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RAMTA RAM RAMSNEHI,CHELA BHAGWAT RAM v. STATE & ORS.

Rajasthan High Court
Nov 25, 2016

17/11/2016 By this D.B. special appeal, a challenge is given by the appellant to the judgment dated 29.09.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3996/2004 in which the writ petition stood dismissed. The appellant in the writ petition made the following prayers: Hence, it is prayed that the writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari or any appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned order dated 31.01.2004 (Annexure-11) passed by the learned Additional Collector (Land Acquisition), Chittorgarh may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondent Panchayat be directed to issue sale deed and in the alternative, the revision may be sent to the State Government for hearing and disposal. (3 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] The short point involved in the case was that the petitioner holding a Patta in his favour which was set aside by the learned Additional Collector by order 31.1.2004 passed in revision No. 17/2002 where by the learned Additional Collector allowed the revision petition and ordered the Patta dated 07.10.1998 to be set aside. The thrust of assailing the above order was on the ground that in view of the circular dated 08.09.2003 (Annexure-10), the Collector was not empowered to exercise the powers under Section 97 of the Act. Such powers could not have been exercised as per the directions after 01.02.2002 and the Collector could have only passed order for forwarding the issue to the State Government. The learned Single Bench dealt the matter on its merits referring to Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, which was referred as Rules. The procedure from Rule 140 to

168 was discussed and it was concluded on merits that any interference in the order would result into revival of any illegal sale/Patta. The learned counsel for the appellant harped upon the revisionary order passed by the learned Additional Collector to be devoid of jurisdiction. The counsel for the respondent however emphasised upon the fact that vide notification dated 13.12.2004 while exercising the powers envisaged (4 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act 1994, Section 98, the powers under Section 97 which stood taken away have been restored with effect from February 2002 as were originally existing on 3.12.1996 to the Collector. Hearing both the parties and looking at the record of the case, we are satisfied upon the merit of the Patta issued as expressed by the learned Single Bench. As far as proposition of the order passed by the learned Collector being without jurisdiction, it is a settled proposition that once such jurisdiction has been restored retrospectively then any order exercising such jurisdiction shall be clearly sustainable in Eye of Law. In the matter of High Court of Delhi & Anr. vs. A.K. Mahajan & Ors. Reported 2009 volume 12, page- 62, the Honble Apex Court laid-down the following propositions:

38. In the present case, the amendment was necessitated on account of the statistics of promotions to the three categories, where the Private Secretaries had almost monopolized the same. Therefore, there was nothing wrong with the amendments. This Court in S.B. Mathur case had also not given any mandamus that the promotions would only be in the light of the existing Rules and in no other. The Court had simply approved of the Rules, as they then stood, providing for the equal status of the three categories and the combined seniority list for them. This did not mean that this Court directed that there could be no change in the modality or that there could be no three separate seniority lists from the three categories. In our opinion, the judgment in S.B. Mathur (5 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] case is completely misunderstood by the High Court.

39. Further, if this was the situation found by the High Court that the Rule could not be changed by amendment, the High Court could have and should have found fault with the whole amendment, not only the retrospectivity aspect thereof. But that has not happened. The High Court has not invalidated the amendments, creating three seniority lists for the three categories and introducing the principle of rotational promotion. It has only found fault with the retrospectivity.

40. We have already pointed out that the retrospective effect given to the amendments was after consideration of material statistics. Further, the date fixed was also relevant, as it was immediately after the last promotion was effected. We, therefore, find no fault with the retrospective aspect and in our opinion, the High Court has wrongly found fault with the retrospective aspect on the incorrect logic that the amendments affected any absolute vested or accrued rights of being considered. There is no such absolute accrued or vested right of consideration, which could not be affected by the retrospective amendments. The only condition is that such retrospective amendments should be constitutionally valid.

41. In the decision in N.T. Devin Katti and & Ors. Vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission the court was considering the right of the candidates to be considered. The question in that case was that as to which Rules were applicable, particularly, when there were amendments in the Rules after the advertisement was issued. The Court clearly held that under such circumstances, normally the existing Rules on the date of advertisement would be applicable, however, if there is an amendment in the Rule with retrospective effect, then it would be the amended Rules, which would be applicable. The Court observed that it was on the date of the (6 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] advertisement that the right of the candidate crystallizes. However, the Court observed that he had no absolute right in the matter.

42. The Court further observed:(N.T. Devin case, SCC p. 165, para 11) "11............If the Recruitment Rules are amended retrospectively during the pendency of selection, in that event selection must be held in accordance with the amended Rules." The Court also observed that:(N.T. Devin case, SCC p. 165, para 11) "11.a candidate, on making application for a post pursuant to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right of selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant rules and the terms contained in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right of being considered for selection in accordance with the rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended rules are retrospective in nature." (Emphasis supplied).

43. This judgment in N.T. Devin Katti case was relied upon further in case of Marripati Nagaraja Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh. This Court observed:(Marripati Nagarja case, SCC pp. 526-27, para 16) 16."The State, in exercise of its power conferred upon it under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution is entitled to make rules with retrospective effect and retroactive operation. Ordinarily, in the absence of any rule and that too a rule which was expressly given a retrospective effect, the rules prevailing as on the date of the notification are to be applied. But, if (7 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] some rule has been given a retrospective effect which is within the domain of the State, unless the same is set aside as being unconstitutional, the consequences flowing therefrom shall ensue. In such an event, the applicable rule would not be the rule which was existing, but the one which had been validly brought on the statute book from an anterior date."

44. In Virender Singh Hooda Vs. State of Haryana, in paragraph 45, this Court recognized the power and competence of the Legislature to make a valid law and make it retrospectively, so as to bind even past transactions. In paras 67 and 68, the Court explained the aspect of retrospectivity and came to the conclusion that there was nothing wrong if the Legislature had removed the basis of the decision of this Court by repealing the circulars. It further observed that:(SCC p. 620, para 67) "............the candidates have the right to the posts that are advertised and not the ones which arise later for which a separate advertisement is issued. A valid law, retrospective or prospective, enacted by the legislature cannot be declared ultra vires on the ground that it would nullify the benefit which otherwise would have been available as a result of applicability and interpretation placed by a superior Court. The decision in the case of Chairman, Railway Board (cited supra) was specifically considered in para 70 of the judgment. The Court reiterated the observation made in that case that a Rule, which seeks to reverse from an anterior date a benefit which has been granted or availed of e.g. promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it operates retrospectively. We have already (8 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] pointed out that it is only to this extent that the retrospectivity can be challenged. However, for that there has to be a tangible benefit awarded like promotion or pay-scale or a rate of pension. Such is not the state of affairs in the present case. The Court also made reference to the decision in State of J&K Vs. Triloki Nath Khosa reported in 1974(1) SCC 19, wherein it was held that impugned Rules did not recall a promotion already made or reduce a pay-scale already granted.

45. In short, law regarding the retrospectivity or retroactive operation regarding the Rules of selection is that where such amended Rules affect the benefit already given, then alone such Rules would not be permissible to the extent of retrospectivity.

46. We are unable to agree with the judgment of the High Court and would choose to set aside the same. It is accordingly set aside. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions filed before the High Court are also dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no orders as to the costs. In another case, namely Chairman Railway Board vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors. cited in volume-6 of page-623, the Honble Apex Court laid-down the following law:

18. This means that even though the President in exercise of his power under the Proviso to Article 309, can make rules which may have prospec-tive or retrospective operation, the said rules may be open to challenge on the ground of violation of the provisions of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution. (9 of 13) [SAW-170/2005]

19. In Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors. (supra) rules had been framed altering the criterion of eligibility for promotion from the post of Assistant Engineer to the post of Executive Engineer and the same were challenged on the ground of retrospectivity by the Assistant Engineers who were in service on the date of making of these rules. Rejecting the said contention, this Court said :(SCC pp.28-29, para 16) "16.It is wrong to characterise the operation of a service rule as retrospective for the reason that it applies to existing employees. A rule which classifies such employees for promotional purposes, undoubtedly operates on those who entered service before the framing of the rule but it operates in futuro, in the sense that it governs the future right of promotion of those who are already in service. The judgment rules do not recall a promotion already made or reduce a pay scale already granted. They provide for a classification by prescribing a qualitative standard, the measure of that standard being educational attainment. Whether a classifica-tion founded on such a consideration suffers from a discriminatory vice is another matter which we will presently consider but surely, the rule cannot first be assumed to be retrospective and then be struck down for the reason that it violates the guarantee of equal opportunity by extending its arms over the past. If rules governing conditions of service cannot ever operate to the prejudice of those who are already in service, the age of superannuation should have remained immutable and schemes of compulsory retirement in public interest ought to have foundered on the rock of retrospec-tivity. But such is not the implication of service rules nor is it their true description to say that because they affect existing employees they are retrospective. (10 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] 20.It can, therefore, be said that a rule which operates in futuro so as to govern future rights of those already in service cannot be assailed on the ground of retrospectivity as being violative of Articles

14 and 16 of the Constitution, but a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date a benefit which has been granted or availed, e.g., promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it operates retrospectively.

21. In B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana, a Constitution Bench of this Court, while holding that the power exercised by the Governor under the Proviso to Article

309 partakes the characteristics of the legislative, not executive, power and it is open to him to give retrospective operation to the rules made under that provision, has said that when the retrospective effect extends over a long period, the date from which the rules are made to operate must be shown to bear, either from the face of the rules or by extrinsic evidence, reasonable nexus with the provisions contained in the rules. (SCR p. 1068:SCC p. 557, para 76)

22. In State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal, decided by a Constitution Bench of the Court, the question was whether the status of ex- ministerial employees who had been allocated to the Panchayat service as Secretaries, Officers and Servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats under the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961 as government servants could be extinguished by making retrospective amendment of the said Act in 1978. Striking down the said amendment on the ground that it offended Articles 311 and 14 of the Constitution, this Court said :(SCC p.62, para 52) 52.The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective (11 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] effect to take away or impair any vested right ac-quired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do's and don'ts of the Constitution neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, twenty years ago the parties had no rights, there-fore, the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by twenty years. We are concerned with today's rights and not yesterday's. The legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained twenty years ago and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the twenty years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history.

23. The said decision in Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni of the Constitution Bench of this Court has been followed by various Division Benches of this Court. (See : Ex. Capt. K.C. Arora & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1984] 3 SCR 623; T.R. Kapur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1987] 1 SCR 584; P.D. Aggarwal & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 427; K.R. Narayanan & Ors. v. State of Kamataka & Ors., [1994] Supp. 1 SCC 44; Union of India & Ors. v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty & Ors., [1994] 5 SCC 450 and K. Ravindranath Pai & Anr. v. State of Kamataka

24. In many of these decisions the expressions "vested rights" or "accrued rights" have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive (12 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] appointment, etc. of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon (supra), B.S. Yadav (supra) and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni.

25. In these cases we are concerned with the pension payable to the employees after their retirement. The respondents were no longer in service on the date of issuance of the impugned notifications. The amendments in the rules are not restricted in their application in futuro. The amendments apply to employees who had already retired and were no longer in service on the date the impugned notifications were issued. In this case the powers of Section 97 were already in existence from 1996 the vide standing order No. 343 of dated 3.12.1996, it was merely suppressed/withheld vide order dated 1.02.2002 reported by order dated 8.09.2003. It is pertinent to mention here that the powers were restored as on 3.12.1996 wide order dated 13.12.2004 and thus the retrospective effect of the order dated 13.12.2004 (13 of 13) [SAW-170/2005] with effect from 1.02.2002 is a mere ratification of the powers under section 97 earlier conferred by notification dated 3.12.1996. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the order does not suffer from any error that may warrant interference in the appellant jurisdiction. The appeal as such having no merit, hence dismissed. (DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)J. (GOVIND MATHUR)J. CK Mishra