesaid letter dated 31st May, 2007 the appellant forwarded pay orders in the sum of Rs. 7.40 crores to the Recovery Officer along with a letter dated 6th June, 2007 of their Advocate being 25% payment of the bid amount minus E.M.D amount of Rs. 1.10 crores which was already deposited by the appellant. That amount was declined to be accepted by the Recovery Officer and, therefore, the pay orders were returned to the appellant on the following day, i.e 7th June, 2007. It may be mentioned here that the record shows that on 6th June, 2007 the Recovery Officer had allowed the appellant to deposit the sum of Rs. 7.40 crores by directing his office to deposit the said pay orders in the Recovery Officer's account on which reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant. Curiously enough, though those pay orders were returned to the appellant on the following day under the direction issued by the same Recovery Officer on 7th June, 2007, he had altered his endorsement dated 6th June, 2007 on the letter of the appellant's Advocate by adding word “not” before the word “allowed” and cancelled the direction/endorsement “Deposit in the Recovery Officer's account” by adding his initials but without altering the date 6th June. The said alteration was made on the original letter dated 6th June, 2007.

3. However, the appellant has produced Xerox copy of the certified copy issued by the office with the endorsement, “Allowed. Deposit in the Recovery Officer's account”. On verification of the record, I found that the Xerox copy of that letter along with the original endorsement accepting the pay orders is there in the original record of the said recovery proceeding along with the acknowledgement or receipt for having received the copy thereof by the appellant.

4. The fact that the order was passed allowing payment by pay orders cannot be disputed in view of the fact that the appellant's Advocate had obtained an official certified copy of that original order; a copy of which is also available in the original record. In such circumstances, the Recovery Officer could have passed a separate order instead of altering the earlier endorsement dated 6th June, 2007 particularly so when the decision not to accept and return the pay orders, seems to have been taken by the Recovery Officer on the following day and the certified copy of the endorsement dated 6th June, 2007 allowing the deposit of pay orders was already issued to the appellant's Advocate. By making alteration in the original endorsement the Recovery Officer was trying to create impression that alteration was made then and there which cannot be true because in that case the certified copy of the original endorsement allowing deposit could not have been issued to the appellant. On the basis of the certified copy of the original endorsement allowing the deposit, on behalf of the appellant it is contended that the subsequent return of the pay orders was improper.

5. On that very day, i.e 6th June, 2007 when the pay orders were deposited towards 25% of the bid amount the appellant had filed miscellaneous application dated 6th June, 2007 seeking direction for immediately taking physical possession of the auctioned property by the Recovery Inspector and directing the Bank to place on record the title deeds, lease deeds and other documents pertaining to the auctioned property. It was also prayed that the original defendants should place on record the title deeds and other documents relating to the auctioned property and lastly to permit the appellant to deposit the balance amount after sorting out the issues regarding encumbrances on the property. In the said application it was stated that the appellant was depositing 25% of the bid amount on the presumption and condition that the auctioned property was free from all encumbrances and the property was readily available for giving possession to the auction purchaser. That application was rejected by the Recovery Officer by his order dated 15th June, 2007 whereby the E.M.D amount was also forfeited. The said order was challenged in an appeal before the Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officer by his reasoned order dated 20th December, 2007 dismissed the appeal confirming the order of the Recovery Officer refusing to extend the period on the conditions laid down in the application dated 6th June, 2007 and forfeiting the amount. Both the orders of the Recovery Officer as well as the Presiding Officer are under challenge in this appeal.

6. On behalf of the appellant, in the first place, reference is made to the public notice dated 20th April, 2007 issued by the Recovery Officer for sale of the property in which, as regards the claims of several parties, the remark is, “not known” and, therefore, it is argued that there may be several other parties having claims in respect of the auctioned property and it was the duty of the Recovery Officer to disclose those claims. It is pointed out that number of parties had filed intervention applications. However, those claims were rejected by the orders passed by the Recovery Officer on 24th, 25th and 28th May, 2007 and, therefore, the appellant was not justified in praying for time to deposit the bid amount after sorting out the issues as regards encumbrances on the property. In support of this contention the appellant has placed reliance on some judgments to which reference can be made at this stage.

7. Firstly, reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, (1983) 2 SCC 127 : AIR 1983 SC 428. That was a case where the Apex Court was considering grant of extension of time to deposit the amount as per the consent decree. In the consent decree obtained by the parties, the period was fixed for deposit of the amount by the defendants. The Supreme Court held that the Court has power to extend the time. In the instant case, there is no consent decree passed but, the auction was held by the Recovery Officer to sell the property of the judgment debtor in the execution proceeding where the Recovery Officer has to follow certain rules and regulations. In this connection a mention may be made to some decisions of the Supreme Court about the power of the Court to extend the time to deposit the amount for which the bid is given by the auction purchaser. As far back as in the year 1954 in the case of Maniklal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahamad, AIR 1954 SC 349, it was held that the Court has got no discretion to extend the time for deposit of money in public auction. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the provisions under the CPC with regard to holding of auction. The said decision was followed and the principle laid down therein was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Balram s/o Bhasa Ram v. Ham Singh, IV (1996) CLT 5 (SC) : (1996) 5 SCC 705 : AIR 1996 SC 2781, holding that Rules 84 and 85 of Order 21 of the CPC are mandatory and, therefore, failure to deposit the full amount of sale price within time would render the sale null and void.

8. The provisions of Rule 57 of the Schedule II to the Income Tax Act are similar to Rules 84 and 85 of the Order 21 of the CPC. The only difference all is that while under the provisions of the CPC no discretion is given to extend the time, under the terms and conditions of present sale discretion had been given to the Recovery Officer to extend the time up to maximum of 10 days. Thus, when the auction was held on 23rd May, 2007 the Recovery Officer could have extended the time to deposit 25% of the bid amount up to 2nd June, 2007 and not beyond that. As regards the payment of the balance of 75% of the bid amount is concerned the period could have been extended by the Recovery Officer up to the maximum of 10 days from the last date for deposit of that amount which was fifteenth day from the date of auction which would have expired on 6th June, 2007. However, in this case the appellant had deposited 25% of the bid amount on 6th June, 2007 which was beyond the period for which extension could have been granted by the Recovery Officer. In any event, the balance amount of 75% never came to be deposited either on or before fifteenth day nor within the period of 2 weeks' time as sought on 31st May, 2007 not even within 10 days after expiry of fifteenth day from the date of auction which would have expired on 17th June, 2007, assuming that the extension was granted by the Recovery Officer. After quoting the aforesaid 2 decisions there can be no doubt that the Recovery Officer had no power to extend the period for depositing the amount, in this case for grant of extension beyond the period of 10 days after expiry of fifteenth day from the date of auction so as to deposit the balance of 75% of the bid amount is concerned. As stated earlier even 25% of the bid amount was not deposited within the extension of 10 days which could have been granted though not granted by the Recovery Officer. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court even with regard to the provisions of holding of the auction-sale under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 which are in para materia with the provisions of Rule 57 of the Schedule II to the Income Tax Act as well as Rules 84 and 85 of the Order 21 of the CPC. The only difference as regards the rule under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 is concerned is that initially 15% amount of the bid has to be deposited immediately and the balance of 85% of the amount of the bid has to be deposited within 15 days from the date of the sale. The Apex Court in the case of Shilpa Shares & Securities v. National Co-operative Bank Ltd., V (2007) SLT 599 : II (2007) CLT 393 (SC) : 2007 (4) Mh. L.J 184 (SC), has held that as the sale was in violation of non-deposit of the amount in time the property had to be resold by holding re-auction.

9. The reason for holding the said rule mandatory has been given by the Apex Court in the case of Rao Mahmood Ahmed Khan v. Sh. Ranbir Singh, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 275 : AIR 1995 SC 2195, cited on behalf of the respondents. That was a case where the property was sold under U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952. After quoting the relevant rules and holding them to be mandatory which are again on par with the aforesaid rules it was observed in para 9 of the judgment as follows:

“The provision has been made mandatory because if the property is not resold forthwith and on the same date but later on after a day or two, the sufficient number of purchasers may not be forthcoming and the property may not fetch adequate and fair price to the prejudice of the judgment-debtor. There is yet another reason for making this provision mandatory and it is this that if on failure of the purchaser to deposit 25% of the bid amount immediately and on the day the person is declared to be the purchaser then the sale of the property will have to be postponed to some other date and according to provisions contained in Rule 25G reproduced in para 6 above, no sale after the postponement under Rule 285D in default of payment of the purchase money shall be made until a fresh proclamation has been issued as prescribed for the original sale.”

10. So far as the provisions of rules 57 and 58 of the Schedule II to the Income-tax are concerned they are Again in para materia with the relevant provisions of U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952. Under Rule 58 also in default of payment the Recovery Officer has to forfeit the deposit amount to the Government and a fresh advertisement has to be given for resale of the property and therefore, earlier acceptance of the pay orders on 6th June, 2007 and, thereafter return of those pay orders on the next date by rejecting the application for deposit of the amount cannot give any right to the appellant as the Recovery Officer had no power to extend the period for initial deposit of 25% of the bid amount beyond 10 days from the date of the sale which, as stated earlier, expired on 2nd June, 2007. The Recovery Officer, in fact granted extension only up to 31st May, 2007 but the deposits were made on 6th June, 2007. In view of the above position in law the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Kedia v. Balaji Builders, AIR 1990 Mad. 232, is of no assistance to the appellants.

11. Then reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Hanu Reddy Realty India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jignesh, III (2008) BC 190 : 2008 (1) Bankers' Journal 853, wherein it was observed that the Recovery Officer under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short ‘the RDDBFI Act’) has wide powers with which we are concerned and the function of the Recovery Officer is that an attempt should be made to get the maximum price for the property which is done in the present case also and accordingly the highest bid was accepted. The extension was also granted to the appellants for a period of 8 days from 23rd May, 2008 to 31st May, 2008. 25% of the bid amount was deposited on 6th June, 2007 up to which date the Recovery Officer was powerless to grant extension and therefore, no fault can be found with the Recovery Officer.

12. As regards the encumbrances are concerned when the property was sold on “as is where is basis and what is basis” the doctrine of “Caveat Emptor” was applicable. Reference may be made to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. Rosali V. v. Nellai Small Match Producers Service Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd., AIR 1999 Knt. 167. In that case an auction had taken place under the provision of the CPC and following the decision reported in Maniklal Shah's case (supra) it was held that the provision being mandatory the delay of day also in depositing the amount would render the sale null and void. In that case 25% of the amount of the bid was deposited on 16th day of the sale but the High Court had set aside the sale though it was confirmed.

13. On behalf of the respondents it is pointed out that only encumbrance on the property is that there are tenants in the property including some Banks and some Government departments. It is not disputed on behalf of the appellant that one month's time from the date of the notice of auction published in the newspaper was given to make inquiries about the encumbrances, if any. Right of the tenants, i.e Banks and Government departments cannot stand in the way of sale of the property because, there is no prohibition to sell the property subject to the rights of the tenants. No other encumbrances including encumbrance claiming ownership of the property have been pointed out. Intervention applications which were filed were ultimately dismissed and the Recovery Officer has mentioned in his order that the applications for intervention were dismissed. If the Recovery Officer or the respondent Bank were not aware about any other encumbrances, the mention in the column of encumbrances of public notice as ‘not known’ cannot be said to be misleading. Moreover, in the public notice itself it is stated that the sale will be on “as is where is basis and what is basis” and the appellant had chosen to give the bid, in fact, the highest bid, subject to the encumbrances that might be noticed or ultimately found by the appellant company.

14. As regards the sale of the property on the condition of “as is where is basis and what is basis” is concerned, reference may be made to the Black's Law Dictionary Eighth Edition at page 121. The phrase “as is” has been explained to mean “in the existing condition without modification”. It is further explained that the said phrase would mean, “a seller can disclaim all implied warranties by stating that the goods are being sold ‘as is’ or ‘with all faults’.” Then it is stated that generally a sale of property ‘as is’ means that the property is sold in its existing condition and use of the phrase ‘as is’ relieves the seller from the liability for defects in its condition.

15. In the instant case phrase used is “as is where is basis and what is basis”. Use of the said phrase gives warning and puts the purchaser on notice that he will be purchasing the property with encumbrances at his own risk. That is how, the vendor disclaims his responsibility for buyer's disappointment which is incorporated in the doctrine of “Caveat Emptor”. P. Ramanath Aiyar's Law Lexicon defines the phrase “Caveat Emptor” to mean “let the purchaser beware”. It is further meant that the purchaser is bound by the actual as well as the constructive knowledge of any defect in the thing purchased which is obvious or which might have been known by exercise of proper diligence. This maxim is used with reference to sale or sales of the properties where the buyer is expected to exercise proper diligence and to inform himself as to its quality and encumbrances. In this case the appellant had agreed to purchase the property subject to the said maxim. The fact that the appellant had given bid at the auction which was held on 23rd May, 2007 would mean that the appellants had chosen to purchase the property at their own risk with the possibility of encumbrances that they might find on the property and therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to question or to ask for a clear title of the property after the bid was accepted.

16. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that the Recovery Officer had wide discretion and he could have granted extension for deposit of the amount as applied for by the appellants. In that respect reliance is placed on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of P. Mohan Reddy v. D.R.A.T, Mumbai, II (2004) BC 76 (DB), where the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Recovery Officer for allowing the auction purchaser to deposit the amount within 7 days. First of all the said decision does not lay down any law that the Recovery Officer has got any unrestricted discretion to extend the time for deposit of the amount. In the instant case the Recovery Officer had exercised his discretion and given time of 8 days to deposit 25% of the amount of the bid up to 31st May, 2007 instead of directing the purchaser to deposit the said amount immediately on acceptance of the bid. It is also argued that the provisions of the Income-tax Rules are applicable “as far as possible” by virtue of section 29 of the rddbfi act and, therefore, the Recovery Officer could have granted extension. In my view, the phrase “as far as possible” has been used in the said provision because that provision is essentially made for the sales which take place in respect of the properties assessed by the Income-tax Officer for recovery of the tax due from the parties and, therefore, that provision has been used with some modification in D.R.T sales. Rules 57 and 58 of the Schedule II to the Income-tax Act are not different from the provisions incorporated under the CPC or under Maharashtra Go-operative Societies Rules nor the said rules are different from the provisions which are incorporated under U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952.

17. Uniform and similar rules incorporated in 4 different enactments would go to show that wherever the properties are sold by public the same rule would be applicable and while interpreting the rule under the provisions of CPC, Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules and U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 the Apex Court has held that those rules are mandatory in nature and the Court has got no power to extend the period. However, by way of modification made in the public auction held by the D.R.T the Recovery Officer is given discretion to extend the period but not beyond 10 days and, therefore, the Recovery Officer could not have extended the period as asked for by the appellants which was beyond the discretion vested in Recovery officer. In the above referred case of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that discretion has been used only up to 7 days to uphold the sale because the public auction according to the High Court, had fetched the highest possible price and the person who had challenged the sale had not offered a higher price than the price which was fetched by the property at the public auction.

18. On behalf of the respondents reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, V (2004) SLT 566 : (2004) 8 SCC 195, wherein, it has been held that a discretion cannot be interfered with unless the exercise of discretion is found to be illegal or irrational. In the case of Excise Commissioner of U.P v. Manmandir Singh, (1983) 4 SCC 318 : AIR 1983 SC 1051, discretion exercised by the Excise Commissioner by ordering re-auction in the interest of the revenue of the State was not interfered with as the re-auction was held for the purpose of acquiring the best price of the auctioned property.

19. Then, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the Recovery Officer had no discretion to forfeit the amount of E.M.D deposited by the appellant. According to the appellant title of the property was not clear because it had encumbrances and therefore, the E.M.D amount should not have been forfeited. In my view, the appellants having chosen to give bid with open eyes in respect of the property which was sold at public auction on the express condition of “as is where is basis and what is basis”, the appellant, after acceptance of its bid, cannot complain that the property did not carry clear title. Reliance is placed on the wording of the terms and conditions of sale. The relevant portion of Clause (1) of the terms and conditions reads as follows:

“If the payments are not so made, then out of the 25% of the amount paid or out of the E.M.D as the case may be, the costs of the auction will be deducted and the balance shall be forfeited and credited to the applicant Bank for adjustment against the certified debts.”

20. The aforesaid wording is clearly in mandatory words under which no discretion is given to the Recovery Officer but to forfeit the E.M.D amount and adjust it towards the costs of the auction and the balance amount shall be credited to the creditor Bank towards adjustment against the certified debts. In this respect reference can be made to the object for making the provision of deposit mandatory as explained by the Apex Court in the case of Rao Mahmood Ahmed Khan (supra). The object of imposing mandatory condition for deposit of 25% of the bid amount ‘immediately’ is to avoid postponement of the sale. The condition of depositing 25% of the bid amount ‘immediately’ and the object for making the said provision would be defeated if the penalty of forfeiture of the amount of E.M.D is not imposed in case, of default in making the deposit. This is especially so when forfeiture clause is mandatory in case like this as non-compliance with the order of deposit would result in holding another auction sale after giving fresh pubic notice in the newspaper which, apart from incurring expenses for sale of the property, would postpone, in some cases, the sale of the property and recovery of certified debts of the decree holder. Such postponement may also result sometimes in discouraging the prospective buyers from coming forward again to give bids because such public auctions may not inspire confidence among the members of the public and, therefore, the forfeiture clause has been made mandatory where the properties are allowed to be sold by public auction. The said provision is made in order to discourage the buyers from backing out from the sale after their bids are accepted. The reasons given for asking indefinite extension of time until all the issues regarding encumbrances are sorted out cannot be said to be genuine reason for extension of time. In the circumstances the Recovery Officer has rightly and judiciously exercised the discretion to forfeit the E.M.D amount and, therefore, does not call for interference.

21. To repeat, the appellant with open eyes and subject to the conditions, of which the appellant has not pleaded nor could have pleaded ignorance, has given the bid which was accepted. The points which are raised in the application dated 6th Tune, 2007 were existing even at the time when the appellant gave bid and, therefore, those points could not have been justifiably raised after the bid was accepted. Even the tenor of the said application gives impression that an indefinite time was asked for only with a view to justify backing out from the bid which was given. I, therefore, see no reason to interfere in the impugned order.

22. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.