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Shyam Narayan & Ors. v. Union Of India
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Valmiki J. Mehta, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a first appeal under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 filed by the appellants who were applicants before the Railway Claims Tribunal (RCT). The appellants impugn the RCT judgment dated 10.5.2016 which dismissed their claim petition seeking statutory compensation of Rs. 4 lakhs.
Facts as pleaded: The deceased, Sh. Manoj, accompanied by Smt. Bindu, was travelling from Kharawar to Daya Basti on 1.9.2014 in Passenger Train No. 64912. It is pleaded that the deceased boarded the train and, due to heavy rush and a jerk, fell from the moving train and sustained fatal injuries. The RCT found that the deceased was a bona fide passenger and died due to a fall from the train, but held that his death was the result of his own criminal negligence and therefore no compensation was payable.
The RCT's factual findings (as recorded and relied upon by this Court) include unchallenged testimony of the train guard, Sh. Satish Kumar (RW-1), who stated that the deceased tried to board the train when it had already picked up speed (about 20 km/hr), had crossed half the platform, and the deceased ran from the side of the ASM's office, could not board and collided with the moving train. The RCT dismissed the claim petition on that basis; the present appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the death of the deceased falls within the definition of an "untoward incident" under Section 123(c) of the Railways Act and thus attracts compensation under Section 124-A of the Railways Act.
- Whether negligence on the part of a bona fide passenger disentitles the passenger or dependants from compensation under Section 124-A, or whether only criminal negligence / self-inflicted injury (as listed in the proviso to Section 124-A) disentitles compensation.
- Whether, on the specific facts (train speed, location on platform, unchallenged evidence of guard RW-1), the deceased's act amounted to ordinary negligence (where compensation is payable) or criminal negligence / self-inflicted injury (where compensation is barred by the proviso to Section 124-A).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants relied on the decision in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (Prabhakaran's case) to argue that compensation should be awarded where a passenger falls from a train while trying to board a running train. They contended that the present case similarly amounts to an "untoward incident" within Section 123(c) and entitles the appellants to compensation under Section 124-A of the Railways Act.
The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate statement of the Railway's adversarial submissions beyond the RCT's factual finding and the guard's deposition which supported the RCT's conclusion of criminal negligence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008) 9 SCC 527 | Holds that provisions dealing with untoward incidents and compensation (Section 123(c) and Section 124-A) should be read liberally; compensation can be payable when a passenger falls while trying to board; however, compensation is not payable where death/injury is due to self-inflicted injuries or criminal negligence. | The Court relied on Prabhakaran to articulate the general rule that beneficial provisions should be liberally construed and that falling while attempting to board can constitute an "untoward incident"; nevertheless, the Court distinguished the present facts and found that the case falls within the proviso (criminal negligence) in Prabhakaran's terms, thereby excluding compensation. |
| Jameela v. Union of India (2010) 12 SCC 443 | Explains that mere negligence does not bar compensation under Section 124-A, but if the death/injury is self-inflicted or due to criminal negligence (requiring mens rea), then the proviso to Section 124-A excludes liability. | The Court cited Jameela for the principle distinguishing ordinary negligence from criminal negligence/self-inflicted injury. Applying that distinction to the present facts, the Court concluded that the facts crossed into criminal negligence and so the proviso applied to bar compensation. |
| Kunal Singh v. Union of India (referenced) | Referenced as authority supporting a purposive and liberal interpretation of welfare/beneficial statutes. | Used (via citation in Prabhakaran) to support the proposition that Section 124-A should be construed liberally, though the Court ultimately found the present case excluded by the proviso despite liberal interpretive principles. |
| B.D. Shetty v. Ceat Ltd. (referenced) | Referenced for the principle that beneficial statutes receive liberal interpretation. | Cited in the chain of authorities supporting liberal construction of Section 124-A; the Court noted these authorities but distinguished the present facts as falling within the proviso. |
| Transport Corp. of India v. ESI Corp. (referenced) | Referenced as part of authorities endorsing purposive interpretation of welfare statutes. | Raised in the context of interpreting Section 124-A purposively; did not lead to allowance of appeal because the facts were found to invoke the proviso. |
| Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (referenced) | Authority for the principle that beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal construction. | Appears as part of the jurisprudential backdrop relied upon in Prabhakaran and referred to by this Court; notwithstanding these precedents, the Court applied the proviso to Section 124-A on the present facts. |
| Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority (referenced) | Another authority cited for liberal interpretation of beneficial statutes. | Referred to in the same cluster of authorities supporting liberal construction; did not alter the Court's conclusion that the present facts fall within the exclusionary proviso. |
| Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. (referenced) | Referenced for the proposition that welfare statutes deserve liberal interpretation. | Cited as part of the authorities on interpretation; the Court noted these but found the facts here required application of the proviso barring compensation. |
| S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom Distt. Manager (referenced) | Also cited in support of liberal interpretation of beneficial provisions. | Noted among authorities on interpretive approach; did not change the outcome because of the Court's factual finding as to criminal negligence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the relevant statutory provisions: Section 123(c) (definition of "untoward incident") and Section 124-A (compensation on account of untoward incident) of the Railways Act. It acknowledged precedent (Prabhakaran and Jameela) establishing two core principles: (1) Section 124-A is a beneficial, no-fault provision and should be read liberally so as to cover passengers who fall while boarding or travelling; and (2) there is an express proviso to Section 124-A that excludes compensation where death/injury results from suicide, self-inflicted injury, the passenger's own criminal act, intoxication or insanity, or natural causes.
The Court emphasized the crucial distinction between ordinary negligence and criminal negligence (self-inflicted injury/own criminal act). It noted that ordinary negligence (even negligent conduct such as standing at open doors) does not normally attract the proviso, but the proviso applies where there is an element of criminality or self-infliction requiring mens rea.
Turning to the facts, the Court accepted the RCT's factual findings — specifically the unchallenged testimony of the train guard (RW-1) that the deceased attempted to board the train after it had crossed half the platform and when it was travelling at around 20 km/hr; the deceased ran from the side of the ASM's office and collided with the moving train. The guard's statement remained unchallenged in cross-examination and was relied upon by the RCT to hold that the death was on account of the deceased's own criminal negligence.
On application, the Court concluded that the present case is distinguishable from cases where falling is accidental or attributable to ordinary negligence in circumstances such as a train just starting or minimal speed or problems like unlocked doors or rush at the gate. Here, given that the train had already traversed half the platform and had appreciable speed (≈ 20 km/hr), the act of attempting to board and the resulting collision amounted to criminal negligence or self-inflicted injury within the meaning of the proviso to Section 124-A. Consequently, the exclusion in the proviso applied and compensation could not be awarded.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED.
Holding (core ruling): The appeal is dismissed. The Court agreed with the RCT's finding that the deceased's death was attributable to his own criminal negligence (as per the first proviso to Section 124-A of the Railways Act), and therefore compensation under Section 124-A is not payable.
Implications: The direct effect is that the appellants are not entitled to the claimed statutory compensation of Rs. 4 lakhs. The Court applied established principles distinguishing ordinary negligence (which does not bar compensation) from criminal negligence/self-inflicted injury (which does bar compensation). The opinion does not announce any new legal principle beyond applying existing Supreme Court authorities to the facts; it affirms that where the facts demonstrate criminal negligence or self-inflicted injury as contemplated by the proviso to Section 124-A, compensation under that provision is excluded.
FAO No. 562/2016 Page 1 of 8 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO No.562/2016
% 31st May, 2017
SHYAM NARAYAN & ORS. ..... Appellants Through: Mr. Raj Kumar Rajput, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA ..... Respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. This first appeal under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 is filed by the appellants who were the applicants before the Railway Claims Tribunal. By this first appeal appellants/applicants impugn the judgment of the Railway Claims Tribunal dated 10.5.2016 dismissing their claim petition. While the Railway Claims Tribunal has held that the deceased Sh. Manoj was a bonafide passenger, and also that the deceased died on account of fall from the train, however, it has been held that the deceased died on account of his own criminal negligence and hence the appellants/applicants were not entitled to compensation.
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2. The facts of the case are that the deceased Sh. Manoj along with one Smt. Bindu was going from Kharawar to Daya Basti on 1.9.2014 in a Passenger Train no. 64912. It is pleaded that the deceased had boarded the train, when due to heavy rush and jerk in the train, he fell down from the moving train and received fatal injuries. The subject claim petition was therefore filed seeking statutory compensation of Rs. 4 lacs.
3. The Railway Claims Tribunal has held in para 10 of the impugned judgment that the deceased died on account of his own criminal negligence because the deceased had tried to board the train when the train had picked up speed and was travelling at about 20 kms per hour, and the train had crossed half of the platform. The deceased had come running from the side of the ASM's office and tried to board the moving train. The deceased however could not board the train and instead collided with the train. This has been specifically deposed by Sh. Satish Kumar who was the guard of the train, and who deposed as RW-1. This statement of the guard Sh. Satish Kumar as RW-1 of the deceased trying to board the moving train which had left half of the platform and having a speed of 20 kms per hour remained unchallenged in the cross-examination. Accordingly, the Railway Claims Tribunal in terms of this finding dismissed the claim petition.
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4. The issue of an untoward incident and entitlement to compensation on account of an untoward incident with respect to the train accident is a subject matter of Section 123(c) and Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989. While interpreting these Sections it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and Others (2008) 9 SCC 527 and
Jameela and Others Vs. Union of India (2010) 12 SCC 443 that even if a bonafide passenger is guilty of negligence yet compensation has to be awarded keeping in mind the conditions of the trains in this country. However the Supreme Court has in these very judgments has also clarified that if the bonafide passenger is guilty of criminal negligence, i.e self-inflicted injuries due to criminal negligence, then no compensation can be awarded under the Railways Act. In Jameela's
case (supra) Supreme Court has made the following observations:-
"7. We are of the considered view that the High Court gravely erred in holding that the applicants were not entitled to any compensation under Section 124A of the Act, because the deceased had died by falling down from the train because of his own negligence. First, the case of the Railway that the deceased M. Hafeez was standing at the open door of the train compartment in a negligent manner from where he fell down is entirely based on speculation. There is admittedly no eyewitness of the fall of the deceased from the train and, therefore, there is absolutely no evidence to support the case of the Railway that the accident took place in the manner suggested by it. Secondly, even if it were to be assumed that the deceased fell from the train to his death due to his own negligence it will not have any effect on the compensation payable under Section 124A of the Act. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
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10. It is not denied by the Railway that M. Hafeez fell down from the train and died while travelling on it on a valid ticket. He was, therefore, clearly a "passenger" for the purpose of Section 124A as clarified by the Explanation. It is now to be seen, that under Section 124A the liability to pay compensation is regardless of any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration. But the proviso to the section says that the railway administration would have no liability to pay any compensation in case death of the passenger or injury to him was caused due to any of the reasons enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e).
11. Coming back to the case in hand, it is not the case of the Railway that the death of M. Hafeez was a case of suicide or a result of self-inflicted injury. It is also not the case that he died due to his own criminal act or he was in a state of intoxication or he was insane, or he died due to any natural cause or disease. His falling down from the train was, thus, clearly accidental.
12. The manner in which the accident is sought to be reconstructed by the Railway, the deceased was standing at the open door of the train compartment from where he fell down, is called by the railway itself as negligence. Now negligence of this kind which is not very uncommon on Indian trains is not the same thing as a criminal act mentioned in Clause (c) to the proviso to Section 124A. A criminal act envisaged under Clause (c) must have an element of malicious intent or mens rea. Standing at the open doors of the compartment of a running train may be a negligent act, even a rash act but, without anything else, it is certainly not a criminal act. Thus, the case of the railway must fail even after assuming everything in its favour."
5. In Prabhakaran's case (supra) the Supreme Court has again extensively examined the issue of liability with respect to an untoward incident and while holding that the provisions must be read liberally, however again has clarified that in case there are self- inflicted injuries on account of criminal negligence then compensation cannot be granted. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court in
Prabhakaran's case (supra) are contained in paras 10 to 12, 14 to 17 and 52 and which paras read as under:-
"10. We are of the opinion that it will not legally make any difference whether the deceased was actually inside the train when she fell down or whether she was only trying to get into the train when she fell down. In our
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opinion in either case it amounts to an "accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers". Hence, it is an "untoward incident" as defined in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act.
11. No doubt, it is possible that two interpretations can be given to the expression "accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers", the first being that it only applies when a person has actually got inside the train and thereafter falls down from the train, while the second being that it includes a situation where a person is trying to board the train and falls down while trying to do so. Since the provision for compensation in the Railways Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, in our opinion, it should receive a liberal and wider interpretation and not a narrow and technical one. Hence in our opinion the latter of the abovementioned two interpretations i.e. the one which advances the object of the statute and serves its purpose should be preferred vide Kunal Singh v.Union of India (SCC para 9), B.D. Shetty v. Ceat Ltd. (SCC para 12) , Transport Corp. of India v. ESI Corp..
12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority (AIR para 11), Lalappa Lingappa and Ors. v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. (AIR para 12), S.M. Nilajkarv. Telecom Distt. Manager (SCC para 12).
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
14. In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive meaning to the expression
"accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers" in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, we will be depriving a large number of railway passengers from getting compensation in railway accidents. It is well known that in our country there are crores of people who travel by railway trains since everybody cannot afford travelling by air or in a private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the expression we will be depriving a large number of victims of train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from getting compensation under the Railways Act. Hence, in our opinion, the expression "accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers" includes accidents when a bona fide passenger i.e. a passenger travelling with a valid ticket or pass is trying to enter into a railway train and falls down during the process. In other words, a purposive, and not literal, interpretation should be given to the expression.
15. Section 2(29) of the Railways Act defines "passenger" to mean a person traveling with a valid pass or ticket. Section 123(c) of the Railways Act defines "untoward incident" to include the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers. Section 124-A of the Railways Act with which we are concerned states:
"Section 124A. Compensation on account of untoward incident.- When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who
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has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident:
Provided that no compensation shall be payable under this section by the railway administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to-
(a) suicide or attempted suicide by him;
(b) self-inflicted injury;
(c) his own criminal act;
(d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity;
(e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to injury caused by the said untoward incident.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "passenger" includes-
(i) a railway servant on duty; and
(ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for travelling by a train carrying passengers, on any date or a valid platform ticket and becomes a victim of an untoward incident.
16. The accident in which Smt. Abja died is clearly not covered by the proviso to Section 124-A. The accident did not occur because of any of the reasons mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Section124-A. Hence, in our opinion, the present case is clearly covered by the main body of Section 124-A of the Railways Act, and not its proviso.
17. Section 124-A lays down strict liability or no fault liability in case of railway accidents. Hence, if a case comes within the purview of Section 124-A it is wholly irrelevant as to who was at fault. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
52. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the submission of learned Counsel for the appellant there was no fault on the part of the Railways, or that there was contributory negligence, is based on a total misconception and hence has to be rejected."
6. (i) Learned counsel for the appellants/applicants by placing reliance on the facts of Prabhakaran's case (supra) argued that in
Prabhakaran's case (supra) also compensation was granted on account of the death of the passenger falling down from a train who was trying to board a running train, and therefore, it is argued that even in the present case it should be held that there is an untoward incident
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within the meaning of Section 123(c) and Section 124-A of the Railways Act.
(ii) I cannot agree with the arguments urged on behalf of the appellants/applicants in the facts of the present case because there is a difference between an untoward incident and an act of criminal negligence. Whereas negligence will not disentitle grant of compensation under the Railways Act, however, once the negligence becomes a criminal negligence and self-inflicted injury then compensation cannot be granted. This is specifically provided in the first proviso to Section 124-A of the Railways Act which provides that compensation will not be payable in case the death takes place on account of suicide or attempted suicide, self inflicted injury, bonafide passenger's own criminal act or an act committed by the deceased in the state of intoxication or insanity.
(iii) Thus it depends upon the facts of each case whether the negligence has crossed the threshold to become an act involving criminal negligence i.e whether boarding a running train is only a negligence or criminal negligence depends on the facts of a particular case. Once the facts of the present case are examined and it is found that the present case is not a case where the deceased was boarding a train which had just started and the deceased could not board the same
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on account of rush existing at the gate or that the speed of the train was just minimal and it had just started and on account of unlocked door etc that the deceased fell down from the running train. In the facts of the present case, it is seen that the train had in fact crossed half of the platform and had picked up a speed of around 20 kms per hour and therefore, the deceased could not board the train but instead collided with the train and died as a result of the accident. Hence the facts of the present case take the case out of ordinary negligence and throws the case within the first proviso to Section 124-A of the Railways Act.
7. Dismissed.
MAY 31, 2017/ib VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
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