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Pintu Dey v. State Of Rajasthan & Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a criminal miscellaneous petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) by the petitioner seeking quashing of FIR No. 468/2012 dated 21.09.2012 registered at Police Station Hiranmagri, District Udaipur. The FIR was lodged at the instance of respondent No. 2 and alleges offences against the management of Hotel Cambay, Udaipur under sections 37, 51, 63 and 68A of the Copyright Act, 1957. The petitioner, who is the Front Office Manager of the Cambay Hotel, was arraigned as an accused in that FIR. The petition challenges the registration of the FIR on the ground that the offences invoked are non-cognizable and that the police registered and investigated the FIR without the requisite order of a Magistrate under Section 155(2) CrPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether offences alleged under sections 63, 65 and 68A of the Copyright Act, 1957—having punishments which "may extend to" up to three years (and, in the case of section 63, a prescribed minimum of six months)—are cognizable offences under Part II of Schedule I of the CrPC.
- Whether registration and investigation of the impugned FIR by the police without an order of a Magistrate having power to try the case or commit it for trial contravenes sub-section (2) of Section 155 of the CrPC, thereby justifying quashing of the FIR.
- Whether sections 37 and 51 of the Copyright Act are only definitional provisions (as contended by the petitioner) while sections 63, 65 and 68A are the penal provisions attracting the question of cognizability.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Sections 37 and 51 of the Copyright Act are definitions; the actual penal provisions are sections 63, 65 and 68A.
- Offences under sections 63, 65 and 68A are non-cognizable under Part II of Schedule I of the CrPC because they carry imprisonment which "may extend to" up to three years (and in section 63 a minimum of six months), and therefore police cannot investigate such non-cognizable cases without an order of a Magistrate under Section 155(2) CrPC.
- Relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Chaudhary v. State (N.C.T.) of Delhi, AIR 2001 SC 2369, and on Amarnath Vyas v. State of A.P., 2007 Cri.L.J. 2025 (Andhra Pradesh High Court), in support of this interpretation.
Respondent / Public Prosecutor's Arguments
- The offences under sections 63 and 68A of the Copyright Act are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years, and such offences fall within the category of cognizable offences under Part II of Schedule I of the CrPC.
- Therefore, the impugned FIR was properly registered and is not liable to be quashed on the ground that it concerns a non-cognizable offence or that it was registered without magistrate's order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajeev Chaudhary v. State (N.C.T.) of Delhi, AIR 2001 SC 2369 | Interpreted expressions like "not less than" and "imprisonment which may extend to" in the context of Section 167(2) proviso (a) CrPC; held that "not less than ten years" covers only offences for which punishment is a clear period of ten years or more, and that "imprisonment which may extend to ten years" cannot be equated with "not less than ten years". | The court relied on this interpretation to conclude that an expression of the form "imprisonment which may extend to X years" should not be equated with the expression "imprisonment for X years and upwards" used in Part II of Schedule I, thereby guiding the characterization of offences as cognizable or non-cognizable. |
| Amarnath Vyas v. State of A.P., 2007 Cri.L.J. 2025 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) | Applied Rajeev Chaudhary to hold that the expression "imprisonment which may extend up to three years" does not fall within the expression "imprisonment for three years and upwards" in Part II of Schedule I of the CrPC; emphasized strict construction of penal provisions. | The court adopted this reasoning and its conclusion as persuasive authority for treating offences punishable with imprisonment "which may extend to three years" as not automatically falling within the cognizable category defined by "three years and upwards". The present court expressly agreed with this proposition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:
- It identified the relevant penal provisions and their punishments as stated in the Copyright Act, 1957:
- Section 63: punishment not less than six months and which may extend to three years, and fine not less than Rs.50,000 (with proviso for lesser sentence in certain circumstances).
- Section 65: punishment may extend to two years and fine.
- Section 68A: punishment may extend to three years and fine.
- It set out Part II of Schedule I of the CrPC, which classifies offences for purposes of cognizability and bailability according to the quantum of punishment, including the relevant thresholds: (a) punishable with death, life or more than seven years; (b) punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards but not more than seven years (cognizable); (c) punishable with imprisonment for less than three years or fine only (non-cognizable).
- Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Chaudhary and the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision in Amarnath Vyas (which applied Rajeev Chaudhary), the court accepted the interpretive principle that an expression such as "imprisonment which may extend to three years" is not the same as "imprisonment for three years and upwards". The court quoted the Rajeev Chaudhary passage explaining that "not less than" covers only punishments that are a clear period of the specified term or more, and that "may extend to" cannot be equated to a minimum fixed term.
- The court agreed with the Andhra Pradesh High Court that penal provisions must be strictly construed and that offences whose maximum punishment "may extend to three years" are not automatically to be read into the classification that requires a minimum of three years' imprisonment.
- On this basis, the court concluded that offences punishable under sections 63 and 68A of the Copyright Act, 1957—each carrying maximum punishments which may extend up to three years—do not fall within the description "imprisonment for three years and upwards" in Part II, and therefore are not cognizable offences for the purposes of the Schedule.
- Given that the offences were determined to be non-cognizable, the court noted sub-section (2) of Section 155 CrPC which provides that "No police officer shall investigate a noncognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial."
- The court found that the impugned FIR was registered and the matter proceeded without any order of a Magistrate having power to try or commit the case for trial; this, on the court's reasoning, was violative of Section 155(2) CrPC.
- Consequently, because the registration of the FIR and the police action were in breach of the statutory prohibition in Section 155(2) CrPC, the court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR.
Holding and Implications
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION ALLOWED — the impugned FIR No. 468/2012 dated 21.09.2012 is quashed.
Direct consequences:
- The impugned FIR registered at Police Station Hiranmagri, District Udaipur on 21.09.2012 against the petitioner is quashed.
- The separate stay petition mentioned in the record was disposed of.
Broader implications: The opinion applies existing authority (Rajeev Chaudhary and Amarnath Vyas) to interpret the expressions used in penal provisions and in Part II of Schedule I of the CrPC, concluding that offences punishable with imprisonment "which may extend to three years" do not fall within the categorical description "three years and upwards" for cognizability. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle beyond applying those precedents; accordingly, no novel precedent is declared by this order beyond its application to the facts before the court.
Vijay Bishnoi, J.:— This criminal misc. petition under section 482 CrPC has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer for quashing the FIR No. 468/2012 dated 21.09.2012 lodged at Police Station, Hiranmagri, District Udaipur for the offences punishable under sections 37, 51, 63, 68A of Copyright Act, 1957 (for short ‘the Act of 1957’ hereinafter).
2. The impugned FIR has been registered at the instance of respondent No. 2, wherein allegations have been levelled against the Management of Hotel Cambay, Udaipur for commission of offences punishable under sections 37, 51, 63, 68A of the Act of 1957. The petitioner being the Front Office Manager of the Cambay Hotel, Udaipur is arraigned as accused in the impugned FIR.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the impugned FIR has argued that although in the impugned FIR various sections are quoted but sections 37 and 51 of the Act of 1957 only deal with various definitions and actually sections 63, 65 and 68A are the penal provisions. It is contended that the offences under sections 63, 65 and 68A of the Act of 1957 are noncognizable offences by virtue of Part-II of Schedule-I of CrPC because they carry imprisonment which can be extended up to three years only and, therefore, as per section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no police officer can investigate a non-cognizable case without an order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial. It is contended that the impugned FIR has been registered by the police without there being any order of the Magistrate and, therefore, the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed only on this ground. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Rajeev Chaudhary v. State (N.C.T) of Delhi, AIR 2001 SC 2369 and decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered in Amarnath Vyas v. State Of A.P, 2007 Cri.L.J 2025.
4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has argued that offences under sections 63 and 68A of the Act of 1957 are punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to three years and the same falls within the category of cognizable offence and, therefore, the impugned FIR is not liable to be quashed on the ground that the same is in respect of non-cognizable offence and cannot be registered or investigated by the police without there being an order of a Magistrate.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned FIR.
6. Sections 63, 65 and 68A of the Act of 1957 read as under:
“63. Offence of infringement of copyright or other rights conferred by this Act.- Any person who knowingly infringes or abets the infringement of-
(a) the copyright in a work, or
(b) any other right concerned by this Act, except the right conferred by Section 53A shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:
Provided that where the infringement has not been made for gain in the course of trade or business the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or a fine of less than fifty thousand rupees.
65. Possession of plates for purpose of making infringing copies.-Any person who knowingly makes, or has in his possession, any plate for the purpose of making infringing copies of any work in which copyright subsists shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.
68A. Penalty for contravention of Section 52A.-Any person who publishes a sound recording or a video film in contravention of the provisions of Section 52A shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.”
7. As per section 63, the offence under the said Act is punishable with imprisonment for a terms which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine. The offence falling under section 65 of the Act of 1957 is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years and an offence falling under section 68A of the Act of 1957 shall punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to three years.
8. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Chaudhary's case (supra) has held as under:
“In this context, the expression “not less than” would mean imprisonment should be 10 years or more and would cover only those offences for which punishment could be imprisonment for a clear period of 10 years or more. Under Section 386 punishment provided is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and also fine. That means, imprisonment can be for a clear period of 10 years or less. Hence, it could not be said that minimum sentence would be 10 years or more. Further, in context also if we consider clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2), it would be applicable in case where investigation relates to an offence punishable (1) with death; (2) imprisonment for life; and (3) imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. It would not cover the offence for which punishment could be imprisonment for less than 10 years. Under Section 386 of the IPC, imprisonment can very from minimum to maximum of 10 years and it cannot be aid that imprisonment prescribed is not less than 10 years.”
9. In Amarnath Vyas v. State Of A.P (supra), the Andhra Pradesh High Court after relying on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Chaudhary's case (supra), has held as under:
“11. Both these judgments discussed hereinabove have not considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajeev Chaudhary v. State (N.C.T) of Delhi AIR 2001 SC 2369: (2001 Cri LJ 2941). The provisions of Section 167(2) Clause (1) proviso (a) of the Cr.P.C came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the said judgment. The offence involved, as can be seen from the matrix of that case, is extortion punishable under Section 386 of IPC. The punishment prescribed therefor is imprisonment of either description for a term, which may extend to 10 years and shall also liable to fine. The expression ‘imprisonment which may extend to 10 years' was discussed by the Apex Court in juxtaposition to the other expression ‘imprisonment for 10 years or more’. The proviso under Clause (1) of Section 167, Sub-clause (2) of the Cr.P.C reads that if the period of ninety days exceeds in the case of investigation relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, the remand prisoner, as a matter of right, is entitled to bail. Therefore, the expression used therein inter alia that imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, as per the judgment of the Supreme Court, could not be equated with imprisonment for ten years or more; and that the expression would cover only those offences punishable with imprisonment for a clear period of ten years or more. Inasmuch as under Section 386 IPC the punishment provided is imprisonment for either description for a term which may extend to ten years, it was considered by the Apex Court and held that such an imprisonment cannot be equated with the sentence of imprisonment for ten years or more. In the view of the Apex Court, imprisonment for a term, which may extend to ten years cannot be construed as similar to the sentence of ten years or more. In paragraph No. 6, the Apex Court held thus:
“In this context, the expression ‘not less than’ would mean imprisonment should be ten (10) years or more and would cover only those offences for which punishment could be imprisonment for a clear period of ten (10) years or more. Under Section 386 punishment provided is imprisonment of either description for a term, which may extend to ten (10) years and also fine. That means, imprisonment can be for a clear period of ten (10) years or less. Hence, it could not be said that minimum sentence would be ten (10) years or more. Further, in context also if we consider Clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2), it would be applicable in case where investigation relates to an offence punishable (1) with death; (2) imprisonment for life; and (3) imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. It would not cover the offence for which punishment could be imprisonment for less than ten (10) years. Under Section 386 of the I.P.C, imprisonment can vary from minimum to maximum of ten (10) years and it cannot be said that imprisonment prescribed is not less than ten (10) years.” In view of the said authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court, the expression used in Second category of II-Part of Schedule-I of the Cr.P.C viz., that the term of imprisonment for three years or upwards, but not more than seven years, cannot be equated with the expression used in Section 63 of the Act viz., the imprisonment which may extend to three years.
12. It is trite that the penal provisions shall have to be construed strictly. True there may be certain other class of offences which may fall in between classification II and classification III of Second Part of Schedule-I. Merely because they are not coming squarely within the domain of classification-III, they, cannot automatically be treated as included in the classification-II. By default, they cannot be considered as coming within the purview of the classification-II. Having regard to the fact that the judgments of Kerala and Gauhathi High Courts supra have not considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajeev Chaudhary's case 2001 CriLJ 2941 (supra), with due respect, they cannot be considered as having laid down the correct proposition of law. Therefore, the expression ‘imprisonment for a term which may extend upto three years', in my considered view, would not come squarely within the expression ‘imprisonment for three years and upwards'. Therefore, the offence punishable under Section 63 of the Act cannot be considered as ‘non-bailable’ one.”
10. Admittedly, offences punishable under sections 63 and 68A of the Act of 1957 carry maximum punishment which can be extended up to three years.
11. Part-II of Schedule-I of CrPC reads as under:
“II - CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES AGAINST OTHER LAWS
OffenceCognizable or non-cognizableBailable or non-bailableBy what court triable1234If punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than 7 years,CognizableNon-bailableCourt of Session.If punishable with imprisonment for 3 years, and upwards but not more than 7 years.CognizableNon-bailableMagistrate of the first classIf punishable with imprisonment for less than 3 years or with fine only.Non-cognizableBailableAny Magistrate
12. As held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Amarnath Vyas's case (supra), there may be certain other class of offences which may fall in between Classification II and Classification III of second part of Schedule-I of CrPC but merely because they are not falling squarely within the domain of Classification III, they cannot automatically be treated as included in Classification-II. By default, they cannot be considered as coming within the purview of Classification II, I am totally in agreement with the above proposition laid down by Andhra Pradesh High Court.
13. Hence, as per the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Chaudhary's case (supra) and by Andhra Pradesh High Court in Amarnath Vyas's case (supra), the expression “imprisonment for a term which may extend up to 3 years” would not come within the expression “imprisonment for 3 years and upwards”. Therefore, the offence punishable under sections 63 and 68A of the Act of 1957 cannot be considered as cognizable offence.
14. sub-section (2) of section 155 of CrPC reads as under:
“(2) No police officer shall investigate a noncognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial.”
15. As per the above provision, no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without an order of a Magistrate.
16. In view of the above discussions, the action of registration of the impugned FIR against the petitioner without there being any order of the Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial is violative of sub-section (2) of section 155 of the CrPC.
17. Resultantly, this criminal misc. petition is allowed. The impugned FIR No. 468/2012 dated 21.09.2012 of Police Station, Hiranmagri, District Udaipur filed against the petitioner is quashed.
18. Stay petition stands disposed of.
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