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Vinod Kumar Garg Petitioner v. Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors. S
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner claims to be the recorded owner of land bearing Khasra No. 1447 Min (2-3) measuring 2 bighas and 3 biswas in Village Malik Pur Kohi @ Rang Puri, District South-West Delhi (the "suit land"). A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 27.06.1996 that included the suit land, and a declaration under Section 6 of the same Act was issued on 03.03.1997. The Land Acquisition Collector made award No. 3/98-99 dated 26.02.1999.
The petitioner earlier moved this Court in W.P. No. 3371/1997 (Vinod Kumar Garg v. Union of India), which was decided and disposed of by order dated 02.05.2013 holding that the quashing of notifications would exclude land already utilized for construction of a flyover and slip-road. The petitioner asserts that no compensation has been paid or tendered pursuant to the award and relies on Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 to contend that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act).
In its counter-affidavit the Government of NCT of Delhi, through the Land Acquisition Collector, stated that possession could not be taken due to an interim stay/status quo order of this Court and that compensation was not paid because the requisitioning authority (PWD) did not send the funds. The Division Bench in Santosh Singh v. UOI (decided 13.11.2014) is discussed in the opinion for its interpretation of Section 24(2) in the context of interim orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the acquisition of the suit land is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act because compensation was not paid/tendered and possession was not taken within the period specified by the Act (the five-year period indicated in Section 24(2)).
- Whether time during which interim judicial orders (stay/status quo) subsisted affects the operation of Section 24(2) — i.e., whether interim court orders prevent acquisition from lapsing under Section 24(2).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner is the recorded owner of the suit land and claims the acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act.
- No compensation has been paid or tendered pursuant to award No. 3/98-99 dated 26.02.1999.
- Relying on Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183, counsel argued that the five-year period indicated in Section 24(2) has ended and therefore acquisition has lapsed.
Respondents' (Government of NCT of Delhi / Land Acquisition Collector) Position
- By counter-affidavit (Para 13), the answering respondents stated that possession of the subject land could not be taken due to an interim stay/status quo order passed by the Court.
- The answering respondents also stated that compensation could not be paid because, for want of possession due to the interim order, the compensation amount was not sent by the requisitioning authority (PWD) to the answering respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vinod Kumar Garg v. Union of India | Earlier order disposing W.P. No. 3371/1997; quashing of notifications except insofar as land already utilized for construction of flyover and slip-road. | Referenced as part of the petitioner's procedural history; the writ was decided and disposed of on 02.05.2013 with the stated exclusion. |
| Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki | Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that acquisition lapses when the five-year period under Section 24(2) has expired. | Relied upon by petitioner's counsel to urge that the acquisition of the suit land has lapsed under Section 24(2). |
| Santosh Singh v. UOI | Held that situations where interim orders were made by the court fall within the ambit of Section 24(2) (analysis of Sections 19, 24(2) and 69 of the Act and interaction with interim orders). | The Court noted this Division Bench decision and treated its analysis as binding for the purpose of interpreting Section 24(2) in the circumstances of interim orders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first set out the undisputed procedural facts: notification under Section 4 (27.06.1996), declaration under Section 6 (03.03.1997), and award No. 3/98-99 (26.02.1999). It noted the petitioner's prior writ (W.P. No. 3371/1997) and the disposal order dated 02.05.2013 that excluded land already used for a flyover and slip-road from the effect of quashing.
The Court observed that neither possession of the suit land was taken nor any compensation was tendered or paid pursuant to the award. It recorded the respondents' explanation (Para 13 of the counter-affidavit) that possession could not be taken due to an interim stay/status quo order and that compensation was not paid because the requisitioning authority (PWD) had not sent funds for want of possession.
The Court considered the Division Bench decision in Santosh Singh v. UOI, which analyzed Sections 19, 24(2) and 69 of the Act and concluded that situations where interim orders were made would fall within the ambit of Section 24(2). The opinion reproduces that analysis and notes that the ruling relied upon is binding on the Court.
On the undisputed factual premise that neither possession was taken nor compensation paid or tendered, and given the binding interpretation reflected in Santosh Singh regarding the ambit of Section 24(2), the Court concluded that the petitioner was entitled to the declaration sought. The Court therefore deemed the acquisition of the petitioner’s share of the suit land to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that the acquisition of suit land in Khasra No. 1447 Min (2-3) to the extent of the petitioner's share measuring 2 bighas and 3 biswas vide award No. 3/98-99 dated 26.02.1999 is deemed to have lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Act.
Implications: As a direct effect of this holding, the writ petition is allowed and the pending application stands disposed of. The opinion does not discuss broader doctrinal implications or purport to establish a new precedent beyond applying existing authority and the facts of this case.
S.P Garg, J. (Open Court):— The petitioner claims himself to be recorded owner of the land bearing Khasra No. 1447 Min (2-3) measuring 2 bighas and 3 biswas situated in the Revenue Estate of Village Malik Pur Kohi @ Rang Puri, District South-West Delhi (hereinafter referred to as ‘suit land’). The petitioner's claim is that acquisition of suit land has lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
2. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (old Act) was issued on 27.06.1996; it included the suit land. A declaration was issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (old Act) on 03.03.1997 The award bearing No. 3/98-99 dated 26.02.1999 was made by the Land Acquisition Collector.
3. It is averred that the petitioner moved this Court for quashing of the notification vide W.P No. 3371/1997 titled as Vinod Kumar Garg v. Union of India. It was decided and disposed of vide order dated 02.05.2013 laying down that except to the extent that the land already utilized for construction of flyover and slip-road would be excluded from the result of the quashing of the notifications.
4. The petitioner avers that pursuant to the award, no compensation has been paid or tendered by the respondents. Relying upon Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183, counsel urged that the acquisition has lapsed since five year period indicated in section 24(2) of the Act has ended.
5. The Govt. of NCT of Delhi through LAC, in its counter-affidavit, states in Para (13):
“13. That without prejudice to the aforesaid plea, it is humbly submitted that as regards status of possession of the subject land, it is humbly submitted that the same could not be taken due to interim stay/status quo order passed by this Hon'ble Court. So far as payment of compensation is concerned, the same could not be paid for want of possession due to interim order and due to which the compensation amount was not sent by requisitioning authority i.e PWD - the beneficiary of the acquisition to the answering respondents.”
6. The Division Bench of this Court in W.P(C) No. 2299/2002 tilted Santosh Singh v. UOI, decided on 13.11.2014, held after overall consideration of the provisions of Section 19, 24(2) and Section 69, of the Act that the situation where interim orders were made by the court too would fall within the ambit of section 24(2). In Santosh Singh (Supra) it was held as follows:
“A close analysis of the above provisions would reveal that Section 19 enables the acquisition process by the appropriate Government issuing a declaration, Section 19 (6) is an important exception in that it imposes a limitation on the power itself (i.e limitation for making declaration). In case the time limit is not adhered to, the acquisition lapses. The proviso to Section 19 (6) recognizes that sometime Court intervention by interim orders impede the appropriate Government from issuing declarations. Section 69 (2) enables increased compensation; yet, the explanation provides that if the landowner secures an interim order, the period spent in litigation, particularly when the interim order subsists, cannot be given benefit to him while calculating interest. Thus, limitation of power freshly conferred or created by the Act does not follow a uniform pattern. The object of the provision in question defines how the allusion to interim orders of court are dealt with. However, section 24 (2) is a special provision that but for its enactment, would have resulted in the operation of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in that all action taken under the old law would have been preserved. It therefore had to be construed in the context of the old enactment which clearly contemplated exclusion of time at the different stages when interim orders subsisted (i.e to make declaration after preliminary notification and also extended period for making the award). These perspectives are indicative of a contrary interpretation. However, this Court notices that the ruling of the Supreme Court on this aspect is decisive; it consequently binds it.”
7. It is evident that neither possession of the suit land was taken over nor any compensation for acquisition of the suit land was tendered or paid to the recorded owner(s)/petitioner.
8. As the respondents have not denied that the compensation of the suit land has not been paid and its possession has not been taken, the petitioner is entitled to the declaration sought. Accordingly, it is held that acquisition of suit land in Khasra No. 1447 Min (2-3) to the extent of petitioner's share measuring 2 bighas and 3 biswas vide award No. 3/98-99 dated 26.02.1999 is deemed to have lapsed by virtue of section 24(2) of the Act.
9. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. Pending application also stands disposed of.
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