Deere And Company, In Re

J. Khosla, (Member):— The applicant, Deere and Co., USA, is a foreign company incorporated under the laws of the USA. It has worldwide subsidiaries. It provides advanced products and services for agriculture, forestry, construction, lawn and turf care, landscaping and irrigation. The Deere group also provides financial services worldwide and manufactures and markets engines used in heavy equipment. John Deere India P. Ltd. (JDIPL) is a company incorporated in India and is a subsidiary of the applicant. It is engaged in manufacture of tractors and provides services in the field of water solutions, crop solutions, information technology and information technology enabled services. The applicant holds 344, 857, 343 equity shares of JDIPL (representing 99. 99 per cent, of the paid-up share capital) and the balance 10 shares are jointly owned by the applicant and Mr. Klaus Ramsauer.

2. John Deere Asia (Singapore) is a private limited company incorporated in the Republic of Singapore and owned by the applicant through John Deere Asia, Netherlands BV. This company is incorporated in the Netherlands. This company serves as the Deere group's marketing organization for its various businesses in South-East Asia and its regional headquarters. With aspirations to serve its customers worldwide in a more efficient and effective manner it restructures the entire business organizations of the company. While boosting its global network, technology and expertise, it transferred its 99. 99 per cent, shares held in JDIPL to John Deere Asia, Singapore, without consideration. The other shares held jointly by the applicant and Mr. Klaus Ramsauer were also transferred to John Deere Asia, Singapore, without consideration. It is claimed by the applicant that these shares are transferred as gift to John Deere, Asia, Singapore. According to the applicant, as these shares are transferred as a gift, it is not liable to pay any capital gain tax under section 45 of the Income-tax Act read with section 47(iii) of the Act.

3. While submitting the above facts, the applicant seeks the rulings of this Authority on the following questions:

“1. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, pursuant to group reorganization, whether transfer of shares of John Deere India P. Ltd. (JDIPL) by the applicant to John Deere Asia (Singapore) P. Ltd. (JD Asia) without consideration is taxable as per the provisions of the Income-tax Act?

2. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, since the transfer of shares by the applicant to JD Asia is without consideration, whether the provisions of section 92 to section 92F of the Income-tax Act relating to transfer pricing would be applicable. (This question is reframed at the time of hearing)

3. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, whether JD Asia the recipient of shares of JDIPL, is required to withhold tax in accordance with the provisions of section 195 of the Income-tax Act?

4. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, if the transfer of shares of JDIPL is not taxable in India, whether the applicant is required to file any return of income under section 139 of the Income-tax Act?”

4. The applicant's application was allowed under section 245R(2) of the Income-tax Act on March 31, 2011, after hearing both the parties and question No. 2 supra is a recasted one.

5. Prelude to the transfer of shares by the applicant, a new global operating model was announced for reorganization of the holding structure of the Deere group of companies. Pursuant to it, the applicant in its letter dated April 23, 2010, to the company director and the secretary, John Deere Asia (Singapore) Pvt. Ltd. conveyed its intention to transfer the entire shares held in JDIPL to the company. The company director and the secretary had agreed to accept the shares, vide its letter dated April 26, 2011, to the applicant and these shares were transferred consequently without any consideration by means of gift deeds.

6. The learned counsel for the applicant while submitting the facts has argued that the transfers of shares are without consideration and, hence, termed the transfer as gift. According to the learned counsel, the shares are capital assets of the company. With the transfer of shares, no gain or profit arises and, therefore, the transfer of shares does not fall within the ambit of section 45 of the Income-tax Act and as such not exigible to capital gains tax. Section 45(1) is extracted below:

“45. (1) Any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall, save as otherwise provided in sections 54, 54B, 54D, 54E, 54EA, 54EB, 54F, 54G' and 54H be chargeable to income-tax under the head ‘Capital gains’, and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place.”

7. The learned counsel argued that these shares were transferred in 2010 as gift. The learned counsel also brought to our attention the provisions contained in section 47(iii) which is quoted below:

“47. Nothing contained in section 45 shall apply to the following transfers:…

(iii) any transfer of a capital asset under a gift or will or an irrevocable trust:

Provided that this clause shall not apply to transfer under a gift or an irrevocable trust of a capital asset being shares, debentures or warrants allotted by a company directly or indirectly to its employees under any Employees' Stock Option Plan or Scheme of the company offered to such employees in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government in this behalf;

8. As per section 47(iii), transfer of shares under a gift will not be regarded as a transfer in terms of section 45 of the Act. The learned counsel argued that as the transfer of shares does not give rise to any gain or profit, the question of paying capital gains tax does not arise. No gain or profit accrued or arose in these transfers of shares as gift.

9. The hon'ble Supreme Court in Cit v. B.C Srinivasa Setty ., [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC) has observed (page 299):

“Section 45 charges the profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset to income-tax. The asset must be one which falls within the contemplation of the section. It must bear that quality which brings section 45 into play. To determine whether the goodwill of a new business is such an asset, it is permissible, as we shall presently show, to refer to certain other sections of the head ‘Capital gains’. Section 45 is a charging section. For the purpose of imposing the charge, Parliament has enacted detailed provisions in order to compute the profits or gains under that head. No existing principle or provision at variance with them can be applied for determining the chargeable profits and gains. All transactions encompassed by section 45 must fall under the governance of its computation provisions. A transaction to which those provisions cannot be applied must be regarded as never intended by section 45 to be the subject of the charge. This inference flows from the general arrangement of the provisions in the Income-tax Act, where under each head of income the charging provision is accompanied by a set of provisions for computing the income subject to that charge. The character of the computation provisions in each case bears a relationship to the nature of the charge. Thus, the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section. Otherwise, one would be driven to conclude that while a certain income seems to fall within the charging section there is no scheme of computation for quantifying it. The legislative pattern discernible in the Act is against such a conclusion. It must be borne in mind that the legislative intent is presumed to run uniformly thorough the entire conspectus of provisions pertaining to each head of income. No doubt there is a qualitative difference between the charging provision and a computation provision and ordinarily the operation of the charging provision cannot be affected by the construction of a particular computation provision. But the question here is whether it is possible to apply the computation provision at all if a certain interpretation is pressed on the charging provision. That pertains to the fundamental integrality of the statutory scheme provided for each head.”

10. Tax planning is legal and as argued by the learned counsel within the ambit of law. Law provides that transfer of shares as gift is not taxable as no profit or gain accrues from such transfer. Lord Tomlin in IRC v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] AC 1 (HL) Act has observed: “Everyone is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow tax gatherer may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax”.

11. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. CTO, [1985] 154 ITR 148 (SC), while relying on the above observation has stated that tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the frame work of law. Colourable devices cannot be part tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment at tax by resorting to dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges.

12. This was followed in Foster'S Australia Limited v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [2003] 263 ITR 706 (SC).

13. All these decisions support the concept of tax planning within the legal framework. Therefore, the contention of the Revenue that it is a device to avoid payment of tax is illogical as contended by the learned counsel.

14. The Revenue had a filed report in this case. The learned Departmental representative has argued that the shares of JDIPL represent capital asset of the assessee and so the transfer of these shares irrespective of its mode of transfer involves transfer of capital asset giving rise to capital gains. The learned representative further argued that there is a transfer of shares between the two corporate entities. In case of a gift, an element of love and affection should be there but in this instant case no love and affection between the two corporate entities can be said to be subsisting and the concept of gift is devised just to hoodwink the Revenue. It is argued that the applicant is an American company and the shares are transferred to a Singapore based company and so the transfer is a cross border transaction. Transfer pricing issues will be applicable to such transaction and sections 92 to 92F of the Income-tax Act will be squarely applicable to such transaction. It is also argued that in the transaction, the capital gains arise in the hands of the applicant which is taxable in India. Consequently, TDS provision as per section 195 of the Income-tax Act will be squarely applicable before effecting any transfer in this regard. It is strenuously argued that under such circumstances the applicant is required to file a return of income under section 139 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, it is submitted that the questions have to be answered against the applicant.

15. The learned counsel for the applicant on the other hand has argued that there is no element of love and affection attached to the gift. According to the ordinary meaning, “gift” means a thing given willingly to some one without payment. The learned counsel further brought to our notice the definition of “gift” given in section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, “gift” is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration by one person called the donor to another called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. The meaning of gift supra reflects no element of love and affection and, therefore, the contention of the Departmental representative in this regard is without substance. The gift of shares by the applicant to John Deere Asia (Singapore) is made without any consideration and, therefore, the transfer has to be held to be a gift.

16. The learned counsel has cited decisions to buttress the applicant's stand, some of which we will deal with hereunder. This Authority had occasion to deal with such cases in the past and the case of Amiantit International Holding Ltd., In re, [2010] 322 ITR 678 (AAR) is one such. We extract below para. 31 from this ruling which is relevant for this case (page 688):

“Viewed from any angle, we are unable to perceive as to how any profit or gain has accrued or arisen to the applicant by virtue of the transfer of shares to its subsidiary company. It is not possible to identify or pinpoint anything which has the characteristic of profit or gain or any consideration which is capable of being valued in praesenti. As pointed out earlier, the income in the sense of profit and gain should be real but not hypothetical income. We may take it that the income may be in cash or in kind and need not necessarily be pecuniary in nature. As stated in the Law and Practice of Income-tax (by Kanga, Palkhivala and Vyas) income, profits and gains may be realized in the form of money's worth as well as money, in kind as well as in cash. Even then, the alleged consideration for which the shares are to be transferred should be capable of being evaluated on commercial and accounting principles.”

17. In the case of Dana Corporation, In re, [2010] 321 ITR 178 (AAR), this Authority held that (page 188):

“The profit or gain envisaged by section 45 is not something which remains ambivalent or indefinite or indeterminable. The profit or gain or the full value of the consideration, cannot be arrived at on notional or hypothetical basis. The profit or gain to the transferor must be a distinctly and clearly identifiable component of the transaction. The consideration for the transfer of shares in terms of money or money's worth is not something which can be implied or assumed. No profit or gain in the form of consideration for transfer can be inferred by a process of deeming or on presumptive basis. There must be a causal nexus between the transfer of capital asset and the profit or gain accruing to or received by the assessee (as pointed out by the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Vania Silk Mills (P.) Ltd., [1977] 107 ITR 300 (Guj)).”

18. In view of the legal position thus explained, question No. 1 has to be answered in the negative.

19. With regard to question No. 2, the learned counsel argues that section 92 of the Income-tax Act provides that computation of income arising from an international transactions having regard to the arm's length price. This provision cannot be applied to a transaction which is not chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act. Only when income accrues, it can be computed having regard to the arm's length price. He cites the following rulings of this Authority in aid of his contention.

(i) Vanenburg Group B.V, In re, [2007] 289 ITR 464 (AAR) (page 472):

“Coming to the question of transfer pricing, it is seen that sections 92 to 92F are contained in Chapter X of the Act under the heading ‘Special provisions relating to avoidance of tax’. These provisions are aimed at preventing avoidance of tax by certain well known devices, determination of arm's length price, computation of income in certain cases, etc., in relation to international transactions. These are again machinery provisions which would not apply in the absence of liability to pay tax.”

(ii) Praxair Pacific Ltd., In re, [2010] 326 ITR 276 (AAR) (page 286):

“Regarding answer to question No. 9, the proposed transfer of equity shares by the applicant to Praxin India would not attract the transfer pricing provisions of sections 92 to 92F of the Act in the absence of liability to pay the tax on the capital gain.”

(iii) Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., In re—(AAR No. 1006 of 2010) [2011] 334 ITR 69 (AAR)

Goodyear Orient Co. (P.) Ltd., In re—(AAR No. 1031 of 2010) [2011] 334 ITR 69 (AAR) (page 78):

“As there is no income liable to tax in the hands of the applicant, the provisions of sections 92 to 92F of the Act will not be applicable and the transfer pricing provisions in Chapter X are not attracted.”

(iv) VNU International B. 7., In re, [2011] 334 ITR 56 (AAR)—AAR No. 871 of 2010):

“The transfer of share VNU International to IMS AG is not liable to be taxed in India and also does not attract the transfer pricing provisions of sections 92 to 92F of the Act.”

20. In the light of the above rulings, the learned counsel argues that in the absence any income accruing by the transfer of shares, the question of application of Chapter X does not arise. Having regard to the principles enunciated in the above rulings we answer the question in the negative.

21. Regarding question No. 3, the learned counsel argued that transfer of shares is not taxable in India and, therefore, deduction of tax does not arise. In the light of the rulings cited, this question is also answered in favour of the applicant.

22. For question No. 4, it is submitted that when there is no taxability under the Act, the question of filing a return does not arise. Rulings of the Authority in Factset Research Systems, In re, [2009] 317 ITR 169 (AAR) and Vanenburg Group B.V, In re, [2007] 289 ITR 464 (AAR) are cited to support the stand.

23. This authority in the recent rulings in VNU International B.V, In re— (AAR No. 871 of 2010) [2011] 334 ITR 56 (AAR) and ABC, In re (AAR No. 840 of 2010) has held that when there is chargeability under the Income-tax Act notwithstanding that no tax may be payable, there is an obligation to file a return under section 139 of the Act. In that view question No. 4 is answered in the affirmative and it is ruled that the applicant is bound to file the return. In view of our above discussion, we answer questions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the negative and question No. 4 in the affirmative and rule accordingly.

24. Pronounced on the 27th day of May, 2011.