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D.K Gupta & Anr. Petitioners v. Renu Munjal

Delhi High Court
Dec 18, 2017
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of Opinion (Yogesh Khanna, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition seeks termination of the mandate of the learned arbitrator (Mr. Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh (Retd.)), on the ground that the respondent (the appointing party, described as the "lender") is ineligible under the Seventh Schedule of the amended Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and therefore the arbitrator appointed by that party is also allegedly de jure ineligible under the Supreme Court decision in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377. The petitioner alleges the arbitrator lacks inherent jurisdiction and that ineligibility goes to the root of his appointment; it is pressed that such an objection can be raised at any stage, including execution.

The petitioner relied on clause 8.9.4 of the parties' agreement dated 2 September 2013, which provides that “The arbitration shall take place before Sole arbitrator, to be appointed by the Lender.” The petitioner also contends that the arbitrator's written declaration does not conform to the requirements of the Sixth Schedule to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended, because it allegedly omits details such as previous arbitration experience and number of ongoing arbitrations.

Procedurally, a prior procedural order dated 23.09.2016 recorded that the learned counsel for the parties, acting on instructions, stated they had no objection on any ground to the appointment of the arbitrator; the arbitrator declared no interest in the parties or the subject matter. The petitioner participated in the arbitral proceedings, filed pleadings and appeared before the arbitrator, and did not raise the ineligibility objection until late in the proceedings. The petition and a pending application were ultimately heard and decided by the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitrator appointed by the lender is de jure ineligible to act by reason of (a) the lender's alleged ineligibility under the Seventh Schedule and (b) the principle in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. that an ineligible appointing person cannot nominate another arbitrator.
  2. Whether a challenge to an arbitrator's eligibility under Section 12(5) (and related schedules) can be raised at a belated stage of proceedings, including where parties have conducted arbitration without objection.
  3. Whether the proviso to Section 12(5) (permitting waiver of applicability by express agreement in writing after disputes have arisen) bars the petitioner's belated challenge.
  4. Whether the arbitrator's disclosure complies with the Sixth Schedule and, if not, what remedial step should be ordered.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The lender who appointed the arbitrator is ineligible under Schedule VII/Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended); therefore its nominee (the arbitrator) is also ineligible per the reasoning in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd., which holds that an ineligible arbitrator cannot validly nominate another arbitrator.
  • The arbitrator's declaration does not conform to the Sixth Schedule because it allegedly omits disclosure of prior arbitration experience and the number of ongoing arbitrations, including where the respondent is involved.
  • Because this is a de jure ineligibility going to the root of the appointment, the arbitrator lacks inherent jurisdiction and his mandate must be terminated; such an objection may be raised at any stage, even at execution.

Other Parties' / Respondent-Related Position (as recorded in the opinion)

The opinion does not set out a detailed, adversarial statement of the respondent's legal arguments. However, the record (procedural order dated 23.09.2016) reflects that the parties' counsel stated they had no objection on any ground to the arbitrator's appointment, and the respondent proceeded with the arbitration (including filing a Statement of Claim), which the Court treated as indicia of waiver of the applicability of Section 12(5) per the proviso.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 The principle that once an arbitrator or appointing person is rendered ineligible by operation of law (Section 12(5) and the Schedules), that person cannot validly nominate another arbitrator; an ineligible arbitrator/appointing person cannot exercise the power to appoint. The Court reproduced and considered TRF at length but distinguished it on the facts: in TRF the appointing person was a Managing Director (an employee) and thus fell within the Seventh Schedule disqualification; in the present case the arbitration clause gives a contractual right to a party (the lender) to appoint an arbitrator who is not an employee, and Section 11(2) permits parties to agree a procedure for appointment. Consequently, TRF did not warrant termination of the arbitrator's mandate in this case.
Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (coordinate Bench decision) Application of TRF principles and the notion that parties, by their conduct (appointment after disputes arose and proceeding with arbitration without objection), can be seen to have waived applicability of Section 12(5) under the proviso (i.e., an express agreement in writing after disputes arose). The Court relied on the coordinate Bench's reasoning to conclude that where parties proceeded after appointment knowing of an ineligibility and filed pleadings, such conduct amounted to waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5). The Court applied this reasoning to hold the petitioner's challenge was not maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying and comparing the arbitration clause in this agreement (clause 8.9.4) with the clause considered in TRF. Key steps of the Court's analysis, as set out in the opinion, were:

  • Clause analysis: The Court noted clause 8.9.4 gives the lender the contractual right to appoint the sole arbitrator. Unlike TRF, where the appointing person (Managing Director) was an employee of a party and thereby fell within the disqualifications under the Seventh Schedule, the present appointing party is not an employer-employee situation and the nominee is not an employee of either contractual party.
  • Statutory construction (Section 11(2)): The Court observed Section 11(2) expressly permits parties to agree a procedure for appointment of arbitrators, which supports the proposition that a contractual right to appoint an arbitrator is permissible under the Act.
  • Distinguishing TRF: The Court distinguished TRF because the factual matrix there involved an appointing person who was an employee (and thus ineligible). Here, the appointing party is a contractual party with a right under agreement; therefore the automatic application of TRF's rule (that an ineligible appointing person cannot nominate) did not directly compel termination of the arbitrator's mandate in the present facts.
  • Waiver under proviso to Section 12(5): The Court relied on the proviso to Section 12(5), which allows parties to waive the applicability of that sub-section by an express agreement in writing after disputes have arisen. The Court recorded that Procedural Order No.1 (dated 23.09.2016) records that learned counsel for the parties stated they had no objection to the appointment and that the arbitrator declared no interest. Further, the petitioner filed pleadings, appeared and participated in the proceedings and did not raise the eligibility objection until late. The Court treated that conduct as amounting to waiver under the proviso and therefore held the belated challenge to eligibility was not maintainable.
  • Reliance on coordinate decision: The Court cited the coordinate Bench decision in Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd., which applied TRF's principles and found waiver in similar circumstances; the present Court adopted that reasoning to the facts before it.
  • Remedial direction on disclosure: Although the Court found no case for termination, it nevertheless directed that the arbitrator should file the declaration strictly in compliance with the Sixth Schedule before proceeding further, since the petitioner insisted on that point.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition challenging the arbitrator's mandate on the ground of ineligibility is not made out and therefore no termination of the arbitrator's mandate was ordered. The Court directed the arbitrator to file a declaration strictly in compliance with the Sixth Schedule before proceeding further. The petition along with the pending application was disposed of.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The arbitrator (Mr. Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh (Retd.)) remains in place; the petition seeking his termination was disposed of. The arbitrator must file the Sixth Schedule declaration in strict compliance before continuing proceedings.
  • Waiver and procedural conduct: The decision underscores that, in the facts of this case, a party's conduct in participating in arbitration, filing pleadings and stating no objection to appointment (as recorded in a procedural order) can amount to waiver of objections under the proviso to Section 12(5), rendering a belated challenge to eligibility not maintainable.
  • Precedential scope: The Court distinguished TRF on its facts and applied prior coordinate bench reasoning; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond application of existing authorities and statutory provisos in the facts before it. No new broader precedent was claimed or established beyond the application of those principles to these facts.

Order: Copy of the order to be given dasti to learned counsel for the parties. The petition and the pending application are disposed of.

Show all summary ...

Yogesh Khanna, J.:— This petition is filed seeking termination of mandate of the learned arbitrator, on the plea the respondent is ineligible to act as an arbitrator, in terms of Schedule VII of the amended Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and as a sequitur, is also ineligible to even appoint/nominate an arbitrator in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377. It is urged since the ineligibility of the purported arbitrator is a de jure ineligibility which goes to the root of the appointment of the arbitrator, the instant petition has been filed as the arbitrator lacks the inherent jurisdiction to proceed any further. It is alleged the plea of inherent lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage, and even at the stage of execution.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the following paragraphs in TRF Ltd. (supra) to press his point:—

“11. We have referred to both the provisions to appreciate the change in the fundamental concept of grounds for challenge. The disclosures to be made by the arbitrator have been made specific and the disclosures are required to be made in accordance with the Sixth Schedule to the amended Act. The Sixth Schedule stipulates, apart from others, the circumstances which are to be disclosed. We think it appropriate to reproduce the same:

54. In such a context, the fulcrum of the controversy would be, can an ineligible arbitrator, like the Managing Director, nominate an arbitrator, who may be otherwise eligible and a respectable person. As stated earlier, we are neither concerned with the objectivity nor the individual respectability. We are only concerned with the authority or the power of the Managing Director. By our analysis, we are obligated to arrive at the conclusion that once the arbitrator has become ineligible by operation of law, he cannot nominate another as an arbitrator. The arbitrator becomes ineligible as per prescription contained in Section 12(5) of the Act. It is inconceivable in law that person who is statutorily ineligible can nominate a person. Needless to say, once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse. One cannot have a building without the plinth. Or to put it differently, once the identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator is lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator is obliterated. Therefore, the view expressed by the High Court is not sustainable and we say so.”

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner then referred to the agreement dated 2nd September, 2013 between the parties especially Clause 8.9.4 which is noted as under:—

“8.9 Arbitration

xxxx xxxx

8.9.4 The arbitration shall take place before Sole arbitrator, to be appointed by the Lender. The arbitral award shall be rendered in English Language.”

4. It is argued clause 8.9.4 above of the agreement gives a right to the lender to appoint an arbitrator and hence she has appointed Mr. Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh (Retd.), who per TRF (supra) has now become ineligible to act, hence his mandate be terminated.

5. It is also alleged though the declaration has been made by the learned arbitrator but is not confirming to VI Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended, inasmuch as the learned arbitrator has not disclosed as to his previous experience, including experience with arbitrations; number of ongoing arbitrations, especially where respondent is involved etc. It is thus argued per TRF Ltd. (supra) if the lender is ineligible so would be her nominee arbitrator and hence the arbitrator has become de jure ineligible to perform his functions and be removed.

6. Before proceeding further, let me here refer to the arbitration clause in TRF Ltd. (supra) which runs as under:

“33. Resolution of dispute/arbitration

(d) Unless otherwise provided, any dispute or difference between the parties in connection with this agreement shall be referred to sole arbitration of the Managing Director of Buyer or his nominee. Venue of arbitration shall be Delhi, and the arbitration shall be conducted in English language.”

7. A bare perusal of the clause above would reveal the sole arbitrator appointed was a Managing Director of the buyer viz its employee and hence per VIIth Schedule was not eligible and hence if the Managing Director was ineligible, so was the person nominated by the Managing Director.

8. However the arbitration clause pertaining to this case is on a different note. Here an arbitrator so appointed is not an employee of a party to the agreement. The arbitration clause herein rather gives a choice to one of the parties viz a lender to appoint an arbitrator. Thus perhaps is a striking difference between the two arbitration clauses viz., clause 33 of TRF Ltd. (supra) and clause 8.9.4 of the agreement dated 02.09.2013 herein. In TRF Ltd. (supra) the Managing Director of the buyer, being an employee of the buyer in a way represents the buyer itself, which is not the case here. Admittedly there exist no bar under the Act which restrains a party to appoint an Arbitrator. Rather section 11(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 empowers the parties to agree on a procedure for appointment of an arbitrator, which exactly is the situation here. section 11(2) is reproduced as under:—

“11. Appointment of arbitrators - …

(2) Subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators.”

9. When there exists no prohibition in the Act for a party to appoint an arbitrator, then a lender or a buyer, per any agreement, may have a right to choose an arbitrator, as even noted in para 17 of TRF (supra) as under:—

“17. First we shall address the issue whether the Court can enter into the arena of controversy at this stage. It is not in dispute that the Managing Director, by virtue of the amended provision that has introduced sub-section (5) to Section 12, had enumerated the disqualification in the Seventh Schedule. It has to be clarified here that the agreement had been entered into before the amendment came into force. The procedure for appointment was, thus, agreed upon. It has been observed by the designated Judge that the amending provision does not take away the right of a party to nominate a sole arbitrator, otherwise the legislature could have amended other provisions. He has also observed that the grounds including the objections under the Fifth and the Seventh Schedules of the amended Act can be raised before the Arbitral Tribunal and further when the nominated arbitrator has made the disclosure as required under the Sixth Schedule to the Act, there was no justification for interference. That apart, he has also held in his conclusion that besides the stipulation of the agreement governing the parties, the Court has decided to appoint the arbitrator as the sole arbitrator to decide the dispute between the parties.”

10. Moreso, the petitioner's challenge to ineligibility of the learned Arbitrator, even otherwise, is not maintainable at this belated stage in view of proviso to Section 12(5) which runs as under:

“Grounds for challenge. -

(5) xx xxx

Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section by an express agreement in writing.”

11. The proviso clarifies the applicability of sub section 5 of Section 12 can be waived by an express agreement in writing. The procedural order No. 1, dated 23.09.2016 records at the very outset, the learned counsel for the parties acting on instructions from the parties stated that they have no objection on any ground whatsoever to his appointment as a sole arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator has declared he has no interest in any of the parties or in the subject matter of the dispute.

12. Admittedly the petitioner has filed pleadings under their signatures/documents; has been appearing before the learned Arbitrator in conduct of the arbitral proceedings and has never raised such objections till at the fag end of the proceedings and thus has no right now to allege the arbitrator has become ineligible.

13. In Bharat Braodband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. decided by the coordinate Bench of this Court it was held:

“In the present case, in my opinion the three conditions that have been laid down by the Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. (supra) were fulfilled. The petitioner, knowing fully well that the arbitrator suffered from an ineligibility in terms of Section 12(5) of the Act proceeded to nominate him as a Sole Arbitrator after the disputes had arisen between the parties and the Respondent concurred in such appointment and even proceeded to file its Statement of Claim before the Arbitrator. Though it was contended that the appointment was made before the decision in TRF Ltd., this would not help the petitioner inasmuch as TRF Ltd. (supra) only applied Section 12(5) of the Act to the facts of the case therein. Petitioner cannot claim ignorance of Section 12(5) of the Act when it had proceeded to appoint the arbitrator and then turn around to challenge the appointment once it finds that the arbitration proceedings are not taking the direction it would like.

16. The appointment was accepted by the respondent who even proceeded to file the Statement of Claim before such arbitrator, without objections to his appointment or jurisdiction. Therefore, the disputes having arisen between the parties, both parties waived the applicability of Section 12(5) of the Act. The appointment being in writing and the filing of the Statement of Claim without any reservation also being in writing, in my opinion, in the facts of the case, the same would amount to an express agreement in writing as required under proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act.”

14. In view the law above and also the facts being different than of TRF (supra) no case for termination of the mandate of Mr. Justice Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh (Retd.), is made out on a plea he has now become ineligible by virtue of an amendment. Nevertheless, since the petitioner insists on a declaration strictly in compliance of VI Schedule of the Act, the learned arbitrator should file the same before proceeding further.

15. Copy of the order be given dasti to learned counsel for the parties.

16. The petition along with the pending application is disposed of.