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Anil Sharma v. Union Bank Of India & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
This order decides two appeals arising from an ex parte order passed against the defendants—M/s. Shabros Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and its directors Mr. Ashok Sharma, Mr. Alok Sharma, and Mr. Anil Sharma—in a case filed by a Bank for recovery of Rs. 98,78,592/- with interest and costs. The ex parte order was issued on 9.9.1997. Mr. Anil Sharma and Mr. Alok Sharma filed separate applications under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC seeking to set aside the ex parte order, both of which were dismissed. Subsequently, they preferred miscellaneous appeals challenging those dismissals. The appellants contended non-service of summons and irregularities in substituted service. The record also reveals procedural steps including attempts at service by registered post, substituted service by publication, and adjournments due to misplaced files.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the ex parte order against the defendants was validly passed given the alleged non-service of summons in accordance with law.
- Whether the appellants had sufficient notice and opportunity to appear and defend the case despite alleged irregularities in service.
- Whether the applications under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC to set aside the ex parte order were rightly dismissed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants were never properly served with summons as their addresses mentioned in the Original Application were incorrect or unrelated to them.
- The service was not effected in accordance with the provisions of Order 5 CPC, including Rules 9A(4), 11, 17, and 19, which prescribe the procedure for service and evidence of refusal.
- Substituted service by publication in "The Statesman" newspaper was invalid as the newspaper had no circulation in Gwalior, where one appellant resided.
- The appellants denied knowledge of the case until many years after the ex parte order was passed, and claimed no receipt of notices.
- They relied on several authorities emphasizing proper service and the conditions under which ex parte decrees can be set aside.
Respondent Bank's Arguments
- The Bank contended that notices were sent by registered post to the addresses mentioned in the Original Application, which were presumed correct in absence of any intimation of change of address by the appellants.
- The appellants admitted connection with the addresses used for service or failed to inform the Bank of any change.
- The appellants failed to lead any evidence to rebut the presumption of service by registered post.
- The Bank relied on the principle that an ex parte order can be sustained if the defendant had notice of the hearing and sufficient time to appear, even if there were irregularities in service.
- The Bank challenged the truthfulness of the appellants, citing fabricated evidence and inconsistent statements.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sushil Kumar Sabharwal v. Gurpreet Singh (2002) 5 SCC 377 | Order 9 Rule 6, CPC - Court's obligation to be satisfied of due service before passing ex parte order | Reinforced the requirement that the court must consciously apply its mind to service of summons before proceeding ex parte; court found this principle applicable and noted appellants failed to rebut presumption of service. |
| Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab (2008) 7 SCC 663 | Substituted service must be at last known address of defendant | Held that substituted service at an address where defendant no longer resided is invalid; court considered this in relation to newspaper publication service and found it inadequate for Gwalior address. |
| Great Punjab Agro Industries Ltd v. Khushian (2005) 13 SCC 503 | This precedent was cited but specific rule not detailed in the opinion | Used to support appellants’ argument on service irregularity, but court found it did not affect the outcome. |
| Naresh Chandra Agarwal v. Bank of Baroda AIR 2001 SC 1253 | Related to service of summons and procedure under CPC | Cited to bolster appellants’ service-related contentions; court found arguments based on this precedent unpersuasive. |
| Basant Singh v. Roman Catholic Mission AIR 2002 SC 3557 | Presumption of service by registered post unless rebutted by evidence | Applied to hold that appellants failed to discharge onus to rebut presumption of service, supporting validity of ex parte order. |
| V. Rajakumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu (2004) SLT 443 | Notices returned with remarks like "not available" deemed served | Supported the view that returned postal notices with such remarks amount to valid service; court relied on this to reject appellants’ claims. |
| Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaiver Chandra AIR 1989 SC 630 | Interpretation of service by registered post under statutory provisions | Clarified that service by registered post is deemed valid once posted and addressed correctly; court applied this principle to uphold service. |
| Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India AIR 2008 SC 1006 | Order 9 Rule 13 CPC - Setting aside ex parte decree requires proof of lack of notice or sufficient cause | Court held that mere irregularity in service is insufficient if defendant had notice and time to appear; applied to dismiss appeals. |
| Ajita Sharma v. Rakesh Kumar Sharma 1999 (1) Civil Court Cases 363 (P&H) | Knowledge of pending litigation precludes claim of non-service | Adopted to emphasize that ignoring known litigation is not ground to set aside ex parte decree; court found appellants had knowledge. |
| Inrays v. State Bank of India I (2008) BC 67 | Similar principle as above regarding knowledge and service | Supported the court’s conclusion that appellants had knowledge and failed to act; appeals dismissed accordingly. |
| S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. AIR 1994 SC 853 | Clean hands doctrine; litigants based on falsehood have no right to relief | Applied to reject appellants’ fabricated evidence and untruthful conduct; court emphasized finality and justice. |
| Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank Of India (2007) 8 SCC 449 | Reinforcement of clean hands and finality principles in litigation | Used to uphold dismissal of appeals on grounds of appellants’ misconduct and failure to rebut service presumption. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the appellants' claim of non-service by examining the procedure followed for service of summons. It noted that notices were sent by registered post to addresses provided by the Bank, and the appellants failed to inform the Bank of any change in address or to rebut the presumption of service. The court found no evidence that the appellants refused service or that service was improperly effected. It rejected the appellants’ contention regarding substituted service by publication, particularly the claim that the newspaper had no circulation where the appellants resided, but held that the appellants had knowledge of the proceedings as evidenced by their conduct and inspection of court records. The court also scrutinized the appellants’ inconsistent statements and fabricated documents, concluding that they did not approach the court with clean hands. The court relied heavily on established principles that an ex parte order can only be set aside if the defendant lacked notice or was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing, and that mere irregularity in service is insufficient if the defendant had knowledge and opportunity to appear. Applying these principles and precedents, the court found the appellants’ appeals without merit.
Holding and Implications
The appeals are dismissed with costs.
The court's decision directly upholds the ex parte order passed against the appellants, confirming that the service of summons was valid in law despite the appellants’ claims. The appellants’ failure to rebut the presumption of service and their conduct led to the dismissal. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling reinforces existing principles regarding service of summons, the conditions for setting aside ex parte orders, and the requirement that litigants approach courts with clean hands. The decision emphasizes the importance of defendants informing the court or parties of any change in address and responding timely to legal proceedings to avoid adverse orders.
J.M Malik, Chairperson:— This order shall decide the two appeals detailed above, An ex parte order was passed against the defendants: (1) M/s. Shabros Electronics Pvt. Ltd., (2) Mr. Ashok Sharma, (3) Mr. Alok Sharma, (4) Mr. Anil Sharma, all directors of M/s. Shabros Electronics Pvt. Ltd., A-25, Connaugt Place, New Delhi in the sum of Rs. 98,78,592/- together with pendente lite and future interest @ 21.75% p.a with quarterly rests from the date of filing of the O.A on 9.9.1997 till realization, as well as the costs of the case.
2. Mr. Anil Sharma, defendant No. 4 in the O.A, moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC, which was dismissed vide order dated 31.10.2002 A review petition filed by him, thereafter, was also dismissed vide order dated 26.11.2002 Aggrieved by that order, he has preferred the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4 of 2003.
3. Likewise, Mr. Alok Sharma, defendant No. 3 in the O.A, moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC read with Section 22(2)(g) of the RDDBFI Act for setting aside the above said ex parte order. The said application was dismissed on 5.1.2006 Aggrieved by that order the present Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53/2006 has been filed.
4. I have heard the Counsel for the parties. The main submission made by both the Counsel for the appellants is that the appellants were never served in this case. Both the Counsel have invited my attention towards the addresses mentioned in the O.A by the Bank in respect of the defendants 3 and 4, respective appellants herein. Their addresses are mentioned as ‘A-25, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001’ and ‘B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi’. Both the Counsel claim that both the above said defendants have got no concern with these addresses. However, they admitted that A-25, Connaught Place, New Delhi is the shop of their father and it was a tenanted shop which now stands vacated. They also admitted that in B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi their elder brother Mr. Ashok Sharma, defendant No. 2 in the O.A, used to reside. It was argued that the service was not effected in accordance with law. Only four postal receipts had been filed, which go to show that an amount of Rs. 21/- each, total being Rs. 84/-, was paid on the registered post in the year 1997. It was explained that if summons was accompanied with the paper book it would have entailed a lot of money. Registered acknowledgement receipts were never received back.
5. The learned Counsel for the appellants further submitted that provisions of Order 5, CPC were given a go-by. Attention of the Court was invited to Order 5 Rule 9A(4), CPC which lays down that “if such summons, when tendered, is refused or if the person served refuses to sign an acknowledgement of service or for any reason such summons cannot be served personally, the Court shall, on the application of the party, re-issue such summons to be served by the Court in the same manner as a summons to a defendant”. Again, Rule 11 of Order 5, CPC lays down that save as otherwise prescribed, where there are more defendants than one, service of the summons shall be made on each defendant. Rule 17 of Order 5, CPC lays down the procedure when defendant refuses to accept service, or cannot be found. It was also argued that as per Order 5 Rule 19, CPC the serving officer should have been examined in the Court in case of refusal.
6. This argument is not relevant as the Court cannot presume that they refused to take service. There is no such evidence on the record. The assumptions of the learned Counsel for the appellants are all wet. On the contrary, the assumption is that they must have received the notices sent through the Registered A.D, for which no evidence in rebuttal was ever led.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellants also explained that substituted service was not effected in accordance with law. The service was effected in the statesman which has no circulation at Gwalior where Mr. Alok Sharma, defendant No. 3, used to reside. Again, the learned Judge did not record his satisfaction in regard to the fact that the defendants were not traceable and that he was satisfied that they cannot be served through ordinary process and they must be served through substituted service.
8. It was also argued that the case was put up before the learned Presiding Officer on 17.9.1997 On 17.9.1997, the Presiding Officer ordered that the defendants be served by registered post and ordinary process and the case was fixed for 23.10.1997 On 23.10.1997, the matter was not put up before the Court. It appears that the same was put up before the learned Registrar who ordered that postal receipts were filed. He ordered that substituted service be effected for the order mentions that the above said order was passed “By orders of the Tribunal”. On 23.10.1997, the defendants were to be served through Dasti and the order is assumed to have been passed by the Registrar on 23.10.1997 when the case was fixed for 8.12.1997 for filing written statement. Again, an order was passed by the Registrar and the case was adjourned to 12.1.1998 On 12.1.1998 it was adjourned to 16.1.1998 The case was put up before the learned Tribunal on the presiding Officer ordered that the defendants be proceeded against ex parte.
9. It was also pointed out that on 24.6.1999 it transpired that the file was misplaced. The learned Presiding Officer mentioned that the Registrar had kept the file with him and the file to be put up before him. However, there were no order sheets available in the file. He, therefore, ordered that in the situation there was no option before him except to fix the case for rehearing. He then adjourned the case to 9.7.1999 and ordered that the parties be informed. The grievance of the appellants is that they were never served in this case.
10. The record reveals that notice was sent to M/s. Shabros Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and the file was inspected by defendants 1 and 2 on 15.1.2001
11. The learned Counsel also invited my attention towards Order 9 Rule 6, CPC which lays down that the Court must have satisfied itself before proceeding against ex parte against any defendant that the party was duly served.
12. The Counsel for the appellants have cited following authorities: Sushil Kumar Sabharwal v. Gurpreet Singh, III (2002) SLT 510 : (2002) 5 SCC 377, wherein it was held:
“12. The provision contained in Order 9 Rule 6, CPC is pertinent. It contemplates three situations when on a date fixed for hearing the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear and three courses to be followed by the Court depending on the given situation. The three situations are: (i) when summons duly served, (ii) when summons not duly served, and (iii) when summons served but not in due time. In the first situation, which is relevant here, when it is proved that the summons was duly served, the Court may make an order that the suit be heard ex parte, The provision casts an obligation on the Court and simultaneously invokes a call to the conscience of the Court to feel satisfied in the sense of being “proved” that the summons was duly served when and when alone, the Court is conferred with a discretion to make an order that the suit be heard ex parte. The date appointed for hearing in the suit for which the defendant is summoned to appear is a significant date of hearing requiring a conscious application of mind on the part of the Court to satisfy itself on the service of summons. Any default or casual approach on the part of the Court may result in depriving a person of his valuable right to participate in the hearing and may result in a defendant suffering an ex parte decree or proceedings in the suit wherein he was deprived of hearing for no fault of his. If only the trial Court would have been conscious of its obligation cast on it by Order 9 Rule 6, CPC, the case would not have proceeded ex parte against the defendant-appellant and a wasteful period of over eight years would not have been added to the life of this litigation.”
13. In the case Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab, III (2008) CLT 32 (SC) : V (2008) SLT 567 : (2008) 7 SCC 663, it was held:
“23. A substituted service furthermore is meant to be resorted to serve the notice at the address known to the parties where he had been residing last. The appellant had been residing in the United States of America for the last about 25 years. He, thus, ceased to stay for all intent and purport at Village Khotheran, District Nawanshahr. Therefore, no substituted service could have been effected on him for service of notice at that address.”
14. The learned Counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that this case applies to his case to a hair as in the instant case the appellant was living in Gwalior and no service was effected at Gwalior as the newspaper. The Statesman' has no circulation at Gwalior. He also cited another authority reported in Great Punjab Agro Industries Ltd v. Khushian, (2005) 13 SCC 503. He also referred to the authority reported in Naresh Chandra Agarwal v. Bank of Baroda, II (2001) SLT 1 : AIR 2001 SC 1253.
15. All these arguments have left no impact upon the Court. Instead of touching the heart of the problem, the learned Counsel for the appellants have laid emphasis on peripheral issues. Briefly stated the factual scenario is this. The notices were sent to all the four defendants through Registered A.Ds in the year 1997. The postal receipts are available on the record. It appears that these notices were sent at M/s. Shabros Electronics Pvt. Ltd., 605, Eros Apartment, Nehru Place, New Delhi because the publication in ‘The Statesman’ newspaper dated 27.11.1997 also mentions the same address. There is not even an iota of evidence which may go to show that the appellants had informed the Bank that they had no connection with the above said address or had left the same or in future all the communications be sent to them at their such and such addresses. The Bank cannot assume that they had shifted to some other places and their addresses are such and such Moreover, the notices were sent to all the four defendants through U.P.C at the addresses of B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. Both the appellants admitted that they used to stay at B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. It was impossible for the Bank to assume that they had left the said address. The appellants did not communicate to the Bank and that they had left that place and shifted to some other places. Under the circumstances, the Court is left with no option but to assume that the service was effected on the appellants. The appellants have failed to produce any evidence in rebuttal of the above said assumption. In his appeal Mr. Anil Sharma stated that he used to work and reside at Gwalior between 1983 and 1997. He was looking after the business of M/s. Gwalior Cement Company Pvt. Ltd. The shop No. A-25, Connaught Place, New Delhi was the showroom of M/s. Gwalior Rayons which was being run by Mr. Prakash Sharma, i.e, the father of all the defendants. However, the said shop was taken over by M/s. Gwalior Suiting about 15 years ago. The said property was tenanted premises from which Mr. Prakash Sharma used to operate and conduct his business.
16. In para No. XII of the appeal he admits that the premises No. B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi was the residence of Mr. Ashok Sharma, the defendant No. 2, up to 1985-86. The defendant No. 4, i.e, the appellant, himself used to stay at Gwalior till 1997 and moved to Delhi in 1998. In fact, at no point of time prior to 15.9.2002 the defendant No. 4 had any knowledge or idea about filing of the above mentioned case by the Bank. He denied having received the notice.
17. The trial Court gave the following finding in this context:
“I have considered the above arguments of learned Counsel for CD No. 4 and have also perused the record. In the earlier application CD No. 4 did not mention that his brother (CD No. 2) had shifted from 8-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi in the year 1985-86. In para 16 of the said application it was mentioned that the premises 8-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi was the residence of Mr. Ashok Sharma (CD No. 2). The earlier order was passed on the basis of this statement, therefore, I do not find any error apparent on record in the order which was passed on the basis of material produced in the Tribunal at that time. Even otherwise, nothing has been annexed along with this application to suggest that CD No. 2, brother of CD No. 4, had shifted from the B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi address in the year 1985-86. The record further shows that CDs are guilty of making incorrect statements from time-to-time. In the earlier application it was stated that 8-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi was the residence of CD No. 2; whereas now it has been stated that even CD No. 2 had shifted from that address in the year 1985-86 that too without producing any cogent documentary evidence in this regard. Even CD No. 2 had filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC being M.A No. 5/01 which was dismissed by this Tribunal vide order 31.10.2001 In the said application CD No. 2 had alleged that he came to know about the present case when an envelope containing the ex parte final order dated 11.12.2000 was delivered at the office address of CD No. 4 on or about 11.1.2001 who in turn sent it to CD No. 2 meaning thereby that even CD No. 4 came to know about the ex parte final order in the month of January 2001 itself. Despite this CD No. 4 has chosen to make a statement in his earlier application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC that he came to know about the passing of the ex parte final order only on 15.9.2002 when a Police Constable came to his house. This conduct itself shows that CD No. 4 is not a truthful person.”
18. Now, I turn to the case of Mr. Alok Sharma. Para 9 of his application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC runs as follows:
“9. Without prejudice to the above submissions, it is also important to bring out in the knowledge of this Hon'ble Tribunal that the A-25, Connaught Place, New Delhi i.e the address of present applicant/defendants No. 3 shown in the Original Application was in fact was the Shop/Showroom of the father of present applicant which was closed down in the year 1985-86 and the present applicant had no concern with the said Show-room or the business run therein. As regards residence of the present applicant/defendant/certificate debtor No. 3, it is submitted that though the present applicant initially i.e in the year 1982-83 was residing at B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi, however, in the year 1986 he shifted to C-657, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. In the year 1990 the present applicant shifted to 90, Sukhdev Vihar and thereafter in the year 1992 the present applicant shifted at A-27, New Friends Colony, New Delhi in the year 1997 onwards as the present applicant is permanently shifted to A-30/9, DLF Qutab Enclave, Phase-1, Gurgaon, Haryana and since then he is continuously residing at the said address. Thus, there was no question of service of Notice to the present applicant either by registered post affixation or by publication in the address where the applicant/defendant No. 3 was not at all residing at the relevant point of time. It is also submitted that since the purported service is effected by publication, the said Newspaper is not circulated in Haryana and thus there was no occasion for the present applicant/defendant No. 3 to know about the proceedings before this Hon'ble Tribunal. The true copies of the Passport and Ration Card showing the address of the present applicant/defendant No. 3 are annexed herewith as Annexure A (Colly).”
19. There is no evidence on the record that the appellants have given intimation to the Bank that they are not residing at B-332, New Friends Colony, New Delhi and their further correspondence should be sent to their new addresses.
20. It is also surprising to note that in his application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC, the appellant Mr. Anil Sharma states that he resigned from the directorship of the company in the year 1983. In September 2002 a police constable came to him and informed that he has to appear before the DRT on 16.9.2002 Consequently he filed the present application on 19.10.2002 On the other hand, Mr. Alok Sharma who also resides along with Mr. Anil Sharma in the same house stated that 10 days prior to the filing of the application dated 8.2.2005 he had gone out of station; in his absence a few people came to his house and apprised his family members about the passing of this order. It is surprising to note that both the brothers did not talk about this case for a period of three years though they were residing in the same house as is apparent from the copy of the Ration Card filed on the record which goes to reveal that all the three brothers were living together. It is also interesting to note that the record reveals that Mr. Ashok Sharma came to know about this case prior to 15.1.2001 because defendant Nos. 1 and 2 inspected the file of the Court on 15.1.2001 They are telling barefaced lies. Lies are lies and nothing would raise them to the status of truth.
21. It is interesting to note that as per the copy of the Ration Card filed by the appellants, both the appellants and their brother Mr. Ashok Sharma were resident of Ward No. 41, Mohalla-Bagle ka Bada, Dal Bazar, Census Building No. 301. at Gwalior as per the Ration Card issued under Madhya Pradesh Foodstuffs Distribution Control Order, 1960, by the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior on 8.5.2003 This Ration Card is in contradiction with the stand set up by the appellants that they remained in Gwalior up to the year 1997. It appears that the said Ration Card is a fabricated one.
22. Rules 22 and 23 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 made under the Act specifies the power and functions of the Registrar. Rule 23 is hereby reproduced:
“Additional powers and duties of Registrar
In addition to the powers conferred elsewhere in these rules, the Registrar shall have the following powers and duties subject to any general or special order of the Presiding Officer, namely—
(i) to receive all applications and other documents including transferred applications,
(ii) to decide all questions arising out of the scrutiny of the applications before they are registered;
(iii) to require any application presented to the Tribunal to be amended in accordance with the rules;
(iv) subject to the direction of the Presiding Officer, to fix date of hearing of the application or other proceedings and issue notice thereof;
(v) direct any formal amendment of records;
(vi) to order grant of copies of documents to parties to proceedings;
(vii) to grant leave to inspect other records of Tribunal;
(viii) dispose of all matters relating to the service of notices or other processes, application for the issue of fresh notices or for extending the time for or ordering a particular method of service on a defendant including a substituted service by publication of the notice by way of advertisement in the newspapers;
(ix) to requisition records from the custody or any Court or other authority.
23. The law has crystalline clarity. In Basant Singh v. Roman Catholic Mission, V (2002) SLT 545 : AIR 2002 S.C 3557, the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold:
“Once it is proved that summons were sent by registered post to a correct and given address, the appellant's own conduct becomes important. Before the trial Court, the appellants were allowed to lead evidence in support of their contentions. An order to that effect was passed by the trial Court. The premises in question was occupied by two defendants jointly. One defendant appeared and examined himself stating that he did not receive the registered letter. However, the appellant B did not appear and no evidence whatsoever, on his behalf, had been led to rebut the presumption in regard to service of summons sent to him under registered post with acknowledgement due. His own conduct showed that the registered summons had been duly served on him. As already noticed, the defendant appeared and save and except the bald statement that registered letter was never tendered to him, no evidence, whatsoever, was led to rebut the presumption. He could have examined the postman, who would have been the material witness and whose evidence would have bearing for proper adjudication. He had failed to discharge the onus cast upon him by the statute. That apart, it was inherently improbable that the registered summons were duly served on appellant but not to the other defendant when they occupied the tenanted premises jointly.”
24. Dealing with the subject of service of summons and notices the Supreme Court held in another case of V. Rajakumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu, IV (2004) CCR 211 (SC) : VI (2004) SLT 443 : I (2005) BC 1 (SC), that where the addressee managed to get the notice returned with postal remarks “not available in the house”, “house locked” and “shop closed” respectively, it must be deemed that notices have been served.
25. The Apex Court in another case Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaiver Chandra, AIR 1989 S.C 630, was pleased to observe:
“The proviso insists that before any amount of rent can be said to be in arrears, a notice has to be served through post. All that a landlord can do to comply with this provision is to post a prepaid registered letter (acknowledgement due or otherwise) containing the tenant's correct address Once he does this and the letter is delivered to the Post Office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the Post Office the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorized by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it. In either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal, be treated as a service on and receipt by the addressee. The difficulty is where the postman calls at the address mentioned and is unable to contact the addressee or a person authorized to receive the letter. All that he can then do is to return it to the sender. The Indian Post Office rules do not prescribe any detailed procedure regarding the delivery of such registered letters. When the postman is unable to deliver it on his first visit, the general practice is for the postman to attempt it on the next one or two days also before returning it to the sender. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make inquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorized to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessee's absence. His responsibilities cannot, therefore, be equated to those of a process server entrusted with the responsibilities of serving the summons of a Court under Order 5 of the CPC. The statutory provision has to be interpreted in the contest of this difficulty nnd in the light of the very limited role that the Post Office can play in such task. If we interpret the provision as requiring that the letter must have been actually delivered to the addressee, we would be virtually rendering it a dead letter. The letter cannot be served where, as in the case, the tenant is away from the premises for some considerable time. Also, an addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receive it. He can also manipulate matters that it gets returned to the sender with vague endorsements such as ‘not found’, ‘not in station’, ‘addressee has left’ and so on. It is suggested that a landlord, knowing that the tenant is away from station for some reasons, could go through the motions of posting a letter to him which he knows will not be served. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. But, as against this, if a registered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in the normal course and is returned, it can only be attributed to the addressee's own conduct. If he is staying in the premises, there is no reason why it would not be served on him. If he is compelled to be away for some time all that he has to do is to leave necessary instructions with the postal authorities, either to detain the letters addressed to him for some time until he returns or to forward them to the address where he has gone, or to deliver them to some other person authorized by him. In this situation, we have to choose the more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical interpretation and that would be to read the word ‘served’ as ‘sent by post’, correctly and properly addressed to the tenant and the word ‘receipt’ as the tender of the letter by the postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant.”
26. It stands established that the appellants were aware of the pendency of the case against them. The Apex Court in a recent authority reported in Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India, I (2008) SLT 521 : I (2008) CLT 135 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1006, the Apex Court was pleased to hold:
“Accepting the recommendations of the Law Commission, the rule was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 13 of Order 9 with effect from February 1, 1977 now reads thus:
13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant—In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he rnay apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit:
Provided that where the decree is of such a nature it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also:
Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant has notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim.
Explanation—Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside that ex parte decree.”
“19. It is, therefore, clear that the legal position under the amended Code is not whether the defendant was actually served with the summons in accordance with the procedure laid down and in the manner prescribed in Order 5 of the Code, but whether (i) he had notice of the date of hearing of suit; and (ii) whether he had sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff. Once these two conditions are satisfied, an ex parte decree cannot be set aside even if it is established that there was irregularity in service of summons. If the Court is convinced that the defendant had otherwise knowledge of the proceedings and he could have appeared and answered the plaintiff(s) claim, he cannot put forward a ground of non-service of summons for setting aside ex parte decree passed against him by invoking Rule 13 Order 9 of the Code. Since the said provision applies to Debts Recovery Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals under the Act in view of Section 22(2)(g) of the Act, both the Tribunals were right in observing that the ground raised by the appellants could not be upheld. It is not even contended by the appellants that through they had knowledge of the proceedings before the DRT, they had no sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff-Bank and on the ground, ex parte order deserves to be set aside.”
27. Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Ajita Sharma v. Rakesh Kumar Sharma, 1999 (1) Civil Court Cases 363 (P & H), held as under:
“If a person knows about a pending case and still ignores the said litigation, it would be wholly unfair for that person to urge that he had not been formally served.”
28. Same view was taken by the Chairperson, DRAT, Delhi in case reported in Inrays v. State Bank of India, I (2008) BC 67.
29. It is thus clear that the appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands and they had no qualms in telling untruth before this Court. For example, they have filed fabricated Ration Card and while staying in the same house they came to know about this case during intervals mentioned above. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs., II (1993) BC 546 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 853, was pleased to hold:
“The principle of finality of litigation cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, Bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.”
30. Similar view was taken by Apex Court in a recent authority reported as Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank Of India., VII (2007) SLT 440 : III (2007) CLT 296 (SC) : IV (2007) BC 240 (SC) : (2007) 8 SCC 449.
31. The whole gamut of the facts of the case and circumstances detailed above leans on the side of the respondent Bank. The appeals are without merits and are dismissed as such with costs. Counsel's fees as per Bank's norms.
32. Copies of this order be furnished to the parties as per law and another copy along with records be sent back to the DRT concerned. Another original judgment be placed on the connected file.
33. Appeals dismissed.
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