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The Principal Commissioner Of Income-Tax-I, Visakhapatnam v. Smt. Baisetty Revathi

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Jul 13, 2017
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sanctioning Bench: Sanjay Kumar, J. & Gudiseva Shyam Prasad, J.) — 13 July 2017

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal by the revenue under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 relates to the assessment year 2010-11. The revenue sought to raise two substantial questions of law concerning the deletion by the Tribunal of a penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Relevant factual and procedural chronology, as stated in the opinion:

  • The respondent-assessee derived income from house property and interest on bank deposits. She filed a return for AY 2010-11 admitting a total loss of Rs.73,25,086/-.
  • Assessment under Section 143(3) was completed on 22.03.2013, making additions: (i) disallowance of interest on borrowed capital (total disallowance stated ultimately as Rs.54,74,678/-) and (ii) addition under Section 68 of Rs.15,60,000/- (unexplained cash credit deposit dated 31.03.2010).
  • After the additions the assessed loss stood at Rs.2,90,408/-. The unexplained deposit was treated as deemed income under Section 68.
  • A penalty notice under Section 271(1)(c) was issued on 22.03.2013. The assessee replied on 17.09.2013 requesting penalty proceedings be dropped, submitting (a) the interest disallowance was on an agreed basis, (b) she could not produce strict proof of source of the deposit, and (c) there was no positive establishment of concealment and she had accepted additions to avoid protracted litigation.
  • Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax rejected the explanation and imposed the minimum penalty of Rs.20,71,750/- under Section 271(1)(c) (order dated 24.09.2013). The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed the penalty.
  • Before the Tribunal (ITA No.599/Vizag/2014), the assessee for the first time contended that the show-cause notice did not specify whether the proposed penalty was for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Tribunal held the notice defective, relying on Karnataka High Court authority and struck down the penalty. The revenue appealed under Section 260A.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in deleting the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
  2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in deleting the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 271(1B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court in MAK Data Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (358 ITR 593), which was relied upon by the revenue?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The ambiguity in the show-cause notice was not raised before the lower authorities; this, the revenue argued, evidenced that the assessee was fully aware of the allegations and thus the contention before the Tribunal was an afterthought.
  • Reliance was placed on MAK Data Private Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax-II (Supreme Court decision) to contend that the Assessing Officer is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner while imposing the penalty, implying that formalities complained of by the assessee were not fatal.
  • Revenue counsel also pointed to the assessee's substantive reply to the show-cause notice as evidence she understood the allegations, arguing that the Tribunal should not have given the assessee the benefit of doubt on the point of notice clarity.

Assessee's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The assessee argued—relying on decisions of Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts—that when penal proceedings are initiated under Section 271(1)(c), the assessee must be informed "in no uncertain terms" of the specific allegation (whether it is concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income) so that she has a fair opportunity to meet the case of the revenue.
  • The assessee pointed to the show-cause proforma (from 22.03.2013) and the manner in which irrelevant contents were struck out leaving a clause that used an "or" between the two alternatives, thereby creating ambiguity as to the precise charge.
  • She further asserted that the Assessing Officer did not make a conclusive finding specifying which of the two offences under Section 271(1)(c) was the basis for the penalty, and that this defect rendered the penalty proceedings and order invalid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND THE INCOME TAX OFFICER v. M/s. MANJUNATHA COTTON AND GINNING FACTORY (Karnataka High Court) Section 271 is a complete code; penalty proceedings must follow that code and principles of natural justice. The Assessing Officer must be satisfied and the assessee must be made aware of the specific grounds (concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars). A generic printed form listing all grounds is inadequate; notice must specify which ground(s) applies; if both offences are in issue, proceedings should be initiated specifically for both. The Tribunal relied on this authority to hold that a show-cause notice which does not specify whether the penalty is for concealment or for furnishing inaccurate particulars is defective. The High Court principle underpinned the Court's agreement with the Tribunal that the ambiguous notice and the AO's lack of clear finding invalidated the penalty.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, GUJARAT-III v. MANU ENGINEERING WORKS (Gujarat High Court) The Assessing Officer must give a positive finding as to whether there is concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars; absence of such clear finding renders the penalty order vulnerable. The Court treated this authority as supporting the requirement of a clear, positive finding by the AO. It reinforced the conclusion that ambiguous or non-specific findings justify striking down a penalty order.
MAK DATA PRIVATE LIMITED v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-II (Supreme Court) (358 ITR 593) The Supreme Court observed that the Assessing Officer is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner or reduce it to writing while initiating penalty proceedings. The revenue relied on this decision. The Court held that MAK Data was not of assistance on the present issue because MAK Data addressed format of recording satisfaction, whereas the present controversy concerned whether the assessee was specifically put on notice as to which of the two distinct charges (concealment or inaccuracy) was being pressed.
K.P. MADHUSUDHANAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COCHIN (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court held it is not necessary for the Assessing Officer, while issuing a notice under Section 271(1)(c), to expressly invoke Explanation 1(B); Explanation 1(B) is part of the statutory provision and need not be separately mentioned. The Court noted this decision but explained it was not applicable to the present controversy, which related to the nature of the charge (concealment vs. inaccurate particulars) rather than invocation of Explanation 1(B).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning, as set out in the opinion, proceeded as follows:

  1. Statutory and procedural framing: The Court emphasised that Section 271 is a specific and self-contained provision for imposition of penalties and must be followed subject to natural justice. Because penalties under Section 271(1)(c) are penal in nature and can be heavy (100% to 300% of the tax liability), procedural strictness is required.
  2. Requirement of specificity in the show-cause notice: Drawing on the Karnataka High Court decision in Manjunatha Cotton, the Court held that initiation of penalty proceedings requires the Assessing Officer to be satisfied of either concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars, and the assessee must be informed specifically which ground is being relied upon so that she may meet the case.
  3. Defect in the notice: The show-cause proforma, after striking out irrelevant clauses, left a clause alleging that the assessee "have concealed the particulars of your income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income." The Court regarded the use of an "or" (and the lack of specification) as creating ambiguity: the assessee could not be sure which distinct offence was the charge.
  4. Inadequacy of a generic printed form: The Court repeated the Manjunatha Cotton principle that sending a printed form enumerating all possible grounds does not satisfy the statutory and natural justice requirement when the consequence for the assessee is severe.
  5. AO's finding was unclear: The penalty order itself showed that the Assessing Officer recorded he was "satisfied that the assessee had concealed/furnished inaccurate particulars of income," which the Court treated as a confused or non-specific finding rather than a clear, positive identification of the precise offence.
  6. Consideration of opposing authorities: The Court examined the revenue's reliance on MAK Data and K.P. Madhusudhanan. It explained MAK Data held only that the AO need not record satisfaction in a particular manner; that principle did not address the separate requirement that the assessee be put explicitly on notice which offence was charged. K.P. Madhusudhanan related to invocation of Explanation 1(B) and was held not to be on point.
  7. On the assessee's late raising of the notice ambiguity: Although the revenue argued the assessee's failure to raise the objection earlier showed awareness of the charge, the Court declined to deny relief on that basis alone because the primary issue was the legal principle—whether a penal show-cause notice must unambiguously state the charge. The Court held the benefit of doubt could not be given to the revenue where the notice and the AO's finding were ambiguous.
  8. Conclusion from analysis: For the reasons above — statutory strictness, requirement of specific notice, and the AO's unclear finding — the Court agreed with the Tribunal that the penalty proceedings and order were invalid.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The revenue's appeal under Section 260A was dismissed.
  • The Tribunal's deletion/invalidating of the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) (which had been imposed by the Deputy Commissioner and confirmed by the CIT(A)) was upheld.
  • No order as to costs was made by the Court.

Broader implications (as stated or evident in the opinion):

The Court emphasised the principle that when initiating penal proceedings under Section 271(1)(c), the specific ground (concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income) must be spelled out in clear and unambiguous terms in the show-cause notice so as to afford the assessee a fair opportunity of defence. The opinion treats this requirement as a matter of statutory procedure and natural justice rather than as a technicality that can be bypassed by reliance on printed forms. The Court did not state that it was laying down a new legal rule beyond applying existing authorities; it simply applied established precedents to the facts and concluded no substantial question of law arose warranting admission of the appeal.

Judges: SANJAY KUMAR, J.; GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD, J. — 13th July, 2017.

Show all summary ...

(Per Sri Justice Sanjay Kumar) This appeal by the revenue under Section 260A of the Income- tax Act, 1961 (for brevity, the Act of 1961), relating to the assessment year 2010-11, seeks to raise the following substantial questions of law for consideration:

1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is correct in law in deleting the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is correct in deleting the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c) by the Assessing officer without taking into consideration provisions of Section 271(1B) of Income-tax Act, 1961 and judicial pronouncement of Honble Supreme Court of India in the case of MAK Data Pvt. Ltd., Vs. CIT 358 ITR 593, wherein, it was specifically held that the A.O has to satisfy whether penalty proceedings be initiated or not during the assessment proceedings and the A.O is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner or reduce it into writing? Facts relevant for the purpose of this order are as under: The respondent-assessee derives income from house property apart from interest on bank deposits. She filed her tax return for the assessment year 2010-11 admitting a total loss of Rs.73,25,086/-. Assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act of 1961 was completed on 22.03.2013 making the following additions:

(i) Disallowance of interest on borrowed capital: Rs.54,74,678/-

(ii) Addition u/s.68 towards unexplained cash credit deposit: Rs.15,60,000/- In the result, against the loss of Rs.73,25,086/- claimed by the assessee, the loss determined upon assessment stood at Rs.2,90,408/-. Under the head Income from House Property, the assessee had claimed interest on borrowed capital to the tune of Rs.1,69,62,265/-. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee had wrongly claimed higher deductions towards interest on borrowed capital without applying deduction on proportionate basis as was done by her in the preceding assessment year and as was agreed to by her for the assessment year 2006-07. Her interest claim of Rs.1,69,62,265/- was proportionately reduced and the disallowance worked out to Rs.53,14,278/-. It was also found that the assessee had claimed pre-construction interest of Rs.3,51,571/- and the same was also proportionately reduced. The total disallowance therefore worked out to Rs.54,74,678/-. Upon verification of the assessees bank account, it was found that there was a deposit of Rs.15,60,000/- on 31.03.2010 for which the assessee failed to produce verifiable or credible evidence of a source. The same was therefore treated as unexplained credit/deemed income as per the provisions of Section 68 of the Act of 1961 and assessed as such. In consequence, the assessee was visited with a penalty notice under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 on 22.03.2013. The assessee submitted letter dated 17.09.2013 citing the following reasons in support of her plea to drop the penalty proceedings:

1. Disallowance with regard to interest on borrowed capital was on agreed basis.

2. Regarding unexplained cash credit deposit, she was not in a position to establish the source with strict proof of evidence.

3. There is no positive establishment of concealment and she had accepted the additions made for want of strict proof of evidence and to buy peace with the department and also to avoid protracted litigation. However, vide order dated 24.09.2013, the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-3(1), Visakhapatnam, rejected the assessees explanation and held her liable to pay the minimum penalty of Rs.20,71,750/- under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 as she had concealed/furnished inaccurate particulars of income. In appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Visakhapatnam, confirmed the penalty order. The only grounds urged by the assessee before the Commissioner were: (1) the penalty order passed by the AO was bad-in-law, (2) the AO had passed the penalty order even though there was no positive establishment of concealment, (3) the AO had not followed consistency as penalties levied in the earlier years were deleted by the Appellate Authority, and (4) on the above grounds or any other grounds that may be presented during the course of personal hearing, the penalty levied may be deleted. Perusal of the order reflects that the assessee did not raise the issue of invalidity of the penalty notice before the Commissioner. In her second appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Visakhapatnam Bench, Visakhapatnam, in ITA No.599/Vizag/2014, the assessee, for the first time, raised the issue that the show-cause notice under Section 271(1)(c) did not specify as to whether it was prompted by concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. Dealing with this contention, the Tribunal placed reliance on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND THE INCOME TAX OFFICER V/s. M/s.MANJUNATHA COTTON AND GINNING FACTORY and opined that unless the show-cause notice is clear as to whether the penalty proposed to be imposed is for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, no penalty could be imposed, as such a notice would be defective. The Tribunal took note of the fact that in the penalty order; the Assessing Officer had not given a conclusive finding as to whether the penalty imposed was for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income and accordingly held imposition of the penalty to be invalid. Smt.M.Kiranmayee, learned counsel representing Sri J.V.Prasad, learned senior standing counsel for the revenue, would argue that the assessee never raised the issue as to ambiguity in the show-cause notice before any of the lower authorities and that this indicated she was fully aware as to what was the allegation leveled against her. Learned counsel would point out that in her reply to the show-cause notice, the assessee sought to explain the lapses on her part which evidenced her awareness as to the exact allegations made against her in the said show-cause notice. Learned counsel would therefore argue that raising the issue of lack of clarity in the show- cause notice for the first time before the Tribunal was an afterthought and that the Tribunal ought not to have given the assessee the benefit of doubt in this regard. Per contra, Sri R.Raghunandan, learned senior counsel representing Sri T.Bala Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for the assessee, would rely upon the decisions of the Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts and assert that when penal proceedings are initiated under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act of 1961, an assessee must be made aware in no uncertain terms as to what is the specific allegation which forms the basis for the proposed penalty. A copy of the proforma notice under Section 271 read with Section 274 of the Act of 1961 addressed to the assessee on 22.03.2013 is produced. Perusal thereof reflects that the irrelevant contents therein, which had no application to the assessee, were struck out leaving only one clause which reads as under: Whereas in the course of proceedings before me for the Assessment Year 2010-11 it appears to me that you have concealed the particulars of your income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. It would be apposite at this stage to consider the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in M/s.MANJUNATHA COTTON AND GINNING FACTORY1. Therein, a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court observed that Section 271 of the Act of 1961 is a specific provision providing for imposition of penalties and is a complete code in itself regulating the procedure for such imposition. The Bench therefore held that penalty proceedings have to be conducted in accordance therewith, subject always to the rules of natural justice. It was pointed out that Section 271 makes appropriate provision for levying penalties on an assessee in different eventualities and one such eventuality is for concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income. It was held that for starting the penalty proceedings, the condition precedent is that the Assessing Officer must be satisfied that a person has either concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. The person who is accused of the conditions mentioned in Section 271 should be made aware of the grounds on which imposition of penalty is proposed as he has a right to contest such proceedings and should have a full opportunity to meet the case of the revenue so as to show that the conditions stipulated in Section 271(1)(c) do not exist and that he is not liable to pay the penalty. It was further held that the practice of the revenue in sending a printed form where all the grounds mentioned in Section 271 are mentioned would not satisfy the requirement of law when the consequence of the assessee not rebutting the initial presumption is serious in nature and he has to pay a penalty ranging from 100% to 300% of the tax liability. As the provisions of Section 271(1)(c) have to be strictly construed, the Bench mandated that the notice issued should set out the grounds which the assessee has to meet specifically, otherwise the principles of natural justice would be offended as the show-cause notice would be vague. Dealing with concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, the Bench observed that some cases may attract both the offences and in some, there may be overlapping of both, but in such cases initiation of the penalty proceedings must be specifically for both the offences. Drawing up penalty proceedings for one offence and finding the assessee guilty of another or finding him guilty for either, the one or the other, was held to be unsustainable in law. In COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, GUJARAT-III V/s. MANU ENGINEERING WORKS , a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court observed that the Assessing Officer must give a positive finding as to whether there is concealment of income by the assessee or whether any inaccurate particulars of such income had been furnished by the assessee. In the event there was no such clear-cut finding, the penalty order was held liable to be struck down. Smt.Kiranmayee, learned counsel, placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.P.MADHUSUDHANAN V/s. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COCHIN . Therein, the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary for the Assessing Officer, while issuing a notice under Section 271(1)(c), to expressly invoke Explanation 1(B) appended to the provision. It is however relevant to note that Explanation 1(B) merely adverts to a case of failure of an assessee to substantiate the explanation offered whereby the amount added or disallowed while computing the total income of such person for the purposes of the penalty provision shall be deemed to represent the income in respect of which particulars had been concealed. The Supreme Court observed that the statutory provision included the Explanation and once the assessee was put on notice, no express invocation of the Explanation is necessary. This judgment has no application to the case on hand as what we are concerned with presently is whether the assessee is required to be put on notice as to whether she is to be penalized for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. These are two different acts. Concealment of income is an act of omission while furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income is an act of commission. The consequences of such acts, being penal in nature, an assessee has to be informed as to what exactly is the charge against him so that he may respond thereto. No doubt, in the present case, the assessee seems to have submitted her explanation on merits without raising a doubt as to what was the precise allegation leveled against her. However, we are more concerned with the principle involved and not just the isolated case of its application against the assessee. Further, the penalty order demonstrates that the Assessing Officer was not even certain as to what was the finding on the strength of which he imposed the penalty. This is clear from the fact that the Assessing Officer recorded that he was satisfied that the assessee had concealed/furnished inaccurate particulars of income. In the absence of a clear finding by the Assessing Officer himself, the benefit of doubt cannot be given to the revenue merely because the assessee did not complain of vagueness in the show-cause notice earlier. Reliance placed by the revenue upon MAK DATA PRIVATE LIMITED V/s. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-II , is of no assistance as the Supreme Court merely observed therein that the Assessing Officer is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner while imposing the penalty or reduce it to writing. That is not the controversy in the case on hand. On principle, when penalty proceedings are sought to be initiated by the revenue under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act of 1961, the specific ground which forms the foundation therefor has to be spelt out in clear terms. Otherwise, an assessee would not have proper opportunity to put forth his defence. When the proceedings are penal in nature, resulting in imposition of penalty ranging from 100% to 300% of the tax liability, the charge must be unequivocal and unambiguous. When the charge is either concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars thereof, the revenue must specify as to which one of the two is sought to be pressed into service and cannot be permitted to club both by interjecting an or between the two, as in the present case. This ambiguity in the show-cause notice is further compounded presently by the confused finding of the Assessing Officer that he was satisfied that the assessee was guilty of both. We are therefore of the opinion that the order under appeal does not brook interference on any ground. We find no question of law, much less a substantial one, arising for consideration warranting admission of this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. _____________________ SANJAY KUMAR,J _______________________________ GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD,J 13th JULY, 2017