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Nb Sub Roshan Lal v. Union Of India & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Larger Bench) regarding the Policy dated 20.09.2010
Factual and Procedural Background
This larger Bench matter was referred from a regular Bench by order dated 06.09.2012 in OA No. 279/2011 because counsel for the parties suggested there was a conflict of decisions regarding the policy dated 20.09.2010 between the Principal Bench and the Allahabad (Lucknow) and Kochi Benches. The Larger Bench noted that all matters involved a common question of law and proceeded to decide them by a common order. The Bench reviewed three earlier judgments (Principal Bench in Nb. Subedar Gulab Rao v. Union of India dated 04.04.2012, Lucknow Bench in Sub. Brijesh Kumar Shukla dated 15.02.2012, and Kochi Bench in Hav. Manktu Ram dated 21.03.2012) and concluded there was no real conflict between them. The matters were therefore heard on merits.
The petitioners are members of the Army (PBOR) who were to retire or be discharged on completion of their terms on or before 31.03.2013. They had already been screened under the earlier policy dated 21.09.1998 and either were not found entitled to extension or lost entitlement before or during extension (often due to being in medical category P2 or for drop in performance). The petitioners contended that because the policy dated 20.09.2010 is beneficial, it should apply to them (either by its effective date or retrospectively) and that the cut-off date for its operation (leading to entitlement only for those retiring on/after 01.04.2013) is invalid and discriminatory.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there is any conflict of judicial decisions on interpretation and application of the policy dated 20.09.2010 requiring reference to a Larger Bench.
- Whether the policy dated 20.09.2010 (a new policy laying down eligibility criteria for extension of service) should be applied so as to benefit persons who were in service on or after 01.04.2011 but whose retirement/discharge fell before 01.04.2013 (i.e., validity and effect of the cut-off dates fixed by the policy).
- Whether the policy dated 20.09.2010 should be given retrospective effect or be read benevolently to apply to persons already screened under the 1998 policy.
- Whether persons already screened under the 1998 policy are entitled to a second screening or re-opening/reconsideration under the 2010 policy.
- Whether the fixation of the cut-off date (01.04.2011 for commencement and consequent eligibility for those retiring on/after 01.04.2013) is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The policy dated 20.09.2010 is beneficial and should be applied to persons in service on or after 01.04.2011; petitioners who were in service on or after that date (or who were availing extension as on that date) should get its benefit.
- The cut-off, or the retrospective operation (or lack of immediate operation) of the policy, is arbitrary; the policy should have been made effective immediately and not from a later date, and fixation of the date 01.04.2011 is arbitrary.
- There is discrimination in denying benefit to P2 category personnel who can be promoted but are denied extension under the old policy; new policy removes that paradox and should be applied to them.
- The clarificatory letter dated 11.01.2011 (and related communications) is unlawful as it deprives petitioners of rights and should be struck down.
- Reliance on Supreme Court decisions (Government of A.P. v. D. Janardhana Rao; M. Venkateswarlu; and K.J.S. Buttar) to support the proposition that beneficial provisions can be given retrospective effect and that cut-off dates can be invalidated in certain factual matrices.
Respondent / Additional Solicitor General's Arguments
- Extension of service is not a vested right but an employer's prerogative; criteria for promotion and criteria for extension can legitimately differ and extension criteria may be more stringent.
- The policy dated 20.09.2010 is a new, comprehensive policy laying down different parameters; it legitimately fixed an effective date (w.e.f. 01.04.2011) to permit dissemination and preparatory work (Record Offices, Line Directorates, constituting Screening Boards) — the six months between issuance and effective date is reasonable.
- Screening is integral to the policy and is to be carried out 24 months prior to superannuation; therefore, the effective operation of the policy will render persons retiring on or before 01.04.2013 ineligible because their screening had already been undertaken under the old policy.
- The policy does not contemplate a second screening or reopening of earlier screening; reopening would require reopening of all similar cases and could do more harm than good (including reverse effects on those earlier approved under the old policy because some criteria became more stringent under the new policy).
- Cases and authorities cited by petitioners (D. Janardhana Rao, M. Venkateswarlu, K.J.S. Buttar) are distinguishable or inapplicable for reasons explained — e.g., different statutory/regulatory context or different subject-matter (pension increases vs. eligibility for extension).
- Reliance on Supreme Court precedents (Rama Rao; Achhibar Maurya; Krishna Kumar; V. Kasthuri; and others) supports the permissibility of fixing a cut-off date and the reasonableness of the date fixed here.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nb. Subedar Gulab Rao v. Union of India (OA 513/2011) — Principal Bench judgment dated 04.04.2012 | One of the three judgments considered on the interpretation of the policy dated 20.09.2010. | The Larger Bench noted this judgment but observed it did not lay down any general proposition on the disputed aspects; the Larger Bench did not sit in appeal over that judgment. |
| Sub. Brijesh Kumar Shukla v. Chief of the Army Staff (Lucknow Bench) — dated 15.02.2012 (OA No. 234/2010) | Upheld the cut-off date (01.04.2011) fixed in the policy dated 20.09.2010 and held the cut-off was neither arbitrary nor violative of Article 14. | The Larger Bench accepted that Lucknow Bench had upheld the cut-off date and relied upon its reasoning when finding no conflict of opinions and when re-examining the validity of the cut-off here. |
| Hav. Manktu Ram v. Union of India (Kochi Bench) — dated 21.03.2012 (OA No. 67/2011) | Considered denial of extension as arbitrary; examined applicability of other judgments (e.g., Gurmeet Singh) and found those decisions not applicable; agreed with Lucknow Bench and dismissed OAs. | The Larger Bench recorded that Kochi Bench agreed with Lucknow Bench and found the Delhi High Court decision in Gurmeet Singh not applicable to the 2010 policy facts. |
| Gurmeet Singh v. Union of India (Division Bench, Delhi High Court) — affirmed in Special Leave Petition (no citation given) | In that case the Delhi High Court allowed applicants to continue and complete tenure and directed further consideration for promotion; relied upon as authority by petitioners in Kochi matters. | The Larger Bench noted Kochi Bench's finding that Gurmeet Singh dealt with an earlier letter (13.06.2007) and not with the 20.09.2010 policy; Kochi Bench found Gurmeet Singh inapplicable to the facts at hand. |
| Government of Andhra Pradesh v. D. Janardhana Rao — (1976) 4 SCC 226 : AIR 1977 SC 451 | Cited by petitioners for the proposition that a beneficial provision can be given retrospective effect (referenced para 9 of the judgment). | The Larger Bench held this judgment pertains to Rule 47 powers (relaxation) and has no bearing on the present issue of validity of the cut-off date in the 2010 policy for extension; thus it does not assist the petitioners here. |
| M. Venkateswarlu v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh — (1996) 5 SCC 167 | Cited by petitioners on the scope for applying beneficial provisions with retrospective effect. | The Larger Bench found this judgment not material to the present controversy for similar reasons as D. Janardhana Rao: it does not address the validity of a cut-off date for a new policy of eligibility for extension. |
| K.J.S. Buttar v. Union of India — (2011) 11 SCC 429 | Held fixation of a cut-off date (01.01.1996) for increased pensionary benefits to be violative of Article 14 in that factual context. | The Larger Bench distinguished Buttar: Buttar concerned pension increases confined to those retiring after a cut-off date and was found to violate Article 14; the present case involves a new policy laying down different eligibility parameters and the Bench held that fixation of the cut-off date here is not similarly bad. |
| Rama Rao v. All India Referred Class Bank Employees Welfare Association — (2004) 2 SCC 76 | Authority relied upon (paras 29, 31–33) in support of fixation of cut-off dates when reasonably connected with implementation requirements. | The Larger Bench relied on this authority (as cited by ASG) to support the view that fixing a reasonable cut-off date for implementation (to allow dissemination and preparatory work) is permissible. |
| Achhibar Maurya v. State of U.P. — (2008) 2 SCC 639 | Authority cited in support of the permissibility/reasonableness of fixing cut-off dates. | The Larger Bench cited this decision among authorities that support the reasonableness of fixing a cut-off date for implementation and found it supportive of the respondent's position. |
| Dr. Ami Lal v. State of Rajasthan — (1997) 6 SCC 614 | Cited as precedent relied upon by the Lucknow Bench. | The Larger Bench noted judgments relied upon and followed by the Lucknow Bench, including this case, in support of upholding the cut-off date. |
| Government of A.P. v. N. Subrayadu — (2008) 14 SCC 702 | Cited among precedents upholding permissibility of cut-off fixation or similar administrative decisions. | Included by the Larger Bench as one of the authorities supporting the reasonableness of a cut-off date. |
| Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Ramesh Chand Aggarwal — (2009) 3 SCC 35 | Authority cited in the course of discussing policy implementation and dates. | The Larger Bench listed this case among authorities which, taken together, support the position that fixation of an implementation date can be reasonable and sustainable. |
| Hardev Singh v. Union of India — (2011) 10 SCC 121 | Authority forming part of the chain of decisions considered on administratively fixing dates/parameters. | Cited as part of the body of Supreme Court decisions which the Larger Bench considered supportive of the respondents' position on cut-off fixation. |
| Balco Employees Union v. Union of India — (2002) 2 SCC 333 | Authority cited as supportive of the proposition concerning implementation choices and reasonable dates. | The Larger Bench referred to this decision as supporting the permissibility of setting implementation dates in administrative policies. |
| Krishna Kumar v. Union of India — (1990) 4 SCC 207 (Constitutional Bench) | Constitutional Bench authority relied upon to support the permissibility of fixing cut-off dates. | The Larger Bench relied upon this decision as supporting the validity of the fixation of a cut-off date in an administrative policy context. |
| V. Kasthuri v. Managing Director, State Bank of India — (1998) 8 SCC 30 : AIR 1999 SC 81 | Authority that discussed and upheld cut-off dates and examined D.S. Nakara's case; cited for support on permissibility of cut-off fixation. | The Larger Bench invoked this decision (which deals with D.S. Nakara) to support the proposition that fixation of a cut-off date can be upheld. |
| D.S. Nakara v. Union of India — (1983 SC 130) | Referenced in the context of distinguishing cases where a differentia creates an unjustifiable class; invoked in discussion of Buttar. | The Larger Bench noted that D.S. Nakara's principles were invoked in Buttar, but found the present facts distinguishable and held that D.S. Nakara reasoning did not invalidate the cut-off here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Bench proceeded in a logical sequence:
- Conflict of decisions: After reviewing the three judgments (Principal Bench, Lucknow Bench, Kochi Bench), the Larger Bench concluded there was no real conflict of opinion requiring resolution by the Larger Bench; the three judgments substantially addressed interpretation of the 20.09.2010 policy and its cut-off date, and the disputes were amenable to determination on merits.
- Nature of the policy: The Bench analysed the nature of the 20.09.2010 instrument and concluded it is a new and comprehensive policy laying down fresh and different parameters for eligibility for extension (some parameters liberalized e.g., medical category P2, while some made more stringent e.g., discipline/“red ink” entries). The court emphasised that it is not merely an ameliorative measure to be automatically grafted onto previously screened cases.
- Distinction between promotion and extension: The court placed legal weight on the distinction that entitlement to promotion (or being considered for it) is a legally vested right when eligibility criteria are met, whereas extension of service is not a vested right but a matter of the employer's prerogative. Consequently, different eligibility parameters for promotion and extension do not create an inherent paradox or inequality violating Article 14.
- Reasonableness of the cut-off date: The Bench accepted the respondents’ practical explanation that dissemination of the new policy, preparatory work by Record Offices and Line Directorates, and constitution of Screening Boards required a reasonable lead-time (reflected in para 7 of the policy), hence issuance on 20.09.2010 with effect from 01.04.2011 (roughly six months) was justified. The court found the six-month interval to be reasonably connected to the legitimate administrative objective of implementation and therefore not arbitrary.
- Integral role of screening and timing: The Bench emphasised that screening is an integral part of the policy and is to be conducted 24 months prior to the date of superannuation (as per the new policy). Therefore, making the policy applicable from 01.04.2011 realistically means it governs screening for those who will reach superannuation on or after 01.04.2013. Individuals whose retirement/discharge fell on or before 31.03.2013 had already been screened under the 1998 policy and the 2010 policy did not provide for a second screening.
- No provision for second screening or reopening: Because the 2010 policy contains no express provision (and none by necessary implication) for re-opening or a second screening of cases already screened under the 1998 policy, the court held petitioners could not claim re-screening or review of earlier screening decisions.
- Practical consequences of reopening: The Bench considered the systemic consequences of ordering reopening (flooding of litigation, possible disqualification of persons earlier approved due to stricter new criteria such as red-ink entries). This practical consideration weighed against granting relief even under a liberal reading of the policy.
- Precedents: The court examined the authorities cited by both sides. It distinguished judgments cited by petitioners (D. Janardhana Rao; M. Venkateswarlu; K.J.S. Buttar) as inapplicable or distinguishable in material respects (different statutory/regulatory context or different subject matter). Simultaneously, it relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions (including Rama Rao; Achhibar Maurya; Krishna Kumar; V. Kasthuri; Balco; and others) that support the principle that an employer/administration may fix reasonable cut-off dates for implementation and that such fixation is permissible where reasonably connected to administrative aims.
- Conclusion of reasoning: Taking the above legal and factual matrix together, the Bench concluded the petitioners' contentions failed — the cut-off date and the application of the 2010 policy as framed were not arbitrary, did not offend Article 14 on the facts and legal analysis presented, and second screening/reopening was not warranted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petitions are DISMISSED.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The petitioners are not entitled to have the 20.09.2010 policy applied so as to reopen or re-screen cases already screened under the 21.09.1998 policy for the purpose of granting extension of service when their retirement/discharge falls on or before 31.03.2013.
- The fixation of the effective date (w.e.f. 01.04.2011) and the resulting cut-off (making extension available for those whose superannuation falls on or after 01.04.2013) was held reasonable and not violative of Article 14 on the facts before the court.
- Petitioners’ challenge to clarificatory communications and requests for re-opening/second screening were rejected.
- Parties were left to bear their own costs.
Broader implications and precedent: The opinion expressly records that there was no conflict among the three considered Bench judgments and that the Principal Bench's decision did not lay down a general proposition on all aspects canvassed. The Larger Bench did not purport to create a new general principle beyond its factual determination: it upheld the administrative authority to fix a reasonable implementation date and denied entitlement to re-opening of earlier screening absent express provision. No broader or novel legal principle beyond these conclusions was declared.
N.P Gupta, Member (Judicial):— This bunch of matters have come to this larger Bench pursuant to the order passed by the regular Bench on 06.09.2012 in OA No. 279/2011 to the effect that learned counsel for the parties submitted that there is a conflict of decision on the issue involved in the present bunch of cases with regard to the policy dated 20.09.2010, in asmuch as the Principal Bench has taken one view of the matter and as against this, Allahabad Bench and Kochi Bench had taken a separate view. Therefore, it was felt necessary to refer the matter to the larger Bench.
2. Obviously all these matters involved the common question of law and are, therefore, being decided by this common order.
3. Hearing the learned counsel for the parties, at the outset, we were taken through the three judgments being those of the Principal Bench and the Lucknow and Kochi Benches of this Tribunal. The judgment of the Principal Bench is dated 04.04.2012 passed in OA 513/2011 Nb. Subedar Gulab Rao v. Union of India. The judgment of Lucknow Bench is dated 15.02.2012 passed in bunch of cases led by OA No. 234/2010 Sub. Brijesh Kumar Shukla v. Chief of the Army Staff and the judgment of the Kochi Bench is dated 21.03.2012 again passed in bunch of cases led by OA No. 67/2011 Hav. Manktu Ram v. Union of India.
4. After going through these three judgments, not only we have no hesitation in observing rather learned counsel for either side also felt and conveyed that there is no conflict of opinion in the aforesaid three judgments but in substance the matter involved is about interpretation of policy dated 20.09.2010 and also about the validity of the cut off date fixed in the above policy. In that view of the matter instead of hearing this Bench has reference to answer the exact preposition of law or to resolve the purported conflict, the matters were heard on merits and are being decided by this common order.
5. We may at this place also observe that so far as the judgment of Lucknow Bench mentioned above is concerned, that bunch of matters involved challenge to the validity of policy dated 20.09.2010 on the grounds interalia that the policy being for the welfare of the personnel of Indian Army, the implementation of the same ought to have been made with immediate effect and not on a subsequent date, in other words fixing of dates regarding implementation of the policy was contended to be manifestly illegal, arbitrary and offends Article 14 of the Constitution. The Lucknow Bench after going through the matter thread bear and considering and relying upon catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court did come to the conclusion firstly, that the cut of date fixed being 01.04.2011 is neither arbitrary nor illegal nor offends Article 14 of the Constitution and thus was held to be valid. The Bench also observed that even otherwise it did not find any ground to interfere in the policy.
6. So far as the judgment of Kochi Bench is concerned, in that bunch of matters the denial of extension of service to the applicants therein was challenged as arbitrary and illegal and the applicants claimed to be entitled to further extension of service as per provisions of the policy. The Kochi Bench noticed the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents therein that the controversy is identical to be one raised before the Lucknow Bench and therefore, the matter should be decided in the light of the prepositions laid down by Lucknow Bench. The counsel for the petitioners herein submitted that Lucknow Bench did not take note of the decision rendered by Division Bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Gurmeet Singh v. Union of India which decision was affirmed by the apex court in Special Leave Petition. According to learned counsel therein, in identical circumstances, Hon'ble Delhi High Court allowed the applicants to continue and complete the tenure and the case was further directed to be considered for further promotion. The Kochi Bench found after going through the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court that the policy of 20.09.2010 was not under challenge before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, rather earlier letter dated 13.06.2007 amending 1998 policy was under challenge and since the policy of 1998 stood resented by subsequent policy dated 20.09.2010, which has been up held by Lucknow Bench, therefore, controversy before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court was not similar to that before the Lucknow Bench. It was also noticed that Hon'ble Delhi High Court was not considering the cases in the category of past cases as postulated under the said policy and thus, it was found that Hon'ble Delhi High Court judgment in Gurmeet Singh case has no application. Then the Kochi Bench agreed with the judgment rendered by Lucknow Bench and decided the OAs by dismissing them in light of the judgment rendered by Lucknow Bench.
7. Then so far as judgment of Principal Bench in Gulab Rao's case is concerned, after going through that judgment what we find is that in that case the individual was for the first time screened on 09.07.2011 i.e after the cut off date fixed in the policy dated 20.09.2010, being 01.04.2011 Likewise the Bench referred to and relied upon Appendix B read with note of para 3 of Appendix A. And contemplated with exception, a PBRO who could not be screened that extension of service under the existing policy as per laid down screening schedule given at para 4 due to LMC, court cases, or any other circumstances beyond his control will be screened by the Screening Board before retirement and the bench found, that since he was to retire after 01.04.2011, and screening was also conducted after that date, he was held entitled to be governed by the policy of 20.09.2010 Regarding this judgment, we may simply observe firstly, that it does not laid down any general proposition on the aspects which has been canvassed before us and are being considered now and subsequently we are not sitting in appeal over the said judgment dated 04.04.2012
8. The fact thus remains that there are no conflicting decisions on the policy and therefore, we have heard learned counsel for the parties on the merits of the matter.
9. Coming to the merits, we may briefly narrate the facts which are very necessary for appreciating the controversy. The facts are that all the persons being the petitioners in these matters are the persons who are to retire or to be discharged on completion of their colour service or original terms of engagement, on or before 31.03.2013 Likewise all the persons are those persons who have already been screened by the Screening Board in accordance with the requirements of the earlier policy being dated 21.09.1998 and are sought to be discharged either on account of having not been found entitled to extension of service for two years or having been found entitled on screening but because of drop in performance or medical category criteria before commencement of the period of extension they are not allowed to avail the extension and some of the persons are those who became disentitled to complete the extension period after having started to avail it, on account of the reasons or conditions incorporated in the policy of 21.09.1998
10. The claim of the petitioners is that since all the petitioners are in actual service “within original terms of engagement or colour service”, on or after 01.04.2011 or were availing the extended period as on the date on or after 01.04.2011, they are entitled to the benefit of policy the dated 20.09.2010 as this policy is a beneficial policy to the employees.
11. Arguing the petition, learned counsel for the petitioners took us to through both the policies being dated 21.09.1998 and 20.09.2010 so also the policy for promotion being dated 10.10.1997 and submitted that the eligibility criteria for entitlement to extension under the policy of 21.09.1998 was far more stringent than even the criteria for eligibility for promotion under the policy dated 10.10.1997 in asmuch as individuals placed in medical category BEE (now known as P2) were eligible for promotion to the next higher rank irrespective of his medical category being temporary or permanent so also irrespective of the disease or injury being attributable or non attributable to or aggravated to service conditions, subject to exception of psychological cases, misconduct or being self inflicted injury, these category of persons were provided to be not entitled to extension according to the policy dated 20.09.1998 and according to the learned counsel for the petitioner this was realised by the respondents to be unfair and harsh rather paradoxical and therefore, the new policy of 20.09.2010 was issued rendering persons in P2 medical category also be entitled to eligible for extension. In that view of the matter since practically all the petitioners here included in this bunch, except one or two are the persons who a re sought to be discharged either by having not been found eligible for extension or having been found to as suffered drop in eligibility or to have not remain entitled to continue in the period of extension only on account of their having been categorised as category P2, since in the new policy P2 category persons are also eligible for extension, they seek to challenge their discharge. Compassion and sympathy has also been invoked and with compassion and sympathy ground of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution was sought to be made out by submitting that when a person of P2 category can be promoted and under new policy has been held eligible for extension then to discharge the persons falling in that category simply because they happened to be retiring on or before 01.04.2013 is highly unjust, improper, inequitable and required to be held to be discriminatory so as to be violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
12. The other submission made is that when the policy was framed being dated 20.09.2010, to ameliorate the conditions of the individuals, it should have been made effective forthwith instead of making it defective from any future dates as it resulted into deprivation of benefits to the individuals being discharged during the interregnum period. Then the next submissions made was that the date fixed for commencement of the policy being dated 01.04.2011 is arbitrary.
13. Then yet another important rather strongest submission made was that those policy dated 20.09.2010 in its own terms is made applicable w.e.f 01.04.2011 but then notwithstanding this all the petitioners who are continuing in service whether being original period of engagement or extended period of engagement are also sought to be deprived off the benefit of the policy on the spacious ground that the policy being applicable to only those persons who are to retire or get discharged on or after 31.03.2013 and thus persons retiring or being discharged during these period from 01.04.2011 to 30.03.2013 are sought to be deprived of all the benefits of this policy despite the policy having been made applicable w.e.f 01.04.2011, the petitioners are entitled to reliefs claimed. The petitioners also submitted that in order to cover up rather salvage the situation, during the pendency of these proceedings the respondents have issued letter dated 11.01.2011 purported to clarifying that every JCO/OR is entitled to screening for extension of two years service in the present rank as per policy dated 21.09.1998, as revised vide policy dated 20.09.2010 effective from 01.04.2011 and that this is amply clear from the earlier letter that the date for new policy to be effective is from 01.04.2011 to screen individuals due for extension w.e.f 01.04.2013 and that there is no provision for second screening. It is submitted that this purported clarification is clearly bad and deprives the petitioners of their rights and is required to be struck down. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. D. Janardhana Rao reported in (1976) 4 SCC 226 : AIR 1977 SC page 451 specially pra 9, then reliance has also placed on another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Venkateswarlu v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 167 and another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.J.S Buttar v. Union of India reported in (2011) 11 SCC 429 to calculate with a beneficial provision can be given with retrospective effect and therefore, there was no occasion for making it effective not even prospectively but from a future date and Buttar's case was relied upon to contend that with the fixing of cut off date is bad as the cut off date fixed being 01.01.1996 was struck down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Buttar's case.
14. On the other hand learned Additional Solicitor General supported the impugned action of the Government. Learned counsel submitted that there is no question of any paradoxical situation as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners in asmuch as in his submission criteria for promotion and criteria for extension of service after completion of original tenure can very well be prescribed by the employer to be different and criteria for extension can be prescribed to be mere stringent. According to the learned counsel, within the terms of engagement or original consideration for promotion is a right and deprivation of that right, different parameters are expected while extension of service is not a right rather it is the prerogative of the employer whether to retain an employee who has completed the original tenure of service or not to retain and for taking such decision it is very well within the right of the employer to provide any stringent parameters as the employer can very well insist and the extension of services of only best persons and therefore, there was nothing wrong in providing two different parameters one for promotion and other for extension. Thus according to the learned counsel it can not be said that by the new policy of 20.09.2010 any paradox was sought to be removed.
15. Then taking us to the genesis of the phenomena of extension of two years, learned Additional Solicitor General pointed out that it was in view of the decision of Ministry of Personnel/Grievance and Pension conveyed vide Office Memorandum dated 13.05.1998 thereby the retirement age was extended by two years which on the civil side was increased across the Board and the Ministry of Defence took that into consideration and issued a letter dated 30.05.1998 to the effect that the modalities of the implication of the orders regarding retirement age of Army personnels by two years are active consideration and orders would be issued shortly and in the meantime the President was conveyed to be pleased to defer the retirement of all Army personnel's who are to retire on 31.05.1998 and thereafter till final orders are issued except the categories motioned therein. We may observe that the petitioners falls within the category of persons so exhibited. Then came to be issued a letter dated 03.09.1998 by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, conveying certain modifications to the terms of engagement w.e.f 30.05.1998 and in this, it was stipulated that all personnels shall be served three years in advance of the date of superannuation by a screening Board to be held at Unit/Regiment/Corps basis as applicable to assess their suitability for retention and such personnels those who are not found suitable as a result of screening shall be retired as per rules. We are told that this period of three years was reduced in 2002 to two years. Thus it was submitted that except for the category of personnel's mentioned in the letter dated 30.05.1998, the retirement age of all personnels were increased by two years while the category of persons mentioned therein were categorized for consideration for extension and it was stipulated that for extension they shall be screened and screening was to take place initially three years in advance and subsequently it was reduced to a period of two years in advance.
16. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that it is in this sequence and with reference to these two letters dated 30.05.1998 and 03.09.1998 that the procedure and criteria for screening was laid down vide letter dated 21.09.1998 which is said to be the policy letter of September, 1998 and in this, in para 4 it was clearly stipulated that all PBOR will be screened for extension by two years by the/screening Board to be held on Unit/Regiment/Corps basis as applicable can assess what is stipulated for extension and the procedure and criteria was laid down in Appendix A. Likewise retention of a PBOR for extension tenure was stipulated to be governed by consideration as per Appendix B to this letter and according to para 4 of Appendix A, screening was to be carried out 36 months prior to the reaching current laid down service guidelines, hence it should be conduced by the same Board which are constituted and assembled for the purpose of deciding promotions for the same rank as per the current practice in various Army services and then in this very appendix, eligibility and suitability parameters were laid down on the medical anvil of willingness, medical classification, physical fitness, ACR/Character Roll and discipline while in Appendix B retention during the extended period was stipulated to be subject to maintaining the standards mentioned therein regarding medical, discipline and ACR and stipulating that if it is noticed that there was drop in any of the above criteria at any time during extended tenure the individual will be discharged within a period of maximum six months after serving show cause notice and that the period of six months is basically meant for discharge drill. With prefacing the above it was submitted by learned Additional Solicitor General that six months time is required for the various authorities to do the initial needful so also even discharge drill does take this time as the matter has to be handled at various levels by various authorities on various purposes.
17. Likewise when new policy was laid down it was required to disseminated to the authorities concerned and carry out preparatory work by the Record Office and Line Directorate and this precisely was mentioned in para 7 of the letter dated 20.09.2010 and therefore, since the policy letter was issued on 20.09.2010, taking six months time, a cut off date was fixed as 01.04.2011 and then next submission that the date was fixed for reasonable nexus. Learned counsel then submitted that whenever a new policy is laid down, of necessity, a cut off date has to be fixed and fixation of such a date is the prerogative of he employer. However if such fixation of dates can be said to be having no nexus sought to be achieved aim or is not based on any reasonable differentia or is much off wide then of course it may be assailed but in absence of any such thing no fault can be found with it. Learned counsel in that regard relied upon the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rama Rao v. All India Referred Class Bank Employees Welfare Association reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76 specially paras 29 and 31 to 33 so also on yet another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Achhibar Maurya v. State of U.P reported in (2008) 2 SCC 639.
18. Regarding the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was submitted that the judgment in D. Janardhana Rao and M. Venkateswarlu cases have no bearing on the aspect involved in the present case as both those cases related to power of Governor relaxing certain provisions and has no bearing on the aspect of validity of cut off date. Then regarding KGA Buttar's case it was submitted that, that case is also not applicable to the present controversy as in that case certain pensionary benefits were increased and the benefit of such increase was restricted to be available only to persons retiring after 01.01.1996 and similar benefits were denied to similarly situated sufferers who were retired prior to 01.01.1996 and reliance of Constitutional Bench judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.S Nakaria's case, it was found that the fixing of the date violating the Article 14 as it brought about a different class between homogenous class. It was also noticed that even the Government itself by subsequent letter had made the benefits available to 03.01.1996 retirees. While in the present case the question involved is as to whether the eligibility criteria for retention in service by extending the service is modified should be applied from the date mentioned therein or also should be applied to the persons like those as contended by the petitioners. In the submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General it was in the nature of a new policy laying down eligibility criteria for extension and it was open to the employer to laid down such policy with effect from particular date so as to make eligible the benefits or consequences of the new policy to the category of persons on one side of the cut off date. Learned counsel submitted that it is always natural consequences of fixation of cut off date that some persons would fall on the right side and other would fall on the wrong side but then that by itself can not be a ground to strike down the cut off date as that is the natural consequences.
19. Then defending the aspect of benefit being available to the persons retiring on or after 01.04.2013, learned Additional Solicitor General again read to us the policy of 20.09.2010 and pointed out that it is clearly stipulated that the policy will be made applicable w.e.f 01.04.2011 and the policy itself contemplates screening and such screening is contemplated rather provided to be under taken or carried out 24 months prior to reaching the current laid down service by the individual concerned. Obviously, screening is integral part of the policy and is included in applicability of the policy with obvious consequences. Therefore, if the policy is to commence from or is to be applied from 01.04.2011, and requires screening to be effected or carried out 24 months prior to reaching the current laid down service limit, obviously extension is to be available only after two years and the persons retiring on or before 01.04.2013 can not claim benefit of this policy.
20. Another limb of argument of the learned Additional Solicitor General was that undisputedly screening is to be undertaken only once. The new policy also does not contemplate any second screening or re-opening or reconsideration of the screening already carried out. Since even under the old policy, the screening is to be carried out 24 months prior to reaching the current laid down service limit, and since the new policy is to become applicable w.e.f from 01.04.2011 all the persons retiring on or before 01.04.2013 already stands screened, obviously on the parameters laid down in the old policy and in the absence of any provision for second screening or reopening of the cases which have already been screened, the individual can not claim to be retained simply because they claimed to be fulfilling eligibility criteria under the new policy. It was then submitted that the contention of the petitioners about the new policy being beneficial one is also not wholly correct in asmuch as of course on the medical category parameters the new policy is a bit literal as it renders P2 category persons also eligible but then on discipline parameters the policy is much too stringent in asmuch as under old policy, individual with 3 red ink entries was also eligible for extension as against which under the new policy the eligibility is restricted to incurring of only two red ink entries. In the submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General if the contentions of the petitioners are accepted, then all the persons who have earlier been even found eligible under the old policy will have to be reconsidered to see as to whether they fulfil other criteria being of red ink entries in the event the exercise will do more harm than good as large number of persons may have to be asked to quit and therefore, also the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners can not be accepted.
21. We have considered the submissions of either side, have gone through various policies and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited by either side and those of Lucknow Bench, Kochi Bench and this Principal Bench.
22. At the outset we may observe at the cost of repetition that so far the judgments of this Principal Bench, Lucknow Bench and Kochi Bench are concerned, there is no conflict of opinion so as to require adjudication about the correctness of either of the views by this Larger bench. Therefore, we are not detaining ourselves on that.
23. Taking up the submissions made by the learned counsels so far the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners are concerned, the submission is quite attractive and accordingly we have seriously considered the same that when a person with particular category can be promoted why he can not be given extension and that whether it is a paradox which has been removed or sought to be removed by the new policy of 20.09.2010, but find the submissions to be not capable of being accepted. We may straightaway observe that right to get promotion in the cadre is a natural phenomena and right to be considered for such promotion is the legally vested right of the employee subject to fulfilling the requisite eligibility conditions. Obviously, if the employer had laid down parameters for eligibility for promotion, which eligibility may have permitted medical P2 category persons also for promotion but then so far extension is concerned, right to get extension is neither a normal phenomena of service nor is it a vested right. On the other hand as pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General that it was in view of giving effect to the Government of India letter dated 30.05.1998 whereby the retirement age of the employees was increased by two years and accordingly, Ministry of Defence had also increased the retirement age of the various categories of persons enblog carving out exception for certain categories of persons mentioned in the letter dated 30.05.1998 and 03.09.1998 and various categories of persons whose retirement age was not enblog increased, for them orders were issued by way of policies to screen them for extension of their service for two years. Obviously, so far services as such is concerned, the tenure was not increased but there was a screening laid down to be held and on the individual fulfilling the criteria laid down for screening was held entitled to two years extension of service. This was all together new policy for giving extension of two years service and for that willingness was also required to be obtained. This is a different story that at the discretion of the employer unwilling person also could be given extension while medical fitness criteria was laid down, obviously laying down that the candidate should be of AYE category then physical fitness criteria and ACR criteria was laid down. Not only this in that policy it was further laid down that the screening is to be done three years in advance before due date of retirement. Of course that period shall reduce to two years but then the screening in advance by certain number of years was very much the sine-qua-non and as per the policy even the person who had been approved on the screening was required to continue to fulfil the eligibility criteria not only till the time of commencement of extension of service but also during the entire period of extension. It is always a choice of the employer if the employer would like to apply the best of the lot for giving extension and in that process if the parameters happened to be stringent as compared to the parameters available to the entitled individual to complete the original tenure of service, including earning promotion, in our view it can not be said that any paradox existed nor can be said that lying down the stringent parameters for extension is or was in any manner unfair or even harsh.
24. It is after expiry of practically 12 years that the policy had undergone a change. Here again we would like to observe that lying down a new policy it was a matter of removal for paradox as alleged by the petitioner but the petitioners but it is a matter of laying down fresh parameters all together and in that process may be that some parameters had remained common in the two policies while some parameters were liberalized and at the same time some parameters were made still more stringent. In that view of the matter it can not be said that there was only compassion which had worked with the employer or that any paradox was removed. Significantly the requirement of screening in advance by two years was very much material. In our view the new policy did not simply water down the earlier policy nor did it simply liberalize parameters, rather it had laid down different parameters in which process some parameters were liberalized still some parameters were made more stringent, the petitioners are neither entitled to invoke compassion nor sympathy nor can it be said that there would be any violation of the Article 14 of the Constitution.
25. So far as the second submission is concerned, about the action of the policy being made to be effective from 01.04.2011, being arbitrary is concerned, in our view this submission also has no force. As found above, the new policy was not a policy laid down only to ameliorate the conditions of the individual but is a new policy laying down different parameters. Obviously, rather, of necessity as and when an employer lays down or frames a new policy some date has to be fixed from which date it is to be effected and unless that date so fixed, is hit by the mischief of judicially pronounced parameters, no interference can be made therein. In the present case, this is a different story that the validity of the cut off date has already been upheld by the judgment of Lucknow Bench in Sub. Brijesh Kumar's case as noticed above, still we have again re-examined the issues and find that the fixation of cut off date does not suffer from any of the wises making it presumable to be interfered with nor it hit with Article 14 of the Constitution. Rather, as submitted by learned Additional Solicitor General that to start implementation of the policy, it is required to be disseminated to all concerned authorities and enable them to carry out preparatory work by the Record Office and Line Directorates. We find this to be the precise reason mentioned in para 9 of the earlier letter dated 20.09.2010 Obviously, for constituting Screening Boards and starting to undertake screening, good amount of spade work has to be done including individually the individual required to be screened, assimilating necessary dates of those individuals, constituting Screening Boards at different places and so on so forth and looking to the large number of employees required to be screened, practically six months time as was contemplated to be required and taken into account for fixing the cut off date can not be said to be arbitrary. Even in the earlier policy of 1998 also, six months time was contemplated. Then two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Additional Solicitor General being in Rama Rao's case and Achhibar Maurya's case to support our this view apart from the judgments taken into account and followed by the Lucknow Bench being those in Dr. Ami Lal v. State of Rajasthan reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614, Government of A.P v. N. Subrayadu reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Ramesh Chand Aggarwal reported in (2009) 3 SCC 35 and Hardev Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 10 SCC 121 which in turn can proceeds on the basis of good number of earlier judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court then the judgment of in Balco Employees Union v. Union of India reported in (2002) 2 SCC 333 does also support this preposition. Thus we do not find any force in this submission either.
26. In addition we may also rely upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC 207 being the Constitutional Bench judgment so also that in V. Kasthuri v. Managing Director, State Bank of India reported in (1998) 8 SCC 30 : AIR 1999 SC page 81 where after dealing with and discussing the judgment in D.S Nakara's case (D.S Nakara v. Union of India reported in 1983 SC 130), the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the cut off date and permissibility of such fixation of cut off date. So far the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in K.J.S Buttar's case is concerned, one thing is that in that case Hon'ble Supreme Court found the fixation of the date to be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, likewise we also find that the question involved in Buttar's case was all together different in asmuch as in that case only rate of pensionary benefits of specified nature of pension was increased and entitlement to such increase of pension had been confined to the employees who had retired after cut off date and those who retired earlier were not held entitled which was found to be violative of Article 14, while in the present case, as held above, the policy of September, 2010 is a new policy laying down different parameters and if it is made applicable or to be available only to a category of persons who are in service after 01.04.2013, it can not be said that fixing of this cut off date is in any manner bad so as to require interference.
27. Then we take up the next submissions made on the basis of the persons serving during the period 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2012 being deprived of the benefit of new policy despite the policy in its own terms having been made applicable from 01.04.2011
28. Making this submission also it was submitted that when the policy was made applicable w.e.f 01.04.2011, all those employees who are in service as on 01.04.2011 do become entitled to the benefit of new policy and since the petitioners fulfil the eligibility criteria for being granted extension they can not be denied extension. It was also submitted that even if hyper technically they are found to be not entitled still the policy should be read in a benevolent manner so as to extend benefit of this policy to them. As a limb of that very argument, it was submitted that the clarificatory letters are subsequent improvements and can not be said to be form part of policy and since those letters are also coming in the way of the petitioners they also should be strucked off in our view this submission also does not have force in asmuh as to start with we may observe that the new policy is a policy by way of a complete, body providing complete mechanism of its operation and applicability right from the start point and therefore, when it is made applicable w.e.f 01.04.2011, it necessarily means that it is to start its operation from the start point w.e.f 01.04.2011 In our opinion this start point of operation is undertaking of screening and therefore, screening is to take place in accordance with new policy w.e.f 01.04.2011 from which date the policy has been made applicable. Since even an old policy as well as a new policy, the screening is to be undertaken two years before the scheduled date of superannuation or discharge, the obvious consequence is that the screening is to be only of those incumbents who are to get superannuated or discharged on or after 01.04.2013 Clarificatory letters may be not forming part of policy then the first one was issued immediately on 28.10.2010 itself and of course other one is of 11.01.2011 but then in our view even in the absence of these letters a bare reading of the policy and in this scheme of things this is the only consequence with which clause and the policy was and is required to be implemented in that fashion only. Therefore, nothing much turns on these two letters. This is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect of the matter is that the employees who are continuing under the terms of their original engagement and are scheduled to superannuate or get discharged on or before 31.03.2013 so also the employees who are continuing on extension during this period and their extension had been cut short in accordance with the old policy are concerned, they are all employees who have already been screened under the old policy of 21.09.1998 and either have not been found suitable or approved for extension or did not remain eligible to have extension till commencement of the extension or who did not retain eligibility till completion of extension. However, the fact remains that all those persons have been screened under old policy. Admittedly the screening is to be undertaken only once and since it had already been undertaken in accordance with the policy of 1998, in absence of any expressed provision or any provision by necessary implication being there in the new policy, they can not be subjected to either second screening nor the earlier screening can be allowed to be reviewed or reconsidered. Obviously, therefore, they can not claim either second screening or review of the old screening or reopening of the screening already done.
29. Yet another aspect of the matter is, as rightly highlighted by the learned Additional Solicitor General that even if by erring infvour of the petitioners, the cases of such employees were to be reopened then this can not be done that only their cases be considered from the stand point as may be beneficial to them rather the reconsideration can possibly be directed on all the parameters meaning thereby that if those persons do not fulfil the other stringent parameters then also they have to go but at the same time once this is reopened, then the re opening is not only conferred to the 22 petitioners but in order to avoid flooding of the court with litigations, the reopening to be undertaken qua all those persons falling in the same category with the obvious result that even the cases of those persons who have been approved under the old policy, will also have to be reopened to check as to whether they are entitled to extension under the new policy and the possibilities are not ruled out that large number of persons already approved, may be found to be ineligible as under the old policy the eligibility criteria tolerated up to 3 red ink entries while the criteria under the new policy tolerates only up to 2 red ink entries and therefore all those candidates who are having 3 red ink entries will have to be made to quit. This would result into a big upheaval apart from the fact that it is likely to do more harm than it likely to bring benefits a handful of persons and therefore also we do not stand advised even to lean in favour of the petitioners on this aspect, even if we were to liberally interpret the policy so as to provide benefit to maximum persons.
30. So far the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners being those in D. Janardhana Rao's case and M. Venkateswarlu's case are concerned, both of them deal only with scope of provisions of Rule 47 of Andhra Pradesh State and Sub-ordinate Service Rules, 1963 where under a cover was available for relaxation under certain circumstances and Hon'ble Supreme Court was judging the validity of the exercise undertaken or exercise of power by the concerned authority under the said Rule 47 with effect from particular date. As against which in the present case, the new policy does not contain any such provision for giving relaxation except those as contained in Note appended to para 3 of the policy dated 20.09.2010 and admittedly, cases of none of the petitioners fall in the said Note. Thus, so far as the petitioners are concerned, there is no power of relaxation reserved in the policy and therefore the two judgments relied upon do not help the petitioners.
31. So far as the judgment in KJS Buttar's case is concerned, that has already been discussed above, and found to be of no help to the petitioners.
32. Thus taken from any stand point, in our view, the petitions do not have merit and are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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