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Satya Prakash Gupta & Ors. Petitioners v. New Delhi Municipal Corporation

Delhi High Court
Dec 7, 2016
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners filed the present petition seeking to quash and set aside a sealing order dated 16.05.2016, whereby the respondent, New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC), sealed their shops located in the Connaught Hotel premises on Shaheed Bhagat Singh Marg, New Delhi. The petitioners had sub-licenses for these shops granted by M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd., which held a principal license from NDMC under a License Deed dated 16.07.1982 valid for 99 years from 04.11.1981. The sub-licenses were renewed periodically by M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. until NDMC sealed the shops. The petitioners submitted a memorandum to NDMC requesting fresh license agreements directly with NDMC, which was refused, leading to this petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners, as sub-licensees under M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd., can claim any legal right or relief against the NDMC after the termination of the principal License Deed with M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd.
  2. Whether NDMC is obligated to enter into fresh License Agreements directly with the petitioners despite the absence of privity of contract.
  3. Whether the sealing of the petitioners’ shops by NDMC was lawful in light of the termination of the License Deed with M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. and the terms of the sub-license agreements.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners relied on Clause 34 of the License Deed dated 16.07.1982, which permitted M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. to grant sub-licenses for shops and other facilities.
  • They contended that their sub-licenses were valid and renewed over the years and that the sealing order by NDMC unlawfully ousted them from possession.
  • The petitioners argued that since the License Deed was valid for 99 years, they have a right to continue occupying the shops and sought direct fresh license agreements with NDMC.

Respondent/NDMC's Arguments

  • NDMC submitted that the sub-licenses granted by M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. were subject to the terms of the principal License Deed, which had been terminated due to violations by M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd.
  • NDMC emphasized that M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. failed to vacate the premises despite termination and unsuccessfully challenged the termination up to the Supreme Court.
  • NDMC argued there is no privity of contract between the petitioners and NDMC, thus the petitioners cannot claim relief against NDMC.
  • NDMC highlighted its statutory obligation under Section 141(2) of the NDMC Act to dispose of public property through transparent auction or tender processes, precluding private negotiations as sought by the petitioners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P v. Shiv Charan Sharma, AIR 1981 SC 1722 Public authorities must ensure transparency and avoid private negotiations in disposal of public property. Supported NDMC's position that public property must be disposed of by auction or tender to prevent bias and discrimination.
Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 Reinforces the principle of transparency and fairness in public disposals. Used to underline the statutory mandate of NDMC in disposing public property.
Shri Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCR 223 Emphasizes the need for transparent public procedures in property dealings. Affirmed the requirement for NDMC to avoid private negotiations.
Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P Financial Corp., (1992) 1 SCR 616 Highlights the public interest in transparent property transactions. Supported the court's reasoning regarding statutory obligations of NDMC.
New India Public School v. HUDA, AIR 1996 SC 3458 Stresses the importance of open and fair tendering processes. Used to justify NDMC’s refusal to enter into private license agreements.
Modi Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal Council, AIR 2007 SC 3131 Confirms the principle that public authorities must avoid biased or discriminatory dealings in public property matters. Applied to uphold NDMC's statutory mandate and rejection of petitioners' request.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined Clause 34 of the License Deed and Clause 4 of the Sub-License Agreements, noting that the sub-licenses were expressly subject to the terms of the principal License Deed. Since M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. failed to comply with the License Deed conditions—specifically converting the Youth Hostel premises into a hotel contrary to the deed—and the License Deed was lawfully terminated by NDMC, the petitioners as sub-licensees cannot claim rights superior to those of the Licensee. The court emphasized that the petitioners knowingly entered into sub-license agreements subject to the principal License Deed’s terms, which had been terminated. Furthermore, the court highlighted NDMC’s statutory duty under Section 141(2) of the NDMC Act to dispose of public property through transparent processes like auction or tender, precluding private licensing arrangements. Given these legal and factual circumstances, the court found no basis for the petitioners to claim relief against NDMC and held that their grievance lies against M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd., the original licensee.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the petition in limine as not maintainable, along with the pending application.

The direct consequence of this ruling is that the petitioners cannot claim any right to occupy the shops or compel NDMC to enter into fresh license agreements with them. The court clarified that the petitioners’ proper recourse, if any, is against M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. The decision does not establish any new legal precedent but reaffirms the principles of privity of contract and statutory mandates governing public property disposal.

Show all summary ...

Hima Kohli, J.:— The present petition has been filed by the petitioners praying inter alia for quashing/setting aside a sealing order dated 16.05.2016, whereunder the respondent/NDMC has sealed their shops situated in a premises commonly known as Connaught Hotel situated on Shaheed Bhagat Singh Marg, New Delhi, and for directions to the NDMC to enter into fresh Licence Agreements with them.

2. Mr. Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent/NDMC had granted a license in respect of the subject premises in favour of M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. by virtue of a License Deed dated 16.07.1982, which was valid for a period of 99 years reckoned from 04.11.1981 Under the said Licence Deed, M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. was permitted to create sub-licenses for running car parking, cycle-scooter stand and shops in favour of third parties. The petitioners had entered into individual Sub-Licence Deeds with M/s Prominent Hotels for taking different shops on sub-license, which they have been occupying for several years. The said sub-licenses were renewed by M/s Prominent Hotels from time to time, till the respondent/NDMC sealed them on passing the impugned order dated 16.5.2016

3. The shops of the petitioners were sealed by the respondent/NDMC on 23.05.2016 allegedly, without permitting them to remove their articles. On 16.06.2016, the petitioners had submitted a Memorandum to the NDMC for granting them the status of licencees by directly entering into fresh license agreements with them. However, the respondent/NDMC has refused to consider the said representation. Hence, the present petition.

4. It has been enquired from learned counsel for the petitioners as to how would the present petition lie against the respondent/NDMC when admittedly, in each case, independent Sub-license Agreements were executed by the petitioners with M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. wherein NDMC was not even a party and therefore their grievance, if any, would lie against M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. and not NDMC.

5. Counsel for the petitioners pegs his case on Clause 34 of the License Deed dated 16.07.1982, executed between the respondent/NDMC (Licensor) and M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. (Licensee) to argue that the Licensee was allowed to run the hotel during the period of the license and it was also entitled to grant sub-licenses in respect of car parking, cycle-scooter stand and shops and it was on the strength of the said permission that Sub-licenses Deeds were executed in favour of the petitioners. He submits that the Licence Deed granted by the respondent/NDMC was valid for a period of 99 years reckoned from 04.11.1981 and by passing the peremptory sealing order, the petitioners have been illegally ousted by the respondent/NDMC and not by the Licensee.

6. Per contra, Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned ASG appearing for the respondent/NDMC also places reliance on Clause 34 of the Licence Deed dated 16.7.1982 and refers to Clause 4 of the Sub-License Agreement enclosed with the petition as Annexures P-1 and P-2 to canvass that the sub-licenses executed by the Licensee in favour of the Sub-Licencees like the petitioners herein, were subject to the terms and conditions of the Principal License Deed executed between M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. and the NDMC. He submits that in the present case, it was M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. that had violated the terms and conditions of the License Deed granted in its favour due to which the same was terminated by the respondent/NDMC several years ago. However, the Licencee failed to vacate the premises and instead, assailed the termination order in court. It is an admitted position that the challenge laid by M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. to the said termination order has been rejected right upto the Supreme Court. It is thus stated on behalf of the respondent/NDMC that there is no privity of contract between the petitioners and the respondent/NDMC for them to claim any relief against it.

7. As the entire dispute hinges on the terms of the Licence Deed and the Sub-Licence Deed, it is considered necessary to examine Clause 34 of the License Deed dated 16.07.1982 executed between M/s Prominent Hotel and NDMC, which is as follows:-

“34. The licencees shall run the Youth Hostel themselves.

However, the licencees may allow sub-licencees within the period of licence for running car parking, cycle-scoter stand for parking and shops. The licencees shall be further responsible for the conduct of various sub-licencees and observance of rules and regulations etc. The licencees shall be further responsible to answer that the sub-licencees shall not get any right over and above the rights and privileges of the licencees.”

8. Clause 4 of the Sub-License Agreement dated 01.05.1987 executed between M/s Prominent Hotel and the Licencee of the shop is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-

“4. That the sub Licence hereby granted shall always be subject to and consistent with the terms and conditions of the original Licence Deed dated 16.07.1982 executed between Prominent Hotels and NDMC and such other terms and conditions as may further be agreed by and between the said Prominent Hotels and NDMC.”

9. Clause 34 of the License Deed makes it clear that the subject premises was given to M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. to run a Youth Hostel, which it had admittedly failed to do. Instead, in breach of the terms and conditions of the License Deed, the premises in question was converted by the Licencee into a hotel. Further, the captioned clause permitted the Licensee to grant sub-licenses only within the period of the license. The License Deed itself having been terminated by the respondent/NDMC on account of the Licensee violating the terms and conditions of grant, the petitioners before this Court, who were sub-licensees under M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd., cannot claim a better title than that which was granted in favour of the latter.

10. The aforesaid position clearly emerges on a reading of the last sentence of Clause 34 of the License Deed. In any event, Clause 4 of the Sub-License Agreements executed by M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. in favour of the petitioners makes it perfectly clear that the sub-licenses would be subject to and consistent with the terms and conditions of the original License Deed. The petitioners were conscious of the terms and conditions of the Sub-License Deeds executed in their favour and having executed the same with eyes wide open, they cannot be heard to state now that they have a better right on the shops, superior to that of the Licensee. Since the primary Licensor, i.e, the respondent/NDMC had determined the Licence Deed executed in favour of M/s Prominent Hotel, the petitioners cannot insist that they have a right in law to step into the shoes of the Licencee and call upon the respondent/NDMC to enter into fresh Licence Agreements directly with them.

11. In any event, the respondent/NDMC being a public authority, is under a statutory mandate under section 141(2) of the ndmc act to put a public property to auction or invite tenders for open participation so as to ensure transparency and to get the best possible price. Private negotiations of the nature proposed by the petitioners herein are to be meticulously avoided as it is treated as a breeding ground of bias and discrimination and is also against public interest [Refer: State of U.P v. Shiv Charan Sharma AIR 1981 SC 1722, Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana AIR 1985 SC 1147, Shri Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal (1987) 2 SCR 223, Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P Financial Corp. (1992) 1 SCR 616, New India Public School v. HUDA AIR 1996 SC 3458 and Aggarwal and Modi Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. New Delhi Municipal Council AIR 2007 SC 3131].

12. Given the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to claim any relief against the respondent/NDMC. If aggrieved, it is for them to seek their remedies against M/s Prominent Hotels Ltd. that had executed the Sub-Licence Deeds in their favour, as may be permissible in law. But, the present petition as filed, is not maintainable for the relief claimed.

13. Before disposing of the present petition, it has been enquired from learned counsel for the petitioners if the petitioners are desirous of removing their goods/articles, if any, stated to be lying in the shops that have been sealed. However, counsel for the petitioners states that he does not have any instructions in this regard.

14. In view of the observations made above, the present petition is dismissed in limine, as not maintainable alongwith the pending application.