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Kuna Alias Sanjaya Behera v. State Of Odisha .
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns the alleged murder of Santosh Behera during the night of 19-20 February 2000. Initially, the death was treated as an unnatural death by hanging. Six days later, on the basis of statements by Niranjan Behera (PW-1) and others, police registered a formal FIR under Sections 302 and 203 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant and one Pravati Behera.
At trial, both accused were convicted under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Trial Court relied principally on the testimony of PW-1, who claimed to have witnessed the killing, and on medical evidence indicating death by strangulation rather than hanging. The High Court affirmed the convictions, accepted the alleged extra-marital affair between the accused as motive, and rejected the defence challenge to PW-1’s credibility. The present appeal is from that affirmance.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction can be sustained solely on the testimony of PW-1 when that testimony is alleged to be improbable, inconsistent and unsupported by other direct evidence.
- Whether the prosecution proved motive—an extra-marital relationship between the accused—to support a conviction based largely on circumstantial evidence.
- Whether delays in lodging the FIR and disclosure of the incident fatally undermine the prosecution case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- PW-1’s conduct was unnatural: he remained silent during the alleged one-hour assault, raised no alarm, and disclosed the incident only after three days.
- The FIR was lodged six days after the incident without adequate explanation, casting doubt on the prosecution narrative.
- PW-1 was intoxicated, his presence at the scene was doubtful, and lighting conditions made observation from 15 cubits implausible.
- Testimony of PW-5, PW-6 and PW-8 is hearsay and cannot corroborate PW-1.
- Medical and inquest findings contain inconsistencies; alleged motive of illicit relationship is unproved.
- Cited precedents emphasise that conviction on a solitary witness requires unimpeachable reliability (Anil Phukan, Ramji Surjya Padvi, etc.).
Respondent State's Arguments
- PW-1’s evidence is coherent, detailed and corroborated by medical findings of death by manual strangulation.
- Delay in disclosure is explained by threats from the appellant; such delay is not fatal when ocular and medical evidence align (Gulam Sarbar).
- PW-1’s testimony is supported by PW-2, PW-3 and PW-12, and establishes motive from the proven illicit relationship.
- Courts below correctly applied the principle that quality, not quantity, of evidence matters.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Anil Phukan v. State of Assam, (1993) 3 SCC 282 | Conviction can rest on a solitary eyewitness if the testimony is reliable. | Used to frame the standard; ultimately, Supreme Court found PW-1 unreliable and declined to apply the rule in favour of conviction. |
| Ramji Surjya Padvi v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 3 SCC 629 | Quality of evidence outweighs number of witnesses. | Cited alongside Anil Phukan; Court held quality here deficient. |
| Chuhar Singh v. State of Haryana, (1976) 1 SCC 879 | General principles on appreciation of evidence. | Mentioned; no specific analysis undertaken. |
| State of A.P. v. Patnam Anandam, (2005) 9 SCC 237 | Reliance on single eyewitness permissible if credible. | Referenced; credibility test found unsatisfied. |
| Mahamadkhan Nathekhan v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 14 SCC 589 | Motive is significant in cases based on circumstantial evidence. | Cited to underline importance of motive; Court found motive unproved. |
| Budha Satya Venkata S. Rao v. State of A.P., 1994 Supp (3) SCC 639 | Principles on evaluation of eyewitness testimony. | Mentioned but not substantively discussed. |
| Niranjan Panja v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 6 SCC 525 | Standards of proof and benefit of doubt. | Cited but not elaborated. |
| Nagaraj v. State, (2015) 4 SCC 739 | Benefit of doubt where evidence is unsatisfactory. | Cited; aligns with Court’s ultimate grant of benefit of doubt. |
| Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401 | When ocular and medical evidence coincide, conviction is sound. | Relied on by prosecution; Court distinguished on facts due to unreliable ocular evidence. |
| Lokeman Shah v. State of W.B., (2001) 5 SCC 235, M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 |
Defines “proved”, “disproved”, “not proved” under Evidence Act and standard of a prudent man. | Used by Court to benchmark the level of certainty required; evidence held below threshold. |
| Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190 | Concept of reasonable doubt and burden of proof. | Cited to emphasise that doubts benefiting the accused must be reasonable; applied in granting acquittal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the sole eyewitness (PW-1) against the evidentiary standards articulated in prior cases and Section 3 of the Evidence Act.
- Lighting and Visibility: The spot map contained no indication of lighting; PW-1 allegedly observed events at 1–2 a.m. from 15 cubits away while intoxicated, rendering his account doubtful.
- Behavioural Improbabilities: PW-1 claimed the assault lasted about an hour, yet raised no alarm despite proximity of 150–200 neighbouring houses and relatives. His silence was deemed incompatible with normal human conduct.
- Delay and Hearsay: Disclosure to PW-5, PW-6 and PW-8 occurred three days later; FIR was lodged six days after the event. Those witnesses’ statements were held to be hearsay and of no substantive corroborative value.
- Motive Not Proved: Alleged extra-marital affair between the accused, accepted by the High Court, lacked persuasive evidence. Trial Court’s earlier rejection of motive was found sound.
- Medical Evidence: Although medical opinion of death by strangulation matched PW-1’s narration, the Court held that medical conformity cannot compensate for a fundamentally unreliable eyewitness account.
- Application of Precedents: The Court reiterated that conviction may rest on a single witness only if that evidence is of sterling quality. Finding PW-1’s testimony riddled with “improbabilities, doubts and oddities,” the Court concluded the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The appeal is allowed; the appellant is acquitted and ordered to be released unless required in another case.
Implications: The decision reinforces the principle that testimony of a solitary eyewitness must meet a high threshold of reliability. Where such testimony is found wanting and motive remains unproved, benefit of doubt must go to the accused. No new legal doctrine was created, but the judgment underscores vigilant application of existing standards for evaluating single-witness evidence.
Amitava Roy, J.— The appellant, successively convicted by both the courts below along with one Pravati Behera under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short, hereinafter to be referred to as “IPC/Code”) along with Section 34 of the Code is in appeal seeking remedial intervention.
2. Whereas the trial court by the judgment and order dated 26-1-2001, as stated hereinbefore, convicted the appellant and the co-accused Pravati Behera, the High Court Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 2001 by the verdict impugned, though has affirmed the conviction of both, had left the co-accused at liberty to move an application for premature release from the jail and for appropriate orders under Sections 433 and 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, hereinafter to be referred to as “CrPC”). Noticeably, the appellant and co-accused had been charged along with Section 302 IPC for the offence under Section 203 as well but were acquitted thereof by the trial court. Though an appeal was preferred by the State against such acquittal, the High Court has affirmed Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 2001 their exoneration as well.
3. We have heard Mr Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr Shibashish Misra for the respondent.
4. The prosecution case unfolds with a written information lodged by Premananda Behera (PW 12) with the police on 20-2-2000, whereby the unnatural death of his brother Santosh Behera by hanging from the roof of a shed adjacent to his (deceased) house, was reported. In the course of the investigation, following the registration of said information, Niranjan Behera (PW 1) disclosed to Daitari Behera (PW 5) that the appellant along with the co-accused Pravati Behera had in the intervening night of 19-2-2000/20-2-2000 murdered the deceased in his house and thereafter had suspended his dead body from the roof of the nearby shed. PW 1 claimed to have witnessed the incident of murder. Following this information, the investigation took a different turn. The appellant and the co-accused were arrested and eventually, charge-sheet was laid against them.
5. Notably, on 26-2-2000, Gunahari Behera (PW 6) and Makhan Behera (PW 8) also came to the police station and reported that PW 1 had disclosed to them as well to have witnessed the appellant and the co-accused committing murder of Santosh Behera (deceased) in his house and thereafter, hanging the dead body from the roof of the nearby shed. The investigating officer in the process of investigation, amongst others caused the inquest of the dead body to be made, prepared a spot map, Ext. P-11, effected seizure, amongst others, inter alia, of a rope and also got the post-mortem of the dead body done before submitting the charge-sheet as mentioned hereinabove. The formal FIR was registered on 26-2-2000 under Sections 302/203 read with Section 34 IPC.
6. At the trial, the accused persons were charged under Sections 302/203/34 IPC. They having denied the allegations, were made to stand trial. The prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses, and after recording the statements of the accused persons under Section 313 CrPC and on a consideration of the materials on record, the trial court convicted the appellant and co-accused under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 of the Code and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs 100, in default to suffer RI for 30 days.
7. In recording the conviction, the trial court laid utmost emphasis on the testimony of PW 1, who apart from narrating the incident of murder, also deposed about the extra-marital relationship between the accused persons, though they were related as nephew and aunt. Reliance was also placed on the evidence of Musimani Behera (PW 3), the mother of the deceased, who, perceived to have hinted as well to this unacceptable liaison. The trial court noted the opinion of Dr Rupabhanu Mishra (PW 11), who conducted the post-mortem examination that the cause of death of Santosh Behera was asphyxia as a result of constriction of the neck and not due to hanging by rope. The trial court, however discarded the prosecution case of illicit relationship between the accused persons and the motive of murder stemming therefrom. It was however of the view that lack of motive notwithstanding, the testimony of PW 1, PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8 taken together proved the charge against the accused persons and, therefore, returned the finding of guilt against them, qua the offences for which they had been charged.
8. Both the appellant and co-accused preferred separate appeals before the High Court and as hereinbefore stated, by the decision assailed, their conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC and the sentence awarded thereupon was affirmed. The High Court, in determining so, sustained the prosecution's plea of motive of murder founded on extra-marital relationship between the accused persons and arrived at the conclusion drawing sustenance from the evidence of PW 1 as well as PW 3, the mother of the deceased, who testified to have rebuked both of them for their deplorable conduct. The High Court, as well believed the version of the incident, as narrated by PW 1 and disclosed to PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8 albeit after a lapse of three days. The High Court accepted the explanation of PW 1 for the delay in such disclosure that the appellant had threatened him with dire consequences, if he did so.
9. Mr Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has emphatically urged that as the testimony of PW 1, the sole eyewitness, as claimed by the prosecution, is wholly unbelievable, the conviction of the appellant is palpably illegal and is liable to be set aside. Apart from contending that the FIR filed after six days of the incident was inexplicably delayed rendering the prosecution case unworthy of any credit, the learned Senior Counsel maintained that the High Court has grossly erred in accepting that the motive behind the murder was the illicit relationship between the accused persons, necessitating the elimination of the deceased. The learned Senior Counsel was particularly critical of the unnatural conduct of PW 1, who incomprehensibly remained indifferent and silent though his uncle was murdered in his view and that the incident, according to him, ranged for about an hour. Further, his unexplained silence about the gruesome murder by the accused persons for about three days also rendered him wholly untrustworthy, he urged.
10. Mr Krishnan argued as well that not only PW 1 at the relevant time was admittedly in an intoxicated state, his presence at the place of occurrence was not free from doubt. The learned Senior Counsel underlined that it being in the evidence that there were several houses of the close relatives of the deceased and PW 1 in the locality, the claim of PW 1 to be a silent eyewitness to the incident, is wholly unbelievable. The learned Senior Counsel insisted as well that in absence of any material on record that the area was sufficiently lighted, it was wholly unacceptable that PW 1 could see the incident from his house at a distance of 15 cubits. In the attendant facts and circumstances, Mr Venugopal maintained that the conviction of the appellant on the testimony of a solitary witness, whose version was laden with inconsistencies, absurdities, and improbabilities, is patently illegal and cannot, in any view of the matter, be sustained in law. He discarded the evidence of PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8, relied upon by the two courts below, on the ground that their testimonies were wholly inconsequential being in the nature of “hearsay”, they having derived the knowledge of the incident from PW 1, as reported to them by him.
11. Mr Venugopal has urged that if the version of PW 1 is disbelieved, as it ought to be, in view of the inherent incongruities, the other materials on record do not unerringly evince the complicity of the accused persons in the offence and thus, the appellant is liable to be acquitted. He argued as well that the injuries enumerated in the inquest report and the medical evidence/post-mortem report, also are inconsistent and contradictory in description, thus rendering the prosecution version highly improbable. The learned counsel emphasised that the evidence on record by no means convincingly establish the illicit relationship between the accused persons and that the High Court did fall in error in accepting the same. The following decisions were cited in endorsement of the arguments advanced:
1. Anil Phukan v. State of Assam (1993) 3 SCC 282
2. Ramji Surjya Padvi v. State of Maharashtra (1983) 3 SCC 629
3. Chuhar Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 879
4. State of A.P v. Patnam Anandam (2005) 9 SCC 237
5. Mahamadkhan Nathekhan v. State of Gujarat (2014) 14 SCC 589
6. Budha Satya Venkata S. Rao v. State of A.P 1994 Supp (3) SCC 639
7. Niranjan Panja v. State of W.B (2010) 6 SCC 525
8. Nagaraj v. State (2015) 4 SCC 739
12. In refutation, the learned counsel for the respondent State has asserted that the evidence of the sole eyewitness PW 1 is coherent, consistent and cogent and is fully complemented by medical evidence and thus the prosecution having been able to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt, the conviction and sentence of the appellant and his co-accused does not merit interference. Having regard to the vivid narration of the incident in minute details, as provided by PW 1, the courts below were perfectly justified in relying on his sole testimony, he urged. As the medical evidence, mentioning the cause of death, is wholly corroborative of the version of PW 1, there is no scope to doubt the culpability of the accused persons, he argued. The learned counsel dismissed the demur of the defence that the evidence of PW 1 was vitiated by contradictions, embellishments and inconsistencies. According to Mr Misra, the statement on oath of PW 1 is amply supported by that of Kumari Nomita Behera (PW 2), the daughter of the deceased and PW 12, who, in the next morning, did detect the dead body of the deceased in a hanging posture from the roof of the adjacent shed, as deposed by PW 1. As the testimony of PW 1 together with that of PW 3, the mother of the deceased persuasively prove the illicit relationship between the accused persons, the High Court was justified in accepting the same to be the motive for the offence, in the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, he insisted. The learned counsel for the respondent urged that as PW 1 had been threatened with death by the appellant, if he dared to disclose the commission of offence, the delay on the part of the witness (PW 1) to confide about the same in PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8 after three days and the filing of the FIR after six days per se, is not fatal for the prosecution. The decision of this Court in Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar (2014) 3 SCC 401 was cited to reinforce the contention that when ocular evidence is in conformity with the medical evidence, conviction based thereon is legal and valid.
13. To appropriately appreciate the competing assertions, it is expedient to evaluate the evidence having a direct bearing on the offence allegedly committed for the offence involved. PW 1, who is the cousin brother of the appellant and incidentally the nephew of the co-accused Pravati Behera, deposed on oath that there was a lingering love affair between the accused persons from before the occurrence and that he had seen them in a compromising position in the house of the deceased, six months' prior to the incident. The witness stated that he informed about this to the mother of the deceased, who rebuked the accused persons. He stated that in the night of occurrence at 9.30 p.m, he had gone to witness a video show in the village, where the children of Pravati Behera, the co-accused were also present. According to him, in the course of the show, the appellant asked him to accompany him for liquor and though the witness initially resisted, he eventually left the video show with the appellant. He stated further that they then went to the house of Baisakhu Behera, where the appellant purchased liquor and consumed the same and forced the witness as well to drink. The witness stated that they then proceeded towards their respective homes and when they were nearing their houses, the appellant concealed himself in a lane near the house of the witness. PW 1 stated that at that time, he saw the deceased and Pravati Behera coming out of their house to ease themselves. On their way back to the house, Pravati Behera entered first and when the deceased was about to enter, the appellant struck him twice from the back, as a result of which, he (deceased) fell down. According to the witness, the appellant sat on the chest of the deceased and pressed his neck by his hands and Pravati Behera covered his mouth with her hands, as a result of which the deceased soon became suffocated and died. The witness stated that thereafter the accused persons brought a rope, tied it around the neck of the deceased and suspended the dead body from the roof of the adjacent shed. Thereafter, the appellant locked Pravati Behera in the house from outside and threatened to kill him, if he disclosed the offence to anyone, whereafter the witness returned home. PW 1 stated that it was three days thereafter that he narrated the incident to PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8.
14. In cross-examination, the witness in substance stated that his house, that of the deceased, PW 12 and other relatives were located nearby and that the courtyard in between his house and that of the deceased measured about 15 cubits. The witness conceded that there were about 150 to 200 houses adjacent to his house, situated at a distance of 20 to 25 cubits. He further stated that at that point of time, he was little intoxicated, and he was then inside his compound. PW 1 deposed as well that though the occurrence took place for about an hour, he did not raise any alarm asking for help. He admitted that on the next day, though about 5000 people had gathered, he did not disclose the incident either to them or to the police. He however sought to explain his conduct by stating that he did not do so as he had been threatened by the appellant but after three days, he gathered courage and informed PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8 of the incident.
15. PW 3, the mother of the deceased deposed that she had rebuked the accused persons on several occasions on noticing “secret talks” between them. The testimony of PW 5 and PW 6 in essence is that on 20-2-2000, PW 1 disclosed to them the incident and the fact that he had witnessed the same. PW 8 stated that about 5/6 days after the incident, when he asked PW 1 about the same, he disclosed to him stating that the appellant and Pravati Behera had committed murder of Santosh Behera. To all these three witnesses, as stated by them, PW 1 disclosed in sequence the facts, as narrated by him on oath.
16. Dr Rupabhanu Mishra (PW 11), who performed the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased had apart from mentioning the external injuries by way of abrasions, etc. opined that death was due to asphyxia by pressing of neck and was not due to hanging by rope. PW 12, as already alluded to hereinabove, stated on oath that on 20-2-2000, he had gone to the house of the deceased to hand over the keys of his sweetmeat shop, where the deceased was employed, but was told by his wife from inside the house that he (deceased) had gone out by locking the door from outside. The witness stated that it was then 5.00/5.30 a.m and when he returned with his torchlight, he detected the dead body of Santosh Behera hanging from the roof of adjacent shed by a rope. He then requested PW 5 to write a report which he thereafter lodged with the police. SI Narendra Kumar Sarangi (PW 16) is the investigating officer, who enumerated the steps taken by him during the investigation and proved amongst others, Ext. P-11, the spot map.
17. The accused persons in response to the questions, laying the incriminating evidence against them denied the correctness thereof and stood by their plea of innocence.
18. Before recording the final conclusions on the basis of the evidence on record, beneficial it would be to briefly note the legal propositions enunciated in the authorities cited at the Bar.
19. That conviction can be based on a testimony of a single eyewitness if he or she passes the test of reliability and that it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of evidence that is important, have been propounded consistently in Anil Phukan (1993) 3 SCC 282, Ramji Surjya (1983) 3 SCC 629, Patnam Anandam (2005) 9 SCC 237 and Gulam Sarbar (2014) 3 SCC 401 with the apparent emphasis that evidence must be weighed and not counted, decisive test being whether it has a ring of truth and it is cogent, credible, trustworthy or otherwise.
20. That in a case where the charge is sought to be proved only on circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important part in order to tilt the scale was, amongst others underscored in Mahamadkhan Nathekhan (2014) 14 SCC 589.
21. With reference to Section 3 of the Evidence Act, which defines “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”, this Court in Lokeman Shah v. State of W.B (2001) 5 SCC 235, AIR 2001 SC 1760 recalled its observations in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P (2001) 1 SCC 691, 2001 Cri LJ 515 as hereinbelow: (Lokeman Shah case (2001) 5 SCC 235, AIR 2001 SC 1760)
“17. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of a particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists (vide Section 3 of the Evidence Act). What is required is materials on which the court can reasonably act for reaching the supposition that a certain fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting on any important matter concerning him….”
22. Prior thereto, in Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P (1990) 3 SCC 190, this Court dwelling on the same theme, had recorded the following exposition:
“28. It can be argued that the concept of “reasonable doubt” is vague in nature and the standard of “burden of proof” contemplated under Section 105 should be somewhat specific, therefore, it is difficult to reconcile both. But the general principles of criminal jurisprudence, namely, that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt, are to be borne in mind. The “reasonable doubt” is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man. Section 3 while explaining the meaning of the words “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved” lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man. The section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of a fact, in other words, “believe it to exist” and secondly in which though he may not feel absolutely certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances act on the assumption of its existence. The Act while adopting the requirement of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof at the same time contemplates of giving full effect to be given to circumstances or condition of probability or improbability. It is this degree of certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be said to be proved. A fact is said to be disproved when the court believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable in the view of a prudent man and now we come to the third stage where in the view of a prudent man the fact is not proved i.e neither proved nor disproved. It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of criminal disputes. It is something different from moral conviction and it is also different from a suspicion. It is the result of a process of keen examination of the entire material on record by “a prudent man”.”
23. The quintessence of the enunciation is that the expression “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”, lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man, so much so that while adopting the said requirement, as an appropriate concrete standard to measure “proof”, full effect has to be given to the circumstances or conditions of probability or improbability. It has been expounded that it is this degree of certainty, existence of which should be arrived at from the attendant circumstances, before a fact can be said to be proved.
24. It is on the touchstone of this legal exposition that the evidence in the case in hand, has to be appreciated. Admittedly, PW 1 is the solitary eyewitness to the incident. He is related both to the deceased and the appellant-accused. Whereas the deceased is his uncle, the appellant is his cousin brother. He claims to have accompanied the appellant from the video show till the place of occurrence. At the relevant time, he was admittedly intoxicated. The incident, as per the prosecution version, occurred between 1 a.m to 2 a.m in the intervening night of 19-2-2000/20-2-2000 in the house of the deceased which was located about 15 cubits from the compound where the house of PW 1 was situated. The spot map, Ext. P-11 prepared by the IO (PW 16) noticeably does not mention about any source of light in the locality. It does not even indicate as to whether the area was lighted at the time of incident so as to make the viewing of the incident possible by PW 1 from the place, where he was located.
25. It is intriguing that though PW 1 claimed that the duration of the incident was about one hour and that the appellant first did assault the deceased from behind twice on which he (deceased) fell down, whereafter he (appellant) sat on his chest and throttled him and that co-accused Pravati Behera covered the mouth of deceased to facilitate his suffocation to death, he did not utter a sound or make a shriek or raise any alarm either to prevent the occurrence or to muster assistance from the inhabitants in the locality. This is more so as he admitted that there were about 150 to 200 inhabitants, lodging nearby apart from the fact that the houses of his relatives as well of the deceased were almost in the same campus. His plea that he did not disclose the incident to others immediately as he had been threatened by the appellant does not explain or justify in any manner whatsoever his inexplicable silence or indifference during the time of commission of occurrence.
26. In the overall scenario, the plea of the defence that the evidence of PW 1 is highly improbable, absurd and doubtful, cannot be lightly brushed aside more particularly in view of the test of essentiality of the degree of certainty, necessary to accept that the facts narrated by this witness as proved. To recall, the incident at the first place had been registered as a case of unnatural death and was after six days of the occurrence converted into one under Sections 302/203/34 IPC against the appellant and the co-accused on the disclosures made by PW 1, PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8. Apart from the fact that testimony of PW 5, PW 6 and PW 8 can by no means be construed to be substantive in nature, these witnesses having derived the knowledge from PW 1, we are inclined to accept the analysis of the materials on record on the aspect of motive as made by the trial court.
27. The testimony of PW 1 with regard to the illicit relationship between the accused persons, his revelation to the mother of the deceased that he and the co-accused were seen in a compromising position in their house with the door open and the reprimand of the mother (PW 3) for the “secret talks” between them (accused persons) lack in persuasion to conclude that the prosecution had been able to prove such relationship and therefore, the motive for the murder by them. The medical evidence to the effect that death had occurred by asphyxia as a result of constriction of the neck and not due to hanging by rope, though conforms to the manner of execution of the offence, as narrated by PW 1, in view of inherent improbabilities and incongruities in his evidence, we do not consider it safe to base the conviction of the appellant and the co-accused thereon. Dehors testimony of PW 1, and the motive as alleged by the prosecution, there is no other tangible and clinching material on record in support of the charge against the appellant and the co-accused. The inference of motive by the High Court drawn from the evidence of PW 1 and PW 3, in the overall perspective as discussed hereinabove, is apparently flawed.
28. On a totality of the consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the evidence of PW 1, as a witness of incident of murder, as projected by him is wholly unacceptable being fraught with improbabilities, doubts and oddities inconceivable with normal human conduct or behaviour and, thus cannot be acted upon as the basis of conviction. The testimonies of PW 3, PW 5, PW 6, PW 8 and PW 11, even if taken on their face value, fall short of the requirement of proof of the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The appellant and the co-accused are thus entitled to the benefit of doubt in the singular facts and circumstances of the case. The contrary view taken by the courts below is against the weight of the evidence on record and the exposition of law attested by the decisions cited at the Bar and traversed as hereinabove.
29. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. As a consequence, the appellant is acquitted and is ordered to be set at liberty if not required in connection with any other case.
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