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Virupakshappa Gouda And Another v. State Of Karnataka And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants are accused in Sessions Case No. 90 of 2015 (Crime No. 118 of 2015, Raichur Rural Police Station) for offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 302, 504, 114 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Their first bail application under Section 439 CrPC before the Principal Sessions Judge, Raichur was dismissed, and the Karnataka High Court (Kalaburagi Bench) affirmed the rejection.
A second bail application was again rejected by the Principal Sessions Judge and the High Court, and Special Leave Petition (Cri) No. 9858 of 2015 was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27-11-2015.
The appellants then filed a third bail application which, unlike the earlier two, was heard by an Additional Sessions Judge who granted bail on the ground that the charge-sheet had been filed and there was “delay in trial.” The State did not challenge this order. The informant (father of the deceased) sought cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC before the High Court. Terming the trial court’s order “perverse,” the High Court cancelled the bail.
The present appeal challenges the High Court’s cancellation order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in cancelling the bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge to the appellants.
- Whether filing of a charge-sheet constitutes a “change of circumstance” justifying a subsequent grant of bail after earlier rejections up to the Supreme Court.
- Whether the trial court applied incorrect legal standards and ignored binding considerations while granting bail.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants did not misuse their liberty, violate bail conditions, tamper with evidence, or influence witnesses.
- The trial Judge’s order relied on recognised precedents (Sanjay Chandra; Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre) and was therefore not perverse.
- Cancelling bail after a considerable lapse of time would not serve the interests of justice.
State's Arguments
- The trial court should not have entertained a further bail application after the Supreme Court had dismissed the appellants’ SLP for the same relief.
- The trial court’s approach was perverse and ignored settled parameters for granting bail; the High Court rightly set the order aside.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 | Object of bail; presumption of innocence; liberty pending trial. | Trial Judge relied on it to grant bail; Supreme Court held the reliance was misplaced given the gravity of the present offence. |
| Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 | Balance between societal interest and personal liberty. | Trial Judge cited para 86; Supreme Court said principle cannot alone justify bail without factual analysis. |
| Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 | Relevant factors in bail: nature of accusation, evidence, threat to witnesses, etc. | Reiterated by Supreme Court to show parameters the trial court ignored. |
| Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 | Comprehensive factors to consider while granting bail. | Used to emphasise that bail must not be arbitrary or fanciful. |
| CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452 | Need for “reasonable grounds” and public interest in bail decisions. | Quoted to highlight requirement of genuine scrutiny of accusations. |
| Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 | Courts must avoid whimsical or capricious grant of bail. | Invoked to stress that liberty is not absolute and must yield to societal order. |
| Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 66 | Bail order vulnerable if based on irrelevant materials or ignoring relevant materials. | Applied to show the trial court’s inclusion/exclusion errors rendered its order invalid. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the Additional Sessions Judge treated the third bail application as though it were the first, overlooking:
- Two prior rejections by the same Sessions Court and the High Court, and dismissal of SLP (Cri) No. 9858 of 2015 by the Supreme Court.
- The fact that filing a charge-sheet is not, by itself, a “change of circumstance” that dilutes the seriousness of the allegations.
- Established parameters for bail, including gravity of the offence, community impact, and potential to tamper with evidence.
The Court held that reliance on general observations in Sanjay Chandra and Siddharam Mhetre, without contextual analysis, was erroneous. The trial court ignored authoritative guidance (Chaman Lal; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar; CBI v. Vijay Sai Reddy) and the heinous nature of the alleged “honour killing.”
Finding the trial court’s approach “perverse,” the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the order granting bail was issued in “sanctuary of errors” and required cancellation. The Court emphasised that once the Supreme Court had earlier declined bail on the same factual matrix, repetition before a lower court was an “absolute impropriety.”
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s cancellation of bail and directed the appellants to surrender forthwith; the trial judge must ensure they are taken into custody.
Implications: The judgment reinforces that (i) filing of a charge-sheet alone is not a changed circumstance warranting bail, (ii) lower courts must respect prior higher-court decisions on bail, and (iii) orders granting bail can be annulled when passed by disregarding established legal parameters. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing principles on successive bail applications and proper exercise of discretion were reaffirmed.
Dipak Misra, J.— Leave granted. The appellants, who have been arraigned as accused in the sessions case being SC No. 90 of 2015 arising out of Crime No. 118 of 2015, registered at Raichur Rural Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 302, 504, 114 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) after being taken into custody, in the course of investigation being aspirant for obtaining liberty, preferred an application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), that is, Criminal Misc. No. 457 of 2015 in the Court of Principal Sessions Judge at Raichur, which stood dismissed.
2. Being grieved by the aforesaid order of rejection for grant of bail, the appellant-accused moved the High Court of Karnataka at Kalaburagi Bench in Criminal Petition No. 200629 of 2015. The High Court adverted to the deadly weapons that were carried by the accused persons, the nature of injuries sustained on the vital parts by the deceased and the allegation of specific overt acts, and rejected 2015 SCC OnLine Kar 8716 the application.
3. Thereafter, a second application for grant of bail was moved by the appellants before the Principal Sessions Judge at Raichur, that is, Criminal Misc. No. 791 of 2015. It was contended before the learned trial Judge that as, in the meantime, the investigation had been completed and the charge-sheet had been filed, there had been a change of circumstance and hence, they were entitled to be admitted to bail. That apart, certain grounds pertaining to ailment of some of the accused persons were highlighted. The learned trial Judge, as is evident, referred to the allegations made in the FIR, the materials that had come on record during the investigation and the post-mortem report and considering all other relevant aspects, declined to enlarge the appellants on bail. It is worthy to note here that though a ground of parity was urged on the base that Accused 4 to 7 had been released on anticipatory bail, the same did not impress the court and accordingly the inevitable result, the dismissal, followed.
4. The aforesaid order of dismissal constrained the appellants to move the High Court in Criminal Petition No. 200944 of 2015. The High Court vide its order dated 23-9-2015 2015 SCC OnLine Kar 8717, after referring to the nature of alleged assault by the accused persons, the type of injury sustained by the deceased and considering the pertinent facts did not accede to the prayer for grant of bail.
5. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, the appellants preferred Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9858 of 2015, which was dismissed vide order dated 27-11-2015 SLP (Cri) No. 9858 of 2015.
6. The aforesaid narration of facts would give one the impression that the attempt of the appellants to be enlarged on bail was over unless some extraordinary circumstance could usher in which could be considered as change of circumstance, but as the chronology of events would show the indefatigable spirit of the appellants forced them to remain embedded in their stance for putting any stand as a change of circumstance for the purpose of grant of bail. We do not intend to mean even for a moment that the accused cannot move successive application for grant of bail. That is his right in law. Our emphasis is on the delineation by the Court. The said right invigorated with adroit efforts, resulted in filing of an application in SC No. 90 of 2015. As is evident from the record, the earlier bail applications were rejected by the Principal Sessions Judge, Raichur, but the third application was taken up by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Raichur. As the order would reveal, the learned trial Judge has thought it apposite to deal with the application as if he was dealing with the first application and copiously referred to the materials brought on record, referred to pronouncements in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40 and Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 694 and commented on the delay in trial and, eventually, released the appellants on bail on certain conditions.
7. The enlargement of bail to the accused persons, as it seems, did not affect the prosecution. The State of Karnataka chose to maintain silence and did not think it appropriate to assail the order.
8. The informant, who has crossed six scores and five, lost his son in an unfortunate and brutal circumstance, moved the High Court in Criminal Petition No. 200768 of 2016 under Section 439(2) CrPC seeking cancellation of bail. The High Court while dealing with the application, adverted 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 8214 to the allegations in the FIR. The nature of allegations, being significant, deserves to be adverted to by us. It is alleged in the FIR that the accused-Appellant 1, had a daughter named Basavarajeshwari who fell in love with the deceased Anand Sagar, the son of the informant, who belongs to “Uppar” community and the accused belongs to “Lingayat” community. The deceased, Anand Sagar, had eloped with the daughter of Accused 1 in the year 2014 and at that juncture, an FIR was registered/filed by the accused to that effect. As the narration would further unroll, the couple left the village, entered into wedlock and thereafter started residing at Bengaluru and later on at Bellary. On 17-5-2015, the deceased, Anand Sagar, had come to his native place Yeramarus and had gone to Raichur on the motorbike of his father. When he returned to Yeramarus at 9.30 p.m and reached near the bus-stop, the accused persons assaulted him with weapons and he breathed his last on the spot. After noting the facts and the injuries sustained by the deceased, the High Court also adverted to the attempts made by the accused persons to obtain liberty despite the same having been declined by this Court. It also came to hold that the spark of life of the deceased had been extinguished because he had dared to fall in love and get married to the daughter of Accused 1, and ultimately opined that delineation by the learned trial Judge with regard to grant of order of bail, was absolutely perverse and, founded on irrelevant aspects. In view of the aforesaid premises, it allowed the application for cancellation of bail and set aside the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, admitting the appellants to bail.
9. We have heard Mr Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr Anirudh Sanganeria, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr V.N Raghupathy, learned counsel for the respondent State. Despite service of notice, no one has entered appearance on behalf of the informant.
10. It is submitted by Mr Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the High Court has erred in cancelling the order of bail as the appellants, after being enlarged on bail, had neither abused the freedom nor have they violated the terms and conditions of the bail order. It is urged by him that there is no allegation of tampering with the evidence or influencing any witnesses and therefore, there was no justification for cancellation of the order of granting bail. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the analysis made by the learned trial Judge for the purpose of grant of bail cannot be regarded as perverse and he has correctly relied upon the pronouncements as is noticeable from his order. It is put forth by Mr Patil that at such distance of time not to admit the appellants on bail and give the stamp of approval to the order cancelling the bail by the High Court, would not subserve the cause of justice.
11. Mr Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing for the State, per contra, would submit that the learned trial Judge should not have entertained the prayer for bail after this Court has dismissed the special leave petition for the same relief. It is his submission that the High Court has correctly opined that there is perversity in the approach by the learned trial Judge while dealing with the application under Section 439 CrPC and hence, it deserved to be set aside.
12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the factum that when a charge-sheet is filed it amounts to change of circumstance. Needless to say, filing of the charge-sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made by the prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge-sheet establishes that after due investigation the investigating agency, having found materials, has placed the charge-sheet for trial of the accused persons. As is further demonstrable, the learned trial Judge has remained absolutely oblivious of the fact that the appellants had moved the special leave petition before this Court for grant of bail and the same was not entertained. Be it noted, the second bail application was filed before the Principal Sessions Judge after filing of the charge-sheet which was challenged in the High Court and that had travelled to this Court. These facts, unfortunately, have not been taken note of by the learned trial Judge. He has been swayed by the observations made in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre (2011) 1 SCC 694, especially in para 86, the relevant part of which reads thus:
“86. … The courts considering the bail application should try to maintain fine balance between the societal interest vis-à-vis personal liberty while adhering to the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the competent court.”
13. The proposition expounded above, has to be accepted, but that has to be applied appositely to the facts of each case. A bail application cannot be allowed solely or exclusively on the ground that the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the competent court. The learned trial Judge has also referred to the decision in Sanjay Chandra (2012) 1 SCC 40, wherein a two-Judge Bench while dealing with the bail applications, observed thus:
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”
14. Be it noted, though the aforesaid passages from Sanjay Chandra case (2012) 1 SCC 40 have their relevance but the same cannot be made applicable in each and every case for grant of bail. In the said case, the appellant-accused was facing trial for the offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471 and 109 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Thus, the factual matrix was quite different. That apart, it depends upon the nature of the crime and the manner in which it is committed. A bail application is not to be entertained on the basis of certain observations made in a different context. There has to be application of mind and appreciation of the factual score and understanding of the pronouncements in the field.
15. The court has to keep in mind what has been stated in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P (2004) 7 SCC 525 The requisite factors are: (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; and (iii) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, it has been opined that while exercising the power for grant of bail, the court has to keep in mind certain circumstances and factors. We may usefully reproduce the said passage:
“9. … among other circumstances, the factors which are to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”
16. In CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy (2013) 7 SCC 452, the Court had reiterated the principle by observing thus:
“34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”
(emphasis in original)
17. From the aforesaid principles, it is quite clear that an order of bail cannot be granted in an arbitrary or fanciful manner. In this context, we may, with profit, reproduce a passage from Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P (2014) 16 SCC 508, wherein the Court setting aside an order granting bail observed:
“16. The issue that is presented before us is whether this Court can annul the order passed 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031 by the High Court and curtail the liberty of the second respondent? We are not oblivious of the fact that the liberty is a priceless treasure for a human being. It is founded on the bedrock of the constitutional right and accentuated further on human rights principle. It is basically a natural right. In fact, some regard it as the grammar of life. No one would like to lose his liberty or barter it for all the wealth of the world. People from centuries have fought for liberty, for absence of liberty causes sense of emptiness. The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilised society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilised. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of an individual is not absolute. [The] society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from its members, and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law.”
18. In this context what has been stated by a three-Judge Bench in Dinesh M.N v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 66 is quite instructive. In the said case, the Court has held that where the Court admits the accused to bail by taking into consideration irrelevant materials and keeping out of consideration the relevant materials the order becomes vulnerable and such vulnerability warrants annulment of the order.
19. In the instant case, as is demonstrable, the learned trial Judge has not been guided by the established parameters for grant of bail. He has not kept himself alive to the fact that twice the bail applications had been rejected and the matter had travelled to this Court. Once this Court has declined to enlarge the appellants on bail, endeavours to project same factual score should not have been allowed. It is absolute impropriety and that impropriety calls for axing of the order.
20. That apart, as we find from the narration of allegations from the order of the High Court, it is not a case where the trial court could have entertained a bail application by elaborate dissection of facts and appreciation of statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC. The gravity of the crime should have been taken note of by the learned trial Judge. The deceased and his wife (the daughter of the accused-Appellant 1) were staying in peace away from the acrimonious community, but due to some kind of “misconceived class honour”, the vengeance reigned and awe for law went on a holiday. They thought that their perception mattered and as alleged, they put an end to the life spark of the young man. The choice of the daughter was allowed no space. Her identity was crushed and her thinking was crucified by parental dominance which has roots in an unfathomable sense of community honour. Though the lovers became fugitive, the anger founded on anachronistic values prompted the accused persons to annihilate the life of a young man. In such a situation, the factors that have been highlighted by this Court from time to time were required to be adverted to and the accused persons should not have been granted liberty on the grounds that have been thought appropriate by the learned trial Judge. The perversity of approach by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who has enlarged the appellants on bail, is totally unacceptable. It is reflective of sanctuary of errors. In such a situation, we are obligated to say that the High Court has performed its legal duty by lancinating the order passed by the learned trial Judge.
21. Consequently, the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed. As we have dismissed the appeal, the appellants shall surrender to custody forthwith and it will be the duty of the trial Judge to see that they are taken into custody. Needless to say, whatever we have stated in the present judgment, is only confined to the defensibility of the order passed by the High Court cancelling the bail granted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and shall not weigh in the mind of the learned trial Judge for the purpose of the trial as that shall depend upon evidence to be adduced during the trial.
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